Comment définir la déroutante pensée de Bonaventure ? Étienne Gilson y voyait à l’œuvre une « logique de l’analogie », tandis que Hans Urs von Balthasar la présentait comme une « monadologie sans harmonie préétablie ». Dans les deux cas, c’est l’expressionnisme du Docteur séraphique qui se trouve mis en valeur : les créatures représentent leur Créateur par tout leur être, et le Créateur lui-même exprime ses créatures. Toutefois, cet expressionnisme universel et divin n’est que la face visible d’une structure dynamique et tripartite plus vaste que l’on peut appeler, en s’appuyant sur d’importantes déclarations de Bonaventure, la logique de la ressemblance. S’émancipant des restrictions et des interdits dionysiens et augustiniens, Bonaventure a étendu le champ sémantique et conceptuel de similitudo en réunissant sous ce vocable toutes les entités « mineures », c’est-à-dire tous les êtres dépendant radicalement d’une origine qu’ils expriment et vers laquelle ils reconduisent ou sont reconduits : le Fils, les créatures images, les créatures vestiges, les espèces sensibles, etc. Dans ce dispositif dont l’homme et le Christ occupent le centre, c’est la réconciliation du ciel et de la terre, de Dieu et du monde, de la théologie et de la métaphysique, que Bonaventure donne à voir. / Bonaventure’s puzzling thought seems to challenge any attempt to define it. Étienne Gilson saw it as a « logic of analogy », while Hans Urs von Balthasar summed it up as a « monadology without preestablished harmony ». Both of them thus emphasize the seraphic Doctor’s expressionism : each creature represents its Creator through its whole being, and the Creator himself expresses his creatures. However, this universal and divine expressionism is but the visible side of a dynamic and threefold structure that we suggest to call, according to several Bonaventure’s important texts, the logic of resemblance. Liberating himself from Dionysian and Augustinian restrictions and proscriptions, Bonaventure broadened the semantic and conceptual field of similitudo by gathering in this noun all « minor » entities, i.e. all beings that completely depend on an origin that they express and towards which they lead or are led back : these are the Son, the image creatures, the vestige creatures, the sensible likenesses (species), etc. Throughout this device, whose center is occupied by the human being and Christ, Bonaventure makes us see the reconciliation of heaven with earth, of the world with God, of theology with metaphysics.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / O presente trabalho se propÃe a apresentar o itinerÃrio filosÃfico seguido por Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) destacando o quanto sua âgnoseologiaâ pretende superar a lÃgica dedutiva e sistemÃtica das ciÃncias e alcanÃar a lÃgica fragmentÃria da realidade atual sem encobrir todos os elementos que a constituem. O pensador lanÃa na introduÃÃo crÃtica-epistemolÃgica de sua obra Origem do Drama Barroco AlemÃo e em sua Passagens conceitos como os de alegoria, monadologia, montagem, apresentaÃÃo, dentre outros, em uma perspectiva filosÃfica que de forma inovadora e original tenta ressaltar a necessidade de levantarmos questÃes referentes ao primado do fragmentÃrio sobre o sistemÃtico no Ãmbito dos mÃtodos e das teorias filosÃficas de nosso tempo. Ressaltando as particularidades de tal proposta epistemolÃgica, e como esta se aplica no todo de sua filosofia apresentaremos o quanto sua crÃtica se direciona para o positivismo, o historicismo, e principalmente Ãs concepÃÃes filosÃficas oriundas do idealismo absoluto. Contra tal perspectiva o pensador aplica a lÃgica do fragmento, da descontinuidade, na construÃÃo de suas Teses sobre o conceito de histÃria destacando o quanto à emergente a necessidade de se fundar uma filosofia contrÃria ao procedimento lÃgico-dedutivo e matemÃtico por estes se realizarem de forma resumida e didÃtica, deixando de lado o problema da expressÃo do singular. Por fim, o presente trabalho pretende demonstrar o quanto o mÃtodo filosÃfico de Benjamin se baseia em uma apresentaÃÃo contemplativa da verdade posta a partir de uma configuraÃÃo descontÃnua e intencional na qual os fenÃmenos sÃo salvos sem perderem sua particularidade. / This paper aims to present the philosophical itinerary followed by Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) highlighting how their "gnoseology" aims to overcome the systematic deductive logic and science and achieve fragmentary logic of current reality without cover all elements that form. The Thinker launches in the introduction-epistemological critique of his work Origin of German Baroque Drama and its Cheap concepts like allegory, monadology, assembly, presentation, among others, in a philosophical perspective that in an innovative and original attempts to highlight the need for we raise questions regarding the primacy of fragmentary on systematic within the methods and philosophical theories of our time. Emphasizing the particularities of such epistemological proposal, and how it applies in all of his philosophy present how his criticism is directed to the positivism, historicism, and especially the philosophical conceptions derived from the absolute idealism. Against such a perspective thinker applies the logic of the fragment, the discontinuity in the construction of his Theses on the Philosophy of History is emerging as highlighting the need to establish a philosophy contrary to procedure and logical-deductive mathematical for these are held in a summarized and didactic, leaving aside the problem of singular expression. Finally, the present work aims to demonstrate how the philosophical method Benjamin is based on a presentation called contemplative truth from a discontinuous and intentional setting in which phenomena are saved without losing their distinctiveness.

1734 var Emanuel Swedenborg en hårt arbetande, rationalistisk vetenskapsman i tidens anda. Detta år utgav han ett av sina mest ambitiösa vetenskapliga och naturfilosofiska verk, Principia Rerum Naturalium. Han försökte här skapa en cosmologia generalis – enallomfattande kosmologisk beskrivning från elementarpartiklarnas uppkomst och konstruktionupp till stjärnornas och planeternas formande. Denna uppsats utreder den ontologiska grundenför Swedenborgs naturfilosofi och lyfter fram tidigare ofta förbisedda aspekter, som hansspekulationer om multiversum. Swedenborgs kosmologi visar sig vara starkt påverkad av ennaturfilosofisk tradition från Gottfried Leibniz.

Notre travail vise à étudier les Max-Phil, textes inédits de Kurt Gödel, dans lesquels il développe sa pensée philosophique. Nous nous intéressons plus spécifiquement à la question du réalisme conceptuel, position déjà défendue dans ses écrits publiés selon laquelle les concepts existent indépendamment de nos définitions et constructions. L’objectif est de montrer qu’une interprétation cohérente de ces textes encore peu connus est possible. Pour ce faire, nous proposons une interprétation de certains passages, interprétation hypothétique mais susceptible d’apporter de nouveaux éléments à des questions laissées sans réponse par les textes publiés, telles celles relatives au réalisme conceptuel. Cette dernière position ne peut être comprise que par un éclairage de la notion de concept chez Gödel. Les concepts sont des entités logiques objectives, au cœur du projet d’une théorie des concepts conçue comme une logique intentionnelle et inspirée de la scientia generalis de Leibniz. L’analyse des Max-Phil souligne que la notion de concept et la primauté du réalisme conceptuel sur le réalisme mathématique ne peuvent se comprendre qu’à la lumière du cadre métaphysique que se donne Gödel, à savoir d’une monadologie d’inspiration leibnizienne. Les Max-Phil offrent ainsi des indices sur la façon dont Gödel reprend et modifie la monadologie de Leibniz, afin, notamment, d’y inscrire les concepts. L’examen de ce cadre métaphysique tend également à éclaircir les rapports entre les concepts objectifs, les concepts subjectifs (tels que nous les connaissons), et les symboles (par lesquels nous exprimons les concepts), mais aussi les rapports entre logique et mathématiques. / Our work aims at studying the unpublished texts of Kurt Gödel, known as the Max-Phil, in which the author develops his philosophical thought. This study follows the specific issue of conceptual realism which is adopted by Gödel in his published texts (during his lifetime or posthumously), and according to which concepts are independent of our definitions and constructions. We want to show that a consistent interpretation of the Max-Phil is possible. To do so, we propose an interpretation of some excerpts, which, even if it is only hypothetical, can give new elements in order to answer open questions of the published texts, e.g. questions about conceptual realism. This last position is not understandable without explaining Gödel’s notion of concept. For him, concepts are logical and objective entities, and they are at the core of a theory of concepts, which is conceived as an intensional logic, following Leibniz’s scientia generalis. The analysis of the Max-Phil underlines that we can understand the notion of concept and the primacy of conceptual realism over mathematical realism only in the light of Gödel’s metaphysical frame, i.e. of a monadology inspired by Leibniz. Thus the Max-Phil shows how Gödel reinvestigates Leibnizian monadology, and offers some clues on the modifications he makes on it in order to include concepts. The examination of this metaphysical frame tends to elucidate the relationships between objective concepts, subjective concepts (as we know them) and symbols (through which we express concepts), and also the relationship between logic and mathematics.