Bonaventure et la lumière : la question semble au premier abord et pour la plupart des médiévistes résolue. Pourtant, la genèse de sa définition de la lumière (II Sent., d. XIII) – notamment la manière dont les idées de Robert Grosseteste lui parviennent – reste encore à déterminer. L’idée d’un usage métaphorique et analogique de la lumière et de sa dimension épistémique permet de mieux évaluer la théorie de la connaissance comme lumière, c’est-à-dire son amplitude réelle souvent réduite à l’illumination divine de l’homme tant intellectuelle que morale. Cette connaissance de la lumière permettant de considérer la connaissance comme lumière par le truchement de la métaphore et de l’analogie donc toute une épistémologie par la lumière se vérifie dans la cosmologie et dans la théorie de la beauté du frère mineur où la lumière joue bien un rôle principiel et paradigmatique. Enfin, que toutes ces implications philosophiques et théologiques de la lumière soient récapitulées dans le Christ compris selon les Écritures, comme splendor, sol iustitiae, lux mundi, compréhension nettement inspirée de la lecture du quatrième évangile et du Livre de la Sagesse par Bonaventure, bachelier biblique, demande encore à être élucidé. C’est en cherchant tant du côté des études à la Faculté des arts de Paris de 1235-1243 que du côté des écrits de Bonaventure, bachelier biblique puis sententiaire, que la question de la lumière dans son œuvre peut être interprétée. Nous proposons donc dans cet ouvrage d’ouvrir quelques pistes de compréhension de la via lucis bonaventurienne. / Bonaventure and light: the issue seems at first and for most medievalists resolved.Yet the establishment of the genesis of his definition of light (II Sent., d. XIII) — and in particular the way in which Robert Grosseteste's ideas reach him — is still to be determined. The idea of a metaphorical and analogical use of light and its epistemic dimension makes it possible to evaluate better the theory of knowledge as light, that is, its actual amplitude, often reduced to the divine enlightenment of Man, both intellectual and moral. This knowledge of light, which makes it possible to consider knowledge as light through metaphor and analogy, and thus a whole epistemology by light, is verified in the cosmology and in the theory of beauty of the Friar Minor in which light plays indeed a principle-like and paradigmatic role. Finally, that all these philosophical and theological implications of light are recapitulated in Christ understood according to the Scriptures as splendor, sol iustitiae, lux mundi, an understanding clearly inspired by the reading of the fourth Gospel and the Book of Wisdom by Bonaventure, bachelor of the Bible, still needs to be elucidated. It is by seeking as much on the side of studies at the Faculty of Arts of Paris from 1235 to 1243 that on the writings of Bonaventure, as baccalaureus biblicus and then baccalaureus sententiarus, that the question of light in his work can be interpreted. We therefore propose in this book to open some avenues of understanding of the bonaventurian via lucis.

No description available.

The problem which spurred this thesis has three components. First, there are entities which we may call stuff – alluded to by uncountable nouns; these entities seem to have a duality for behaving like both (i) an object or a discrete middle size substance – which are supposed to be non-repetitive and independent, and as well as (ii) a concept or a universal – which are repetitive but dependent (on some independent substances). Second, a dichotomy persists between the two aspects of the duality: what is non-repeatable cannot be repeatable and, conversely what is repeatable cannot be non-repeatable. Third, there is a background of how we conventionally do logic, and our present trend of doing – or rather, doing away with – metaphysics. The thesis then came up with four chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the question – how can, or how do we deal with stuff predication following the conventional guidelines? – where by stuff predication I mean any predication involving stuff. I also tried there to find out some clues from Frege’s works. Chapter 2 dives into some related issues pertaining to language, grammar and the notion of constitution. Chapter 3 examines critically two types of theories or views (one of them has been recently championed by Michael Dummett and P.F. Strawson; the other by David Armstrong) arguing how repetitive entities differ from the non-repetitive ones. My counter argument is that those arguments are either fallacious or not even complete. Chapter 4 takes an Aristotelian perspective following the lead of E.J. Lowe. The thesis has a pessimistic tone at the end: the conventional method is quite inadequate as it misses some subtleties pertaining to stuff, nor could Lowe’s Aristotle take us too far. Nevertheless, one cannot – I hope – miss some deeper insights glimpsing into this work. Particularly, Chapter 3 opens up some new venues to think about: our thoughts about our own arguments and proofs may need some revamping.

Comment définir la déroutante pensée de Bonaventure ? Étienne Gilson y voyait à l’œuvre une « logique de l’analogie », tandis que Hans Urs von Balthasar la présentait comme une « monadologie sans harmonie préétablie ». Dans les deux cas, c’est l’expressionnisme du Docteur séraphique qui se trouve mis en valeur : les créatures représentent leur Créateur par tout leur être, et le Créateur lui-même exprime ses créatures. Toutefois, cet expressionnisme universel et divin n’est que la face visible d’une structure dynamique et tripartite plus vaste que l’on peut appeler, en s’appuyant sur d’importantes déclarations de Bonaventure, la logique de la ressemblance. S’émancipant des restrictions et des interdits dionysiens et augustiniens, Bonaventure a étendu le champ sémantique et conceptuel de similitudo en réunissant sous ce vocable toutes les entités « mineures », c’est-à-dire tous les êtres dépendant radicalement d’une origine qu’ils expriment et vers laquelle ils reconduisent ou sont reconduits : le Fils, les créatures images, les créatures vestiges, les espèces sensibles, etc. Dans ce dispositif dont l’homme et le Christ occupent le centre, c’est la réconciliation du ciel et de la terre, de Dieu et du monde, de la théologie et de la métaphysique, que Bonaventure donne à voir. / Bonaventure’s puzzling thought seems to challenge any attempt to define it. Étienne Gilson saw it as a « logic of analogy », while Hans Urs von Balthasar summed it up as a « monadology without preestablished harmony ». Both of them thus emphasize the seraphic Doctor’s expressionism : each creature represents its Creator through its whole being, and the Creator himself expresses his creatures. However, this universal and divine expressionism is but the visible side of a dynamic and threefold structure that we suggest to call, according to several Bonaventure’s important texts, the logic of resemblance. Liberating himself from Dionysian and Augustinian restrictions and proscriptions, Bonaventure broadened the semantic and conceptual field of similitudo by gathering in this noun all « minor » entities, i.e. all beings that completely depend on an origin that they express and towards which they lead or are led back : these are the Son, the image creatures, the vestige creatures, the sensible likenesses (species), etc. Throughout this device, whose center is occupied by the human being and Christ, Bonaventure makes us see the reconciliation of heaven with earth, of the world with God, of theology with metaphysics.