This master’s thesis analyzes whether at all and at what level the Czech republic and Sweden meet the Maastricht criteria, because this is a necessary condition for adopting the single currency euro. The theoretical part of this thesis will be focused at theoretical basis, which means the European Union and its history, monetary union and individual convergence criteria. Analysis of actual situation of meeting the Maastricht criteria and evaluation the harmonization of national economic in the Czech republic and in Sweden will be realized in analytical part of this thesis.

This master’s thesis evaluates whether at all and at what level the Czech republic and Sweden meet the Maastricht criteria, because this is a necessary condition for adopting the single currency euro. The theoretical part of this thesis will be focused at theoretical basis, which means the European Union and its history, monetary union and individual convergence criteria. Analysis of actual situation of meeting the Maastricht criteria and analysis of preparedness medium and large business to adopt the single currency of the euro will be realized in next part of this thesis.

Diplomová práce se zabývá problematikou měnové politiky v Evropské unii, respektive v Evropské měnové unii. Samotnému vzniku Evropské měnové unie předcházelo dlouhé období integračních procesů a je spojováno se dvěma mezníky. Prvním mezníkem byl vznik Evropské centrální banky, která představuje jednu z nejdůležitějších institucí a je zodpovědná za provádění jednotné měnové politiky v eurozóně. Druhým důležitým momentem bylo zavedení společné evropské měny, eura. Navzdory podstatným obchodním výhodám spojených s přijetím eura se brzy ukázalo, že jednotná měnová politika nemusí vyhovovat všem zemím kvůli jejich odlišným ekonomickým potřebám a schopnostem, které vyžadují různou měnovou politiku. Tato práce se soustředí na současnou ekonomickou situaci v eurozóně se zvláštním důrazem na otázku dluhové krize.

Ziel des Artikels ist, die Entwicklung der Eurokrise im Spannungsfeld von Institutionen und Handeln zu erklären. Dazu rekonstruieren wir im ersten Schritt die Krise in zwei Perspektiven, zum einen als Verkettung ökonomischer und politischer Funktionszusammenhänge, zum anderen als Arena von Verteilungskonflikten. Darauf aufbauend analysieren wir den Verlauf der Eurokrise, den wir in fünf Phasen unterteilen. Im Zentrum stehen dabei folgende Fragen: 1. Welche Akteure werden jeweils in die Problemkonstellation „Eurokrise“ hineingezogen? 2. Welche Relevanz haben die unterschiedlichen Akteure für das Funktionieren der gemeinsamen Währung und wie setzen sie diese Relevanz in den Verteilungskonflikten, die sich aus der Eurokrise ergeben, ein? Es geht also um die Entwicklung der Akteurskonstellation im Zuge der Eurokrise und um die Funktionsrelevanz dieser Akteure als Handlungsressource in den Konflikten um die Verteilung der Kosten der Krise. Im dritten Schritt der Untersuchung fassen wir unsere empirische Rekonstruktion der Eurokrise zusammen. Unser Fazit ist, dass die Eurokrise die defizitäre Institutionalisierung der gemeinsamen Währung manifest macht. Weiter gehende Regulierung, also zusätzliche Institutionenbildung steht aber vor dem schwierig auflösbaren Widerspruch zwischen funktionalen Erfordernissen und Interessen, bzw. zwischen Erwartungsstabilisierung und Interessenverfolgung.:Krise?; Ein institutionen- und handlungstheoretischer Rahmen; Folgen der Finanzkrise für die Eurozone; Konsequenz: Ergänzung der defizitären Institutionalisierung

Bibliografický záznam VLACH, Michael. Evropské ekonomické vládnutí - možnost nebo nutnost? Praha, 2011. 95 s. Diplomová práce (Mgr.) Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut mezinárodních studií. Katedra západoevropských studií. Vedoucí diplomové práce Prof. Ing. Luděk Urban, CSC., Jean Monnet Professor Abstract Diploma Thesis "European Economic Governance - an option or the necessity?" deals with the current debate on the reform of European economic governance (EEG). It focuses on the genesis of the pre-crisis European economic governance, primarily on the Economic and Monetary Union, and on the performance of the EMU and the features of EEG before and during the crisis. It investigates the issues and challenges that arisen largely from the aftermath of the crisis such as imbalances on the Internal Market due to serious competitiveness issues between the Member States, lack of crisis management, financial supervision etc. The common cause of these problems, the insufficient economic governance is identified having source largely in the original design of EMU which was adopted largely for economic reasons but contemporary political limits restrained the Economic union and macroeconomic coordination provisions thus enabling the current situation. In the final part the proposed and implemented...

En 1969, dans une Communauté économique européenne (CEE) aux fondements déjà bien établis, et sous l’égide d’un néogaullisme assumé par la présidence de Georges Pompidou, l’Allemagne devient le modèle d’une France en quête de politique industrielle qui lui permettrait d’affirmer son rang sur l’échiquier international. Depuis le milieu des années 1960, le système monétaire international est fragilisé par l’endettement considérable des États-Unis. La France veut être à l’initiative d’une relance de l’Union économique et monétaire (UEM). Cette décision politique doit lui permettre d’adapter son économie et son industrie à l’instabilité grandissante du Système monétaire international. Comme le rappelait Jacques Rueff, « L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas ». L’action de l’économie française durant cette période qui court de la relance de l’Union économique et monétaire (décembre 1969) à la rédaction du Traité de Maastricht (février 1992), jalonnée par la mise en place du Système monétaire européen (SME : janvier 1979) et de l’Acte unique (janvier 1986), repose sur une volonté politique primordiale au service des relations avec la RFA, puis de l’Allemagne réunifiée. Les relations monétaires franco-allemandes ont pour but de promouvoir une Europe forte, maîtresse de son destin, et, d’une certaine façon, de revenir à une stabilité des changes. Le mythe de la stabilité de « l’étalon-or » a des acceptations différentes des deux côtés du Rhin. Si des études historiques récentes ont été consacrées partiellement aux conséquences de l’évolution des politiques monétaires européennes (et surtout françaises) sur l’intégration économique et monétaire dans la CEE, elles demeurent souvent centrées sur le septennat de VGE ou le début du premier mandat de François Mitterrand. La genèse de l’UEM est un processus dynamique long qui court de décembre 1969 à février 1992. En fait, les relations monétaires franco-allemandes englobent deux niveaux de décisions et d’applications. En premier lieu, sont à mentionner, les plus hautes instances politiques (présidence, chancellerie et ministères, mais aussi Commission européenne). En second lieu, interviennent les banques centrales dont le rôle quant à la mise en place et l’application des politiques monétaires est primordial. Cette dichotomie illustre l’avènement progressif du primat de l’économie sur la politique, perçu et analysé différemment en France et en Allemagne. Les attentes et les objectifs politiques et économiques divergent. Nous montrons dans cette étude que le processus d’UEM apparaît souvent comme un engrenage économique, où la politique cède le pas à l’économie. Les relations monétaires apparaissent asymétriques. Le pouvoir politique français a comme véritable interlocuteur le pouvoir économique allemand, représenté par la Bundesbank. Le « couple » franco-allemand est un mythe politique, français, que brise la libéralisation économique mondiale. L’UEM est, pour l’Allemagne, un moyen d’établir une Allemagne européenne au sein d’une Europe fédérale. En France, elle apparaît pour les gouvernements néo-gaullistes et libéraux comme un moyen de compenser une grandeur blessée, alors que les gouvernements socialistes donnent l’impression de l’utiliser pour compenser une idéologie en déroute. L’UEM parvient à la stabilité monétaire, mais en refusant l’Union politique européenne, proposée par l’Allemagne, la France laisse s’éloigner le rêve d’une Europe puissance et établit les bases une Europe allemande. / In 1969, in a well-established European Economic Community (EEC) under the neo-Gaullist presidency of Georges Pompidou, Germany stood as a model for France, looking for an effective industrial policy and a recovery of its rank on the international scene. Since the mid 1960s the international monetary system had been weakened by the growing US debt. France wanted to be the leader of the economic and monetary union (EMU). This political decision was a means to improve its economy confronted with the instability of the international monetary system. As pointed out by Jacques Rueff, « L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas. » During this period, from the relaunch of the EMU (December 1969) to the Maastricht Treaty (February 1992), French economic action was based on a strong political will defined to reinforce the relationships with the Federal German Republic, and then the reunified Germany. The Franco-German monetary relationships aimed to promote a strong and independent Europe and to restore an exchange rate stability. The “golden standard” stability myth was viewed and understood differently in France and Germany. If recent historical studies have been partially devoted to the consequences of European monetary policies (essentially in France) on economic and monetary integration in the EEC, they focused on the 1974-1981 or 1981-1986 periods. The creation of the EMU was a dynamic process running from December 1969 to February 1992. Franco-German monetary relationships included two levels of decision-making. First, on the political level, there was the presidency, the chancellery, the European Commission and the ministers. Second, its counterpart, economic power. The latter requires analysis of the role played by central banks in the definition and application of monetary policies. This dichotomy illustrates the progressive transition between the political level and the economic level during the 1980s. The decline of politics and the primacy of economics were analyzed differently in France and Germany. Political and economic objectives and expectations were contrasted and divergent. This study demonstrates that the EMU dynamic was an economic process where politics gave way to economics. Monetary relations were asymmetric. The real interlocutor of French political authorities was German economic power, represented by the Bundesbank. The Franco-German tandem was a political myth broken by world economy liberalization. For Germany, the EMU was a device to define a European Germany in a federal Europe. In France, it represented an illusory means to restore French primacy for conservative and liberal governments and a way of compensating a failing ideology for socialist governments. The EMU provided monetary stability, but the dream of a powerful and independent Europe vanished with the Maastricht treaty. Even as it rejected the idea of European political union defended by the German diplomacy, France paradoxically laid the foundations of a German Europe.

This study sought to establish the critical underpinnings for the organisational effectiveness of regional integration institutions (RIIs). The interest arose out of a general observation of failure by RIIs in Africa to effectively achieve the objectives for which they were established. Informed by theories of organisational effectiveness, the study hypothesised that RIIs are likely to be effective in achieving the objectives for which they were established if the basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory are embedded in their institutional structures, systems and processes. The East African Community (EAC) was used as a unit of analysis. A comparative analysis of the world's most advanced RII, the European Union (EU) was also undertaken. The findings revealed that the basic fundamentals of organisational effectiveness theory are only weakly ingrained in the EAC while deeply embedded in the EU. Recommendations were made on how the EAC could improve its organisational effectiveness. / PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION / MA (PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION)

Motivation of virtually all regional economic integration (REI) initiatives has been prospect of enhanced economic growth. Although REI's role in contributing to growth and development was recognised and acknowledged, its importance in Africa has never been properly outlined. Theoretical background, economic assumptions and evidence of REI are examined to bring out REI's importance to Africa. Depicting from these, benefits and challenges of REI in Africa are explored. This dissertation analyses the progress, pace, approach, sequence of REI in Africa looking at different variables. Africa's regional integration blueprint and institutional framework are compared to EU's but selected areas are identified as essential for Africa. Progress on REI has been found to be slow. This study concludes that REI should be viewed as one aspect of strategy towards Africa's development and growth. However, the benefits of REI make it imperative for it to remain the central pillar of Africa's development agenda. / Economics / M.Com. (Economics)

This thesis analyses whether the concept of monetary sovereignty evolves under the impact of globalization and financial integration, and provides a framework for assessing what this implies. Thereby, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of both the contemporary exercise of sovereign powers in monetary and financial matters and of the driving forces behind the evolution of international law in this field. As elaborated in chapter 1, the contemporary concept of monetary sovereignty proposed by this thesis is not static but dynamic in nature. Due to the dual nature of sovereignty as a concept having not only positive but also important normative components, monetary sovereignty cannot become eroded under the impact of legal and economic constraints. Chapter 2 examines the ongoing hybridization of international monetary law arising from changes in the sources of this complex body of law, from the unsuitability of the categories of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law for characterizing all normative evolutions in this field, and from the rise of private and transnational monetary law. Chapter 3 scrutinizes the phenomenon of exchange rate misalignment under monetary and trade law. Intrinsically related, it assesses which aspects of the IMF’s legal framework should be reformed in order to tackle contemporary challenges to the stability of the international monetary system, such as global current account imbalances. Chapter 4 analyses the increasing regionalization of monetary sovereignty. It argues that, to the extent that transferring sovereign powers to a monetary union is what provides a state’s population with maximum monetary and financial stability, the underlying transfers are not a surrender of monetary sovereignty, but its effective exercise under the form of cooperative sovereignty. Finally, chapter 5 assesses the implications of the contemporary concept of monetary sovereignty proposed herein for the reorganization of the international financial architecture in the wake of the Great Recession.

The goal of my thesis on Supervision over the banking industry in the EU member states is to describe critically and to define newly engendering concept of the banking union. It is a very actual topic because the effective mechanism creation, which should solve problems of the European banking sector, is currently one of the primary goals of the European Union. The study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is the theoretical one. The definition and differentiation of the essential terms such as supervision and surveillance can be found there. Further the basic theoretical modules can be found there, from which it is possible to stem during the banking supervision implementation in practice. The second and the third chapters are the analytical parts. The introduction of the second chapter glances at the backgrounds of the legislative proposals acceptance in this area. Afterwards the chapter is already focused on four pillars of the proposed Banking union. The first pillar is formed with so called "single rule book", thus the uniform regulatory rules that are the implementation of the requirements expressed in so called Basel III. In this part of the study there is outlined why it is not quite happy at present to burden the credit institutions in the European Union even more through...