Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The central problem of this dissertation is to test some aspects of the hypothesis that a modified version of Edgar Sheffield Brightman's Moral Laws constitutes a fundamental theoretical framework for social ethics. A test case is considered which compares the implicit assumptions made qy certain religious social ethicists with those characteristic of moral law social etlncs. It is hypothesized that if social ethics based on moral laws do represent fundamental principles, then evidence of dependence on them will be found in the writinr,s of those who hold to other systems. These investigations allow six propositions to be made on the proper components of a viable social ethic. These are derived from the investigation of the presuppositions of moral laws and the consequences of the types of appeals made to moral law social ethics by Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey. Two methodological procedures are used. The first is an analytic and synthetic exposition of the central theoretical problem of outlining particular aspects of moral law foundations for social ethics. This exposition includes contributions of philosophy and social science. These data are incorporated into a fourfold re-classification of Brightman's Noral Laws as amended to include a law of the ideal of community. The second methodological procedure involves the use of content analysis of selected works of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey. The analysis is made by examining the arguments in specific ethical considerations in terms of the adequacy of their theoretical framework. It is noted that the authors rely on arguments analogous to the principles of moral law social ethics where their theory seems inadequate, and that the theoretical framework often makes no improvement on moral law social ethics. The limitations of this study are uncerstood in terms of the use of the data. In the work on the expansion of Edgar S. Brightman's Horal Laws, contributions by other philosophers and by social scientists are limited to the areas where their thinking is consonant with that of Brightman, although new insights of these thinkers are incorporated. The thought of neither Reinhold Niebuhr nor Paul Ramsey has been exhaustively analyzed. This dissertation is not primarily concerned with this problem but rather, only with their thought as illustrative material. The limits of the conclusions regarding this illustrative material are that some forms of Christian social ethics may be subsumed in moral law social ethics without doing violence to the ethical efficacy of Christian theory. This excludes, however, accepting the exclusiveness of revelatory data as a presupposition. It is concluded that at least six aspects of moral law foundations for social ethics are universally valid. First, that the term "normative system" must be understood as capable of development; second, that any valid social ethics must be adequately grounded in an empirical approach; third, that empiricism must be broadly understood in terms of a theory of reality which is organic and pluralistic; fourth, that ethics must always find its locus in the category of personality which, in social ethics, is integral to the concept of community; fifth, that ethical terms and their validity may only be understood in the light of one's understanaing of the nature and function of culture; sixth, that religious ethics should be included as part of the data of moral experience. / 2031-01-01

Thesis advisor: Christopher Bruell / This study of Xenophon’s Memorabilia investigates the famous Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. Specifically, it is an attempt to understand the claim that anyone who knows what the right thing is to do, automatically chooses to do it. I concentrate on Socrates’ view of one particular virtue, namely moderation. This is both because moderation is the virtue that Xenophon’s Socrates most often identifies with knowledge, and because it is the virtue that Xenophon associates most closely with Socrates himself. The first part of the dissertation considers whether the thesis that virtue is knowledge is an accurate description of ordinary moral life. The first task is to articulate the ordinary moral outlook. I examine the presentation of this outlook in seven conversations about political ambition in Book Three of the Memorabilia. I conclude that according to Xenophon’s Socrates, the moral outlook is based on two beliefs. One belief concerns the content of the moral law. It is the belief that we are obligated to do good for others, and in the first place to be good citizens and serve our country. The second belief is that morality is good, and the greatest good, for the individual who obeys the moral law, regardless of the apparent sacrifices that it requires. This second belief seems to be the basis for the view that virtue is knowledge: obedience to the moral law is so good that anyone who knew this would automatically obey the law, and anyone who resists obeying it must be ignorant of how good it is. The moral outlook combines these two beliefs. It holds that that what is best for the political community is also best for the individual, or that the law that directs us to do good for others and the law that discloses to us what way of life is best for ourselves are the same law. This belief is so fundamental to the moral life that the question, whether what is good for the individual really coincides with what is good for the community, is not a legitimate question to raise, and it cannot be raised without departing somewhat from the ordinary moral attitude. On the other hand, once the fundamental assumption of moral life comes to light as a mere assumption, it is impossible to avoid investigating it, and to continue to assume that we know what virtue is. Accordingly, the second half of the dissertation attempts to clarify this question, by examining Xenophon’s presentation of the Socratic education in Book Four of the Memorabilia. I argue that this part of the Memorabilia does not assume that virtue is political virtue, and rather shows how Socrates investigated what virtue is without this prior assumption. The last part of the dissertation is a preliminary effort to follow Socrates’ investigation of this question. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2008. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

La thèse est centrée sur la notion de temporalité pratique. Elle étudie le rapport entre normativité et temporalité en montrant que dans la connaissance, l’objectivité est produite par une méthode de schématisation des catégories de l’entendement, ce qui permet de relier et d’appliquer les concepts universels, a priori et intérieurs, à un donné sensible particulier, alors que dans la pratique, les catégories de la liberté rendent possible une synthèse pratique au sein des désirs mais immédiatement sans passer par la schématisation de l'imagination. Il ne s’agit plus de légiférer sur un donné sensible et de l’ordonner mais de produire une réalité ou une effectivité qui est la « résolution de la volonté» de manière absolument immédiate. Or, s'il y a production d'une volonté moralement déterminée, il doit y avoir une temporalité pratique dans laquelle se déploie cette causalité par liberté. Cette notion n’a pas été élaborée par Kant mais il semble nécessaire de la penser pour comprendre l’efficace de la Loi morale. En effet, le problème de l’applicabilité du principe pur inconditionné dans le temps de l’esthétique transcendantale est incompréhensible car s’il s’applique dans le temps alors on doit conclure qu’il est lui-même conditionné a priori et s’il s’applique en dehors du temps, on arrive à la conclusion que le caractère intelligible est intemporel, éternel et immuable, ce qui éteint la liberté pratique comme bonne volonté. Notre thèse vise à répondre à ce problème en montrant que la Loi morale n’est agissante et ne devient un devoir que par la personne qui n’est pas immuable mais qui est temporalité pratique et duratio nouménon (durée rendue infinie par le postulat de la Dialectique de la raison pratique). / The thesis is centered on the notion of practical temporality. It studies the connection between normativity and temporality by showing that in knowledge, objectivity is produced by a schematism of the categories of the understanding, which allows to connect and to apply the universal concepts, a priori and internal, to one given sensitive private individual, while in practice, the categories of freedom make a practical synthesis possible within the desires, but at once, without passing through the schematism of imagination. It is not any more a question of legislating on one given sensitive and of ordering it, but of producing a reality or an effectiveness which is the " resolution of the will ", in a absolutely immediate way. Now, if a morally determined will has been produced, there should be a practical temporality in which this causality through freedom will operate . This notion was not elaborated by Kant but it seems necessary to think of it to understand the effectiveness  of moral Law. Indeed, the problem of the applicability of the unconditioned pure principle in the time of transcendental aesthetics is incomprehensible because if it applies in the time then we have to conclude that it is itself a priori conditioned and if it applies outside time, we reach the conclusion that the intelligible character is timeless, eternal and unchanging, which invalidates practical freedom as goodwill. Our thesis aims at answering this problem by showing that the moral Law is active and becomes a duty only by the person who is not unchanging but who has to be seen as practical temporality and duratio nouménon (duration made infinite by the postulate of the Dialectic of practical reason).

É consensual entre os comentadores, que Kant muda a sua estratégia argumentativa na passagem entre a Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes e a Crítica da razão prática. Só há divergências quanto ao grau, ou radicalismo, desta mudança. Esta dissertação procura analisar esta mudança, sob uma temática específica: a relação entre a liberdade e a lei moral. Esse estudo foi despertado por um debate recente envolvendo Schönecker, Wood e Allison. O ponto de apoio para o estudo, será o esforço de Kant para estabelecer um paralelismo entre as duas primeiras Críticas, procurando ampliar ou adaptar conceitos apresentados no campo teórico, para o campo prático, como será analisado para a causalidade. Para facilitar a compreensão das posições de Kant nas duas obras, será utilizada a metáfora de um fio condutor. Este se apresentará como duas inferências encadeadas, no caso da Fundamentação e como rationes essendi e cognoscendi no caso da segunda Crítica. São ressaltadas as limitações da primeira explicação e confirmada, na segunda parte da dissertação, a mudança da estratégia, através da configuração de um novo fio condutor. Uma proposta adicional é apresentada para caracterizar a mudança estratégica: as rationes, no campo prático, devem ser necessariamente gêmeas e fortemente recíprocas. Essas características são apresentadas, em contraste com o uso das rationes no campo teórico. / It is not controversial, among the scholars, that Kant changes his justification strategy in the passage from the Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals to the Critique of practical reason. What is not consensual is the degree or radicality of this change. This dissertation aims to understand this change, under a specific subject matter: the relationship between freedom and the moral law. This work was triggered by a recent debate set up by Schönecker, Wood and Allison. A stronghold for the presented arguments relies on Kants struggle to build up a parallelism between the first two Critiques, looking for an extension, or an application of concepts developed in the theoretic field, to the practical one. This will be specifically treated when analyzing causality. To enable an easier learning curve to Kants position in the referred two works, a metaphor of a guiding thread will be used. This metaphor will turn out, either as two chained inferences, regarding the Groundwork, or, as ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi, as in the second Critique. The limitations of the first metaphor are explored and the change of strategy breaks through as a new guiding thread. An additional point is presented to deepen the understanding of the rationes: they must be twins and strongly reciprocal. These new features are presented comparing the theoretical use of reason with the practical one.

Thesis advisor: Ronald K. Tacelli / This dissertation aims to examine the notion of 'human dignity' in Kant by means of a conversation with three Kantian scholars. One cannot understand Kant's notion of human dignity without placing it in the context of his moral thought. For this reason we look in Chapter One at the philosopher Roger Sullivan. His major work Immanuel Kant's moral theory includes a highly detailed treatment of human dignity. I shall present an analysis of his understanding within the context of his methodology and his general approach to Kant's moral philosophy. We look in Chapter Two at Susan Shell and her 'Kant on Human Dignity.' In addition to this, we consider Shell's methodology and some of her work on the early Kant where we find the roots of Kant's conception of dignity. Chapter Three addresses Oliver Sensen and his novel interpretation of Kant's use of the term 'dignity.' Utilizing the tools of Analytical Philosophy, he enters into dialogue with Kantian interpreters, suggesting that their understanding of dignity in Kant harbours elements at odds with Kant's thought and that they thus fail to grasp the radical nature of Kant's notion. In the final and Fourth Chapter, I try to bring these scholars into a conversation with each other. First, I show the strengths of each position and then, using insights of Sullivan, Shell and Sensen, I venture to ask whether one could not develop the notion of a phenomenology of dignity. I also consider whether in both Shell's and Sensen's account there is not an implicit dynamic at work, which suggests the necessity of transcendence and the Good. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

A proposta estruturante deste trabalho é problematizar, em diferentes temas, o lugar das preocupações estéticas ou sensíveis nos textos de Kant à luz de A Educação Estética do Homem. Partindo sempre da letra de Kant, elaboramos as questões e as posturas desse autor no que diz respeito ao campo estético no modo da escrita kantiana, na formulação dos princípios morais e na promoção da tarefa moral entre os homens. O nosso objetivo é, por um lado, ressaltar a importância dessas questões e, por outro lado, mostrar a possibilidade de, sem desrespeitar os princípios kantianos, assumir posturas distintas das de Kant. Nesse empreendimento, Schiller, enquanto poeta-filósofo ou filósofo-poeta, mostra-se sobretudo na obra supracitada o autor que, de maneira destacável, compreende os princípios da razão e defende uma postura original de exercitá-los. Reconhecendo que a sensibilidade não tem muito a acrescentar na fundamentação de princípios racionais defendida pelo entendimento analítico, Schiller reserva-lhe um papel totalmente diferente no que se refere ao desafio humano de agir segundo tais princípios num mundo em que as contingências nunca se fazem ausentes (num mundo ininterruptamente pulsante). Se a compreensão exata da legislação da razão necessita atravessar o caminho escolástico ou analítico das Críticas, sendo, portanto, acessível a poucos homens, a tarefa da razão necessita se apresentar como exequível a todo e qualquer homem que a queira. Não se trata aqui de afirmar que a educação estética executa melhor essa tarefa que o projeto do esclarecimento, mas apenas que aquela educação, embora se coloque numa perspectiva plenamente humana, não representa um perigo à pureza ou incondicionalidade da razão. / The main purpose of this work is to discuss, on different themes, the place of aesthetic or sensitive concerns in Kant\'s texts since the Letters upon Aesthetic Education of Man. Always starting from the letter of Kant\'s philosophy, we prepared the issues and postures of this author with regard to the aesthetic field in Kant\'s writing style, in the formulation of moral principles and the promotion of moral task among men. Our objective is, on the one hand, stress the importance of these issues and, on the other hand, show the possibility of, without breaching the Kantian principles, assume different postures of Kant. In this endeavor, Schiller, as a poet-philosopher or philosopher-poet, shows - especially in the aforementioned work - the author who, in a remarkable way, understands the principles of reason and defends a unique position to apply them. Schiller acknowledges that the sensitivity does not have much to add in the grounds of rational principles defended by the analytical understanding. Regarding the human challenge to act on these principles in a pulsating world, where contingencies are never absent, Schiller assigns to the sensitivity a totally different role. If the exact understanding of the legislation of reason need to go through the scholastic or analytical way of Kants Critiques, and need be accessible to few men, the task of reason needs to present itself as feasible to every man who wants to. It is not about asserting that the aesthetic education performs better this task than the project of enlightenment, but only that such education, although it puts a fully human perspective, does not represent a danger to the purity and absoluteness of reason.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:12:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 312268 bytes, checksum: c2d8a036f15f684f8a3ddeff90cf0c5e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-06-09 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / To if dealing with the criminal legal philosophy in Kant, objective in this work of research, arguing the moral bedding of the penalty, from the perspective of the existence of a duality of citizens in the soul of all the human beings. Being overcome as principle with that the freedom, in Kant, if coats with autonomy, they make with that all can act as its interests, however without never being able to ignore the knowledge of the imperative of the morality, without being able to ignore the existence of its supply-sensible reality. Breaking of a bibliographical research in the Kantians workmanships on philosophy politics, one will search to show as, when dealing with criminal law, Kant it bases the severity of its proposal punitive on the existence of the moral law in the interior of all the human beings. In this study, leaving of the concept of that, in Kant, the right in sends the coercion to them exterior that we suffer to be able to act socially the law in accordance with and, the existence of the morality, also exerts on us another form of coercion: the moral coercion, that is an interior coercion and that in the punishment, before the existence of a conviction, the criminal punishes itself exactly, as a form to recoup its lost dignity in the practical undertaking of the criminal one, readjusting the criminal with its private court. / Ao se tratar da filosofia do direito penal em Kant, objetiva-se neste trabalho de pesquisa, discutir o fundamento moral da pena, a partir da perspectiva da existência de uma dualidade de sujeitos no íntimo de todos os seres humanos. Tomando-se como princípio de que a liberdade, em Kant, se reveste de autonomia, fazem com que todos possam agir conforme os seus interesses, contudo sem jamais poder ignorar o conhecimento do imperativo da moralidade, sem poder ignorar a existência de sua realidade supra-sensível. Partindo de uma pesquisa bibliográfica nas obras kantianas sobre filosofia política, buscar-se-á mostrar como, ao tratar de direito penal, Kant fundamenta o rigor da sua proposta punitiva na existência da lei moral no interior de todos os seres humanos. Neste estudo, partindo do conceito de que, em Kant, o direito nos remete a coação exterior que sofremos para poder agirmos socialmente de acordo com a lei e, a existência da moralidade, também exerce sobre nós outra forma de coação: a coação moral, que é uma coação interior e que na punição, antes da existência de uma sentença condenatória, o criminoso pune a si mesmo, como uma forma de recuperar a sua dignidade perdida no cometimento da prática delituosa, reajustando o criminoso com o seu foro íntimo.

É consensual entre os comentadores, que Kant muda a sua estratégia argumentativa na passagem entre a Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes e a Crítica da razão prática. Só há divergências quanto ao grau, ou radicalismo, desta mudança. Esta dissertação procura analisar esta mudança, sob uma temática específica: a relação entre a liberdade e a lei moral. Esse estudo foi despertado por um debate recente envolvendo Schönecker, Wood e Allison. O ponto de apoio para o estudo, será o esforço de Kant para estabelecer um paralelismo entre as duas primeiras Críticas, procurando ampliar ou adaptar conceitos apresentados no campo teórico, para o campo prático, como será analisado para a causalidade. Para facilitar a compreensão das posições de Kant nas duas obras, será utilizada a metáfora de um fio condutor. Este se apresentará como duas inferências encadeadas, no caso da Fundamentação e como rationes essendi e cognoscendi no caso da segunda Crítica. São ressaltadas as limitações da primeira explicação e confirmada, na segunda parte da dissertação, a mudança da estratégia, através da configuração de um novo fio condutor. Uma proposta adicional é apresentada para caracterizar a mudança estratégica: as rationes, no campo prático, devem ser necessariamente gêmeas e fortemente recíprocas. Essas características são apresentadas, em contraste com o uso das rationes no campo teórico. / It is not controversial, among the scholars, that Kant changes his justification strategy in the passage from the Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals to the Critique of practical reason. What is not consensual is the degree or radicality of this change. This dissertation aims to understand this change, under a specific subject matter: the relationship between freedom and the moral law. This work was triggered by a recent debate set up by Schönecker, Wood and Allison. A stronghold for the presented arguments relies on Kants struggle to build up a parallelism between the first two Critiques, looking for an extension, or an application of concepts developed in the theoretic field, to the practical one. This will be specifically treated when analyzing causality. To enable an easier learning curve to Kants position in the referred two works, a metaphor of a guiding thread will be used. This metaphor will turn out, either as two chained inferences, regarding the Groundwork, or, as ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi, as in the second Critique. The limitations of the first metaphor are explored and the change of strategy breaks through as a new guiding thread. An additional point is presented to deepen the understanding of the rationes: they must be twins and strongly reciprocal. These new features are presented comparing the theoretical use of reason with the practical one.

A proposta estruturante deste trabalho é problematizar, em diferentes temas, o lugar das preocupações estéticas ou sensíveis nos textos de Kant à luz de A Educação Estética do Homem. Partindo sempre da letra de Kant, elaboramos as questões e as posturas desse autor no que diz respeito ao campo estético no modo da escrita kantiana, na formulação dos princípios morais e na promoção da tarefa moral entre os homens. O nosso objetivo é, por um lado, ressaltar a importância dessas questões e, por outro lado, mostrar a possibilidade de, sem desrespeitar os princípios kantianos, assumir posturas distintas das de Kant. Nesse empreendimento, Schiller, enquanto poeta-filósofo ou filósofo-poeta, mostra-se sobretudo na obra supracitada o autor que, de maneira destacável, compreende os princípios da razão e defende uma postura original de exercitá-los. Reconhecendo que a sensibilidade não tem muito a acrescentar na fundamentação de princípios racionais defendida pelo entendimento analítico, Schiller reserva-lhe um papel totalmente diferente no que se refere ao desafio humano de agir segundo tais princípios num mundo em que as contingências nunca se fazem ausentes (num mundo ininterruptamente pulsante). Se a compreensão exata da legislação da razão necessita atravessar o caminho escolástico ou analítico das Críticas, sendo, portanto, acessível a poucos homens, a tarefa da razão necessita se apresentar como exequível a todo e qualquer homem que a queira. Não se trata aqui de afirmar que a educação estética executa melhor essa tarefa que o projeto do esclarecimento, mas apenas que aquela educação, embora se coloque numa perspectiva plenamente humana, não representa um perigo à pureza ou incondicionalidade da razão. / The main purpose of this work is to discuss, on different themes, the place of aesthetic or sensitive concerns in Kant\'s texts since the Letters upon Aesthetic Education of Man. Always starting from the letter of Kant\'s philosophy, we prepared the issues and postures of this author with regard to the aesthetic field in Kant\'s writing style, in the formulation of moral principles and the promotion of moral task among men. Our objective is, on the one hand, stress the importance of these issues and, on the other hand, show the possibility of, without breaching the Kantian principles, assume different postures of Kant. In this endeavor, Schiller, as a poet-philosopher or philosopher-poet, shows - especially in the aforementioned work - the author who, in a remarkable way, understands the principles of reason and defends a unique position to apply them. Schiller acknowledges that the sensitivity does not have much to add in the grounds of rational principles defended by the analytical understanding. Regarding the human challenge to act on these principles in a pulsating world, where contingencies are never absent, Schiller assigns to the sensitivity a totally different role. If the exact understanding of the legislation of reason need to go through the scholastic or analytical way of Kants Critiques, and need be accessible to few men, the task of reason needs to present itself as feasible to every man who wants to. It is not about asserting that the aesthetic education performs better this task than the project of enlightenment, but only that such education, although it puts a fully human perspective, does not represent a danger to the purity and absoluteness of reason.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-20T13:17:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciano_Duarte_Silveira_Dissertacao.pdf: 1213664 bytes, checksum: a67c645270b0f20920a39856110e657b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-27 / The Factum der Vernunft (Fact of reason) is considered one of the most controversial and difficult issues in Kant´s Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), specifically in its first part. Therefore, the current master´s thesis intends to be an exegetical and systematic study of Immanuel Kant´s second Critique, in a perspective which aims to establish the genesis as well as the statute of the Factum der Vernunft by means of the reconstruction of his moral foundation. The possibility of justification in moral philosophy is intimately connected by a necessary justification of the moral law properly. The Factum consists in a necessary element in order to establish the proof of the existence of an objective freedom. In this sense, we will proceed to a systematic reconstruction of Kant´s Moral Philosophy since the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) and the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), as well as other Kant´s works. We will also look for support to some representative scholars whose research regarding this theme is relevant to the delineation of possibility of a solid justification in moral philosophy / O Factum der Vernunft (Factum da razão) é considerado como um dos mais controversos e difíceis problemas na Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), especificamente em sua primeira parte. Contudo, a presente dissertação propõe-se a um estudo exegético e sistemático da segunda crítica de Immanuel Kant, na perspectiva de estabelecer a gênese e o estatuto do Factum der Vernunft mediante a reconstrução de sua fundamentação moral. A possibilidade da justificação em filosofia moral está intimamente vinculada à necessária justificação da própria lei moral. O Factum consiste em um elemento imprescindível para o estabelecimento da prova da existência da própria liberdade como sendo objetiva. Neste sentido, procederemos a uma reconstrução sistemática da filosofia moral de Kant a partir da Kritik de reinen Vernunft (1781) e da Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), assim como outras obras de Kant. Também procuraremos apoio em alguns autores cuja pesquisa considerando este tema é relevante, tentando delinear a possibilidade de uma sólida justificação em filosofia moral