The first case of Covid-19 in Sweden was confirmed at the end of January 2020. At the time of conducting this study the society has begun vaccination against the virus. Although a majority of the population seem positive towards vaccination, the question remains which factors are influencing this attitude. The aim of this study is to create an understanding of how young adults in Sweden reason about Covid-19 and the vaccination thereof. The aim of this study is answered with the following question statements, how do young adults in Sweden reason about the risk of Covid-19 and the vaccination thereof and how do young adults in Sweden reason about the vaccination formed by their natural attitude and trust towards expert systems. Previous research shows that risk and trust towards expert systems are influential factors on individuals' inclination towards vaccines, regarding child vaccines or previous influenza vaccines. Antecedent quantitative studies show differences in vaccination attitudes between age categories and that young adults were most likely to have a negative attitude towards vaccines. This qualitative interview study, focusing on individuals in the age category of young adults, shows how risk and trust towards expert systems can influence their reasoning regarding Covid-19 and the vaccine against the virus, furthermore it shows how their natural attitudes can be affected by the pandemic. The result of this study shows that the studied young adults tend to see more risks with Covid-19 towards other people than themselves, which can be a contributing factor to the attitude towards vaccination of that age category. This study also shows that a high trust in expert systems can enable a positive reasoning regarding the vaccine and that the subjects of this study’s natural attitudes are changed by the pandemic. / Det första fallet av Covid-19 bekräftades i Sverige i slutet på januari 2020. Vid studiens genomförande har samhället påbörjat vaccineringen mot viruset. Även om majoriteten av befolkningen verkar positivt inställda till vaccinet återstår frågan om vilka faktorer som påverkar detta. Syftet med denna studie är att skapa en förståelse för hur unga vuxna i Sverige resonerar kring Covid-19 viruset och vaccinationen mot det. Syftet besvaras med följande frågeställningar, hur resonerar unga vuxna i Sverige kring risker med Covid-19 viruset och vaccinationen mot det och hur formas unga vuxna i Sveriges resonemang kring vaccinering av den naturliga inställningen och deras förhållningssätt till expertsystem. Tidigare forskning visar att risk och tillit till expertsystem kan vara påverkande faktorer på individers vaccinationsbenägenhet, åtminstone när det gäller barnvaccin eller tidigare influensavaccinationer. Tidigare kvantitativ forskning har även visat på skillnader i vaccinationsbenägenhet mellan åldersgrupper, där unga vuxna var mest troliga att vara negativt inställda. Denna kvalitativa intervjustudie med individer i åldersgruppen unga vuxna visar hur risk och tillit till expertsystem kan influera deras resonemang kring Covid-19 viruset och vaccineringen mot det samt hur deras naturliga inställning kan påverkas av pandemin. Resultatet av studien visar att respondenterna tenderar att se allvarligare på risker med Covid-19 gentemot andra än sig själva, något som kan vara en bidragande faktor till den åldersgruppens inställning till vaccinering. Studien visar även att en hög tillit till expertsystem möjliggör ett positivt resonemang kring vaccineringen och att den naturliga inställningen i pandemins samhälle är förändrad hos respondenterna.

Au cœur de la phénoménologie gît une thèse métaphysique selon laquelle le flux phénoménal du vécu (Erlebnisstrom) puise son sens et son être en lui-même, plutôt que d’une quelque réalité extérieure ou sous-jacente. En outre, cette thèse de l’autonomie existentielle du flux phénoménal, ou de l’équivalence de l’être et du paraître, ne s’atteste que moyennant une transformation complète de notre rapport au monde, où l’on s’efforce de se mettre à l’écoute des choses, et du mystère qui les enveloppe, plutôt que de les maîtriser. Pris ensemble, cette thèse métaphysique et cette attitude du laisser-être (Seinlassen) constituent les deux piliers de la phénoménologie comme manière de vivre dont la présente thèse se propose de tracer les grandes lignes. Pour ce faire, nous centrons nos recherches sur l’œuvre du fondateur de la phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, que nous soumettons toutefois à une critique immanente; c’est Husserl qui à la fois dégage l’idée d’une phénoménologie comme manière de vivre et lui pose le plus sérieux obstacle. Cette tension au sein de la pensée husserlienne s’aperçoit à même les deux exigences qui la définissent : celle du « retour aux choses mêmes », d’une part, et celle de la description eidétique, de l’autre. À l’aide de différents interlocuteurs – qui nous permettent d’interroger Husserl rétrospectivement (Pyrrhon), contemporainement (James, Bergson) et prospectivement (Heidegger) –, nous montrons que ces deux exigences sont en fait incompatibles, et proposons afin de résoudre cette contradiction d’éliminer un de ses termes, soit l’exigence de description eidétique. Se fait alors jour la possibilité d’une phénoménologie qui assume pleinement sa vocation existentielle. Enfin, en parallèle à cette critique immanente de Husserl, et afin de l’étayer, nous développons une explication génétique de l’ἐποχή transcendantale, où celle-ci est caractérisée en tant que conversion de l’attitude naturelle à une forme de conscience postréflexive, c’est-à-dire mystique. / At the heart of phenomenology lies a metaphysical claim according to which the phenomenal stream of lived experience (Erlebnisstrom) derives its meaning and its being from itself, rather than from some external or underlying reality. Moreover, this claim of the existential autonomy of the phenomenal stream, or of the equivalence of being and appearing, can only be verified through a complete transformation of our relationship to the world, where we seek to become mindful of things, and of the mystery in which they are steeped, rather than seeking to master them. Taken together, this metaphysical claim and this attitude of letting-be (Seinlassen) constitute the two pillars of phenomenology as a way of life, which the present thesis proposes to describe in broad outline. To do so, we focus our research on the work of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, which we submit however to an internal critique; it is Husserl who both allows us to contemplate the idea of phenomenology as a way of life and at the same time poses the greatest obstacle to it. This tension within Husserlian thought can be seen in the two imperatives that define it: that of the “return to the things themselves”, on the one hand, and that of eidetic description, on the other. With the help of various interlocutors – who allow us to interrogate Husserl retrospectively (Pyrrho), contemporaneously (James, Bergson) and prospectively (Heidegger) – we show that these two imperatives are in fact incompatible, and propose in order to lift this contradiction to eliminate one of its terms, namely the imperative of eidetic description. Thus a path is cleared for a phenomenology that fully commits itself to its existential vocation. Finally, in parallel to this internal critique of Husserl, and to better support it, we develop a genetic explanation of the transcendental ἐποχή, where it is characterized as a conversion from the natural attitude to a post-reflective, that is mystical, form of consciousness.