Empirical studies of the baroque abound. The bibliography is enormous. Yet, to this day, if one asks: "What is the baroque?" the answer that can be expected is a hesitant: "Mostly...an architectural style which became prevalent in 17th century Europe." With his much acclaimed Lo barroco, Eugenio d'Ors did succeed in extending the sphere of significance of the baroque, from the stylistic domain where it had been confined for many centuries, onto the much vaster realm of epistemology. However, despite the soundness of d'Ors's epistemological approach, the trouble with his "eons" theory is that nothing in the world, be it natural or man-made, fits neatly into such precise, universal categories. The fault, as we see it, lies in the classical dynamics underlying the dorsian opposition clasicismo/barroquismo. But today, man's newly acquired understanding of microphysical processes has led to a non-classical scientific paradigm--a breakthrough which has totally changed man's fundamental concepts about the world and himself, and has enabled the French scientist and scholar, Stephane Lupasco, to elaborate a revolutionary epistemological paradigm: la logique du contradictoire, based on the antagonistic forces inherent to Energy, and on its remarkable properties of relative potentialization and actualization. Making use of Lupasco's novel theories, we, in turn, have developed a new conception of the baroque, a phenomenom which finds its explanation solely through the application of the lupasquian logique du contradictoire, and, more specifically, through the definition of psychic matter (la conscience de la conscience et la connaissance de la connaissance) as Energy's awareness of its own tripolar, infrastructural dynamics and of its inexhaustible creative potential. It is, indeed, to this existential self-consciousness that the term baroque can most aptly be applied.

That trivialism ought to be rejected is almost universally held. I argue that the rejection of trivialism should be held in suspicion and that there are good reasons for thinking that trivialism is true. After outlining in chapter 1 the place of trivialism in the history of philosophy, I begin in chapter 2 an outline and defense of the various arguments in favor of the truth of trivialism. I defend four such arguments: an argument from the Curry Paradox; and argument from the Characterization Principle; an argument from the Principle of Sufficient Reason; and an argument from the truth of possibilism. / In chapter 3 I build a case for thinking that the denial of trivialism is impossible. I begin by arguing that the denial of some view is the assertion of an alternative view. I show that there is no such view as the alternative to trivialism and so the denial of trivialism is impossible. I then examine an alternative view of the nature of denial – that denial is not reducible to an assertion but is a sui generis speech act. It follows given such an account of denial that the denial of trivialism is possible. I respond to this in two ways. First, I give reason for thinking that this is not a plausible account of denial. Secondly, I show that even if it is successful, the denial of trivialism is still unassertable, unbelievable, and severely limited in its rationality. / In chapter 4 I examine two important arguments that purport to show that it is impossible to believe in trivialism: one from Aristotle and a more recent one from Graham Priest. According to Aristotle, it is not possible to believe in trivialism because such a belief is incompatible with being able to act in a discriminating manner. According to Priest, belief in trivialism is incompatible with being able to act with a purpose. I show that there are a number of ways to respond to such arguments, and so it is far from obvious that it is impossible to believe in trivialism. / In chapter 5 I reply to one of the few sustained arguments against the truth of trivialism. According to this argument, trivialism cannot be true because it entails that every observable state of affairs is contradictory - which is clearly not the case. After raising a number of objections to this line of reasoning, I argue that a contradictory state of affairs will necessarily appear consistent. As such, that the world appears consistent is not a good reason for thinking that it fails to be contradictory. / In chapter 6 I defend the claim that the observable world is indeed contradictory in the way that trivialism implies. I show that a dialetheic solution to Zeno’s paradox of the arrow requires one to postulate that a body in motion is located at every point of the path of its journey at every instant of the journey.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Rostock, 1906. / Vita (in Latin) : p. [33], second group. Includes bibliographical references.

Geometry. Pure Form. What are the limits of these concepts in architecture? To what extent can they be realized through constructive means? To the architect, these concepts are often the originating forces driving their work, but their nature is intangible, and can be best understood through reason. There exists then, a dichotomy that the architect is left to resolve: that which is solely of an intelligible nature and that which can exist within the physical limitations of our reality. While architectonic limitations are that of the physical, Architecture itself exists within both of these realms, the duality of the mind and of the body, and it is the charge of the architect to reconcile their inherent contradictions. The limitations of the mind and the body are incompatible at an absolute level, but there exists a degree of overlap within which architecture is found. Place is a catalyst that can trigger this dissonance. The intelligible exists in a placeless space, a space that was given a framework by René Descartes in his notion of extension, and exists as a free body. In contrast, the architectonic is contingent on placement and the forces of gravity. They are simultaneously contradictory and co-related. This thesis pursues the limits of this contradiction; its culmination more akin to an architectural follie than the original intent: a modest hiking shelter. / Master of Architecture / This thesis explores the duality and contradictions that arise when the realm of reason and the realm of that which is built coincide. The framework through which this exploration takes place is in the conception and design of a small structure in the mountains of Ticino, an Italian canton of southern Switzerland. It is a building whose purpose is pleasure, nothing more. The pursuit of ideal form in place is a catalyst for the series of contradictions that exist within not only this thesis, but the realm of architecture. Place and space. Mind and body. Intelligible and sensible.

Nous avons rencontré Augustin dans les Confessions , pour la première fois, au milieu des années 90.Nous avons été conquise par le style, le ton, mais ce qui nous a le plus frappée, c'est l'impression de transparence, d'authenticité qui s'en dégage. Cependant, des lectures subséquentes révèlent des contradictions, des emprunts et des omissions dérangeantes. Cette constatation nous a paru paradoxale, compte tenu qu'Augustin se pose lui-même comme chercheur de vérité. C'est pourquoi nous avons décidé que notre mémoire de maîtrise porterait sur Augustin et son rapport à la vérité. Il peut sembler un peu inhabituel de traiter d'un problème philosophique à partir d'une autobiographie. Une justification conjointe de la problématique et de la source s'imposait. Il est généralement admis qu'Augustin est le maître à penser de l'Occident, il est le seul Père de l'Église de son époque qui ait été l'auteur d'une école de pensée : l'augustinisme. Or, la recherche de la vérité est le domaine par excellence de la philosophie. Plusieurs philosophes de tous les temps admettent avoir été sous influence augustinienne. Lui-même a été influencé par la philosophie platonicienne et par le néoplatonisme, sans oublier les oeuvres de Cicéron. Il est donc, bien incontestablement, un philosophe. Par ailleurs, la teneur philosophique des Confessions est indéniable, bien qu'on lui assigne un classement d'autobiographie. Les neuf premiers livres sont plus évidemment autobiographiques, mais ils contiennent néanmoins beaucoup d'éléments philosophiques. Cependant, les trois derniers livres sont absolument philosophiques. Si donc, Augustin est un philosophe, s'il se proclame un chercheur de vérité et si, par ailleurs, il prend des libertés avec la vérité dans les Confessions , nous avons indubitablement un problème. On pourrait nous objecter que dans une autobiographie, malgré l'existence d'un pacte autobiographique, la vérité fait problème et cela pour plusieurs raisons : l'éloignement temporel, une défaillance de la mémoire, le désir de plaire, de se montrer autre que l'on est. Mais nous pensons qu'Augustin savait qu'il introduisait des distorsions dans son oeuvre et qu'il savait également pourquoi il le faisait. Augustin est un rhéteur. Il a enseigné la rhétorique pendant de nombreuses années. La rhétorique est l'art de persuader et les moyens pour le faire sont parfois discutables. Deux axiologies gouvernent la vie d'Augustin : l'ambition matérielle et le désir de réformer ses frères dans une perspective de salut. Nous pensons que le pragmatisme d'Augustin lui fait voir dans le catholicisme, le moyen de réaliser ses deux objectifs. Ambroise le convainc qu'il existe certaines similitudes entre le néoplatonisme et le christianisme et Augustin croit qu'une conversion au christianisme ne fera pas obstacle à son adhésion à la philosophie néoplatonicienne. Devenu prêtre et évêque d'Hippone, Augustin devra se conformer à la ligne de pensée du christianisme, participer à l'élaboration des dogmes et de l'orthodoxie catholique, assujettir la philosophie à la théologie chrétienne, dont il se fera le défenseur contre les hérésies. Cette charge de l'évêque d'Hippone et la responsabilité qui en découle lui interdisent de faire valoir son approbation et son attachement à la philosophie. Pour toutes ces raisons, nous pensons qu'Augustin a dit trafiquer la vérité, écrire entre les lignes, pour rejoindre un auditoire d'initiés dans une période de persécution tout en restant loyal envers l'Église.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Droit public--Aix-Marseille 3, 2001. / Bibliogr. p. 433-456.

Cette thèse se rapporte à la notion de contradiction, entendue en son sens logique ou formel. Plus précisément, elle vise à dégager une conception de la contradiction chez un philosophe qui, du point de vue chronologique, précède l’avènement de la syllogistique et de la logique : Platon. À partir de l’examen des dialogues réfutatifs de Platon, il s’agira de mettre en lumière la forme des propositions contradictoires, de déterminer la terminologie et les métaphores utilisées par Platon pour nommer et décrire la contradiction et d’évaluer le contexte dans lequel avait lieu la réflexion platonicienne. L’analyse révélera que Platon se faisait une idée somme toute assez précise de la contradiction logique et qu’il a même eu une influence sur Aristote lorsque ce dernier élabora son célèbre principe de non-contradiction. / This thesis examines the notion of contradiction understood in its logical or formal sense. Specifically, it seeks to study that notion in a philosopher who, chronologically speaking, precedes the advent of syllogistic or logic: Plato. Based on an analysis of Plato’s refutative dialogues, this thesis will determine the form given by Plato to contradictory propositions, unveil the terminology and metaphors used by Plato to name and describe contradictions and evaluate the context in which Plato reflected upon contradiction. The analysis will reveal that Plato had a very clear idea of what is a logical contradiction and that he even had an influence on Aristotle when the latter defined his famous principle of non-contradiction.

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Cette thèse se rapporte à la notion de contradiction, entendue en son sens logique ou formel. Plus précisément, elle vise à dégager une conception de la contradiction chez un philosophe qui, du point de vue chronologique, précède l’avènement de la syllogistique et de la logique : Platon. À partir de l’examen des dialogues réfutatifs de Platon, il s’agira de mettre en lumière la forme des propositions contradictoires, de déterminer la terminologie et les métaphores utilisées par Platon pour nommer et décrire la contradiction et d’évaluer le contexte dans lequel avait lieu la réflexion platonicienne. L’analyse révélera que Platon se faisait une idée somme toute assez précise de la contradiction logique et qu’il a même eu une influence sur Aristote lorsque ce dernier élabora son célèbre principe de non-contradiction. / This thesis examines the notion of contradiction understood in its logical or formal sense. Specifically, it seeks to study that notion in a philosopher who, chronologically speaking, precedes the advent of syllogistic or logic: Plato. Based on an analysis of Plato’s refutative dialogues, this thesis will determine the form given by Plato to contradictory propositions, unveil the terminology and metaphors used by Plato to name and describe contradictions and evaluate the context in which Plato reflected upon contradiction. The analysis will reveal that Plato had a very clear idea of what is a logical contradiction and that he even had an influence on Aristotle when the latter defined his famous principle of non-contradiction.

The Purbeck Review of Schools, initiated by Dorset County Council in 2008, resulted in the closure of the middle school in Swanage, leaving the town bereft of secondary education by July 2013. A community-led group, Education Swanage, founded a new school in the town, which opened in September 2013 as a free school, with a humanscale ethos. Although there was controversy about free schools at the time, there is no research to date about how personal values influence the founding of such a school. This research answers the question how did values influence the founding of The Swanage School? This inductive research was informed by literature on the conceptualization of ‘values’ and the ‘sacred’ and delimited by theoretical insights from practical theology, living theory and human-scale education. The action research strategy, set within a paradigm of praxis, addressed how values influenced action in founding the school. Semistructured interviews, an online survey and a validation group were used to discover how values influenced practice. The data revealed a variety of interpretations of the term ‘values’, which were most commonly alluded to as being central in guiding and informing everyday interaction in the world and relating to how humans respond to others whilst also being a reflection of personal identity. The research identified areas of practice where the interplay of intrinsic and extrinsic values was influential when operating in contradiction and congruence to affect change. Analysis of the findings enabled conclusions and propositions to be developed, which focused on how values influenced the process of moving from contradiction to congruence in order to enact change. Values were a significant influence in the founding of The Swanage School. When values were contradicted they acted as standards of judgement and formed the basis of conversations which led to problems being solved and decisions being made. Concepts from the wider literature and the field of practical theology provided insight into how values can be defined and how their influence on action can be interpreted as an encounter with the sacred. The conclusion of this study and its contribution to knowledge is the explanation of how values influenced the founding of The Swanage School in the form of a living educational theory.