This thesis presents an empirical investigation of the role of competition in determining (1) bidder firm behaviour in, and (2) the resulting valuation effects of, corporate takeovers. The study is based on the most comprehensive sample currently available of interfirm tender offers for publicly traded U. S. target firms during the period 1971-1990. Corporate takeover contests differ in complex ways with respect to the asymmetric information and bargaining environment, distributions of bidder reservation values and target share ownership, and information acquisition costs. There is substantial theoretical work examining the strategic role of the choice of payment method, bidder elimination and target management resistance, and of particular interest in this thesis, pre-bid acquisition of target shares ("toehold") and its impact on the subsequent tender offer price. Despite a voluminous empirical literature on corporate acquisitions, systematic evidence on the extent and role of bidder toeholds on bidding strategies is sparse. While the toehold has been shown to be prevalent in takeover contests, the extant empirical literature contains few results pointing to the strategic role suggested by theory. The lack of statistical significance may reflect a combination of small samples, weak experimental design, and biases in estimation. This thesis remedies the small sample problem by examining more than 1350 takeover contests in the U. S. from 1971 to 1990. The experimental design is improved by including a larger set of sample controls, and addressing the bias issue by estimating a set of equations which simultaneously determines the toehold and the takeover premium. The wealth effects of takeover contests are estimated as a function of toeholds, the number of bids/bidders, the outcome of the bid, and the target management response. Other empirical issues, including the effect of toeholds on the probability of target management resistance and emergence of a second bid in the contest, are also examined. Finally, a new econometric technique is developed for simultaneously estimating event probabilities and conditional expected event returns in order to determine whether entering the takeover auction, and responding to rival bids for the target shares, on average enhances the wealth of the initial bidders' shareholders. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

This diploma thesis is aimed at a creation of offers in a company. The proposal of an offer system in the Pohoda information system which the company uses is described in this thesis. An analysis of offers created in 2013 according to the specified indicators is another part of this work. The work contains a theoretical part focusing on an area of offers, business meetings, ERP systems and Competitive and Business intelligence. In the next part of the work the company which the proposal is made for as well as the Pohoda information system, where the specific functions and parts of the system are described, are presented. The system of offers creation which is used in the company now and also its current shortcomings are introduced in this thesis. Next a proposal for improving of the current system and an implementation proposal to the Pohoda information system is created. In the last part of the work the analysis of offers from 2013 is made. An estimate of the benefits of the proposed system for individuals and for a company and a summary of the processed analysis are both contained in the conclusion of this work. The thesis contains annexes an example of a current offer and data which were used for the analysis of the offers from 2013.

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This work is in the spirit of the literature on the understanding and analysis of the different forces that shape the takeover process. We focus on the strategic interaction among the raiders and we study their decision to enter the bidding for a target form in a context of asymmetric information. Each raider incurs a fixed takeover sunk. cost when she decides to enter the bidding. Therefore she wants to avoid bidding for the firm and losing the bid to a raider with a higher valuation. We analyze the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in one-period, two-period and infinite period models where each raider decides whether and in which period to enter. This decision depends on the takeover cost, the target's reservation price and the distribution function of the raiders' valuations. We also consider the case where one of the raiders is a large shareholder and the role of management in maximizing the shareholders' interests. We find that raiders delay entry into the bidding when the takeover cost or the reservation price for the firm increase. Such an increase also implies a decrease in the probability of a takeover. If one of the raiders is a large shareholder, he will enter the bidding faster the bigger is the percentage of shares he owns in the target. The existence of a large shareholder will, however, discourage other raiders from entering. The shareholders of the target firm might benefit from an increase in the target's reservation price but they never profit from an increase in the takeover cost. We conclude with an empirical section that indirectly tests some of our model's implications. The results of our empirical work indicate that raiders enter the bidding faster when the management's reaction to the bid proves to be friendly. The premiums offered by the raiders and the size of the target test insignificant in determining the pre-bidding period. Finally we find that the existence of a large shareholder discourages other raiders from entry. However, the large shareholder has on average a longer pre-bidding waiting period than a raider with no ownership in the firm. / Ph. D.

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Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Hamburg, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 585-679).

Univ., Diss.--Hamburg, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. 585 - 679.

The recent upsurge in the number of take-over bids in British Columbia and in England has revealed several problems of control. These resulted in legislation in British Columbia and a system of voluntary self-control by the institutions involved in England. The object of this paper is to examine the adequacy of control in some important aspects of take-over bids. As a background to discussion, two bids which disturbed the financial and legal communities in England are described. Some of the problems which were illustrated during the course of these bids are isolated and examined. These include the directors' powers when reacting to a take-over offer, disclosure of information, equality of treatment for shareholders, the role of financial advisers, and the position of minority shareholders after the completion of a bid. It will be seen that two different methods of control operate in British Columbia and in England. In British Columbia, the Securities Act 1967 contains provisions relevant to take-overs, and is administered by the Securities Commission. In England the situation is more complex. Legislative provisions are contained in the Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules, but more significant control is exercised by the Take-over Panel who administer the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers, 1969, a voluntary system of self-control. In both jurisdictions the common law plays an important role. The strengths and weaknesses of the two systems and their effect on the problems under discussion are noted. The Securities Commission has wide investigatory and legal powers, but the rules are somewhat inflexible and as the Commission is understaffed it cannot give the attention necessary to problems which may arise. The Take-over Code contains excellent rules, which may be easily adjusted to take account of changes in commercial circumstances, but the Panel suffers from a lack of legal powers. It is discovered that shareholders in each jurisdiction have common problems of access to information and enforcement of the rules. In those areas in which the common law is the controlling influence, there is uncertainty as to the rights of shareholders and the extent to which they may be affected by a resolution of the company in general meeting. It is suggested that the problems which are revealed by an examination of recent bids can best be approached through a procedure which combines the best and eliminates the worst facets of the present systems in British Columbia and in England. It is therefore recommended that a Take-over Commission be established in each jurisdiction under the Securities Act and the Companies Act respectively, having supervisory, investigatory and legal powers. Flexibility is maintained by enabling a committee of experts to draw up and continually revise the rules pertaining to take-overs. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This paper examines the effect a target's operating characteristics can have on the takeover-decision of a potential bidder. Consequently, the general socioeconomic changes within the takeover market and their consequences for companies acting within this hostile environment are described and the most common economic and non-economic motives of bidders as well as several distinctive target characteristics discussed. In particular, this study identifies and subsequently analyses 28 variables viewed to be potentially relevant for a bidder's takeover-decision. In order to obtain the best possible insights into the behavior of the identified variables and their particular influence on the likelihood of getting taken over, the specific variables are empirically tested on an individual level through the application of different nonparametric techniques as well as on a combined level through the performance of a binary logistic regression analysis. The empirical examination is based on a total of 804 observations gathered by Bloomberg L.P. for the pharmaceutical and the related health care sector and covers the period from 1996 to 2002. The results of the different testing methods, although subject to certain limitations, give reason to believe that there are indeed certain factors that can make companies more interesting for potential bidders. Therefore, a regular performance of 'target-self-tests' as suggested by the author is viewed to be paramount for an early anticipation of hostile takeover attempts and a timely establishment of adequate measures of defense, which as a consequence could contribute considerably to a decrease of a company's likelihood of getting taken over. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie fokus op die effek wat 'n potensiele teiken se bedryfseienskappe op die oorname besluit van die organisasie wat die oorname oorweeg, kan hê. Gevolglik word die algemene sosio-ekonomiese veranderinge in die oorname mark en hulle gevolge vir maatskappy wat daarbinne opereer, bespreek. Verder word die mees algemene ekonomiese en nie-ekonomiese beweegredes van maatskappye wat oornames oorweeg asook verskeie onderskeidende eienskappe van teikenmaatskappye, ook bespreek. In besonder identifiseer en analiseer hierdie studie 28 veranderlikes wat potensieel relevant mag wees tydens 'n oorname besluit. Ten einde die bes moontlik insig te verkry oor die gedrag van die ge-identifiseerde veranderlikes en hulle spesifieke invloed op die waarskynlikheid van 'n oorname, word nie-parametriese tegnieke toegepas om op individuele en saamgestelde vlak die veranderlikes empiries te toets. Hierdie empiriese ondersoek is gebaseer op 'n totaal van 804 observasies soos versamel deur Blomberg L.P. vir die farmaseutiese en verwante gesondheidsorgsektore en strek oor die tydperk 1996 tot 2002. Die resultate van die onderskeie toetsmetodes - gegewe sekere beperkings - dui daarop dat daar inderdaad sekere faktore is wat maatskappye meer aantreklike teikens vir 'n potensiele oorname kan maak. Gevolglik beskou die navorser dit as belangrik dat sekere 'selftoetse' gereeld gedoen behoort te word. Dit kan dien as vroee waarskuwingsein met betrekking tot die waarskynlikheid van 'n vyandige oorname; en kan die geteikende maatskappy help om tydige verdedigingsmeganismes in plek te kry ten einde die waarskynlikheid van oorname beduidend te verminder.

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