Donor-accountability demands have increased the importance of indicator-based Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) for official development assistance (ODA). This unremitting pressure for aid- recipient countries to produce indicators and for donors to judge the success of aid exclusively by indicators is well documented by development scholars and practitioners. The research for this dissertation examined how this pressure reffered to as "indicatorism" influenced and was influenced by the implementation of donor development aid. The donor-funded Kenya Education Sector Support Program (KESSP) served as a case study to address this issue. It investigated the factors that formed "indicatorism" for KESSP; the actual production of indicators for KESSP; the influence of the politics of development aid on M & E; and whether Geographic Information (GI) served as an alternative to indicators in the M & E process. The case study used an archival review of KESSP documentation, detailed observation of KESSP project sites, focus group discussions with KESSP stakeholders at four field sites in Kenya, interviews with donor and government officials, an analysis of KESSP indicators, and an analysis of KESSP's school mapping project (SMP). Through an examination of the historical context preceding KESSP, this dissertation concluded that a sequence of policies fostered a culture of "indicatorism". Donor policies that included structural adjustment and those that promoted global development targets have encouraged both donors and recipient governments to unrelentingly use indicators to judge aid. Within Kenya performance-contracting policies have reinforced this emphasis on indicators. An investigation of how KESSP's indicators were produced revealed that pressures to inflate indicators corrupted KESSP's M & E system. There was strong evidence that national administrative data systems produced exaggerated indicators. However, there was no evidence to suggest that local implementers over-counted core educational statistics intended to produce indicators for KESSP. An investigation of the politics that surrounded KESSP showed that political relations shaped the findings of indicator-based M & E reporting. When relations were strong at the beginning of KESSP, M & E reporting was used to show the success of KESSP. As these relations deteriorated M & E reporting reflected the rifts between donors and the Kenyan government. However, even after donors suspended aid, indicators still framed the discourse about KESSP and free primary education in Kenya. An examination of the use of GI for KESSP's M & E demonstrated that despite its planned use as an integral part of KESSP's M & E, GI was not used to evaluate KESSP. Mapping data about KESSP could have exposed the government to a degree of transparency beyond what reporting aggregate national indicators provided. There are, of course, other explanations why GI was not used. For instance, the rapid creation of new administrative districts could have also made its use infeasible. The absence of transparency in the M & E process could very well be a symptom of the culture of "indicatorism", but this lack of transparency also makes it difficult to rule out alternative explanations about KESSP and its M & E process.

Foreign capital inflows (FCI) play an important role in the economic development of the recipient country as they fund investments and promote growth. However, the size and composition of such inflows are determined on the basis of country specific requirements. The study investigates the impact of capital inflows on the economy of Kenya at a time when the government implemented economic reform measures to stabilize the economy and restore sustainable growth. More specifically, the study examines the impact of foreign capital flows remittances such as overseas workers remittance, official development aid, and external debt, on selected macro-economic variables using monthly time series data and a single-equation empirical approach. The study findings reveal that some forms of FCI are not influenced by the macro economic variables in the country but by other factors such as political stability and policy variables.

Aid effectiveness is a reoccuring theme in the social sciences. Maybe rightfully so, as development is slow in many parts of the developing world. Core literature on the matter seems to suggest that aid effectiveness is contingent on recipients’ level of corruption. Assuming this to be true, I examine the EU’s disbursements of Official Development Assistance over the past decade by running regressions: is there a relationship between the level of aid received, and a country’s level of corruption? As the EU is one of the largest donors of foreign aid globally, and has the power to shape the global foreign aid agenda, this question puts to the test whether the EU is leading the way, or rather is an obstacle in front. My findings suggest that corruption is not a determinant for aid. The EU thus fails to provide the much needed incentive for reforming political structures and fighting corruption in the developing countries.

Notre recherche combine deux approches dans l’analyse de la politique étrangère saoudienne relative à l’octroi de l’aide au développement: i) une approche interne (analyse des politique générales : l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre des programmes d’aide publique au développement ; l’identification des principaux acteurs de l’APD et l’analyse des résultats de l’APD ? ii) et une approche internationale (en se basant sur la théorie des relations internationales, nous identifions les mécanismes qui sous-Tendent la politique d’aide saoudienne ainsi que le rôle du Fonds Saoudien de Développement dans l’efficacité et l’efficience de l’Aide Publique au Développement. Nous cherchons, tout au long de ce travail, à apporter des éléments de réponse quant à l’ambivalence qui plane sur le visé de l’APD saoudienne. Nous traitons la question des aides internationales et les programmes du développement présentés par le gouvernement saoudien. L’objectif de ce travail sera donc l’étude et l’analyse du rôle de l’APD saoudienne dans la lutte contre la pauvreté essentiellement dans les pays en développement. / Our research combines two approaches in the analysis of Saudi foreign policy on the granting of development assistance: i) an internal approach (general policy analysis: the development and implementation of assistance programs official development identifying the main actors of ODA and analysis of the results of ODA? ii) and an international approach (based on the theory of international relations, we identify the mechanisms that underlie Saudi aid policy and the role of the Saudi Development Fund in the efficiency and effectiveness of ODA. We seek, throughout this work, to provide some answers about the ambivalence that hovers over the target of ODA Saudi Arabia. We treat the issue of international aid and development programs presented by the Saudi government. objective of this work will be the study and analysis of the role of ODA Saudi in the fight against poverty mainly in developing countries.

En matière d’aide au développement le droit est aussi inventif que fertile : droits économiques et sociaux, droits de l’homme, développement humain durable, etc. ; autant de matières mises en balance avec le droit du marché, de la concurrence sous couvert d’un intérêt économique général. La première option de cette étude est d’envisager les mécanismes juridiques propres à l’aide au développement à travers ces deux finalités à première vue antinomiques : l’efficience économique et le développement humain. La seconde est de délimiter le champ de recherche à la matière conventionnelle afin d’apprécier le seul processus partenarial qui, du point de vue de la coopération internationale, n’a pas livré tout son potentiel. L’intérêt de ce modèle de coopération internationale fondé sur le « Partenariat » n’est encore que secondaire comparé à la nature des parties (publique et privée) qui s’obligent, la nature des droits (politiques, économiques et sociaux) qu’il se propose de concilier, et enfin, les obligations à la fois de rentabilité et d’humanisme (le marché du développement humain) qu’il impose aux partenaires. Ainsi, la finalité de cette recherche est, certes, d’interroger les effets juridiques de tels partenariats, mais également de considérer le contrat de marchés publics d’aide au développement comme, potentiellement, porteur d’une nouvelle formule de coopération visant à résorber les inégalités de développement entre États. / As regards development aid the law is as creative as fertile : economic and social rights, human rights, sustainable development, etc. ; so many matters put in balance with the market law, the competition on behalf of a general economic interest. The first option of this study is to consider the legal mechanisms peculiar to the development aid through these two ends, at first sight paradoxical/antinomical : the economic efficiency and the human development. The second is to bound the field of research to the conventional material in order to appreciate the only process partnership which, from the international cooperation point of view, has not delivered yet all his potential. The interest of this international cooperation pattern based on the ”Partnership” remains still secondary, compared with the nature of the parties (public and private) which bind themselves, the nature of the rights (political, economical and social) that it sets out to conciliate, and finally, the bonds of profitability as well as humanism (the market of human development) it imposes upon its partners. Thus, the purpose of this research is indeed, to question the legal effects of such partnerships, but also, to regard the contract of public procurements of Development Aid, as potentially a growth market of an new model cooperation to be used for resorb inequalities of development between states.