Syftet med uppsatsen har varit att undersök om USA:s och Kinas agerande för attsäkerställa tillgången på olja medför en sådan risk att en allvarlig konflikt kan uppstå mellanstaterna. Genom att utforska världens produktion och konsumtion av olja mellan åren 2000 -2004 klarläggs dels vilka de stora producentområdena är, dels att världen idag har fått ettökande behov av olja. Tillsammans med hur världens idag kända reserver är fördeladeunderstryks den strategiska betydelsen av Mellanöstern.Genom att studera USA:s och Kinas nuvarande produktion, konsumtion, reserver ochprognoser inför framtiden skapas en bra bild över vilket beroende av importerad olja de haridag och bedöms få i framtiden. Allt tyder på att USA och Kina i fortsättningen kommer varastarkt beroende av importerad olja från Mellanöstern.Den empiriska undersökningen visar på stora skillnader mellan staternas agerande inomden politiska, ekonomiska och militära sektorn. I slutanalysen är det möjligt att peka ut fyraområden där det i framtiden finns allvarliga risker för konflikt mellan USA och Kina i derassträvanden efter tillgång på olja. Det första berör Kinas aggressiva oljestrategi. Den andra är detkinesiska samarbetet med ”the rogue state” Iran och den allians som håller på att formas mellanländerna. Det tredje området som har identifierats är Kinas strävan efter att skapa politisktinflytande i Mellanöstern och den fjärde är den kinesiska marina uppbyggnaden där Kinasmålsättning är att skapa en ”blue-water navy” för att kunna skydda sina egna oljetransporterfrån Mellanöstern. Det är viktigt i sammanhanget att påpeka att allt inte faller tillbaka på Kinautan att det snarare är Kinas strävan att få en plats i solen som kolliderar med amerikanskaviljan att bibehålla sin dominans. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-uppsHylla: Upps. ChP 03-05

Hensikten med denne oppgaven er å undersøke i hvilken grad Norges energistrategiske betydninghar fått gjennomslag i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk etter den kalde krigen, og hvordan dette kanforklares.Norge er pr 2002 verdens sjette største oljeprodusent, og verdens tredje største oljeeksportør etterSaudi-Arabia og Russland. Norge er dessuten verdens tredje største eksportør av gass i rør, og dennorske gasseksporten utgjorde i år 2001 om lag to prosent av verdens totale gassforbruk.Denne energistrategiske betydningen har tilsynelatende ikke fått noen sentral plass i utformingenav den norske sikkerhetspolitikken, noe som med stor sannsynlighet skyldes at den norskeregjeringen bevisst har valgt å ikke sikkerhetisere den norske petroleumsproduksjonen. / This paper analyses to what extent Norwegian oil- and gas production has influencedNorwegian security policy after the cold war.As of 2002, Norway was the world's sixth largest oil producer, and the world's thirdlargest oil exporting country. Norway is one of the world's major gas producers aswell, and approximately 30% of the European Union's gas imports comes fromNorway, and for some countries as much as 40% is imported from Norway. Thisgives Norway significant influence on the international oil- and gas market.Today, no industrialised country can manage to keep up its industrial production,transport or general welfare without this energy, and there are no substitute productsavailable in the short or long term to replace oil or gas. As a major petroleumproducer, Norway is therefore in a position where it must maintain production evenin times of crisis and conflict in order to keep the European Union’s economiessolvent. Norway itself could also become involved indirectly in conflicts if one of theconflict parties wants to hurt the oil market. Norwegian petroleum installations couldbe attacked by foreign military forces or, more likely, by terrorists. Norway couldeven be faced with international political pressure to control where and when toexport its petroleum. Therefore Norway needs to take this into account whendeveloping its security policy. However, the general impression is that Norway hasn'tdone so, and the question is why.This paper clearly demonstrates that oil- and gas production has not achieved anexplicit and dominant position in Norway’s security policy. To the contrary, it washardly mentioned at all until the dramatic fall of oil prices during the winter of 1997-1998. During 1998 petroleum was widely discussed by the government, by externalagencies and individuals, but in 1999 the subject again disappeared fromgovernmental papers.The most likely explanation seems to be that the Norwegian government thinks thatthe best security policy is to focus as little attention as possible on its petroleumproduction. To defend all installations against a terrorist or military attack would beextremely difficult, and in case of a traditional military attack on Norway, NATOwould be involved anyway. In case of a terrorist seizure of an oil platform, Norwayhas a military unit trained to handle that situation. Further, the risk of anenvironmental catastrophe resulting from a terrorist attack is not as high as it mightseem at first glance. The platforms are constructed to minimize damage from firesand minor explosions, and the wells are equipped with vents to shut off oil leakage incase of emergency. Through incidents during the '70s and '80s, Norway learned thatit can cope with international political pressure by strictly keeping to a commercialpolicy in the trade of petroleum, while limiting political control to the exploitation ofthe resources.All in all, the Norwegian government has developed a security policy that focuses aslittle attention as possible on oil- and gas production, and it has maintained thatpolicy almost uninterrupted through the 1990s. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

EU bruker stadig mer energi, spesiellt olje og gass, og må stadig øke importen.Organisasjonens egen produksjon er ikke tilstrekkelig til å dekke energibehovet.Russland og Norge er noen av de største eksportlandene av petroleum til EU.Oppgaven er å analysere energipolitikken som EU fører mot Russland og Norge.Som en følge av energipolitikken som EU fører mot disse to landene er detinteressant å se hvilke sikkerhetsmessige konsekvenser/forhold dette eventueltforårsaker innen triangelet EU, Russland og Norge. / European Union consumes increasingly more and energy, particularly oil and gas. Afollowing consequence is larger imports of these sources of energy. The organisationsown production does not satisfy the need of this vital energy.This article will focus on and analyse the EU energy policy towards Russia andNorway. Due to the organisations policy towards these countries, interesting pointsare the following consequences this makes inside the triangle, EU, Russia andNorway / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02