by Mok Yeuk-shing. / Includes bibliographical references / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1986

The thesis will show how Jennifer Dawson's fiction of the 1960s and '70s explores the effects of the overlapping dialects of the normalizing discourse, interlocking manifestations of constraint that consolidate themselves through internalization on a continuum that underpins, generates, perpetuates and constitutes perceptions of `the social. ' A Laingian reading of the scapegoating of perceived dissenters, to invalidate or ideally to pre-empt implied dissent and to confirm in their membership the members of `the group, ' will be applied to illuminate the response provoked by Dawson's protagonists, semantically discredited by a continuum of coercive structures that range from the psychiatric to the dynamic of individual relationships. A Foucauldian analysis of the transition of the maintenance of the status quo from identifiable applications of force to democratized formulations of normalizing power to an internalization of the panoptic principle will further contextualize the dilemmas and tensions of Dawson's protagonists, on whose experience Procrustean identities are systematically if subtly imposed. A Foucauldian perspective will be used to cast light on the feelings of deadlock addressed in the novels, where the tendency of power to incite identification makes a locus of authentic resistance elusive and hard to sustain. This perspective will also inform how Dawson's fiction dramatizes the futility of resistance that fails to engage at the level of form and which thus reinforces power's underlying paradigm, even on the sites of its ostensible subversion. The thesis will demonstrate how her novels increasingly reflect the Laingian concept of contextual intelligibility, revealing how the targets and transmission wires of the normalizing drive are fully enmeshed in power's dynamic structure. Foucault's emphasis on the interstitial will be applied to show how, in her fiction of the `70s, the mutual impact of individual lives is portrayed as not only constraining but also as potentially inspiring. Her protagonists move towards a conscious awareness of the need to forge and activate an interstitial perspective, symbolized initially by music, from which to transcend collusion with the normalizing drive. Only when `freedom' is understood to be not a destination but an attitude of mind do her protagonists emerge from the impasse of complicity and develop a receptiveness to genuine exchange and a view of themselves as more than merely acted upon but as potential definers and inhabitants of their experience.

Esta investigação busca aproximar as vivências da privação de liberdade em pacientes detentos num hospital penitenciário e compreende--las à luz da questão da liberdade segundo Hannah Arendt. Ela surge a partir da percepção da existência de muitas formas de se estar preso, além do que comumente se compreende como o encarceramento. Inicia--se com uma descrição fenomenológica do Centro Hospitalar do Sistema Penitenciário em que se busca compreender as peculiaridades deste lugar onde duas instituições complexas, o hospital e a prisão, se encontram; passa por uma aproximação das atividades do homem segundo Hannah Arendt (trabalho, obra e ação) no contexto do hospital penitenciário; e chega a narrativas de encontros entre a investigadora e quatro pacientes detentos, nos quais suas histórias e a maneira como vivem a privação de liberdade se acercam. Por fim, a partir de uma discussão teórica acerca da questão da liberdade, conclui--se, através dos encontros narrados e das transformações que a pesquisadora sofreu ao longo de dois anos de trabalho no hospital penitenciário, que a liberdade é restrita nesse contexto não como inicialmente havia se pensado, mas principalmente de outras maneiras. Se a liberdade é compreendida como o início de algo novo, acostumar--se à prisão significa sua restrição. A impossibilidade de encontro com o outro observada em pessoas que perpetraram alguns tipos de crime também impossibilita a liberdade enquanto ação entre os homens. Ainda assim, em situações muito específicas se pode avistar na prisão a possibilidade da ação que instaure o novo singular, principalmente quando a vida de quem está preso pode ser transformada numa história que se possa contar / This study examines experiences of liberty deprivation by inmates in a penitentiary hospital through the prism of Hannah Arendts question of liberty. It offers a broader scope of inmates perception of their own imprisonment, beyond the usual understanding of incarceration as simply deprivation of freedom. The first part presents a phenomenological description of the Penitentiary Systems Hospital Center, examining the peculiarities of this space, where two complex institutions, the hospital and the prison, meet. The second part explores Hannah Arendts human activities (labor, work and action) in the context of the penitentiary hospital. The third part analyses the narratives of the encounter between the researcher, and her transformations over the two years conducting field research, and four inmates, in which their account and their experience of liberty deprivation come near. These clinical results examined within the elaborated theoretical framework clearly indicate that freedom, understood as starting something new, may actually take place in a prison, even if circumscribed

Programme evaluation research examined the criminological and socio-legal issues of a Claimant Fraud Investigation Program (CFIP) operating inside the workers' compensation system. Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to evaluate the programmes' choice of deterrence as an instrumental mechanism for achieving compliance. Key aspects of the programme were analysed from both criminological and socio-legal standpoints. Justice and liberty tensions were examined in reference to the programmes' deterrence mechanisms and the perceptions of fourteen participants' were thematically analysed. The study develops an analytically useful concept of light blue-collar crime that could be applied to other organisations and scenarios. The study concluded the programme is not effective and has more of a symbolic than instrumental value. It conducts itself ethically, however, there are problems with its' choice of deterrence and the study indicates there is a low probability for a deterrent effect. Recommendations are made for other actors and institutions to play non-deterrence based roles intended to achieve compliance.

Ip Hon Ho. / Thesis (M.Div.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-82). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.3 / Chapter 2. --- Different beliefs of the free market --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Market' as invisible hand guided by self-interest --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Market as a platform to promote prosperity of life and freedom --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3 --- Market as a place of competition --- p.8 / Chapter 2.4 --- Market as a self-regulating system --- p.9 / Chapter 2.5 --- Private Property right as the necessary condition for free market economy --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Review of contemporary Christian critiques of market --- p.10 / Chapter 3.1 --- Michael Novak: defense of classic liberal economy --- p.11 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The concept of liberty --- p.11 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- The 'co-creation' role of man --- p.12 / Chapter 3.1.3. --- The tripartite system and the sinful nature of man in a free market economy --- p.13 / Chapter 3.2 --- Rebecca M. Blank: Criticism on Market from an economist and a theologian --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The model of competitive market --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.2. --- Conflicting values between beliefs in competitive market with Christian values --- p.15 / Chapter 3.3 --- Paul Tillich's critique on free market --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3.1. --- The religious relevance of Capitalism and Free market --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Tillich model of criticism --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Depending Conditions for capitalism: Technical reasons --- p.22 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Criticism of the Spirit of Capitalism and Free market --- p.23 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- Criticism of the form of capitalism --- p.26 / Chapter 3.3.6 --- The big machine --- p.27 / Chapter 3.4 --- The insufficiencies of the above Christian Critique --- p.30 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Michael Novak: --- p.31 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Rebecca Blank --- p.32 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Paul Tillich --- p.32 / Chapter 4. --- The discussion on the freedom in free market --- p.33 / Chapter 4.1 --- Economic Compulsion --- p.34 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Economic reason: Monopolistic power --- p.35 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Political Reason: Political Economy --- p.37 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Short Summary --- p.39 / Chapter 4.2 --- Slavery Characteristics of free market --- p.40 / Chapter 4.3 --- Basic Characteristics of a slavery system --- p.40 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Backgrounds of Slavery system in Greco Roman Empire --- p.41 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Structure of the working relationship: Dehumanized structure --- p.42 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Social status: Alienation --- p.43 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Incentive system: Another form of Economic Compulsion --- p.44 / Chapter 4.3.5 --- Short summary --- p.47 / Chapter 4.4 --- Slavery characteristics of the free market --- p.47 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Working relationship: dehumanized structure --- p.48 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Social status: Alienation --- p.50 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Incentive system: Another form of Economic Compulsion --- p.51 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Short Summary --- p.54 / Chapter 5. --- The critique of the spirituality of market by the concept of 'market spirituality' --- p.54 / Chapter 5.1 --- The ground of understanding spirituality --- p.55 / Chapter 5.2 --- Basic Characteristics of spirituality --- p.57 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- First-order and second-order experiences of Spirituality --- p.57 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The trainable quality of Spirituality: Ascetical and Mystical aspect --- p.58 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- The unintentional ascetical aspect of spirituality --- p.59 / Chapter 5.3 --- The understanding and basic assumptions of Market Spirituality --- p.62 / Chapter 5.4 --- The Formation of spirituality in our daily routine --- p.64 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Pathway of knowing in free market --- p.66 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Pathway of acting in free market --- p.67 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Pathway of relating to others in free market --- p.69 / Chapter 5.5 --- Common examples of market spirituality --- p.69 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Believing in the self-regulatory mechanism --- p.69 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Competitive spirituality --- p.70 / Chapter 5.5.3 --- Detachment relationship --- p.72 / Chapter 5.5.4 --- Consumerism --- p.73 / Chapter 5.5.5 --- Commodification --- p.74 / Chapter 5.5.6 --- Short summary --- p.75 / Chapter 5.6 --- Theological reflections on market spirituality --- p.76 / Chapter 5.6.1 --- The penetration of the market spirituality into our church and individual life --- p.76 / Chapter 5.6.2. --- Contrast with the Christian Spirituality --- p.77 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.79 / Bibliography --- p.80

La recherche avait pour objet l'étude de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel à l'aune de la liberté des Anciens et de la liberté des Modernes, concepts proposés par Benjamin Constant en 1819. Le juge constitutionnel français semble plus enclin à protéger les exigences de la liberté des Anciens que l'autonomie individuelle. La première partie de la thèse tente de démontrer que le Conseil constitutionnel opère un contrôle des principes de la représentation politique au service de la liberté des Anciens : la Haute instance est exigeante en ce qui concerne l'élaboration démocratique de la norme et la préservation des « biens » collectifs tels que l'unité du peuple souverain ou l'indivisibilité de la République. La seconde partie de la thèse est consacrée au contrôle du respect des droits individuels, qui est également opéré au service de la liberté des Anciens. L'existence d'un recours juridictionnel suffit souvent à garantir la constitutionnalité des atteintes aux droits substantiels, en laissant une large marge de manœuvre à la représentation politique. Le juge constitutionnel s'est néanmoins montré rigoureux à l'égard du respect des libertés de communication, sans lesquelles les représentants disposent d'une légitimité électorale mais non pas démocratique. / The research had for subject the study of the decisions of the Constitutional Council in the light of the liberty of the Ancients and the liberty of the Moderns, both concepts proposed by Benjamin Constant in 1819. The French constitutional judge seems more inclined to protect the requirements of the liberty of the Ancients than the individual autonomy. The first part of the thesis attempts to demonstrate that the Constitutional Council operates a control of the principles of the political representation to the benefit of the liberty of the Ancients : the High authority is demanding as regards the democratic elaboration of the law and the conservation of the collective "goods" such as the sovereign people's unity or the indivisibility of the Republic. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to the control of the respect for individual rights, which is also operated in the service of the liberty of the Ancients. The existence of a jurisdictional appeal is often enough to guarantee the constitutionality of infringements of substantial rights, leaving a wide margin of discretion to the political representation. The constitutional judge nevertheless showed himself rigorous towards the respect for the liberties of communication, without which the representatives have an electoral but not democratic legitimacy.

康德在《單純理性範圍內的宗教》一書中非常重視「思慮品格」(Gesinnung)這個概念，並把它視為所有行動的「終極基本格準」。首先，他認為一個人或道德行動者為善或是惡取決於這種「傾向」。再者，「思慮品格」在康德的行動理論中亦扮演非常重要的角色，它解釋了理性行動者作惡的可能條件。故此，「思慮品格」是評價康德關於「根本惡」以及理性行動理論的重要概念。進一步說，「道德完整」的可能性以及「道德歷程」的可理解性也都建基於此概念。因此，「思慮品格」對於康德道德哲學的整體計劃而言也甚為關鍵。儘管康德在《道德底形上學之基礎》及《實踐理性批判》兩本書中曾數度提及「思慮品格」，但這概念在康德《單純理性範圍內的宗教》之前的著作中卻似未受到充分的重視。本文將要指出，康德並非在其後期作品中才突然提出「思慮品格」這概念，事實上，在許多較早的著作中，這個關鍵的概念早已留下重要的理論線索。 / 本文嘗試指出，康德在討論《實踐理性之批判》裡的「自由範疇」理論，特別是論及「道德人格」範疇時，早已舖排有關「思慮品格」的理論。「道德人格」範疇與「思慮品格」分別為道德罪責提供智性及心理根據，而後者正是以前者作為根據。對康德而言，「道德人格」並非一個心理概念，而是實踐判斷的先驗形式，正如「實體/屬性」這個在時間中連結不同直覺之基礎的「自然範疇」一般，作為它的同位範疇 (isomorphic category)，「道德人格」是關聯個別實踐判斷的基礎。然而，我們仍然需要解釋，行動的證成理由如何推動我們的意志，因為對「有限理性行動者」而言，純粹理性並不一定具有實踐性，或者說，一個行動的證成理由並不一定是我們的動力。康德正是以「思慮品格」這個概念來闡明採納「格準」的心理基礎。當我們釐清了採納「格準」的心理基礎後，便能明白人在甚麼意義下要為自己的行動負責。本文希望能夠清楚闡明「思慮品格」與「道德人格」的關係，更希望由此說明這兩個概念以及「自由範疇表」的理論關係，並對有關問題引起更多關注和討論。 / In religion within the limit of reason alone Kant deliberately proposes the concept Gesinnung and regards it as the “ultimate underlying maxim“ of all actions. Firstly, whether a certain person or a moral agent should be regarded as good or evil depends on this ‘disposition’. Moreover, Gesinnung assumes an important role in Kant's theory of action, namely to explain how it is possible for a rational agent to act evil. It is thus an important aspect of evaluating Kant's account of radical evil and rational agency. Furthermore, the possibility of moral integrity and the intelligibility of moral progress also lie in this concept, rendering it important also in Kant's whole project of moral philosophy. Although Gesinnung appears in Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason for a few times, very little had been said about the use of the term until Religion was written. It would be strange to for Kant to propose this important concept all of a sudden without any previous clues. I shall argue that the clues can already be found in the discussion of Categories of Freedom (the category of Personality) in the Critique of Practical Reason. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the category “personality“ and Gesinnung serve to provide the rational and psychological grounds of moral imputation respectively, and that the latter arises from the foundation built from the former. The category “personality“ is not a psychological concept but an a priori form of practical judgment: as isomorphic to the categories, “personality“ serves as the ground of relating discrete practical judgments just as “subsistence and inherence“ in categories of nature serves as the ground of relating intuitions in time. But we also need a psychological ground for moral imputation to explain how the justifying reason motivates our will, as for a finite rational agent pure reason may not always be practical, i.e. the justifying reasons for certain actions may not always be our motivation for the actions. Kant uses Gesinnung as a conceptual apparatus to explain the psychological ground for the adoption of maxims and hence how we impute our actions. Through this essay, I hope that I have explained the relation between Gesinnung and “personality“ clearly and more importantly, shown that the theoretical significance of these two concepts and the table of the Categories of Freedom deserve closer attention. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Ng, Yat Kan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-121). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Table of contents --- p.v / Chapter 0.1 --- Prelude: structure of the essay --- p.1 / Chapter 1.01 --- Searching for the unchanged in the midst of changes- legacy of western philosophy --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1 --- Kant and the category of Subsistence and Inherence --- p.5 / Chapter 1.11 --- The ‘placement problem’ in the Categories of the Understanding --- p.5 / Chapter 1.111 --- Mathematical categories as a priori conditions of intuition --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2 --- “Substance and its transcendental time-determination --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- Kant’s critique of the a-temporal treatment of Substance --- p.20 / Chapter 2 --- Kant’s on the problem of the personal identity: Transcendental “I“, Refutation of Idealism and brief remarks on “personality“ in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.26 / Chapter 2.1 --- Transcendental apperception --- p.26 / Chapter 2.11 --- Kant’s refutation of idealism --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2 --- Preliminary remark: “Person and its genealogy --- p.38 / Chapter 2.21 --- Personality: Remarks from Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.41 / Chapter 3 --- Interlude: Brief accounts on the Moral Law and Autonomy --- p.45 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Moral Law 45 / Chapter 3.2 --- On autonomy: an explication on the role of “self“ in “self-legislation“ --- p.51 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Wood’s etymological mistake --- p.52 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Kant’s distinction on the “author and the “legislator“ of the law --- p.53 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Typic as a “procedure and the significance of “autos --- p.57 / Chapter 3.3 --- Intelligible noumenal character and the Empirical phenomenal character --- p.61 / Chapter 4 --- “Personality“ in Kant’s moral philosophy --- p.69 / Chapter 4.1 --- Overview of the problem --- p.69 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Categories of Freedom: a complete failure? --- p.71 / Chapter 4.3 --- “Personality as the “substratum of moral actions 85 / Chapter 5 --- The Analysis of the Will and Radical Evil --- p.94 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction: The Good Will and the Absolutely Good Will --- p.94 / Chapter 5.11 --- The Good and the Evil --- p.95 / Chapter 5.2 --- Autonomy part two: Wille and Willkür --- p.101 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Gesinnung --- p.104 / Chapter 5.31 --- Gesinnung and Personality: the psychological and rational grounds of moral imputation --- p.105 / Chapter 5.32 --- Gesinnung and Radical Evil --- p.110 / Chapter 6 --- Concluding remarks --- p.118 / Chapter 7 --- Bibliography --- p.120

A crítica de Marx à política, embora esparsa em seus escritos, possui um caráter bem definido e coerente, que se mantém ao longo de toda a sua obra desde a Questão Judaica (1843) até a Crítica de Gotha (1875). Essa pesquisa tem como objetivo apresentar, em seu conjunto, os principais aspectos dessa crítica. Começamos com a análise de seu princípio fundamental, a identificação da sociedade civil como base real do Estado, e a determinação do vínculo orgânico existente entre o Estado e a propriedade privada. Em seguida, passamos à crítica do Estado moderno, a partir de suas duas formas extremas: a forma bonapartista, que explicita a natureza do Estado como máquina de escravização do trabalho pelo capital, e a forma democrática, denunciada em seus limites intrínsecos e identificada como grau máximo de liberdade sob a dominação do capital. Seguimos com a crítica do direito, que atinge tanto o seu conteúdo quanto a sua forma, incluindo os direitos humanos. Passamos então à crítica da superstição política, isto é, às ilusões políticas teóricas e práticas, que abarcam desde as robinsonadas contratualistas às ilusões dos estadistas e revolucionários, com destaque para a crítica do viés democrático. Por fim, após explicitar a incompatibilidade radical entre política e liberdade humana e diferenciar a revolução meramente política da revolução social radical, chegamos à afirmação de uma nova qualidade de liberdade, para além da política, isto é, à abolição positiva da política, entendida como reabsorção das forças sociais usurpadas pelo Estado. / Marxs critique of politics, though spread throughout his writings, has a well-defined and coherent character that remains constant in all his work, from On the Jewish Question (1843) to Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875). This research aims to present the leading aspects of that critique as a whole. We start from the analysis of its main principles, namely the identification of civil society as the real base of State, and the organic connection between State and private property. Then we focus on the critique of modern State in both its extreme forms: the Bonapartist form, that accounts for the nature of the State as a slavering machine of labour by capital; and the democratic form, unveiled in its inherent limits and identified as the highest level of liberty under domination of capital. After that we turn to the critique of Right, which aims both its content and its form, including human rights. Then we approach the critique of political superstition, i.e., both theoretical and practical political illusions, that comprises a wide range of notions, from the contractualist robinsonades to the statesmens and revolutionaries illusions, with special emphasis on the critique of the democratic bias. At last, after clarifying the irreconcilability between politics and human liberty, and distinguishing between merely political revolution and radical social revolution, we get to the claim of a new quality of liberty, beyond politics, which means the positive suppression of politics, understood as reabsorption of social forces usurped by the State.

Neste trabalho examinamos a concepção de sociedade civil no pensamento social e político de Benjamin Franklin, cujas idéias exerceram grande influência na formação da mentalidade do homem do Novo Mundo. Essa mentalidade inaugura um novo modo de conceber a vida em sociedade, exaltando tudo o que se opõe aos valores da velha ordem. Contra o princípio da honra, os títulos de nobreza e a posição social dos indivíduos, ela exalta a virtude republicana, celebra o trabalho e reclama o respeito à dignidade humana, intrínseca a todos os homens independente da sua condição de nascimento. Não por acaso, virtude e trabalho aparecem como categorias centrais no pensamento de Benjamin Franklin. Longe de degradante, ele entendia o trabalho como energia vital do homem e expressão de sua liberdade. Além de ser um meio para obtenção da riqueza, o trabalho servia também para promover a virtude na medida em que libertava o homem da condição de pobreza, servilismo e dependência da boa vontade dos outros. A tese aí era de que o homem não pode ser considerado verdadeiramente livre se não for, ao mesmo tempo, politicamente livre e economicamente independente. Nesse sentido, sua concepção de sociedade se apresenta articulada com princípios que remontam a uma antiga tradição. É principalmente no ideal da civitas libera, ou Estado livre, que ela se inspira. Esse ideal havia predominado na Roma republicana de Tito Lívio, foi revivido e adaptado no renascimento italiano, sobretudo por Machiavel, e retomado no século XVII pelos defensores da causa republicana inglesa. No século XVIII, essa influência chegou até as colônias inglesas na América e teve em Franklin um dos seus principais representantes. / In this work we inspect the conception of civil society in the social and political ideas of Benjamin Franklin, which exerted large influence on the mentality constitution of the New World´s man. This mentality had initiated a new way to conceive the life in society exalting all that opposed the values of the old order. Against the principle of honor, the nobility titles, and the individual social position it exalts the republican virtue, celebrates the work, and claims respect for human dignity inherent to all men, not depending on their birth condition. Not by chance, virtue and work appears like central categories in the ideas of Benjamin Franklin. Far from conceiving it as shameful, he comprehended the work as the man´s vital energy and expression of his freedom. More than a way to obtain wealth, the work also attended to promote the virtue once it released man from the poverty and servility condition as much as from the dependence of the others good will. This theses utters that man couldn´t be considered free if he wasn´t at the same time politically free and economic independent. In this way, his conception of society seems articulated with doctrines that ascend an ancient tradition. It is mainly inspired by the ideal of civitas libera or the Free State. This ideal had predominated in the Republican Rome of Tito Livio, and then was relived and adapted by the Italian Renascence, mainly by Machiavelli, and was recovered by the defenders of the English republican cause, in the seventeenth century. This influence came to the English colonies in America in the eighteenth century, and it had in Franklin one of its main representatives.

The ideas of liberty presented in the important works of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, The Second Treatise of Government (1689) and On Liberty (1859), are often viewed as belonging to the same conceptual tradition, that of English liberalism. This thesis is an articulation of the diversity between the theories of liberty expressed by Locke and Mill in the Second Treatise and On liberty. \ am aiming to provide a corrective to the tendency to ignore or to gloss over very significant differences between the two men. The work concentrates on the philosophical aspects of each theory of liberty, arguing that they differ in four respects. These are; definitions of liberty; justifications of liberty; how much liberty and for whom they recommend it, and finally, who they believe threatens liberty and how this threat is to be curbed. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that in terms of these areas Locke and Mill are pursuing different ends. I conclude that Locke and Mill present strikingly different theories of liberty and cannot be thought of as belonging to the one conceptual tradition in terms of the definition, the justification, the prescription and the threat to liberty. Ultimately, I question the value of including Locke and Mill in the one conceptual tradition of liberty solely on the basis that they argue ‘freedom from.’