Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / Most African states today are facing the serious challenge of socio-economic development. This is a problem not generated by the paucity of material and natural resources, but rather by challenges arising from mismanagement of these resources. Nigeria is in fact, a good example of a country in Africa facing socio-economic development challenges not as a result of lack of resources, but rather the mismanagement of abundant resources at its disposal. This mismanagement is associated with the culture of prebendal, clientelist and neo-patrimonial politics which have made it extremely difficult for technocrats and bureaucrats to contribute adequately to the development of the country. In fact, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, technocrats in Nigeria are not allowed to occupy sensitive economic development positions for a sustained period of time and are never the driving forces in the formulation of socio-economic development policies and initiatives. In this country bureaucrats and technocrats have not been a stable force for development- given the constant changes of these groups by the political leadership and the splitting of sensitive ministerial portfolios for political reasons. Instead, political offices are captured and used for the benefits of office holders and those of their associated factions, class and ethnic groups. This negatively affects the insulation of appointed technocrats and bureaucrats from vested political interests. Therefore, instead of appointing or employing technocrats and seasoned bureaucrats to occupy relevant positions, appointments and employments are done in order for people to share from what is commonly referred to as ‘national cake’ in the parlance of Nigerian politics. Central to the argument of this thesis is that one-party dominance and authoritarianism does not necessarily undermines techno-bureaucratic governance, as the cases of countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore in Asia as well as Botswana and South Africa in Africa suggest, but when such system is associated with politics of prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism techno-bureaucratic governance becomes difficult and the achievement of state’s led development becomes more daunting. This work therefore investigates why attempts at promoting prebendalism, clientelism and neo-patrimonialism under Nigeria’s one-party dominant system undermines techno-bureaucratic governance. It also unravels how these have impacted negatively on socio-economic development of the country from 1999 to 2014. This study will contribute to the understanding of how the insulation of technocrats and bureaucrats from vested political interests can contribute to the development of the underdeveloped countries, using the developmental state argument as a basis of analysis.

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Zambia is one of only three countries in southern Africa which has experienced two alternations, but there has been little institutional reform since independence. A time-based comparison of Zambia’s constitution, legislation and institutions from 1991 to 2015 is conducted because the ‘moving picture’ reveals continuities which tend to be overlooked by a ‘snapshot’ analysis. New incumbents are reluctant to relinquish the increasing returns derived from executive dominance and weak oversight institutions such as the national assembly and judiciary. Therefore, institutional weaknesses from Zambia’s one-party state have infiltrated the multi-party era, where they continue to blur the separation of powers. Factionalism stemming from ethnic polarisation, which emerged in the colonial era, undermines all ruling parties in Zambia. The study finds that succession contests, triggered by term limits or the deaths of sitting presidents, are the primary mechanism which repeatedly weakens dominant parties. The outcomes of such intra-party conflicts have far-reaching consequences for the political party system by giving rise to new parties, re-orientating ethnic and political alliances, and contributing to turnover in elections. However, the dissertation reveals that both the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and the Patriotic Front governments in Zambia reneged on the reforms which they promised while in opposition and opted to maintain the constitutional clauses, repressive legislation and patronage system which they inherited. An extensive analysis of the 35 by-elections which occurred after the 2011 turnover ascertains that there was pervasive co-option of opposition members into the Patriotic Front, leading back to the dominant path. Therefore, the dissertation concludes that one-party dominance in Zambia is path dependent. Consequently, it is an alternation fallacy to expect the ousting of a dominant party to stimulate democratisation. Democracy advocates will need to confront the challenge of providing incentives that will persuade incumbents to undertake reforms which diminish executive dominance and strengthen the independence of oversight institutions.

Over the past decade, a third wave of autocratisation has stormed the world, hitting democracies and autocracies alike. The ongoing democratic backsliding is attributed to a range of factors. From “executive aggrandisement” and strategic manipulation of elections to "autocratic lawfare”. Such autocratic tendencies are contributing to autocratisation in dominant party regimes in Africa. If most dominant party systems are increasingly autocratising in Africa, then there is a problem with the dominant party structure that warrants academic inquiry. However, the literature on one-party dominance and democratic consolidation in Africa are a bit old, hence do not address the current debates on democratic backsliding in the continent. Botswana and Tanzania are interesting cases of autocratising dominant party systems because they have witnessed rapid erosion of democratic qualities over the decade. But what effects do these patterns of democratic backsliding have on the quality of democracy in dominant party systems in Africa? Employing a comparative research design (MSSD) and using historical institutionalism and the substantive democratic theory as well as relying on secondary data in Botswana and Tanzania (Mainly Afrobarometer surveys, V-Dem Index, CPI Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and Freedom Index), this study explores this question within the framework of peace and development research. It analysed four variables: management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition. Findings suggest that a dominant party structure in Botswana and Tanzania creates conditions that erode the quality of democracy, hence democratic backsliding. Therefore, the thesis argues that autocratisation in Botswana and Tanzania suggests reproduction of one-party dominance at the expense of consolidation of substantive democracy. This way, a dominant party structure in Africa appears to be a peace and development research problem because it creates strong incentives for dominant parties to autocratise rather than democratise when challenged by a strong political opposition.

This thesis, “One-Party Democracy”: Prospects for a Future Democratic China with Reference to Swedish Democratic Experience, attempts to contribute further to the investigation on democracy in the People’s Republic of China. In a comparative and institutional analysis, this study aims to gauge a possible future way for the future democratic features in the People’s Republic of China to emerge by using, as a point of reference, the Swedish system of a one-party dominant democracy under the rule of a socialist party in a capitalist economy.