知識經濟時代，企業為了維持競爭地位，重視技術與專利，原是為防止特定企業技術被複製或模仿。可是因為科技創新研發產品生命週期縮短、產品所涵蓋的專利權量多而複雜、與專利法規制度設計等因素，專利市場也因此而活絡，專利中介者的價值就此產生。專利中介者的存在使企業得以開放式之創新模式，進行組織內外部技術交流，為節省交易成本的種種問題，以及避免侵權爭議，專利中介經營型態開始多樣化，並隨著時間演進，不同型態的營運效益也開始呈現差異。過去中介者偏重於攻擊訴訟、防禦功能、移轉買賣，然而現今最大的專利中介者美國高智公司，其營運模式角色演化類型、價值創造，都與舊有的中介者營運模式不同。 本研究以個案研究與文獻整理方式大略了解高智實際運作方式為何。高智已經擁有自己的實驗室，並且積極與研究單位合作提供研發預算，不同於其他專利事業體被動防禦、積極主張的角色，高智創造出與客戶發展長期的合作關係價值，高智發揮一般中介者降低交易成本之功能，更是主動引進學術研發使其專利商業化。另外，高智近年來也有主動發起專利訴訟，企圖維護該公司的專利資產價值，高智的營運模式在實際運作上雖未有明確的法律爭議，或許未來可能還是會有相關專利法與競爭法的問題。 / In the era of knowledge economy, entrepreneurs gradually take technologies and patents seriously. Patents have been traditionally used to prevent others from copying or imitating valuable technologies. During the past decade, the market for patent application, licensing and transaction began to grow rapidly. Because of shorter production of life cycle, overlapping set of patent rights, and complicated patent systems, many managers adopt the concept of open innovation. There are many obstacles while trading patents; therefore, patent intermediates are arising. As time goes on, these business models changed a lot. Intellectual Ventures, the brand new largest intermediate company, is regarded as a successful intermediary model with a unique business model attempting to bring more performances to the patent market. The major purpose of this study is to explore Intellectual Ventures real operation in the patent market. Intellectual Ventures has its own research lab, monetizes new inventions and cooperates with scholar research units. Intellectual Ventures creates a long term relationship with its clients and develops a different role from other traditional patent entities. Intellectual Ventures not only functions as a traditional intermediate to reduce the transaction costs, but also focuses on the commercialization of new patents and scholar ideas. But recently Intellectual Ventures has been involved in some civil legal activities to assure its own patent asset values, revealing that in the future the practice of Intellectual Ventures business can possibly cause some legal disputes about civil patent activities and antitrust conducts respectively.

Les trolls de brevets ont connu un développement économique et médiatique très important depuis le début des années 2000. Ce modèle économique consiste à acquérir et valoriser des brevets d'invention de manière agressive en exploitant les faiblesses du système de brevets. Les revenus des trolls proviennent exclusivement des accords de licences conclus avec les entreprises fabricantes ou des dommages et intérêts obtenus à l’issu d’actions en contrefaçon. L’étude des trolls implique une analyse juridique, statistique et économique de leurs pratiques afin de pouvoir déterminer la réalité de ces modèles économiques et envisager une réponse à ces comportements. De plus, une approche de droit comparé est nécessaire car les disparités entre les règles de droit américaines et européennes permettent sont à l'origine des différences de situations observées entre les deux continents.La première partie est consacrée à la cinématique des trolls de brevets, détaillant les différentes stratégies et diversifications des pratiques au cours des quinze dernières années. On constate alors la nécessité de dépasser l’opposition manichéenne classique entre trolls des brevets et entreprises fabricantes. La réalité est plus complexe, les entreprises fabricantes et certaines entités publiques étant désormais fortement impliquées dans des stratégies similaires.La seconde partie est consacrée à la dynamique des trolls avec l'étude des conditions de développement, qui permettent de comprendre pourquoi cette pratique n’est pas présente sur le territoire européen dans les mêmes proportions. L’analyse de ces comportements face aux fonctions du droit de brevet est ensuite nécessaire pour caractériser l’abus constitué par ces stratégies. Enfin, l’encadrement de ces pratiques est étudié à travers les défenses disponibles pour les entreprises victimes de ces stratégies, tant en droit positif qu’en droit prospectif. Ces défenses sont appelées à traiter les conséquences et non les causes des trolls de brevets, il est donc nécessaire d’envisager le développement du marché secondaire des brevets, car ses faiblesses sont en partie responsables de l’avènement des trolls. Ainsi, un meilleur encadrement de ce marché pourrait permettre de développer les échanges de brevets et réduire les possibilités d’abus autorisées par le système des brevets aujourd’hui. / The economic development and media coverage of patent trolls has tremendously increased since 2000. This business model consists in acquiring and aggressively monetizing patents through the exploitation of the patent system failures. Patent trolls generate revenues from licensing agreements with manufacturing entities and damages obtained by court decision. The conduct of a legal, economic and statistical study is necessary in order to determine the reality of these business models and to suggest a response to these behaviors. A comparative law approach is necessary as the differences between the american and european law is the source of factual disparities observed between these two continents.The first part is dedicated to the patent trolls kinematics through the study of the various business models and their diversification over the past 15 years. It reveals the need to overcome the classical opposition between trolls and manufacturing companies as these companies and even some public funded structures are now developing similar strategies.The second part study the mechanic of patent trolls through their conditions of development, which helps to understand why trolls are not operating in Europe through the same proportions. The assessment of an abuse of the patent system is then conducted with the study of these behaviors through the lens of the patent function. Furthermore, the actual and future legal responses offered to companies facing abusive infringement claims are studied. However these defenses are meant to treat the consequences of abusive behavior and not their causes, it is therefore necessary to study the development of the secondary patent market, since some of its weakness are partially responsible for the development of patent trolls. We suggest that the enhancement of some elements of the secondary patent market could help foster patent exchange and reduce the possibility of abusing the patent system.

政府透過法律制度將原先具有非排他性及非敵對性等公共財性質之專利財產化，藉此鼓勵發明人進行研發，間接為整體社會帶來促進創新與阻礙創新等不同面向之影響，而專利之私有化使擁有專利之所有人取得排他獨佔權限，如此累積創新所帶來之結果便是形成專利叢林現象，使單一產品生產時須取得眾多專利，增加未取得專利之侵權風險，該專利叢林現象後續更促使訴訟成為新興專利聚集型態獲取利益之手段。 從專利取得之角度觀察，其取得專利之方式可系統化分為自行研發、併購等內化形式或取得專利授權等外部形式，而專利取得之動機則從單純產業利用轉變為企業策略性考量；現今專利市場中，更經常將取得之專利以授權或出售方式商品化，甚或以專利作為商業談判、利益交換之籌碼，使專利有貨幣化現象。從經濟學之角度思考，專利貨幣化或有交易、預防及投機等動機，並得從專利本質上與後續發展上之特性觀察到專利貨幣化之因素。 由於本文將專利市場分為專利聚集、專利交易平台、專利資訊提供者及一般個人、實際從事生產公司與研究機構等不同類型參與者，並將研究對象著重在專利聚集與專利交易平台二者，因此特於本文中討論專利聚集形成之階段與交易模式，且因應專利交易模式而衍生探討專利交易價金之計算。從本文可知，專利聚集得區分為攻擊型、防禦型、以授權營利型及混合型四大類，各類型專利聚集及專利交易平台皆有其創造價值之價值鏈活動安排、整體產業競爭作用力之五力分析與支援核心競爭優勢之相對應策略活動系統，並從各市場參與者之運作模式中亦得觀察可能存在之缺失。 攻擊型專利聚集表面上雖提供授權服務，然手段上具有強制性，以訴訟等手段迫使下游實際從事生產等公司支付授權金以取得專利授權，從模式上觀察，其存在未經挑選專利、擁有專利過多及組織體系過於龐雜等缺失；而防禦型專利聚集則從下游買方之迫切需求角度出發，以防禦目的之專利授權或出售為訴求，藉由廣泛涵蓋不同領域之專利組合滿足下游買方對於專利侵權風險之控管，然其現有模式可能因支付有限年費導致難以確保購買大量專利之品質，並有為符合眾多會員需求使專利相關性降低以及整體產業難以避免搭便車現象等缺失；至於以授權營利型專利聚集透過技術或產品標準定義之專利組合，包裹式將下游實際從事生產廠商需要之專利一次性授權，雖不見得有授權之急迫需求，但顯然降低下游買方取得授權之交易成本，惟其缺失為權利金分配制度之公平性與專利組合之區別標準。混合型專利聚集則涵蓋上述三種專利聚集之優勢，並以特殊之智財資本市場重新定位無形資產能夠創造之價值，對於下游買方及上游專利供應者而言，皆帶來產業結構變化之衝擊，同時以專利組合授權來滿足下游專利被授權人之需求，不過，混合型專利聚集管理複雜度高、經濟利潤有下降可能，並且長期將有價格扭曲之應變風險。 專利交易平台與專利聚集不同之處在於其不直接取得專利或專利授權，僅以專利供給方與需求方之交易中介者自居，然從廣義概念上，其亦為專利聚集之一種形態，有助於專利買賣雙方取得資訊，降低搜尋、談判或執行等交易成本，並透過其他業務互補專利交易平台業務可能之不足，惟其仍舊有所缺失，亦即價格決定機制之困難、服務範疇過大導致成本控管之不經濟與交易公開之接受程度等問題。從本文各章節之分析中，可比較各市場參與者之不同，亦得觀察彼此間之互動與缺失，從而提出未來可能之研究方向，並針對專利市場之管制與開放給予建議。 / The propertization of patents which intrinsically show the traits of public goods including non-excludable and non-rival was established to encourage inventors and therefore leads to positive and negative influence to the society indirectly. The privatization of patents protects the exclusive rights of the owners, whereas what we called the accumulated innovation set up the patent thickets that enhance the risks of infringement and promote the strategic litigations raised by new patent aggregators. The methods of acquiring patents could systematically divided into internalization which includes R&D and M&A, and externalization which includes licensing and so on. While the motivations of acquiring patents transform from industrial applications to strategic considerations, and the patents gradually become commercialized and even express its monetization. This paper classifies different players in the patent market, such as patent aggregators, patent transaction platforms, patent information providers and operating companies, while with the focus on patent aggregators and patent transaction platform. Besides, the patent aggregators could be categorized into “offensive patent aggregators”, “defensive patent aggregators”, “running by licensing patent aggregators” and “hybrid patent aggregators”. Moreover, the findings of this paper stand on what each patent aggregator and patent transaction platform has its scheduled activities of the value chain, the five forces model to the analysis of its industry and the strategic activities system for supporting its core competence, and even the demerits of its operating model. The offensive patent aggregators provide licensing services, while its services apparently contain compulsive licensing model by raising claims against the operating companies. Instead, defensive patent aggregators help the downstream buyers in need to fight against the offensive patent aggregators by licensing or selling patent portfolios which cover broad technological areas and benefit risk management. Next, the running by licensing patent aggregators package their patents by standards of technologies or products and provide “one-stop-shop licensing solutions” to the downstream buyers to save the transaction costs. Furthermore, the hybrid patent aggregators embrace the advantages of three kinds of patent aggregators mentioned above and try to create the IP capital market leading to the transformation of the industry structure. On the other hand, the patent transaction platforms are different from the patent aggregators in the ownerships of patents. The patent transaction platforms will never become the owner of the patents or acquire the rights of patent licensing, it just named themselves intermediaries of transaction that reduce the transaction cost and enhance the transparency of information. Nevertheless, the diversified operating models of different patent aggregators and patent transaction platforms exist its improvable or inevitable drawbacks. The analysis of each chapter in this paper could help to compare the players in patent market and contribute to observe the shortages and interactions between the ones. What’s more, this paper gives some suggestions for further researches in the future as the conclusion.