Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Georges Amauri Lopes.pdf: 1318748 bytes, checksum: 7414a99112e9a61d311cc5e645cce46d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-09-04 / If it is true that the contemporary societies are extremely complex, formed by many subgroups owner of different values, there is no reason to deny that all of them agree on a minimum of morality and types of behaviors necessary to make any pacific union in the society possible. The elements which are in that agreement are learned by the socialization procedure, and are sustained and protected by the informal social control in a first moment. When this control is no longer effective those fundamental elements and social conditions are at risk, the State must bring to itself the formal social control, which is made by the penal law, one of the many instruments that exist for it. Many of the fundamental social conditions may be put on danger by acts in the economic activity specifically. This paper intends to legitimate the economic penal law as a way of protecting the fundamental social conditions necessary for a pacific, fair and equal social life, which may be offended by abusive acts of the economic power. / Em que pese ser a contemporaneidade caracterizada por uma sociedade altamente complexa, na qual podem ser encontrados diversos sub-grupos orientados por valores ou padrões comportamentais diversificados, não se nega haver um mínimo consenso ético sem o qual não se faria possível a existência de qualquer coesão pacífica. Os elementos espirituais que a compõem são ensinados no processo de socialização e assegurados, num primeiro momento, pelo controle social informal. Quando este não se mostra mais capaz a tanto e bens jurídicos essenciais estão sob risco, o Estado tem o dever de chamar para si o controle social formal, constituindo-se o direito penal em um dos instrumentos existentes. Vários daqueles bens jurídicos podem ser lesionados por atos manifestados especificamente na atividade econômica. Esta dissertação tem por escopo fundamentar o direito penal econômico como meio de proteção aos bens jurídicos essenciais à coexistência social pacífica, justa e igualitária que podem ser colocados em risco pelos atos abusivos do poder econômico.

Dans l’Ancien Droit, le droit criminel des affaires constitue une étape singulière de l’histoire d’une matière qui reçoit aujourd’hui le nom de droit pénal des affaires. À cette époque, les fraudes commises par les professionnels de la vie des affaires ne relèvent cependant pas toutes du droit criminel. Dans l’ombre des divers textes de police économique, naît en effet une matière dont les règles sont si spécifiques qu’elles doivent être isolées du droit commun. L’exemple de la Flandre wallonne et du Hainaut – où la bourgeoisie industrielle et commerciale fonde la puissance des républiques urbaines –fournit un corpus jurisprudentiel important et représentatif. L’étude de cette jurisprudence prouve que les turpitudes du cercle des affaires de ces provinces sont parfois criminellement réprimées. Ainsi, entre 1424 et 1789, six cent soixante-neuf sentences et arrêts sont prononcés en droit criminel des affaires. La richesse de cette branche du droit criminel et le silence des criminalistes en ce domaine, imposent decréer a posteriori des catégories juridiques permettant de rendre compte de la grande variété des incriminations. Hier comme aujourd’hui, le droit criminel des affaires comprend un versant général (vol et faux) et un versant spécial (droit criminel commercial, droit criminel de la consommation et droit criminel fiscal). De ce premier constat résulte plusieurs questions. Comment distinguer le droit criminel des affaires de la police économique ? Quelles sont les différentes infractions à la vie des affaires ?Quelles en sont les spécificités qui nécessitent de les traiter distinctement des autres infractions ? / In ancient law, buisiness criminal law constitutes a peculiar step in the history of what has now become « buisiness penal law ». Although, in those days, the various types of fraud committed by buisiness professionnels don't all relate to criminal law. In the shadow of various economic police texts, emerges a subject whose rules are so particular that they have to be isolated from common law. For example, Flandres wallonne and Hainaut provinces (where the industrial and commercial wealthy bourgeoisie establish the power of the urban republics) provide a important and representative body of case law. The study of this jurisprudence reveals that the turpitudes of the buisiness circles of these provinces sometime relate to criminal law. Consequently, between 1424 and 1789, 669 judgments areissued in criminal law. The abundance of this branch of law and the silence of the criminal law specialits on it lead to the necessity of creating a posteriori several law categories in order to appreciate the great variety of incriminations. Yesterday and today, buisiness criminal law contains general (theft and forgery) and special (commercial criminal law, consumer criminal law and tax criminal law) topics. As a consequence of this firstobservation many questions appear. How to distinguish between buisiness criminal law and economic police ? Which are the different offences committed against the buisiness world ? Which are their specificities that lead to treat them distinctly from the other offences.

Two prominent historians, David Cannadine and Brad Gregory, have recently contended that history is distorted by overemphasis on human difference and division across time and space. This problem has been acute in studies of Native-Newcomer relations, where exaggeration of Native pre-contact stability and post-contact change further emphasized Native-Newcomer difference. Although questioned in economic, social and political spheres, emphasis on cultural difference persists. To investigate the problem, this study examined the Algonquian wihtiko (windigo), an apparent exemplar of Native-Newcomer difference and division. With a focus on the James Bay Cree, this study first probed the wihtiko phenomenon’s Native origins and meanings. It then examined post-1635 Newcomer encounters with this phenomenon: from the bush to public opinion and law, especially between 1815 and 1914, and in post-1820 academia. Diverse archives, ethnographies, oral traditions, and academic texts were consulted. The cannibal wihtiko evolved from Algonquian attempts to understand and control rare but extreme mental and moral failures in famine contexts. It attained mythical proportions, but fears of wihtiko possession, transformation and violence remained real enough to provoke pre-emptive killings even of family members. Wihtiko beliefs also influenced Algonquian manifestations and interpretations of generic mental and moral failures. Consciously or not, others used it to scapegoat, manipulate, or kill. Newcomers threatened by moral and mental failures attributed to the wihtiko often took Algonquian beliefs and practices seriously, even espousing them. Yet Algonquian wihtiko behaviours, beliefs and practices sometimes presented Newcomers with another layer of questions about mental and moral incompetence. Collisions arose when they discounted, misconstrued or asserted control over Algonquian beliefs and practices. For post-colonial critics, this has raised a third layer of questions about intellectual and moral incompetence. Yet some critics have also misconstrued earlier attempts to understand and control the wihtiko, or attributed an apparent lack of scholarly consensus to Western cultural incompetence or inability to grasp the wihtiko. In contrast, this study of wihtiko phenomena reveals deeper commonalities and continuities. They are obscured by the complex evolution of Natives’ and Newcomers’ struggles to understand and control the wihtiko. Yet hidden in these very struggles and the wihtiko itself is a persistent shared conviction that reducing others to objects of power signals mental and moral failure. The wihtiko reveals cultural differences, changes and divisions, but exemplifies more fundamental commonalities and continuities.

Depuis le début des années 2000, de plus en plus de pays décident d’introduire à leur droit pénal un nouvel outil de « justice négociée » utilisé pour des délits de corruption transnationale. Ainsi, cette troisième voie, s’ajoutant à la décision de poursuivre ou non, est maintenant utilisée pour les personnes morales par les procureurs aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, au Brésil, au Canada et ailleurs. De cette façon, les compagnies peuvent, sans reconnaissance de culpabilité, éviter un procès criminel par le paiement d’une amende et par des engagements de meilleure gouvernance. Dans cette recherche, notre attention se pose plus particulièrement sur le cas de la France. Longtemps pointé du doigt par les instances internationales comme un mauvais élève de la lutte à la corruption transnationale et avec une culture juridique particulière, il nous semble surprenant que Paris décide d’aller de l’avant, en 2016, avec une justice plus souple, inspirée de principes anglo-saxons. Comment pouvons-nous expliquer ce changement soudain ? Nous répondons à ce questionnement en nous inspirant des littératures sur les mécanismes de diffusion des politiques publiques qui s’attardent à comprendre comment le choix d’un gouvernement peut être influencé par les décisions d’acteurs externes. Représentant chacune un mécanisme causal, quatre hypothèses sont retenues, soit celles de coercition, de compétition, d’émulation et d’apprentissage. À travers un traçage de processus minutieux et surtout l’analyse des discours des politiciens français, nous arrivons à la conclusion que la diffusion des outils de « justice négociée » pour lutter contre la corruption transnationale amène une explication suffisante pour comprendre le changement législatif soudain de l’Hexagone. De façon plus générale, l’interaction des différents mécanismes de diffusion de politique nous amène à penser que l’utilisation d’une justice plus souple pour ce type de délit n’est pas près de s’arrêter. / Since the early 2000s, more and more countries have decided to introduce into their criminal law a new tool of "negotiated justice" for foreign bribery offenses. Thus, this third route, in addition to the decision to prosecute or not, is now used for legal persons by prosecutors in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Canada and elsewhere. In this way, companies can, without admission of guilt, avoid a criminal trial through the payment of a fine and through commitments to better governance. In this research, our attention is particularly focused on the case of France. Long pointed out by international organizations as a bad student in the fight against transnational corruption and with a particular legal culture, it seems surprising to us that Paris decides to move forward with a more flexible justice, inspired by Anglo-Saxons principles, in 2016. How can we explain this sudden catching up? We respond to this questioning by drawing inspiration from literature on the mechanisms of policy diffusion, which focuses on understanding how the choice of a government can be influenced by the decisions of external actors. Each representing a causal mechanism, four hypotheses are retained, namely those of coercion, competition, emulation and learning. Through careful process tracing and especially the analysis of the speeches of French politicians, we come to the conclusion that the diffusion of the tools of “negotiated justice” to fight against foreign bribery provides a sufficient explanation to understand the sudden catching up of the Hexagon. More generally, the interaction of the different policy diffusion mechanisms leads us to believe that the use of more flexible justice for this type of crime is not about to stop.