TITLE: Faust and the role of myth in the philosophy of Czech thinkers: Bratránek, Masaryk, Patočka AUTHOR: Tereza Čechová DEPARTMENT: General Antropology SUPERVISOR: Mgr. Jakub Marek, Ph.D. ABSTRACT: The thesis Faust and the role of myth in the philosophy of Czech thinkers: Bratránek, Masaryk, Patočka, deals with the theme of Faust and its role in individual works of the mentioned philosophers. The thesis briefly contains the origin and development of the Faust myth, its most famous literary work, and its appearance on the Czech territory. The main chapters of the thesis are those that are focused on such texts of the mentioned thinkers, who are concerned with the Faustian theme. The resulting analyzes and comparations contribute to the depiction and arrangement of the role of the Faustian myth in Czech philosophy, mainly because of the different approaches, goals and methods of research used in their work by F. T. Bratránek, T. G. Masaryk and Jan Patočka. KEYWORDS: Faust, Myth, Contract with the Devil, Goethe, Czech Philosophy, Philosophy of History, Jan Patočka, F. T. Bratránek, T. G. Masaryk

(EN) In the last of his finished works, Nietzsche presents a special sort of retrospect of his past and, at the same time, prospect of his future. The aim of the thesis is to examine the possibility that Nietzsche attempts to present some of the results of his preceeding inquires in practice and provides readers with a guideline for creation of practical philosophy in accord with their own constitution, being aware of external and internal dangers of the project. By means of an exemplary self-interpretation, Nietzsche demonstrates the process of human self-becoming.

This thesis deals with the anthropological thinking of Nicholas of Cusa. The first part presents the fundamental metaphysical motifs that are the basis for this anthropology - above all, it concerns the conception of human as a mind (intellect). This conception is linked with the thinking of the first Principle (God) as the unity that is identical with itself. This unity/oneness of the One descends into the world through number that is one and multiple at the same time (all higher numbers consist of ones). The emphasis on unity of the One and on number as a mean of the creation is the reason, why Cusa's main concern, regarding the understanding of the world, aren't individual substances, but the relations between these substances. And for this kind of metaphysical thinking it is really important to develop also a strong notion of human intellect (mind), but the first philosophical texts to some extent fail to do so. The second part of this thesis deals with the proper anthropology that is developed in the dialogues with the idiota. It is shown what is the role of human mind in the dynamics of descent and ascent of unity of the One - it is the human mind and its intellectual return to its Beginning through which is all creation being made one and being brought to its true nature that is the One. The last...

The present dissertation is a case study in applied phenomenology, specifically the postcolonial phenomenology of racism theorized by Lewis Gordon and applied to scholarly studies conducted on African American Jews and their kinfolk. My thesis is the following: Presumptively ontological human natures cannot function axiomatically for humanistic research on African American Jews. A humanistic science of Africana Jews must foreground the lived social worlds that permit such Jews to appear as ordinary expressions of humanity. The basic premise here is that subaltern (or denied) humanity exists in a neocolonial social world by virtue of an ordinariness that supervenes on humanity. For example, the more historians consider Africana Jews as ordinary, the more Africana Jews' humanity will appear. And the more human Africana Jews appear, the more inhuman their extraordinary appearance appears. This symbiosis constitutes a basic existential condition. When research on Africana Jews ignores this condition, it succumbs to ontological Jewishnness and other concepts rooted in what postcolonial theorist Frantz Fanon calls the "colonial natural attitude. / Religion

Modern economic theory of self-interest alleges that in their economic relations people always behave in a way that maximises their utility. The idea whether human beings were solely self-interested has a long history as it can be seen from the writings of Greek philosophers and the Church fathers. Among Greek philosophers there were those who argued that human beings were naturally self-interested (Aristotle) and those who maintained that human beings were communal by nature (Plato, Stoics and the Pythagoreans). The later position was adopted by the Church fathers as they condemned self-interest as the sin of avarice and greed. The justification of self-interest in human and political activities was part and parcel of the economic and political early modernists, as it can be seen in the works of Mandeville, Hobbes, Hume and Adam Smith. In the writings of these thinkers, the flourishing of wealth depended on individual freedom to pursue their self-interests. In this regard, selfinterest became the sole source of motivation in the behaviour of homo economicus. A persistent motif in late modern economic discourse on self-interest is based on the idea that people think and act on the basis of that which is to their self-interest. It is mainly for this reason that late modern economic thinkers maintain that society would prosper when people are left alone to pursue their self-interests. Late modern economic theory of utility maximisation alleges that individuals act only after calculating costs and benefits. The argument of this thesis, based on the commonalities between African humanism and process philosophical anthropology, is that self-interest is antithetical to communal life as advocated in the ethic of Ubuntu. One who acts solely on the basis of maximising his or her utility would inevitably deprive others of a humane existence. A holistic metaphysical outlook based on the relatedness and interrelatedness of everything that exists as we find it in African humanism and process philosophical anthropology implies that the individual exists in internal relations with everything else. We should go beyond selfinterest by giving primacy to a holistic ethic. / Systematic Theology & Theological Ethics / D. Div. (Theological Ethics)

Social science is in crisis. The task of social science is to study “man in situation”: to understand the world as it is for “man”. This thesis charges that this crisis consists in a failure to properly address the philosophical anthropological question “What is man?”. The various social scientific methodologies who have as their object “man” suffer rampant disagreements because they presuppose, rather than consider, what is meant by “man”. It is our intention to show that the root of the crisis is that social science can provide no formal definition of “man”. In order to understand this we propose a phenomenological analysis into the essence of social science. This phenomenological approach will give us reason to abandon the (sexist) word “man” and instead we will speak of wer: the beings which we are. That we have not used the more usual “human being” (or some equivalent) is due to the human prejudice which is one of the major constituents of this crisis we seek to analyse. This thesis is divided into two Parts: normative and evaluative. In the normative Part we will seek a clarification of both “phenomenology” and “social science”. Due to the various ways in which “phenomenology” has been invented we must secure a simipliciter definition of phenomenology as an approach to philosophical anthropology (Chapter 2). Importantly, we will show how the key instigators of the branches of phenomenology, Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre, were all engaged in this task. To clarify our phenomenology we will define the Phenomenological Movement according to various strictures by drawing on the work of Schutz and his notion of provinces of meaning (Chapter 3). This will then be carried forward to show how Schutz’s postulates of social science (with certain clarifications) constitute the eidetic structure of social science (Chapter 4). The eidetic structures of social science identified will prompt several challenges that will be addressed in the evaluative Part. Here we engage in an imperial argument to sort proper science from pseudo-science. The first challenge is the mistaken assumption that universities and democratic states make science possible (Chapter 5). Contra this, we argue that science is predicated on “spare time” and that much institutional “science” is not in fact science. The second challenge is the “humanist challenge”: there is no such thing as nonpractical knowledge (Chapter 6). Dealing with this will require a reconsideration of the epistemic status that science has and lead to the claim of epistemic inferiority. Having cut away pseudo-science we will be able to focus on the “social” of social science through a consideration of intersubjectivity (Chapter 7). Drawing on the above phenomenologists we will focus on how an Other is recognised as Other. Emphasising Sartre’s radical re-conception of “subject” and “object” we will argue that there can be no formal criteria for how this recognition occurs. By consequence we must begin to move away from the assumption of one life-world to various life-worlds, each constituted by different conceptions of wer.

Le présent mémoire porte sur la question de la mort de Dieu dans la philosophie allemande du XIXe siècle. Plus précisément elle entend mettre en lumière le rôle qu’un auteur comme Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) a pu jouer dans la réception d’un tel événement pour la philosophie de cette époque. On observe en effet chez Hegel et Nietzsche, certainement les deux philosophes les plus importants à s’être intéressés au thème de la mort de Dieu, deux manières tout à fait différentes, voire antinomiques, d’interpréter un tel événement. Ce qui fera dire à certains auteurs comme Deleuze et Foucault notamment, qu’entre Hegel et Nietzsche il ne saurait y avoir qu’une coupure radicale tant leurs compréhensions de la mort de Dieu diffère. Un tel geste trahit cependant un certain arbitraire qui empêche de comprendre la genèse philosophique d’un tel déplacement, entre Hegel et Nietzsche, dans la manière d’aborder la mort de Dieu. C’est ici que l’étude de la philosophie feuerbachienne s’avère fructueuse, car si elle demeure dans un dialogue critique par rapport à la conception hégélienne de la mort de Dieu, sa réponse opère cependant un déplacement qui anticipe certains aspects de la pensée nietzschéenne. C’est à partir de l’analyse de sa critique de la religion chrétienne et de l’anthropologie philosophique nouvelle qui l’y oppose que l’on sera en mesure de saisir la nature de ce déplacement feuerbachien. / This Master’s Thesis focuses on the topic of the death of God in the nineteenth century German philosophy. More specifically, it highlights the role played by Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) in the development of this problematic, i.e. his influence on the way this decisive “death” has been interpreted philosophically. The two major philosophical figures who have reflected on the death of God, namely Hegel and Nietzsche, have done so in very different, some would say antinomian, ways. Authors such as Deleuze or Foucault have even argued that between Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s way of addressing the question of the death of God there can be no common ground, but only an irrevocable clash. Unfortunately, such a statement forbids further investigations enabling a more rigorous understanding of the philosophical development that occurs between Hegel and Nietzsche on that specific topic, that is, on the death of God in nineteenth century German philosophy. Here, I shall argue, the study of Ludwig Feuerbach’s thought becomes essential to such an understanding, since it develops a critical dialogue with Hegel’s stance on the death of God, while at the same time anticipating some aspects of Nietzsche’s approach to the problem of the death of God.

Ce travail se propose de comprendre l’éthique élaborée par Spinoza comme cheminement individuel dans le cadre d’une nature déterminée de part en part, et au sein de laquelle aucune finalité n’est assignée aux hommes. La question consiste donc à se demander comment l’on peut passer à une autre manière d’exister sans postuler de distance de soi à soi ; et cela revient à incarner différemment, singulièrement, le déterminisme commun. S’appuyant sur l’étude de concepts tels fabrica, constitutio, occasio, ou encore aptitudes, ce travail part du dynamisme des choses singulières afin d’établir l’historicité propre à l’existence humaine. Dans ce cadre, les rencontres déterminantes sans être librement choisies sont parties prenantes du cheminement éthique, comme autant de circonstances propices à l’occasion desquelles on peut accroître son aptitude à être diversement affecté. Il s’agit ainsi de constituer une « anthropologie éthique » qui permette de concevoir l’éthique à partir de l’existence courante des hommes du commun, mais sans jamais la réduire à une science des comportements. Cela requiert ainsi de penser la possibilité de changements sur fond de continuité, en incluant dans le cheminement tout ce qui est à même d’alimenter des variations orientées, comme le désir, l’imagination d’un modèle ou la sensation de soi à divers moments de son existence. Est requis pour cela de constituer un concept de « singularité », qui se distingue de ce qui est simplement particulier, mais qui ne s’oppose pas cependant à un cheminement commun. Cela revient alors à considérer l’éthique non comme un état à atteindre (un devenir « quelque chose »), mais comme le fait même d’être « en devenir ». / The aim of this study is to conceive of Spinoza’s ethics as an individual progression within the framework of a completely determined existence wherein no finality is assigned to man. Hence, the question is how to pass from one mode of existence to another without distancing one from oneself or, that which amounts to the same, how to embody, differently and in a singular way, the common determinism. Taking our point of departure in concepts such as fabrica, constitutio, occasio or aptitude, this study thus begins by looking at the dynamics of individual things in order to determine the historicity proper to human existence. Within this framework, encounters that are determining but not freely chosen are integral parts of the ethical progression, constituting so many circumstances propitious for the production of the occasions where one’s aptitude to be affected in many ways can be augmented. The objective is then to establish an “ethical anthropology” allowing to conceive of an ethics taking its point of departure in the everyday existence of common people but without ever reducing to a science of behaviors. This also requires that the possibility of change must be thought on the basis of continuity by including in the progression everything that supports the different variations and their orientations, such as desire or the imaginary models or senses of self that we have at different moments of our existence. In order to do that, one must construct a concept of “singularity” as of something different from the merely “particular” but that nonetheless is not opposed to a common progression. This amounts to considering ethics, not as a state to achieve (a “becoming something”) but rather as the very fact of being “in becoming.”

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-09-03T12:58:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Cristine Reis Oittica.pdf: 874905 bytes, checksum: 22b28ed8f737a7e16bf74f834fdef6c3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-03T12:58:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cristine Reis Oittica.pdf: 874905 bytes, checksum: 22b28ed8f737a7e16bf74f834fdef6c3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-21 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The dissertation has no abstract / O objstivo desta Dissertação aporta-se nos conceitos de Ennui e Divertssement, termos abordados na obra do teólogo e matemático francês Blaise Pascal. Discutiremos a natureza do homem e sua condição humana atrelada pela busca ao divertimento como fuga de sua estrutura ontologica de miserabilidade e condicionada a desviar-se da angústia, estado atávico da natureza do homem. Para tanto, faremos uma tragetória conceitual pelos principais influenciadores da filosofia de Pascal: Santo Agostinho e Cornelius Jansenius, seguindo pelo desmembramento do paradoxo grandeza e miséria, discussão essencial na obra do filósofo, o que nos ajudará a compreender a função do divertimento pascaliano no terceiro capítulo. Por fim, a compreensão dos conceitos de Ennui e Divertissemnt, através do Fragmento 199 dos Pensées. A obra do filosofo será tratada a partir da condição trágica, a qual os escritos pascalianos estão submetidos

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-05T13:18:26Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Henrique Ciucci da Silva.pdf: 1366323 bytes, checksum: 8e0174dad0665db18a13a568dfff6a12 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-05T13:18:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Henrique Ciucci da Silva.pdf: 1366323 bytes, checksum: 8e0174dad0665db18a13a568dfff6a12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-10-25 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The dissertation discusses the anthropological and philosophical conception, which Paulo Freire used to ground a pedagogy of the encounter and a political pedagogy. Starting from the idea of a pedagogy of the meeting, the perspective that goes through the dissertation is the social relation of the individual, having, thus, a critical synthesis on the pedagogical context. The thinker from Pernambuco approaches Maritain's Integral Humanism when he affirms that there is no education without relating the teacher to the student in the human context that exists between them. In the Marxian view and the critique of teaching and learning, Paulo Freire discusses the problems and antagonisms of classes, starting with an analysis of two pedagogical political projects: dialogic education, one that places the individual in a world reading and makes it the historical subject and antidialogical education that makes the subject a mere object of its context and does not show the world in a political language. In phenomenology, Paulo Freire shows that the task of knowing is directed to the subject and not to the object. And it is as subject and only as subject, that the man can really know. In the philosophical conception, Paulo Freire is dedicated to speaking about the context of freedom in Sartre and on the Personalism of Mounier. In freedom in Sartre, Paulo Freire argues that the individual without this does not realize a critical view of the world, because it will be in a false dialogue. About the Personalism de Mounier, Paulo Freire points out to us the problematic of human beingship, that only through an education of appreciation of the person, there will be possibilities for reflection / A dissertação discute a concepção antropológica e filosófica, as quais Paulo Freire utilizou para fundamentar uma pedagogia do encontro e uma pedagogia política. Partindo da ideia de uma pedagogia do encontro, a perspectiva que percorre a dissertação é a relação social do indivíduo, tendo assim, uma síntese crítica sobre o contexto pedagógico. O pensador pernambucano se aproxima do Humanismo Integral de Maritain, ao afirmar que não existe uma educação sem relacionar o docente com o discente, no contexto humano que existe entre ambos. Na visão marxiana e a crítica sobre o ensino e a aprendizagem, Paulo Freire discute os problemas e os antagonismos de classes, lançando-se numa análise de dois projetos políticos pedagógicos: a educação dialógica, aquela que coloca o indivíduo em uma leitura de mundo e o faz ser o sujeito histórico e a educação antidialógica, que faz o sujeito ser um mero objeto de seu contexto e não mostra o mundo em uma linguagem política. Na fenomenologia, Paulo Freire mostra que a tarefa do conhecer é direcionada ao sujeito e não ao objeto. E é como sujeito e somente enquanto sujeito, que o homem pode realmente conhecer. Na concepção filosófica, Paulo Freire dedica-se a falar do contexto da liberdade em Sartre e sobre o Personalismo de Mounier. Na liberdade em Sartre, Paulo Freire discute que o indivíduo sem esta não realiza uma visão crítica do mundo, pois ficará em um diálogo falso. Acerca do Personalismo de Mounier, Paulo Freire nos indica a problemática da coisificação humana, que somente através de uma educação de valorização da pessoa, haverá possibilidades de reflexões