This thesis seeks an answer to a question of whether social normative systems, particularly law and morality, are consistent with the most recent scientific and philosophical findings. Those in fact often conclude that the human will is not free and that the human decision- making is only a physiological process governed by the laws of physics. Such findings thus, at a first glance, collide mainly with the concept of responsibility, through which law and morality are implemented. Therefore, the paper begins with a brief introduction of the current state of knowledge concerning free will and presents mainly determinism and indeterminism. The conclusion of the first part called Free Will and Determinism introduces a view of the world, which best suits the current state of knowledge and is further referred to as Physicalism. The second part called Law, Morality, Physicalism, briefly presents law and morality as regulators of human behavior, for which the concept of free will is fundamental. The focus of the thesis then shifts towards the institutions of criminal and civil law, that seem to be threatened by Physicalism the most. However, general consistency of Physicalism and the examined normative concepts is concluded, while it is argued that within the physicalistic view of the world, law and morality...

Thesis advisor: Ronald K. Tacelli / This dissertation arose from concerns that the prevalent philosophy of materialism which reduces everything to matter has inadvertently contributed to the ecological destruction of the planet, and an impoverished understanding of human nature. Conceptual arguments and empirical data cry out for a philosophy beyond materialism (or its current avatar Physicalism) that moves us beyond 17th century classical science, making use of 20th century quantum science to better understand our world. Such a new philosophy would embed a new scientific paradigm that incorporates both the first person point of view and the third person "no point of view."The main issue I engage in this dissertation is whether consciousness can be explained by Physicalism. While functionalism, the dominant theory of Physicalism, answers many questions related to consciousness, it leaves major ones unanswered. I offer a critique of Physicalism using conceptual arguments and empirical data encompassing what I call the "chemistry of attention." I also offer innovative proposals toward a philosophical approach I term "Aspect Monism" that builds on earlier monist philosophies (Spinoza) while incorporating dualistic features, suggesting that this new approach would better account for consciousness. The proximate history of Physicalism to either explain the mind away or reduce it to the brain from Behaviorism through Identity Theory to Functionalism is laid out as well as the difficulty in establishing the boundaries of Physicalism.The project utilizes conceptual arguments to critique Physicalism in three areas of concern: What is left out? What is assumed? What is causing methodological confusion? The areas of qualia, cognition, intentionality, meaning and personhood are left out. This is demonstrated, in part, by various thought experiments like the inverted spectrum argument, the Chinese nation argument, the zombies' argument, the knowledge argument and the Chinese room argument. The problem of causal closure of the physical is that which is assumed. The ambiguity with respect to method is that which causes confusion.Empirical data from the neurosciences (EEG, ERP, fMRI experiments during meditation; OCD and phobia treatment; placebo and nocebo effect) are used to critically analyze Physicalism with respect to mental states and causation and the analysis of such data points to a close relationship between attention and changes in the brain, and subsequently to the collapse of Physicalism into Epiphenomenalism. Such a metaphysical approach to consciousness is suggested from, and provides a home for, the neurophysical approaches to the origins of consciousness. I present a neuro-quantum perspective using Stapp and Penrose-Hameroff who suggest these origins via neuroscience and quantum physics.As we search for a new scientific paradigm and consequently a new metaphysics that takes into consideration the objective and the subjective, and the inner and the outer, a new philosophy and a new scientific paradigm which incorporates both the first person point of view and the third person "no point of view" data is the need of the hour. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

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Contemporary materialism, which tries to explain the working principles of the mind and the universe, become less meaningful after the developments in the modern physics. The modern physics showed that the definition of matter, as it is used in defining materialism, is no longer valid. Chomsky states his position as &ldquo / Chomsky&#039 / s challenge to materialism&rdquo / by claiming that with the abolishment of the definition of the matter, there is no reason to defend materialism, which depends on that definition. Therefore, materialism becomes an empty doctrine thus cannot be used in explaining the mind. The developments in the modern physics creates the need for a new doctrine, which can explain the mind and at the same time be compatible with the modern physics and possible any future physics. This new doctrine, the methodological physicalism, aims to explain the mind by using the modern physics. Creating such a doctrine requires understanding of materialism and its form as well as understanding the problems of materialism and its forms. By identifying the defects in materialism and by using the modern physics as a standing point methodological physicalism can achieve a more successful understanding of the working of the mind. By using the modern physics, the methodological physicalism can explain why the currents models of the mind fail. Moreover, it can explain how certain models of the mind constructed, which employs the quantum mechanics while explaining the mind. The methodological physicalism will help understanding the mind where materialism fails to do so.

A given qualitative mental experience possesses qualitative aspects, or qualia, that identify and distinguish it from other qualitative mental states. While some philosophers explained the mental phenomena by positing nonphysical kinds of entities, some others propose wholly physical explanations. Even if those physicalistic explanations of the mental shed some light on the issue of body-mind relation, Joseph Levine claims that there still exists an explanatory gap between a qualitative mental state and the physical state supposedly responsible for it, since there is no explanation of how and why a certain kind of physical state gives rise to a specific kind of quale.This thesis is an exploration of this problem and evaluation of some of the views that interpret the gap as either ontological or epistemological in order to find out whether the gap is compatible with physicalism or not. The focus is on the Phenomenal Concept Strategy that proposes a physicalistic account for the existence of the gap that is based on the character of phenomenal concepts. I examine whether this strategy is satisfactory or not and propose a possible physicalist account to the special character of phenomenal concepts.

Kim criticizes non-reductive physicalism as a suitable metaphysics of mind among things because of its failure on the issue of mental causation. The failure is especially present in the thesis of supervenience physicalism. Kim concludes that the causal powers of mental states can be reduced to the causal powers carried by the physical states realizing them. Such causal reduction might involve identity between mental properties and physical properties. I think this is not a necessary conclusion. I try to clarify some premises behind Kim’s analysis, regarding issues of irreducibility, downward causation and the structure of the physical domain. I think the main reason why Kim doubts the plausibility of non-reductive physicalism is his view that downward causation and non-reductive metaphysics indicate the physical domain being hierarchically divided into levels. It seems like Kim would take the opposite position regarding the structure of the physical: an undivided continuum. Yet, the question is if that position follows from the ontological tenet of physicalism. Finally, I conclude that not necessarily, and I develop some further implications and suggestions.

I present a thorough metaphysics of causal overdetermination, which yields new insights into mental causation, our world's counterfactual structure, and properties of moral responsibility. I investigate causal overdetermination in three related papers.In "Overdetermination Underdetermined," I show that overdetermination has been underspecified in the literature, leading to a conflation of several important questions: (i) what is overdetermination?, (ii) is overdetermination physically possible, and if so, how ubiquitous is it?, and (iii) is overdetermination a problem?I diagnose the source of confusion as the following definition implicitly used in the literature:(OD) Causes c1 and c2 overdetermine an effect e if c1 and c2 are (i) distinct, (ii) they occur, and (iii) they are each sufficient to cause e in the way that it occurs.I hold that this is not in fact a definition, but a schema with several open definienda: distinctness, occurrence, causation, and precision in the way that the effect occurs. Different satisfiers yield different notions of overdetermination. Answers to the central questions regarding overdetermination are sensitive to the kinds of overdetermination in play. Once we are clear on what overdetermination is and to which sorts we are ontologically committed, we can also be clear on what is at stake for each debate--and it typically is not acceptance or denial of causal overdetermination per se.In "Overdetermination and Counterfactual Sensitivity," I show that the counterfactual structure of the world is richer than previously thought. I introduce a novel class of events that are insensitive to the additive force of multiple causes. They do not covary counterfactually with the multiplicity or force of their causes. They are to be contrasted with sensitive effects, which counterfactually covary according to the number and sorts of causes they have.In "Moral Overdetermination", I examine causal overdetermination in the context of moral responsibility. I use cases of moral overdetermination to introduce puzzles about the relationship between causal responsibility and moral responsibility that deserve further exploration. Along the way, I consider the instrumental value of various reductive theories of causation as guides to moral assessment, and I unearth interesting consequences for moral luck and for collective responsibility.

The thesis develops solutions to two main problems for mental realism. Mental realism is the theory that mental properties, events, and objects exist, with their own set of characters and causal powers. The first problem comes from the philosophy of science, where Psillos proposes a notion of scientific realism that contradicts mental realism, and consequently, if one is to be a scientific realist in the way Psillos recommends, one must reject mental realism. I propose adaptations to the conception of scientific realism to make it compatible with mental realism. In the process, the thesis defends computational cognitive science from a compelling argument Searle can be seen to endorse but has not put forth in an organized logical manner. A new conception of scientific realism emerges out of this inquiry, integrating the mental into the rest of nature. The second problem for mental realism arises out of non-reductive physicalism- the view that higher-level properties, and in particular mental properties, are irreducible, physically realized, and that physical properties are sufficient non-overdetermining causes of any effect. Kim’s Problem of Causal Exclusion aims to show that the mental, if unreduced, does no causal work. Consequently, given that we should not believe in the existence of properties that do not participate in causation, we would be forced to drop mental realism. A solution is needed. The thesis examines various positions relevant to the debate. Several doctrines of physicalism are explored, rejected, and one is proposed; the thesis shows the way in which Kim’s reductionist position has been constantly inconsistent throughout the years of debate; the thesis argues that trope theory does not compete with a universalist conception of properties to provide a solution; and shows weakness in the Macdonald’s non-reductive monist position and Pereboom’s constitutional coincidence account of mental causation. The thesis suggests that either the premises of Kim’s argument are consistent, and consequently his reductio is logically invalid, or at least one of the premises is false, and therefore the argument is not sound. Consequently, the Problem of Causal Exclusion that Kim claims emerges out of non-reductive physicalism does not force us to reject mental realism. Mental realism lives on.

Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-04-15T14:46:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Andrea Schimmentiseg.pdf: 673140 bytes, checksum: 52e682603c2b5a64359409218c25f51b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-29T14:44:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Andrea Schimmentiseg.pdf: 673140 bytes, checksum: 52e682603c2b5a64359409218c25f51b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-29T14:44:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Andrea Schimmentiseg.pdf: 673140 bytes, checksum: 52e682603c2b5a64359409218c25f51b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / O objetivo desta dissertação é compreender as teses de Donald Davidson acerca do lugar do mental no âmbito de uma visão fisicalista do mundo. Com seu conceito de mental, que é parte de uma teoria explicativa da vida ordinária e da ação intencional, Davidson critica a tradição reducionista. Ele afirma que a eficácia causal dos eventos mentais no mundo físico, e a autonomia destes mesmos eventos em relação às leis estritas da física, são idéias que não estão necessariamente em contradição. Neste sentido, Davidson acredita que a eficácia do pensamento e da intenção no mundo material pode conviver com a liberdade da razão em relação às leis naturais. Há causalidade mental sem reducionismo, pois a eficácia causal do mental não precisa ser suportada por leis estritas, ou por identidades entre tipos ou propriedades mentais e físicas. A visão davidsoniana do mental foi definida por alguns críticos como sendo dualista, por considerar que a irredutibilidade da intencionalidade às leis que governam o mundo natural torna o mental como um domínio autônomo. Outros críticos, ainda, sugerem que o conceito davidsoniano de mental leva ao epifenomenalismo ou ao eliminativismo, pois caracterizaria o mental como ineficaz causalmente no mundo físico. A grande contribuição de Davidson foi a sua refinada tentativa de oferecer uma teoria holística da mente e da ação, no interior da qual pensar a relação entre as nossas crenças, desejos, intenções, e as nossas ações. Neste sentido, a sua obra mostrou que a causalidade é um conceito que não pode ser excluído do conjunto dos conceitos que usamos para tentar oferecer descrições e explicações da relação entre os nossos estados mentais e nossas ações. / Salvador

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