In this thesis I offer a novel alternative response to Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986) knowledge argument in support of non-reductive physicalism (NRP). The knowledge argument is framed as an attack on reductive physicalism (RP), as it suggests the possibility that the subjective experience (SE) of an event or phenomenon adds ‘real’ knowledge to a person’s existing knowledge. My novel response aims to enrich the current debate, dominated as it is by Western philosophy of mind, by introducing one specific African concept of mind into the debate. The concept of mind I introduce into the debate, is Kwasi Wiredu’s (1987) quasi-physicalist interpretation of the Akan concept of mind. My alternative reply specifically contributes to the debate by changing the negative ability reply to the knowledge argument, framed by Nemirow (1980, 1990) and Lewis (1983, 1988) in Western philosophy of mind, into a positive support for Jackson (1982, 1986) by introducing African voices into the debate. I demonstrate that although the unsolved mind-body problem is presented as an ongoing philosophical issue in Western philosophy, a turn to an African perspective can shine new light on the problem. The novel alternative reply to Jackson’s knowledge argument consists of an epistemological argument that subjective experience (SE) adds genuine knowledge to a person’s existing knowledge, and a metaphysical argument that subjective experience (SE) is an emergent mental property. These two arguments validate property dualism as well as the knowledge argument. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2019. / CSIR- CAIR 2017-2019 University of Pretoria (UP) Postgraduate Bursary 2018-2019 / Philosophy / PhD / Unrestricted

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History & Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)

The ideal of artificial intelligence can firstly be set as the ability of a mechanical (or electronic) agent to be able to, as a human, observe, reason, learn, communicate and act in complex environments and secondly, to explain this type of behaviour in humans, animals or any other type of agent. The aim of this study is firstly to determine whether this ideal is feasible and secondly, to look at the physicalist premise thereof, viz., everything is physical according to Dooyeweerd’s view of the creation, fall and redemption motive. First we determine the essence of artificial intelligence through the Curch–Turing thesis. We then place the essence of artificial intelligence alongside the essence of life firstly to see whether the construction of an artificial intelligence agent is possible and whether the subject artificial intelligence has something to say regarding intelligent behaviour in humans, animals and similar agents. Lastly we look at the physicalist premise of artificial intelligence viz., everything is physical from the reformative creation, fall and redemption motive. The Church–Turing thesis forms the boundary of what is feasible in artificial intelligence and what is not feasible. Every component of the thesis is limited to the arithmetic law sphere of Being, i.e. the succession of discrete elements in a set of elements. Any effort to reduce the spatial aspect of the being to the arithmetic aspect of Being, like the enumeration of irrational numbers, ends in an antinomy. Any artificial intelligence agent is in its nature limited to the arithmetic law sphere of Being. The structural intertwinement, which such an artificial intelligence agent has with its underlying physical components is, in contrast with living organisms that of an irreversible grounded enkapsis. Life and mind has, in contrast to the arithmetic seclusion of an artificial intelligence agent, a fullness and totality. It has an ability to unlock Being in its fullness, which comes to the fore in a way that any living organism unlocks the plastic horizon of Being in the respective internal and phenomenological horizons. The unlocking of the spatial aspect plays a key role with its kernel of totality, simultaneity and continuousness. In both these horizons, the organism is in a living enkapsis with both its underlying physical substrate and the physical things in its external surroundings. The ideal of artificial intelligence is thus a phantasm. The only comment it can give on biology is that which has to do with the succession of discrete elements in a system. Hempel’s dilemma and the halting problem expose the physicalist point of departure of everything is physical as a religious premise, which is not empirically verifiable. Instead of getting a better view of Being the contours of meaning of life as well as all the supra physical aspects of Being fades away or is denied with concealment of Being. The only way in which we can get the broadest possible insight into Being is in the light of the Word of God. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

The ideal of artificial intelligence can firstly be set as the ability of a mechanical (or electronic) agent to be able to, as a human, observe, reason, learn, communicate and act in complex environments and secondly, to explain this type of behaviour in humans, animals or any other type of agent. The aim of this study is firstly to determine whether this ideal is feasible and secondly, to look at the physicalist premise thereof, viz., everything is physical according to Dooyeweerd’s view of the creation, fall and redemption motive. First we determine the essence of artificial intelligence through the Curch–Turing thesis. We then place the essence of artificial intelligence alongside the essence of life firstly to see whether the construction of an artificial intelligence agent is possible and whether the subject artificial intelligence has something to say regarding intelligent behaviour in humans, animals and similar agents. Lastly we look at the physicalist premise of artificial intelligence viz., everything is physical from the reformative creation, fall and redemption motive. The Church–Turing thesis forms the boundary of what is feasible in artificial intelligence and what is not feasible. Every component of the thesis is limited to the arithmetic law sphere of Being, i.e. the succession of discrete elements in a set of elements. Any effort to reduce the spatial aspect of the being to the arithmetic aspect of Being, like the enumeration of irrational numbers, ends in an antinomy. Any artificial intelligence agent is in its nature limited to the arithmetic law sphere of Being. The structural intertwinement, which such an artificial intelligence agent has with its underlying physical components is, in contrast with living organisms that of an irreversible grounded enkapsis. Life and mind has, in contrast to the arithmetic seclusion of an artificial intelligence agent, a fullness and totality. It has an ability to unlock Being in its fullness, which comes to the fore in a way that any living organism unlocks the plastic horizon of Being in the respective internal and phenomenological horizons. The unlocking of the spatial aspect plays a key role with its kernel of totality, simultaneity and continuousness. In both these horizons, the organism is in a living enkapsis with both its underlying physical substrate and the physical things in its external surroundings. The ideal of artificial intelligence is thus a phantasm. The only comment it can give on biology is that which has to do with the succession of discrete elements in a system. Hempel’s dilemma and the halting problem expose the physicalist point of departure of everything is physical as a religious premise, which is not empirically verifiable. Instead of getting a better view of Being the contours of meaning of life as well as all the supra physical aspects of Being fades away or is denied with concealment of Being. The only way in which we can get the broadest possible insight into Being is in the light of the Word of God. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History and Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)

Denna essä är en ontologisk och epistemologisk undersökning av bland annat etiska och medvetandefilosofiska implikationer av en konsekvent fysikalistisk hållning. I detta kontrasteras mot en transcendentalistisk hållning, som den av T. M. Scanlon, den skeptiska empirismen av David Hume, reciprokt baserade moraliska system (e.g. J. L. Mackies självreferentiella altruism) samt en medvetandesyn i linje med Galen Strawsons kriterier för en realistisk fysikalism som i min mening löser alla så kallade psykofysiska problem. / This paper contains an ontological and epistemic analysis of the implication of a consistently physicalist view of reality. This in polemic contrast with transcendentalist positions as that of T. M. Scanlon. I follow along the lines of a sceptical empiricism that I ascribe to Hume and from which, I argue, consistently follows guidelines as set by for example J. L. Mackie and Galen Strawson on topics of self-referential altruism and realistic physicalism respectively.

The thesis deals with the problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world. It denies the approach that is prevailing in the contemporary philosophy of mind that treats the phenomenal consciousness and intentionality separately. The position held in this thesis is to claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness and intentionality are inseparable and that it is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter, and vice versa. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is viewed as the problem of the existence of (conscious) intentionality in the physical world. With the aim to achieve an analysis of intentionality that would keep its phenomenal character and the first person point of view, and, at the same time, shed light on its realization in the physical world, thoughts of Peter Strawson, G. E. M. Anscombe, Tim Crane, Colin McGinn and John Searle are discussed. The result is an outline of intentionality that allows to explain the fundamental level of intentionality as a physical process and the higher levels of intentionality as a development of the fundamental level. Two principles are crucial for this approach: the development of intentionality from the fundamental level to the higher level is comprehensible only if we keep the...

Jakub Mihálik: Consciousness in Nature. A Russellian Approach Abstract: This thesis attempts to provide a philosophical answer to the question of how phenomenal consciousness, or experience, can exist in the physical world, i.e. in the world as it is described by science. The thesis has three parts: In the first part (chapter 1) I explicate the concept of phenomenal consciousness and contrast it with other concepts of consciousness common in the literature. Moreover, I suggest that the project pursued in this thesis can be naturally viewed as a part of the more general project of trying to find a stereoscopic view of man, taken by Wilfrid Sellars to be a crucial task for contemporary philosophy. In the second part of the thesis (chapters 2 to 4) I offer a detailed evaluation of the attempts at a materialist reduction of consciousness. While in chapter 2 I explore and critique the approach of apriori physicalism (Dennett, Lewis, Rey, etc.), in chapters 3 and 4, I focus on the more recent doctrine of a posteriori physicalism and especially its most prominent variety called the phenomenal concept strategy (Loar, Papineau, Levin, Schroer, etc.). One problem with a posteriori physicalism is that, as Nida-Rümelin, Goff and others argue, the view cannot make sense of the plausible thesis that our phenomenal...

After a short introduction concerning the problem of "Artificial Intelligence" (AI) the work continues with a summary of the state of the art.Thereafter, it goes on to profile four different basic scientific views of human beings and AI: symbolism, connectionism, biologism and physicalism. The emphasis is on the elucidation of anthropologically relevant statements to intelligence, spirit, thinking, perception, will, consciousness, self-consciousness, feelings and life.It is demonstrated that the basic views referred to represent greatly abbreviated and distorted pictures of human beings. Theories that do not go beyond the quantifiable level cannot adequately encompass the nature of relevant concepts and capabilities. That is above all because of the fact that generally a philosophical materialism is advocated, which considers the existence of intellectual substances impossible. For this reason a philosophical critique is necessary. The position of moderate and critical realism is advocated, whose anthropological statements are secured by epistemological and metaphysical investigations.The work comes to the conclusion that human beings cannot be understood symbolistically, connectionistically, biologistically or physicalistically. Man is a physical-intellectual entity, endowed with reason, a living social being. He is formed and led by his intellectual and therefore immortal soul, which gives him uniqueness, irreplaceability and the value of personhood. He is capable of thinking and thus of objective, abstract perception, and therefore is intelligent. Humans have an unfettered will, which, led by mental perception, is to be directed toward the good. They are moreover, through reflection, self-conscious. Humans live an intellectually determined life, which essentially differs, despite biological similarity, from that of animals and cannot possibly, due to its substantial superiority, have developed from animal life.All substantial anthropological abilities (such as intelligence, will, consciousness etc.) presuppose spirit. Because it is not within the power of human beings to create a simple substance such as spirit, a thinking, perceptive, intelligent, willing, self-conscious, sentient living being can at best be only technically imitated, modelled or simulated but never be reproduced, copied or created. The relationship of humans to AI is thus determined by an insuperable difference between their natures.

Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.