Phenomenal consciousness presents a recalcitrant problem for the scientific conception of the world and the physicalist thesis that claims that everything that exists (including whatever is involved in any mental phenomena) is physical and physically explainable. Thus, on this view, every truth is a physical truth. By Putnam-Kripkean considerations and for several other reasons, I defend the claim that any version of such a physicalist thesis must be a necessary thesis, which ultimately means that contingent physicalism is not tenable. Against this thesis, philosophers have put forward several anti-physicalist arguments including the knowledge argument, the conceivability/modal argument, the explanatory gap argument, and the property dualism argument. All these arguments rest on the assumption of an epistemic/explanatory gap, which I call the &ldquo / phenomenal-physical gap,&rdquo / between the phenomenal and the physical. I claim that the phenomenal-physical gap (the PP-gap) is unbridgeable, from which it can be concluded that a priori physicalism is not tenable. The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS), which is a specific strategy within a posteriori necessary physicalism, aims at offering an explanation in physical terms of why we have such an unbridgeable gap by differentiating between phenomenal and physical concepts in a fundamental way. Nevertheless, proponents of PCS&mdash / the most promising version of a posteriori necessary physicalism&mdash / face a severe problem that I call &ldquo / the problem of phenomenal subjecthood&rdquo / in explaining in physical terms why we have the PP-gap. The phenomenon of &ldquo / experiencing&rdquo / consists of three substantially existing elements: the phenomenal subject (the experiencer), the experiential item (what is experienced by the subject), and the phenomenal s-v-o relation (the experiential relation) between the first two. I argue for the substantial existence of phenomenal subjects based on an argument I provide, the reality of some mental phenomena such as phenomenal unity and continuity, and the mental facts concerning phenomenal peculiarity, phenomenal agency, and the sense of phenomenal I-ness, the reality of all of which one cannot deny. Since PCS accounts are mostly qualia-centered accounts that ignore the reality of phenomenal subjects and the phenomenal s-v-o relation, they cannot account for the PP-gap in physical terms without first offering substantial theories of phenomenal subjecthood. But once they grant the substantiality of phenomenal subjects, they face severe difficulties in establishing their accounts of the nature of phenomenal concept, and thus the PP-gap in physical terms.

Evidence supporting a range of 6-14 years between mental illness symptom recognition and psychological help seeking has spurred a substantial interest in help seeking barriers. The present study suggests that mind and body dualism, the perceiving of the mind as an entity distinct from the body, is one such barrier to help seeking. Despite the fact that beliefs in mind-body dualism or its opposite, that of physicalism, are evident in virtually all human cultures and religions, surprisingly little is known about the psychological and behavioral implications of holding such beliefs. An exception to this disparity is a study that demonstrated a connection between dualism and decreased engagement in healthy behaviors, such as exercise and eating habits (Forstmann et al., 2012). The aim of the present study was to expand on these findings by investigating the effects of mind-body beliefs and gender on attitudes towards professional psychological help and holistic or alternative medicines. In accordance with my hypothesis, a MANOVA indicated a main effect of gender, such that women felt more positively than men about seeking professional help for their own mental health problems as well as about the general value of therapy for others. A secondary analysis indicated that participants who self-identified as Jewish felt significantly more positive about psychotherapeutic treatment compared to Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist religious groups. Future research should continue to examine the links between mind-body ideologies, religion, culture, and help seeking through a large-scale correlational analysis utilizing naturally occurring mind-body beliefs.

In this thesis I offer a novel alternative response to Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986) knowledge argument in support of non-reductive physicalism (NRP). The knowledge argument is framed as an attack on reductive physicalism (RP), as it suggests the possibility that the subjective experience (SE) of an event or phenomenon adds ‘real’ knowledge to a person’s existing knowledge. My novel response aims to enrich the current debate, dominated as it is by Western philosophy of mind, by introducing one specific African concept of mind into the debate. The concept of mind I introduce into the debate, is Kwasi Wiredu’s (1987) quasi-physicalist interpretation of the Akan concept of mind. My alternative reply specifically contributes to the debate by changing the negative ability reply to the knowledge argument, framed by Nemirow (1980, 1990) and Lewis (1983, 1988) in Western philosophy of mind, into a positive support for Jackson (1982, 1986) by introducing African voices into the debate. I demonstrate that although the unsolved mind-body problem is presented as an ongoing philosophical issue in Western philosophy, a turn to an African perspective can shine new light on the problem. The novel alternative reply to Jackson’s knowledge argument consists of an epistemological argument that subjective experience (SE) adds genuine knowledge to a person’s existing knowledge, and a metaphysical argument that subjective experience (SE) is an emergent mental property. These two arguments validate property dualism as well as the knowledge argument. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2019. / CSIR- CAIR 2017-2019 University of Pretoria (UP) Postgraduate Bursary 2018-2019 / Philosophy / PhD / Unrestricted

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History & Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)

The ideal of artificial intelligence can firstly be set as the ability of a mechanical (or electronic) agent to be able to, as a human, observe, reason, learn, communicate and act in complex environments and secondly, to explain this type of behaviour in humans, animals or any other type of agent. The aim of this study is firstly to determine whether this ideal is feasible and secondly, to look at the physicalist premise thereof, viz., everything is physical according to Dooyeweerd’s view of the creation, fall and redemption motive. First we determine the essence of artificial intelligence through the Curch–Turing thesis. We then place the essence of artificial intelligence alongside the essence of life firstly to see whether the construction of an artificial intelligence agent is possible and whether the subject artificial intelligence has something to say regarding intelligent behaviour in humans, animals and similar agents. Lastly we look at the physicalist premise of artificial intelligence viz., everything is physical from the reformative creation, fall and redemption motive. The Church–Turing thesis forms the boundary of what is feasible in artificial intelligence and what is not feasible. Every component of the thesis is limited to the arithmetic law sphere of Being, i.e. the succession of discrete elements in a set of elements. Any effort to reduce the spatial aspect of the being to the arithmetic aspect of Being, like the enumeration of irrational numbers, ends in an antinomy. Any artificial intelligence agent is in its nature limited to the arithmetic law sphere of Being. The structural intertwinement, which such an artificial intelligence agent has with its underlying physical components is, in contrast with living organisms that of an irreversible grounded enkapsis. Life and mind has, in contrast to the arithmetic seclusion of an artificial intelligence agent, a fullness and totality. It has an ability to unlock Being in its fullness, which comes to the fore in a way that any living organism unlocks the plastic horizon of Being in the respective internal and phenomenological horizons. The unlocking of the spatial aspect plays a key role with its kernel of totality, simultaneity and continuousness. In both these horizons, the organism is in a living enkapsis with both its underlying physical substrate and the physical things in its external surroundings. The ideal of artificial intelligence is thus a phantasm. The only comment it can give on biology is that which has to do with the succession of discrete elements in a system. Hempel’s dilemma and the halting problem expose the physicalist point of departure of everything is physical as a religious premise, which is not empirically verifiable. Instead of getting a better view of Being the contours of meaning of life as well as all the supra physical aspects of Being fades away or is denied with concealment of Being. The only way in which we can get the broadest possible insight into Being is in the light of the Word of God. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

The ideal of artificial intelligence can firstly be set as the ability of a mechanical (or electronic) agent to be able to, as a human, observe, reason, learn, communicate and act in complex environments and secondly, to explain this type of behaviour in humans, animals or any other type of agent. The aim of this study is firstly to determine whether this ideal is feasible and secondly, to look at the physicalist premise thereof, viz., everything is physical according to Dooyeweerd’s view of the creation, fall and redemption motive. First we determine the essence of artificial intelligence through the Curch–Turing thesis. We then place the essence of artificial intelligence alongside the essence of life firstly to see whether the construction of an artificial intelligence agent is possible and whether the subject artificial intelligence has something to say regarding intelligent behaviour in humans, animals and similar agents. Lastly we look at the physicalist premise of artificial intelligence viz., everything is physical from the reformative creation, fall and redemption motive. The Church–Turing thesis forms the boundary of what is feasible in artificial intelligence and what is not feasible. Every component of the thesis is limited to the arithmetic law sphere of Being, i.e. the succession of discrete elements in a set of elements. Any effort to reduce the spatial aspect of the being to the arithmetic aspect of Being, like the enumeration of irrational numbers, ends in an antinomy. Any artificial intelligence agent is in its nature limited to the arithmetic law sphere of Being. The structural intertwinement, which such an artificial intelligence agent has with its underlying physical components is, in contrast with living organisms that of an irreversible grounded enkapsis. Life and mind has, in contrast to the arithmetic seclusion of an artificial intelligence agent, a fullness and totality. It has an ability to unlock Being in its fullness, which comes to the fore in a way that any living organism unlocks the plastic horizon of Being in the respective internal and phenomenological horizons. The unlocking of the spatial aspect plays a key role with its kernel of totality, simultaneity and continuousness. In both these horizons, the organism is in a living enkapsis with both its underlying physical substrate and the physical things in its external surroundings. The ideal of artificial intelligence is thus a phantasm. The only comment it can give on biology is that which has to do with the succession of discrete elements in a system. Hempel’s dilemma and the halting problem expose the physicalist point of departure of everything is physical as a religious premise, which is not empirically verifiable. Instead of getting a better view of Being the contours of meaning of life as well as all the supra physical aspects of Being fades away or is denied with concealment of Being. The only way in which we can get the broadest possible insight into Being is in the light of the Word of God. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History and Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)

This paper compares two models of the philosophy of mind: René Descartes' substance dualism and Daniel Dennett's multiple-drafts model. Descartes posits that the body and consciousness are distinct substances capable of independent existence, with the pineal gland serving as the point of interaction between the physical and conscious realms. Conversely, Dennett rejects this dualist approach, proposing that consciousness and all mental activities emerge from complex, multitrack neurophysiological processes distributed across various brain regions. Additionally, the paper examines the knowledge argument as a significantchallenge to physicalism. The study aims to demonstrate that Dennett's physicalist model, grounded in contemporary neuroscience, offers a more plausible explanation for the emergence of consciousness through neuronal activity, whereas substance dualism fails to elucidate the phenomenon and instead contributes to its mystification. / I denna uppsats jämförs två modeller av medvetandefilosofin, den substansdualistiska modellen av René Descartes och the multiple drafts model av fysikalisten Daniel Dennett. Descartes ser kropp och medvetande som två skilda substanser som kan existera oberoende av varandra. Enligt Descartes är tallkottkörteln den fysiska platsen där det fysiska och medvetandet kommer i kontakt med varandra. Dennett förkastar Descartes teori och beskriver uppkomsten av medvetande och alla former av mental aktivitet som ett resultat av komplexa flerspåriga neurofysiologiska processer på olika platser i hjärnan. Uppsatsen tar också upp och analyserar ett viktigt argument mot fysikalismen, kunskapsargumentet eller Mary i det svartvita rummet. Syftet med uppsatsen är att visa att Dennetts fysikalistiska modell är en samtida, neurovetenskapligt välgrundad och lämplig modell för att förklara uppkomsten av medvetandet som en produkt av neuronal aktivitet i hjärnan och att substansdualism inte ger förklaringar till fenomenet medvetande, utan snarare stöder ämnets mystifiering.

Denna essä är en ontologisk och epistemologisk undersökning av bland annat etiska och medvetandefilosofiska implikationer av en konsekvent fysikalistisk hållning. I detta kontrasteras mot en transcendentalistisk hållning, som den av T. M. Scanlon, den skeptiska empirismen av David Hume, reciprokt baserade moraliska system (e.g. J. L. Mackies självreferentiella altruism) samt en medvetandesyn i linje med Galen Strawsons kriterier för en realistisk fysikalism som i min mening löser alla så kallade psykofysiska problem. / This paper contains an ontological and epistemic analysis of the implication of a consistently physicalist view of reality. This in polemic contrast with transcendentalist positions as that of T. M. Scanlon. I follow along the lines of a sceptical empiricism that I ascribe to Hume and from which, I argue, consistently follows guidelines as set by for example J. L. Mackie and Galen Strawson on topics of self-referential altruism and realistic physicalism respectively.

The thesis deals with the problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world. It denies the approach that is prevailing in the contemporary philosophy of mind that treats the phenomenal consciousness and intentionality separately. The position held in this thesis is to claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness and intentionality are inseparable and that it is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter, and vice versa. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is viewed as the problem of the existence of (conscious) intentionality in the physical world. With the aim to achieve an analysis of intentionality that would keep its phenomenal character and the first person point of view, and, at the same time, shed light on its realization in the physical world, thoughts of Peter Strawson, G. E. M. Anscombe, Tim Crane, Colin McGinn and John Searle are discussed. The result is an outline of intentionality that allows to explain the fundamental level of intentionality as a physical process and the higher levels of intentionality as a development of the fundamental level. Two principles are crucial for this approach: the development of intentionality from the fundamental level to the higher level is comprehensible only if we keep the...