The thesis focuses on theoretical and empirical analysis of the New Regionalism trends that are further applied to the case of the European Union. Aim of the thesis is to explain the substance and features of New Regionalism in the world economy and confront them with the current state of integration in the European Union. The matter is whether the European Union, which has belonged to the most successful examples of regional integration, is strong and flexible tool of its member states to cope with changing conditions of the globalized world economy and whether it can aspire for a more substantial role in regional and global governance.

Thesis advisor: David Deese / The proliferation of regional trade agreements is a well-documented phenomena. This thesis focuses on the relatively unexplored area of non-economic motivations states may have for joining regional trade agreements. It uses the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the negotiation of the European Community's Single European Act as case studies. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2004. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Free (libre) and open source software (FLOSS) emerged in the 1980s as a radical alternative to proprietary software. Fighting back against what FLOSS enthusiasts viewed as overly restrictive intellectual property protections placed on proprietary software, FLOSS was designed with the intent of granting users the right to study, modify, adapt, or otherwise tinker with the source code of software. As such, FLOSS users were able to collaborate in producing software that could be distributed freely and widely to others, who could, in turn, make changes to the software. As FLOSS projects grew in popularity, the productive process was spread throughout a broad network of distributed users, all of whom could work on the code. The result of this process was the creation of robust, effective, and efficient forms of software that could compete with those offered by large software companies. Increasingly, however, some of those large software companies became involved in the development of FLOSS projects. On its face, this may seem to be a contradiction of interests. Why would a for-profit company invest in the development of software that is made freely available for others to use? This is the contradiction that lies at the heart of this research project. More specifically, this project looks at the dynamics that exist between communities of FLOSS developers and the corporations that are involved in or make use of their projects. Working from a critical political economy perspective, this study complicates theories of the commons and commons-based peer production by illustrating how FLOSS processes and products are being incorporated into broader corporate structures and strategies. The three case studies presented - Red Hat, Microsoft, and Oracle's acquisition of Sun Microsystems - exemplify different elements of this dynamic. Red Hat provides an example of how a company that relies exclusively on free software can be turned into a profitable business. The Microsoft case demonstrates why the company has undergone a transition from vehement opposition to FLOSS toward a more supportive position. Finally, Oracle's acquisition of Sun Microsystems demonstrates how FLOSS communities cope with changing ownership structures and unwanted corporate interference into their projects.

The social and environmental impacts of consumer electronics and information communications technologies (CE/ICTs) reflect dynamics of a globalized and interdependent world. During the early 21st century the global consumption of CE/ICTs expanded greatly while the infrastructure behind CE/ICTs, especially the extraction and disassembly phases, became more integrated. This dissertation examines how messages about the social and environmental impacts of CE/ICTs changed during this period and explores the discursive power of actors involved in environmental justice campaigns surrounding the disposal and disassembly of electronic waste (e-waste). The dissertation reports the results of a mixed methods investigation of twelve years of media coverage of e-waste through quantitative content analysis and qualitative document analysis. The analysis examined almost 800 articles from eleven media outlets between 2002 – 2013 and explored differences between legacy media coverage (e.g. The New York Times, USA Today) and coverage from digital news outlets focused on technology (e.g. Ars Technica, CNET, Gizmodo). When the story of e-waste began to gain traction in media outlets, the haze of commodity fetishism cleared for a brief moment and the social relations of exploitation behind the wonders of technology were included in media narratives. While the media coverage about e-waste initially examined environmental justice issues of pollution and labor exploitation, the coverage evolved into focusing on the technical and business solutions to managing the environmental problems and the growth of a private sector profiting from mineral reclamation through electronics recycling.

Cette thèse utilise le concept de bien public comme fil conducteur herméneutique permettant d’explorer la théorie et l’histoire de l’économie politique. Située à l'intersection de la philosophie politique et de l'histoire de la pensée économique moderne, cette thèse examine la question de recherche suivante: quels sont le rôle et le potentiel que peuvent avoir les biens publics pour favoriser plutôt qu’empêcher la capacité d’action individuelle et collective en politique et dans la vie sociale ? En réponse à cette question, la thèse soutient la primauté des biens publics de deux manières. Premièrement, puisque les biens publics pluriels constituent l’infrastructure essentielle de la vie sociale et des relations humaines, ils sont prioritaires par rapport aux deux autres modes, privé et commun, d’approvisionnement et de jouissance des biens. Deuxièmement, dans la mesure où ils reposent sur la coordination et la contrainte gouvernementales au sein de relations d’autorité politique inévitables et inéluctables, les biens publics priment également sur le bien commun conçu dans son acceptation moniste. / This dissertation takes up the concept of public goods as a hermeneutical thread with which to explore the theory and history of political economy. Situated at the intersection between political philosophy and the history of modern economic thought, this dissertation examines the following main research question: what is the role and potential of public goods to foster rather than disable individual and collective agency in politics and social life? In response to this question, the dissertation articulates the primacy of public goods in two senses: first, since plural public goods constitute the indispensable infrastructure of social life and human relationships, they have primacy over both private and common modes of providing and enjoying goods. Second, since they rely on governmental coordination and compulsion in inescapable and ineluctable relationships of political authority, public goods also have primacy over the common good in its monist conception.

A migração partidária, embora seja um evento relativamente raro na maioria dos países, trata-se de um fenômeno disseminado no Brasil. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar empiricamente os efeitos da migração partidária sobre variáveis políticas entre os anos de 2001 e 2012, fazendo uso de um banco de dados com 4974 municípios. Além disso, parte-se de uma abordagem alternativa, uma vez que, diferente da literatura convencional que trata da migração partidária de legisladores, neste artigo a atenção se voltará para o executivo, mais especificamente, para os prefeitos, algo ainda não explorado pela literatura. A mudança partidária do prefeito é interpretada como um efeito de tratamento, em que o grupo tratado é o de municípios cujo prefeito mudou de partido durante a vigência do seu mandato. Para encontramos um município no grupo de controle que possua as mesmas chances de ser tratado aplicamos um Propensity Score Matching (PSM), e então será comparado o impacto da migração sobre os políticos migrantes. Os resultados obtidos via logit apontam que os prefeitos pertencentes a partidos coligados a esferas superiores de poder tem menor probabilidade de mudarem de partido, uma vez que estes teriam melhores condições de auxiliarem os prefeitos em sua tentativa de reeleição. Além disso, foi concluído que os prefeitos migrantes possuem maior chance de tentarem se reeleger na eleição seguinte, mas sem muito impacto sobre a chance de se reelegerem, sendo que, dentre os migrantes, os melhores desempenhos para ambas as variáveis dependentes se encontram entre aqueles que migram de um partido de fora da base do governo estadual para um partido que esteja dentro dessa base. Por fim, não foi constatato nenhum efeito estatisticamente significante da migração, tanto em si como desagregada pelos tipos de migrantes, sobre as transferências recebidas pelos municípios / Although party switching is a relatively rare event in most countries, it is a widespread phenomenon in Brazil. This paper aims to present empirically the effects of party switching on political variables between the years 2001 and 2012, using a database with 4974 municipalities. Moreover, it is based on an alternative approach, since the conventional literature deal with party switching of legislators, this paper will focus on the executive, more specifically, on mayors, something not yet explored in the literature. The mayor\'s party switching is interpreted as a treatment effect, in which the treated group is that of municipalities whose mayor changed party during the term of his mandate. To find a municipality in the control group that has the same chances of being treated, we apply Propensity Score Matching (PSM), and then the impact of the switching on the switcher politicians will be compared. The results obtained by logit show that mayors belonging to parties affiliated with the state governor\'s party or the president\'s party are less likely to change parties, since they would be better able to assist the mayors in their re-election attempt. Moreover, it was concluded that switchers mayors are more likely to attempt reelection in the next election, but without much impact on the chance of re-election, and among the switchers, the best performances for both dependent variables are among those who switch from a party outside the state government coalition to a party within that coalition. Finally, there was no statistically significant effect of switching, both in itself and disaggregated by the types of switchers, on the transfers received by the municipalities

O objetivo desta dissertação é avaliar o impacto da política de segurança pública dos municípios na criminalidade. Para tanto, faz-se uso de uma estratégia de identificação baseada em restrições na matriz de variância condicional. As equações do modelo e as hipóteses de identificação estão micro-fundamentadas nas previsões de um modelo de economia política. As premissas do modelo são semelhantes às hipóteses do modelo básico de eleitor mediano. As premissas adicionais em relação a este modelo são: (i) existe incerteza em relação a um parâmetro das preferências dos eleitores e (ii) que o resultado de um referendo sobre comercialização de armas de fogo representa um sinal sobre esse parâmetro desconhecido. A base de dados usada no estudo contém seis medidas de crime (tentativa de homicídio, roubo, latrocínio, furto, estupro e homicídio) e três medidas de polícia diferentes (gastos em segurança pública, gasto em policiamento e número de guardas municipais no ano de 2005) para os municípios dos estados de MG, RJ e SP nos anos de 2004 e 2005. As estimativas de GMM mostram que a polícia não possui efeito negativo e significante na criminalidade em nenhum dos modelos estimados. Além disso, as estimativas de GMM que usam medidas de gasto como medidas de polícia apresentam coeficientes positivos. Apesar disso, as estimativas de GMM que usam o número de guardas municipais como medidas de polícia apresentam coeficientes negativos. Essa reversão de coeficientes em relação às estimativas de OLS é uma evidência de que existe viés de simultaneidade. Esse resultado também é uma evidência de que existe uma endogeneidade não tratada nas regressões de GMM com medidas de gasto. Não se encontraram evidências que a endogeneidade nas regressões de GMM com medidas de gasto seja explicada por seleção em não observáveis. / The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the impact of public security policy of the municipalities in crime. With this purpose, we use an identification strategy based on constraints in the matrix of conditional variance. The model equations and the identification hypotheses are based on forecasts of a model of political economy. The assumptions of the model are similar to the assumptions of the basic median voter model. There are two additional assumptions to the basic median voter model: (i) there is uncertainty regarding a parameter of the preferences of voters and (ii) that the result of a referendum on sale of firearms is a sign on the unknown parameter. The database used in the study contains six measures of crime (attempted murder, burglary, larceny, theft, rape and murder) and three different measures of police (public security expenditures, spending on policing and the number of city police officers) for municipalities in the states of RJ, MG and SP in 2004 and 2005. GMM estimates show that the police do not have any significant negative effect on crime in any of the models estimated. Furthermore, GMM estimates using spent on public safety and spent on policing as police measures have positive coefficients. Nevertheless, the GMM estimates using the number of city police officers and police measures have negative coefficients. This change of sign in relation to the OLS coefficients is evidence that there is simultaneity bias. This result is also evidence that there is endogeneity in the GMM regressions with measures of spending. No evidence was found that the endogeneity in GMM regressions with measures of spending is explained by selection on unobservable.

Os principais modelos de equilíbrio parcial e DSGE que estudam a dinâmica do investimento desconsideram questões centrais para a pesquisa desse tema e tem dificuldades em explicar resultados da literatura empírica. Defendemos que estudar a dinâmica do investimento como um sistema adaptativo complexo por meio de modelos de simulação baseados em agentes (ABMs) é uma alternativa promissora. Nessa dissertação motivamos, descrevemos, justificamos metodologicamente e construímos um ABM nos inspirando em modelos importantes da literatura e incorporamos às expectativas de demanda das firmas uma regra de revisão de otimismo e um mecanismo de interação em suas decisões de produção e investimento. Com isso, reproduzimos diversos fatos estilizados da literatura empírica e conseguimos testar os efeitos macroeconômicos de hipóteses teóricas relacionadas a fenômenos de contágio via confiança, motivações políticas e à reflexividade, presentes nas decisões das firmas. Nossos resultados colocam em dúvida a efetividade de mecanismos análogos à greve de investimentos, como meios dos empresários controlarem as políticas dos governos, mas confirmam que endogeneizar possíveis motivações políticas, ainda que subjetivas, no nível de confiança das firmas tem efeitos macroeconômicos substanciais. Ademais, nossos experimentos sugerem que i) tanto a evolução da produtividade, quanto dos salários reais são condições necessárias para o crescimento, ii) choques de confiança temporários tem efeitos de longo-prazo, iii) para que choques de pessimismo localizados contagiem a economia, eles precisam ser persistentes, iv) considerar o conceito de reflexividade tem consequências macroeconômicas importantes. Não encontramos evidências de que contrações fiscais do governo possam ser expansionistas, por meio de seus efeitos na confiança. / The main parcial equilibrium and DSGE models which study investment dynamics disregard core issues about this subject and have problems to explain results coming from the empirical literature. We argue that studying investment dynamics in a complex adaptive system by using Agent-Based Models is a promising alternative. In this work we motivate, describe, justify methodologically and build an ABM in line with important models from the literature and we incorporate to firms\' demand expectations an optimism revision rule and an interaction mechanism in their decisions to produce and invest. Thereby, we replicate many stylized facts from the empirical literature and we were able to test macroeconomic effects from theoretical hypothesis related to confidence-driven contagion phenomena, political motivation and reflexivity, present in firms\' decisions. Our results question the effectiveness of mechanisms analogous to the investment strikes, as a way for businessmen to control government policies, but confirm that endogenize possible political motivations, yet subjective, in the level of confidence of the firms has substantial macroeconomic effects. Furthermore, our experiments suggest that i) both productivity and real wages are necessary conditions for growth, ii) temporary confidence shocks have long-term effect, iii ) for localized shocks of pessimism, to contagion the economy, they need to be persistent, iv) consider the concept of reflexivity has important macroeconomic consequences. We find no evidence that government fiscal contractions can be expansionist, through their effects on confidence levels.

In the last few decades, many governments around the world—especially in emerging economies—have strayed from neoliberal prescriptions to get closer to a model originating from East Asia: the developmental state. These East Asian countries (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan) instead of just regulating market mechanisms, have exercised strong control over their economies and society through highly-ambitious long-term economic and social development programs implemented in tight partnership with the private sector. Indeed, this phenomenon is worth exploring when we ask the question of how governance and political economy is evolving in the world and what are the new approaches that can inform governments. This Ph.D. thesis focuses on the evolution of strategies for social and economic development and more specifically on the emergence of developmental states in Africa. By looking at the case of Rwanda that is often considered as a success story in Africa, the aim of this thesis is to show how much this state is transforming its institutions in line with a model that resembles the developmental state, but with its specificities and perspective. Based on a large selection of primary sources gathered in Rwanda between 2015 and 2016, we argue that the system of governance of Rwanda has evolved in a different direction than the typical neo-liberal model often advocated by the West and is following a developmentalist approach much closer to some early East Asian developmental states. The case of Rwanda is a good starting point to analyze the emergence of alternative governance models in Africa which illustrate the current change in today’s political economy.

Thesis advisor: Hideo Konishi / My doctoral dissertation consists of three chapters on political economy and public economics. The first chapter discusses the effect of media bias on a voting competition. The second chapter focuses on how residents respond to increasing natural disaster risks in a multi-community framework. The third chapter investigates a coalition formation game with congestion effects. In chapter 1, I present a two-party election model with media noise. The media may provide polarized messages instead of those that explain the parties' actual policies. The rational voter relies on the media as an imperfect information source regarding a party's platform. Given this framework, I show that Downsian policy convergence is not valid. Moreover, when a party's ideology is relatively strong and the media bias is significant, one-sided polarization can occur: the party with more imprecise reports may adopt a more extreme strategy, whereas its opponent is more of a centrist in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This occurs when one party is misrepresented more often, causing the voter to think that the other party has more incentive to polarize. Therefore, the voter may favor the highly misrepresented party, which gives that party more room to polarize. I also show that parties never gain from these increasing misrepresentations, and a biased media environment can negatively affect the voter's welfare. My results suggest that the public should pursue a balanced media environment. Global warming and climate change have become increasingly important. In chapter 2, I investigate a local public goods economy using a new element: location-specific risks of disasters. Agents in this economy ``vote with their feet'' by choosing their favorite location as their residential base. In each location, all residents use majority rule to decide the local wealth tax rate and the amount of local public goods provision that can reduce the loss caused by disasters. I show that the equilibrium is wealth stratified if preferences are represented by a homothetic Stone-Geary utility function. Moreover, when disaster risks at a location increase, the population usually moves away from that location and the housing rents consequently decrease. Meanwhile, the housing rents and tax rates increase at the location the residents shift to. Moreover, I use this framework to numerically evaluate two policies: foreign donation and inter-jurisdiction transfer. If developed countries provides subsidies to a location with greater risks in a developing country, wealthier agents in the recipient country may move into the said location and force poorer agents to move out. This effect makes the wealthier the direct beneficiary of the foreign subsidy. Furthermore, I find that the inter-jurisdiction transfer may harm the poorer by rising housing rents. In chapter 3, I consider a coalition-formation problem, in which there is a set of feasible alternatives for each coalition and each player's payoff is affected by the coalition she belongs to and by its chosen alternative. In this chapter, I focus on ``congestion effects'': an agent's payoff goes down as an additional player joins the coalition other things being equal. The equilibrium notion considered is ``stability": a stable allocation (pairs of coalition structure and alternatives chosen by each coalition) is an allocation such that no coalition has an incentive to deviate from it. I find quite robust counterexamples to show that stability may fail to exist even under strong preference conditions such as the intermediate preference property and single peakedness. Nevertheless, I show a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of stability: congruent-pair solvability. I also provide some results on the ``Nash-like" equilibrium notion. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.