Rev. doctoral diss. Univ. of Oxford, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [261]-274) and index.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ArquivoTotalMaisa.pdf: 670994 bytes, checksum: 77b2783954211a552e0d4343dbd68256 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-01-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This study aims to investigate the possibility of understanding civil disobedience as a political duty. For this, we analyze the works of the Italian political philosopher Alessandro Passerin d'Entrèves. From the author's conception of the State, we analyze the relations of command and obedience in the state s structure and establish another approach to the problem of obedience to the laws using d Entrèves concept of 'political obligation'. Analyzing studies from Passerin d'Entrèves, Norberto Bobbio and Hannah Arendt, specifically about the legitimacy of civil disobedience and resistance, we try to answer the question: Why should we disobey? To enable the approach described above, we explore some classic problems of political philosophy and law, such as the notion of authority, the conflict between the concepts of legality and legitimacy and the definition of the state as a monopoly of force. In this sense, this research addresses some conflicts between great streams of western thought, as positivism and natural law, political science and philosophy, among others. From d Entrèves notion of political obligation it is possible to understand civil desobedience as a duty, especially in the democratic experiences. / Esse trabalho se propõe a investigar a possibilidade de compreender a desobediência civil como um dever políticoa partir da análise das obras do filósofo do direito e da política italiano Alessandro Passerin d Entrèves. A partir da concepção de Estado do autor, analisamos as relações de comando e obediência na estrutura estatal e estabelecemos umaaproximação ao problema da obediência às leis através de seu conceito de obrigação política . Analisando especificamente estudos acerca da desobediência civil e da legitimidade da resistência de Passerin d Entrèves, Norberto Bobbio e Hannah Arendt, tentamos responder à pergunta: porquê desobedecer? Para possibilitar a abordagem acima descrita, exploramos alguns problemas clássicos da filosofia política e do direito, tais como a noção de autoridade, o conflito entre os conceitos de legalidade e legitimidade e a definição do Estado como monopólio da força legítima. Nesse sentido, essa pesquisa aborda alguns conflitos entre grandes correntes do pensamento ocidental, como jus naturalismo e jus positivismo, ciências políticas e filosofia, entre outros. A partir da noção de obrigação política de d Entrèves é possível interpretar a desobediência civil como dever, especialmente nas experiências democráticas.

A obrigação política é interpretada como um problema de cooperação. Inicialmente rejeita-se a idéia de que a cooperação sempre emerge do equilíbrio de ações autointeressadas. Discutindo alguns dos mais conhecidos princípios morais para a obrigação política são rejeitadas princípios verticais, como a gratidão e o consentimento, e alguns princípios horizontais, como dever natural e deveres associativos. Defende-se, por fim a equidade como um princípio moral capaz de dar sentido à obrigação política entendida como requisito de uma sociedade entendida como um empreendimento cooperativo. / Political obligation is treated as a cooperation problem. At first, an account that cooperation always emerges as equilibrium of self-interested actions is rejected. Discussing some of most popular moral principles of political obligations, we reject vertical principles, as gratitude and consent, and some horizontal principles, like associative and natural duty, that are not centered in the idea of society as cooperation. Finally, the principle of fairness is defended as the most adequate moral principle to make sense of political obligation as requisite of a society understood as a cooperative venture.

The following essay argues that Transnational Civil Disobedience may be justified when it is applied to questions relating to global climate change. Civil Disobedience as a politically motivated form of lawbreaking posits questions regarding political obligation and citizenship and such questions are amplified when applied to the transnational level.Furthermore, this essay focuses on the influential account of Civil Disobedience as it has been formulated by John Rawls. The writer argues that there are potential issues with this formulation when it is applied outside of the greater scope of Rawls’s work. Instead, the essay argues for a formulation of Civil Disobedience that includes a politicizing feature, and to view it as an extra institutional form of political discourse that is detached from notions of state belonging.Finally, it is argued that the All Affected Principle may be used as a necessary condition for justifying acts of Transnational Civil Disobedience. The nature of Global Climate change as an event that affects the human race as a whole, gives rise to the potential for non-citizens to claim a level of political agency in matters that affect them despite lacking formal representation.

M.A. / The dissertation analyses the political involvement of two women's organisations, Kontak and Women for Peace, during the period 1976-1990. Both organisations were established in the political watershed year of 1976. Kontak had its roots in `verligte' Afrikaner thinking concerned primarily about the image of the Afrikaner as oppressor. Women for Peace stemmed from the heart of liberal capitalist thinking fearing that the welfare community was under threat. Both organisations thus arose from the privileged white establishment and in this aspect differ from the many other women's organisations that existed in the period under review. The meaning of "political involvement" is defined in the study and evaluated in terms of the protest registered against the apartheid system, the ideological stand that was taken and the extent to which race relations improved. The latter was after all an essential objective of both organisations, more particularly to end conflict than to ensure a complete transition to democracy. The positioning, objective and conduct of the abovementioned organisations must of necessity be highlighted against the background of the oppressive political situation of the day. For this reason the study provides an overview of the political context within which the organisations had to function. It commences with the riots of 1976 when the National Party came under increasing pressure to scale down apartheid and make it more acceptable. Mention is made of the power of the National Party to equate matters of national interest with discrete party political interests. Further mention is made of the unbridgeable gap between intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics and how the decisive power of the latter was publicly suppressed. The impossibility of "political neutrality" is emphasised and that was precisely the label that the two organisations under discussion would have liked to attach to themselves. Kontak and Women for Peace were not the only players in the field of women's organisations. The study briefly discusses a few of the other main players such as the ANC Women's League, Inkatha's Women's Brigade and the Black Sash. Both Kontak and Women for Peace explicitly stated that they wished to seek reconciliation and peace between privileged whites and disadvantaged blacks "outside of the party-political arena". Neither of them could escape their political roots, however. The new enlightenment in the National Party for example prevented Kontak from taking an increasingly critical stand against apartheid. In the same way the much sharper voice of the Women for Peace was silenced by the approval of liberal PFP thinking. Both organisations registered protest within the safety of intra-parliamentary politics. They constituted no revolutionary threat for the apartheid state and their leaders were neither imprisoned nor banned. In summary it can be said that both Kontak and Women for Peace were able to realise the objectives of reconciliation within their chosen but limited target groups. Praiseworthy projects were undertaken and strong anti-apartheid positions were adopted. Democratic adjustments were constantly made with regard to membership, leadership hierarchy and language orientation. As far as the political main stream was concerned both, however, were wrongly positioned. The black majority moved in extra-parliamentary circles, outside the field of experience and even the protest actions of privileged whites. For this reason Kontak and Women for Peace were unable to contribute directly to the democratic transition to black majority rule but to some extent succeeded in sensitising the privileged white communities to accept change.

Though various obligations typically affect our behavior without being recognized, they have a substantial impact on how we operate as human beings. The relationships we have between, say, our parents when in their household obligate us to take out the trash at certain times and wash the dishes after dinner. The relationships we have between our closest friends often oblige us to hear them out when they have undergone a traumatic experience. Upon reflection, it may be easy to point out a number of the obligations which inform our social behavior. What is not so easy, however, is pointing out the foundation for such obligations. In this project I will explore the foundation of obligation, specifically political obligation. Through this exploration I will attempt to situation political obligation in the ontology of political actors. In particular, an analysis of liberal democracy and social democracy, and their ontological backgrounds, liberalism and communitarianism, will be utilized in order to elucidate both the usefulness and the location of political obligation. Ultimately, I will show how recourse to Marxism provides for a more robust account of political obligation.