This study’s purpose is testing the rentier state theory’s relationship to the degree of democracy and political stability in the MENA-region. In order to fulfill the aim of this study three research questions are formulated: what kind of relationship exists between oil export per capita and political stability in the MENA region? To what extent does the rentier state theory explain the variation in the degree of democracy in the MENA region? What kind of relationship exists between the rentier state theory and the degree of democracy in the MENA region? To which four hypotheses are formulated. Furthermore, to test these hypotheses and thereby meet the purpose of this study, its methodological approach consists of two regression models: one multiple regression analysis and one bivariate regression analysis. The former is set out to test the relationship between the dependent variable degree of democracy and the independent variables oil rent, tax revenue and political stability, using the control variable HDI. The latter regression analysis is employed to test the relationship between oil export per capita as the independent variable and political stability as the dependent variable. The multiple regression model finds insufficient support for the rentier state theory as an explanatory model for the variation in democracy in the MENA region, only observing a significant relationship with tax revenue. Whereas the bivariate regression model finds a significant positive relationship between oil export per capita and political stability. These findings do not exclude the possibility that the rentier state theory can explain variations in the degree of democracy in other oil rich regions outside of the Middle East and North Africa region. Nor do the results exclude the possibility of the rentier state theory explaining the variations in degree of democracy in certain MENA region countries. Additionally, there is reason to believe that a higher oil export per capita contributes to a higher degree of political stability in the MENA region. The observations of this study are problematized using earlier research that propose further studies including explanatory factors beyond the rentier state theory in the MENA region. These factors include armed conflicts, post colonialism and religious radicalization.

Traditional studies of the modernization-instability thesis have neglected the simultaneous influence of time and place on the relationship between modernization (social mobilization and political participation) and political instability, and the possible causal linkage between the two concepts. Empirical support for modernization-instability hypothesis will be obtained if and only if there is a strong positive correlation between modernization and political instability and the former causes the latter unidirectionally. Only then can one assert that modernization is exogenous, and that a policy geared toward restricting modernization is a proper anti-instability policy. This work attempts to address the question of correlation and causality through a pooled time-series cross-sectional data design and the use of Granger-causality tests. Particular attention is paid to the error structure of the models. Using pooled regression, a model of political instability is estimated for a total of 35 countries for the period 1960-1982. Granger tests are performed on twelve separate countries randomly selected from the 35. The results indicate that there is the expected positive relationship between modernization and political instability. Further, political institutionalization and economic well-being have strong negative influence on political instability. With regard to causality, the results vary by country. Some countries experience no causality between modernization and political instability, while some witness bidirectional causality. Further, some nations experience unidirectional causality running from modernization to political instability, while some depict a reverse causation. The main results suggest that modernization and political instability are positively related, and that political instability can have causal influence on modernization, just as modernization can exert causal influence on political instability.

Thesis (MA)-- Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The interplay between political risk and emerging markets is current and dynamic. As global interest shifts, investors cannot ignore emerging market behaviour and their influence. However, with great potential and opportunities, too comes great political risk. This research study begins with the point raised by the Eurasia Group that emerging market risk differs to that of developed market risk, and that risk in some instances can be ‗unbounded‘. Subsequently, the Eurasia Group deems emerging markets a top risk for 2013. Focussing on the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, Nigeria and Mexico offer valuable case studies. This research study offers a comparative study of these two countries in order to determine a generic list of political risk factors that are facing the oil and gas industries in emerging markets. In an increasingly volatile world, with a growing global demand for energy sources, and greater uncertainty surrounding investments and potential returns, political risk analysis is an invaluable decision-making tool for Transnational Oil Corporations (TNOCs) in order for their assets and interests to be protected. The central research question concerns the main political risk factors facing investors who want to participate in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. The aim of the research study is to answer the central research question through the help of supplementary questions. The first of these ask what the main political risk factors for TNOCs operating in the Niger Delta are. The second question asks what the main political risk factors for TNOCs operating in the Gulf of Mexico are. So as to complete the political risk picture, the last question asks how political risk in the oil and gas industry can be mitigated. This research study will contribute to existing research, and will assist investors with risk identification, analysis and mitigation. By utilising the generic list of essential political risk factors, TNOCs are made aware of the most salient political risks in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, and therefore are better placed to make rational and informed decisions when it comes to foreign investment. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die wisselwerking tussen politieke risiko en opkomende markte is intyd en dinamies. Soos globale belange verskuif, kan beleggers nie die opkomende markte se gedrag en invloed ignoreer nie, alhoewel met groot potensiaal en geleenthede kom daar ook groot politieke risiko. Die navorsingstudie het begin met die Eurasia Groep wat uitgelig het dat opkomende markrisiko verskil van die van ‘n ontwikkelde mark en dat die risiko in sekere gevalle ―ongebonde‖ kan wees. Gevolglik is opkomende markte as ‘n top risiko vir 2013 geklassifiseer. Met ‘n fokus op die olie- en gasindustrie in opkomende markte, bied Nigerië en Mexiko waardevolle gevallestudies. Die navorsingstuk bied ‘n vergelykende studie van dié twee lande met die doel om ‘n generiese lys van politieke risikofaktore wat die olie- en gasindustrie in opkomende markte in die gesig staar, vas te stel. In ‘n toenemende onstabiele wêreld met ‘n toenemende globale aanvraag vir energiebronne en groter onsekerheid rakende beleggings en potensiële opbrengs, is politieke risiko-analise ‘n waardevolle besluitnemings-meganisme vir Trans-Nasionale Oliekorporasies (TNOKs) om hul bates en belange te beskerm. Die sentrale navorsingsvraag fokus op die hoof politieke risikofaktore vir beleggers wat in die olie- en gasindustrie van opkomende markte wil belê. Die doel van die navorsingstudie is om die sentrale navorsingsvraag te beantwoord met behulp van aanvullende vrae. Die eerste vraag raak die hoof politieke risikofaktore vir TNOKs aan wat in die Niger-Delta opereer. Die tweede vraag handel oor die hoof politieke risikofaktore vir TNOKs wat in die Golf van Mexiko opereer. Die laaste vraag voltooi die politiese risiko profiel deur te vra hoe die politieke risiko in die olie- en gasindustrie verminder kan word. Die navorsingstudie sal bestaande navorsing aanvul en beleggers help om risiko‘s te identifiseer, analiseer en verminder. Deur ‘n generiese lys van politieke risikofaktore te gebruik, word TNOKs bewus gemaak van die mees prominente politieke risiko‘s in die olie- en gasindustrie van opkomende markte, wat hulle in staat stel om rasionele en ingeligte besluite te neem wanneer dit by internasionale beleggings kom.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Nigeria’s ability to play a regional stabilizing role in the Gulf of Guinea is severely thwarted due to unresolved conflict in the Niger Delta. Stemming from agitation by local communities, it evolved from peaceful rallies into an armed insurgency with the youth as the vanguard, and the conflict has subsequently spread into neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Benin. The aim of this study was to analyse the conflict in the Niger Delta, southern Nigeria in order to assess its impact on the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. Taking the form of a political risk analysis, a means of forecasting potential pitfalls for an investing client to mitigate or manage risk, the study postulated that a country specific risk analysis would not be sufficient to analyse an integrated system like the Gulf of Guinea. Many scholars have suggested that regional analysis has become more important than national. In the context of Africa contagion effects, the spill over, positive as well as negative from one country to another, casts doubt on the value of assessing only a country specific risk analysis. Taking this phenomenon into account, a regional risk index was created in order to assess the regional implications of the conflict in the Niger Delta. The index consists of six variables chosen from four political risk frameworks, namely the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Business Environment Risk Intelligence, The Brink Model, and finally the International Country Risk Guide. The variables were chosen on their utility for regional political risk analysis and their status as major risk variables, universal risk variables employed by various risk frameworks. In the subsequent political risk analysis, the first four variables were rated as having a high risk while the latter two garnered a medium risk rating. As such the overall rating for the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea was found to be high. This study finds that conventional country specific risk models are still very much the preferred means of analysing risk, but that regional risk analysis would have to take a larger role in political risk analysis in the future. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Nigerië se vermoë om ‘n streeks-stabiliserende rol in die Golf van Guinea te speel, word ernstig gedwarsboom deur die onopgeloste konflik in die Niger Delta. Die oorsprong van die konflik in vreedsame gemeenskaplike protestaksie vir meer regverdige verdeling van olie inkomste het uitgekring na gewapende konflik, beide in die Delta self en in buurlande Kameroen, Ekwatoriale Guinee en Benin. Hierdie studie het gepoog om die konflik in die Nigeriese Delta te bestudeer om die impak van politieke risiko op die Golf van Guinea te assesseer. Die studie het die vorm van ‘n politieke risiko analise aangeneem, ‘n middel van vooruitskatting om potensiële valstrikke aan ‘n kliënt wat wil belê uit te wys om sodoende konflik te verlig of te beheer. Die studie veronderstel dat ‘n landspesifieke konflik analise onvoldoende is om ‘n geïntegreerde sisteem soos die Golf van Guinea te analiseer. Met menige akademici wat voorstel dat streeksanalise belangriker geword het as die nasionale, word daar in die konteks van die gevolge van Afrika-besmetting, die oorloop daarvan van een land na ‘n ander, positief sowel as negatief, ‘n skaduwee gegooi op die waarde van die assessering van slegs ‘n landspesifieke konflik analise. Met hierdie fenomeen in gedagte, is ‘n streek risiko inhoud geskep om die implikasies vir die konflik in die Niger Deltastreek, te assesseer. Die inhoud is saamgestel uit ‘n verskeidenheid van ses variante gekies uit vier politieke risiko raamwerke, nl die ‘Ekonomist Intelligence Unit’, die ‘Business Environment Risk Intelligence’, die ‘Brink Model’ en ook die ‘International Country Risk Guide’. Die variante is gebruik vir hulle waarde vir streekspolitieke risiko analise, asook die belangrikheid van hulle hoof risiko veranderlikheid, ‘n universele Hoof risiko variant wat gebruik word in verskillende risiko raamwerke. In die gevolglike politieke risiko-analise, is die vier variante beskou as ‘n baie hoë risiko, terwyl die laaste twee as medium risiko beskou word. Dus is die algemene taksering vir die politiese risiko in die Golf van Guinea baie hoog. Die studie vind uiteindelik dat lande se spesifieke risiko modelle steeds die verkose manier is om risiko’s te analiseer, alhoewel politieke risiko analise ‘n groter rol sal speel in toekomstige streek risiko analise.

Samuel P. Huntington has argued that political stability is dependent on the degree of institutionalization of participation in the political system. Critical analysis of hypotheses reveals serious flaws in his logic. His concepts were shown to be very hard to make operational and to test. The main hypothesis of a direct relationship between institutionalization and stability was shown to be influenced most likely by additional intervening variables. This study seeks to survey and analyze some of the problems which have arisen with the present state of theory in comparative politics. However, this thesis is particularly interested in .Huntington's work which covers the evolution of his thinking regarding the relation of violence and of political stability, i.e., the degree of government and not the form, with the institutionalization of participation.

Cette thèse s’intéresse à l’étude de la relation entre l’ouverture financière et politique et la croissance économique dans les pays en voie de développement. En effet, réformes politiques et libéralisation financière étaient le mot d’ordre des instances financières internationales qui conditionnaient l’octroi des aides financières à l’application de certaines réformes en faveur de la démocratie, du respect des droits de l’Homme et de l’intégration à la sphère financière mondiale. Notre investigation empirique porte sur un échantillon de 108 pays en voie de développement entre 1984 et 2008 et fait appel aux techniques d’estimation de panel statiques et dynamiques et les nouveaux tests de causalité en panel hétérogène. Nos résultats, démontrent que la libéralisation financière en plus de son impact direct sur la croissance, agit positivement sur l’investissement, le commerce extérieur ainsi que la stabilité macroéconomique à travers une réduction de l’inflation. L’intégration financière favorise, aussi, le développement du secteur financier et du capital humain. Ailleurs, la démocratie, même si elle n’a pas d’impact direct significatif sur la croissance, semble influer positivement sur celle-ci de manière indirecte à travers le canal du commerce extérieur mais aussi du développement financier et la promotion du capital humain. Ailleurs, l’instabilité politique affecte négativement le développement économique de manière directe mais aussi de manière indirecte en diminuant les investissements et le commerce avec l’extérieur et en augmentant l’inflation. Finalement, nos résultats suggèrent l’existence d’une relation de causalité bidirectionnelle entre l’intégration financière et la démocratie. Cependant, la relation entre ouverture financière et stabilité politique est plus spécifique et dépend des caractéristiques régionales des pays. / The purpose of this thesis is to study the relationship between financial integration, political openness and growth in developing countries. In fact, political reforms and financial liberalization was the slogan of the international financial institutions which conditioned the granting of financial aid to the implementation of certain reforms in favor of democracy and more respect of human rights in addition to more financial integration. Our empirical investigation covers a sample of 108 developing countries between 1984 and 2008 and uses both static and dynamic panel data estimation in addition to the new causality test in heterogeneous panel. Our results show that financial liberalization positively impact growth directly and through indirect channel like Investment, trade and macroeconomic stability. It also favors financial development and promotes human capital. Even though, democracy doesn’t directly influence growth, it has an indirect positive effect on it through favoring international trade in addition to financial and human capital development. Otherwise, political instability negatively affects growth directly but also indirectly through decreasing investment and increasing inflation. Finally, our results suggest the existence of a bidirectional relationship between financial integration and democracy. In the other side, the relationship between financial integration and political stability is more specific and depend upon regionals characteristics of the country.

L’impact de la croissance économique sur la pauvreté est un sujet d’intérêt politique majeur dans les pays en développement. Depuis que les institutions internationales ont admis l’importance de la croissance économique dans l’amélioration du bien-être des individus, celle-ci est devenue un élément fondamental des stratégies de lutte contre la pauvreté. Dans un tel contexte, l’attention accordée à la croissance économique dans la lutte contre la pauvreté est beaucoup débattue dans la littérature économique. Cette thèse procède à une analyse empirique de l’impact de la croissance économique sur la pauvreté, dans le cas des pays de la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale, sur la période 1981 à 2005. Dans une première partie, nous dressons un bilan théorique incontournable sur la pauvreté et sur les liens entre la croissance économique et la pauvreté. Nous présentons les stratégies de lutte contre la pauvreté et les faits stylisés de la pauvreté monétaire et non monétaire dans les pays de la CEMAC. Dans une deuxième partie, nous testons empiriquement l’impact de la croissance économique sur la pauvreté dans la CEMAC, en incluant l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) en guise de comparaison. Nous évaluons empiriquement, le rôle des inégalités de revenus, de la corruption, et de la stabilité politique dans l’impact de la croissance économique sur la pauvreté dans les zones CEMAC et UEMOA.Les résultats suggèrent que la croissance économique est nécessaire pour réduire la pauvreté dans la CE-MAC et l’UEMOA. L’étude révèle que l’impact de la croissance économique sur la pauvreté est une fonction décroissante du degré d’inégalités. L’investigation montre également l’impact négatif d’une amélioration de la qualité des institutions sur la pauvreté. Les efforts de réduction de la pauvreté réalisés à travers la stimulation de la croissance économique devraient être accompagnés par des efforts de réduction des inégalités, de réduction de la corruption et un cadre politique sain. / The impact of economic growth on poverty is a major political issue in developing countries. Since inter-national institutions have recognized the importance of economic growth in improving the well being of individuals, it has become a fundamental element of strategies that aim at reducing poverty. In this context, attention given to economic growth in the fight against poverty is much debated in the economic research. This thesis conducts an empirical analysis of the impact of economic growth on poverty, in the case of Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) for the period 1981-2005. In a first section, we build a key theoretical assessment on poverty and on the links between economic growth and poverty. We present strategies for poverty reduction and the stylized facts of monetary and non-monetary poverty in the CAEMC countries. In a second part, we empirically test the impact of economic growth on poverty in the CAEMC by including the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) for a comparison. We evaluate empirically the role of income inequality, corruption, and political stability in the impact of economic growth on poverty in CAEMC and WAEMU zone.The results suggest that economic growth is necessary to reduce poverty in CAEMC and WAEMU zone. The study reveals that the impact of economic growth on poverty is a decreasing function of inequality. The investigation also shows the positive impact of improving the quality of institutions on poverty re-duction. The policies aimed for poverty reduction through the stimulation of economic growth should be accompanied by simultaneous efforts to reduce inequality, corruption and a sound policy framework.

"Thesis presented to the faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, for completion of graduation requirements, academic year 2003-4." / "August 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-55).

How does the level of clientelistic distribution effect the risk of violent challenges towards the state in democracies? The relationship between democracy and violent conflict has been extensively tested, with diverging results. Utilizing time-series data from 162 independent democratic states ranging from 1946 to 2018, the relationship is here tested by separating the informal institutions of democracy from the formal. And running the level of clientelistic distribution, a conflicting informal institution, as the independent variable in a linear probability model. Which shows that an increase in the level of clientelism significantly increases the risk of violent challenges.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Tunisia is often described as the solitary success among the political transitions which followed. Much has been ascribed to the trade agreement (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or EMP) between EU and Tunisia in promoting said democracy. Recently, Tunisia has also become dependent on IMF loans. This has raised concerns of the effect of neoliberal policies that are advocated for by the IMF, EU and the World Bank. The correlation between neoliberal policies and political stability is still being debated among scholars and the linear causalities remain unclear. Several scholars have criticised the EU-Tunisian trade agreement and EU policies, claiming that this has led to increased poverty and social instability in the country. This study seeks to determine, in accordance with such critique, if a neoliberal agenda is advocated for by the EU. Previous studies have focused on policy effects of the trade and foreign relations between EU and Tunisia. Instead this study analyses the mutual trade agreement and EU political policy agenda for Tunisia to understand the intent of the EU. A content analysis is used on the Association Agreement as well as the EU Policy Paper `Cadre Unique d’appui 2017-2020´ towards Tunisia.This study uses a definition of neoliberalism based on Joseph Stiglitz well-renowned critique on IMF-policies in developing countries in the 1980s-1990s. The result of the analysis shows that even though policy or trade provisions may correspond to a neoliberal agenda, the overall language in both the trade agreement and the policy documents suggest that EU is well-aware of possible negative effects of neoliberal policies. Throughout the documents EU advocates for a balanced approach including both economic and social interests.The study does not find evidence for EU knowingly pursuing a neoliberal agenda in Tunisia. Instead it suggests that future studies on the topic should focus on the EU Commission’s own projections of its policies, a more thorough study on policy effects of specific treaty- and policy provisions, and/ or how neoliberal approaches have recently evolved in development policies.