Le conflit civil moldave entre 1989 et 1992 a laissé un pays et une population divisés entre le fleuve Dniestr/Nistru. Malgré la victoire de la Pridnestrovie (RMP) dans sa guerre d’indépendance, elle n’a pas atteint son objectif de devenir un Etat reconnu. L’Accord de cessez-le-feu de 1992 qui a mis officiellement fin à la guerre a renforcé la séparation de la RMP par la création d’une zone tampon et l’établissement des forces de maintien de la paix. Comme convenu dans cet accord, la fin du nouveau statu quo et donc la résolution finale du conflit devraient passer obligatoirement par la détermination d’un nouveau statut politique pour la RMP. Faute d’avoir réussi à déterminer un statut officiel, le conflit est resté gelé. Lors de la période d’après-guerre, l’équilibre des pouvoirs a favorisé la RMP sur le plan économique, énergétique et sécuritaire, la plaçant dans une position de force vis-à-vis de la Moldavie. Cependant, puisqu’une reconnaissance étatique n’a jamais été accordée à la RMP, cette dernière a donc hérité d’un déficit symbolique que seule la Moldavie pouvait lui octroyer par la reconnaissance. Une politique active de reconnaissance envers la RMP entre 1994 et 1998 a été le facteur déterminant dans la transformation du conflit, conduisant à la signature de trois « grands accords ». Le célèbre Mémorandum de Moscou de 1997 a souligné ce processus transformatif au travers duquel les deux « opposants » se sont dès lors considérés comme « partenaires » au sein des négociations. Au cours de l’année 1998, Chisinau et Tiraspol se sont engagées sur le chemin de la paix en adoptant des mesures de confiance et de sécurité avec l’Accord d’Odessa / The Moldovan civil conflict between 1989 and 1992 left the country and the people permanently divided between the banks to the Dniestr/Nistru River. Despite Pridnestrovia’s (PMR) victory in its war of independence, it would not achieve its goal of being a recognized state. The ceasefire agreement of 1992 officially put an end to the war and solidified Prinestrovia’s separation through the creation of a security zone and the establishement of peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the resolution of the conflict and the end of the new status quo had to be synchronized with the accordance of a new political status for the PMR. As an official status was never determined, the conflict has remained frozen. During the post-war period, the balance of power favored the PMR from an economic, energy and security perspective, providing it with major leverage over Moldova. However, given that the PMR was never attributed statehood meant that it inherited a symbolic deficit because only Moldova could provide it with recognition. Moldova’s policy of recognition towards the PMR between 1994 and 1998 would be the determing factor in the transformation of the conflict, leading to the signing of three “major accords”. The historic Moscow Memorandum of 1997 highlighted this transformative process by which the two “opponants” considered eachother as “partners” within the negociation process. By 1998, Chisinau and Tiraspol embarked upon the path of confidence building and security measures with the Odessa Accord of 1998

To predict and prevent future armed conflicts like Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022, there is more value in knowing how these wars occurred rather than why they occurred. The Russian Playbook is built from three distinct “plays” employed by Moscow and organised in the theoretical framework of Historical Institutionalism through Path Dependence modelling. This research focuses on Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as cases for comparison by building on the Soviet legacy in each state which forms the antecedent historical conditions of the Playbook’s Path Dependence. Where Play 1 focuses on offensive and defensive influence seeking as a form of structural persistence, Play 2’s shaping and weaponisation acts to counter reactive sequences. Both Plays function within path dependency’s punctuated equilibrium and appear consistently throughout Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova following the collapse of the Soviet Union. When Play 1 and Play 2 are overpowered by reactive sequences that cannot be countered, Moscow deems the disequilibrium as irremediable and the path towards conflict begins. Play 3 refers to the start of lock-in effects towards conflict, beginning with “pre-crisis” conditions. Play 3’s Lock-in Effectsserve as the period in which a predictable conflict outcome is likely to occur, though lock-in refers to the path adherence in preparation for future conflict. This Play occurs in both Georgia and Ukraine at the time of this research, though its future employment within Moldova should not be excluded. These actions, in the form of the Russian Playbook and its Plays act as a guide for operationalising and implementing Russia’s grand strategy. This research goes beyond individual figureheads of Russia or specific institutions and instead focuses on patterns that exist throughout historical cases. These patterns show there is nothing particularly “new” in how Russia operates despite the vast number of newly coined phrases including “hybrid” leading people to believe otherwise. As such, Putin did not create the Russian Playbook, he inherited it. / <p>Master's of Political Science with a Specialisation in International and European Relations.</p>