<p>The secessionist conflict in Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova have led to more than a decade of political dialogueon finding a peaceful solution to conflict resolution, proving that the current format of negotiations is inefficient. The increased interest of the EU in the resolution of this conflict is caused by prospective inclusion of Romania in the EU, placing the Transdniestrian conflict at EU periphery, where confrontation is contrary to the all-European orientation at stability and integration. Presumably the involvement of the EU could lead to finding a political solution to the Transdniestrian conflict. Thus, the purpose of this research is to explore how EU involvement in the Transdniestrian conflict could lead to its prospective resolution. The results of this research, in form of conclusions and recommendations, depict that a more active involvement of the EU in Transdniestrian conflict resolution, as consulter and mediator, make it feasible to find a solution to the long-lasting disputes in the Republic of Moldova.</p>

The secessionist conflict in Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova have led to more than a decade of political dialogueon finding a peaceful solution to conflict resolution, proving that the current format of negotiations is inefficient. The increased interest of the EU in the resolution of this conflict is caused by prospective inclusion of Romania in the EU, placing the Transdniestrian conflict at EU periphery, where confrontation is contrary to the all-European orientation at stability and integration. Presumably the involvement of the EU could lead to finding a political solution to the Transdniestrian conflict. Thus, the purpose of this research is to explore how EU involvement in the Transdniestrian conflict could lead to its prospective resolution. The results of this research, in form of conclusions and recommendations, depict that a more active involvement of the EU in Transdniestrian conflict resolution, as consulter and mediator, make it feasible to find a solution to the long-lasting disputes in the Republic of Moldova.

This thesis has for major aim to present the de facto state through another approach, by placing their intrinsic frozen conflict situation as a rational choice rather than a symptom of the lack of recognition. To do so, the case studies of Transnistria and Somaliland have been chosen since, the de facto state's academic field had, so far, focus more on the Caucasus' cases - therefore lack of similar comparisons. It appears indeed that, both these cases possess numerous similarities - such as not basing their identity on ethnicity or religion. Thus, through an empirical research, it has been possible to approach the establishment of these two de facto states and the reason behind the lack of international recognition; but also the role and influence of the frozen conflict within their internal evolution as well as their role in its perpetuation; and finally, the place of their parent state and the international community in the continuation of the status quo. It seems thus that, if it remains unlikely to find out if Somaliland and Transnistria do use the frozen conflict as a political tool to reach their political goals - namely international recognition but also identity building -, it appears that all actors involved in these conflicts do benefit from the perpetuation of such status quo.

Reference SERGEEVA, Oxana. Enteral Predispositions of the Conflict in Donbass. Prague, 2021. Master's thesis. Charles University,Facultyof Social Sciences,Institute of SecurityStudies. Abstract The Revolution in Ukraine of 2014 has brought a lot of regional and international changes. Even though the crisis appears to be over, the new official authorities of Ukraine and the self- proclaimedDonetsk and Lugansk people's republics are still conflicting.It has commonly been assumed that the armed conflict in Donbas was the result of a latent Russian military aggression against Ukraine and that forces opposing the Ukrainian government do not represent the local populationrather being sponsored by the Russian authority.However, external incentives arguably could not lead to the emergence of a viable and widespread rebel movement unless there were internal predispositions to the emergence of armed separatism. It is vital to address problems within the country to identify domestic preconditions for invasion and conflict incitement. This researchwould argue that a key role in the emergence of the armed separatist movement in Donbas was played by at least two factors: historicallyformed polaritywithin the Ukrainian populationand the structure of the government. Thus, the armed conflict in Donbas was the result of a...

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Reconciliation is important for reducing the likelihood of future conflict between groups but can be particularly difficult to achieve. This remains true within divided societies as the result of frozen conflict. This thesis asks why do some individuals, in the context of divided societies engaged in frozen conflict, have more positive reconciliatory attitudes than others? The approach of community center peacebuilding organizations (CCPB) was identified as one possible solution to this question. The hypothesis suggests that individuals who engage in such organizations will have more positive reconciliatory attitudes compared to the average community member. This is based on a theoretical framework that relies on contact theory, suggesting that the CCPB model establishes the necessary conditions for nurturing more reconciliatory attitudes in individuals. It is suggested to achieve this through positive intergroup contact that is generalizable to the outgroup as a whole.  A quantitative study based on 101 cases from original survey data is used to test this hypothesis. Using a logistic regression, support is found that establishes a significant positive correlation between engagement in CCPB and reconciliatory attitudes.   Key Words: reconciliation, contact theory, peacebuilding, community center, shared space, frozen conflict, divided societies, Cyprus

Le conflit civil moldave entre 1989 et 1992 a laissé un pays et une population divisés entre le fleuve Dniestr/Nistru. Malgré la victoire de la Pridnestrovie (RMP) dans sa guerre d’indépendance, elle n’a pas atteint son objectif de devenir un Etat reconnu. L’Accord de cessez-le-feu de 1992 qui a mis officiellement fin à la guerre a renforcé la séparation de la RMP par la création d’une zone tampon et l’établissement des forces de maintien de la paix. Comme convenu dans cet accord, la fin du nouveau statu quo et donc la résolution finale du conflit devraient passer obligatoirement par la détermination d’un nouveau statut politique pour la RMP. Faute d’avoir réussi à déterminer un statut officiel, le conflit est resté gelé. Lors de la période d’après-guerre, l’équilibre des pouvoirs a favorisé la RMP sur le plan économique, énergétique et sécuritaire, la plaçant dans une position de force vis-à-vis de la Moldavie. Cependant, puisqu’une reconnaissance étatique n’a jamais été accordée à la RMP, cette dernière a donc hérité d’un déficit symbolique que seule la Moldavie pouvait lui octroyer par la reconnaissance. Une politique active de reconnaissance envers la RMP entre 1994 et 1998 a été le facteur déterminant dans la transformation du conflit, conduisant à la signature de trois « grands accords ». Le célèbre Mémorandum de Moscou de 1997 a souligné ce processus transformatif au travers duquel les deux « opposants » se sont dès lors considérés comme « partenaires » au sein des négociations. Au cours de l’année 1998, Chisinau et Tiraspol se sont engagées sur le chemin de la paix en adoptant des mesures de confiance et de sécurité avec l’Accord d’Odessa / The Moldovan civil conflict between 1989 and 1992 left the country and the people permanently divided between the banks to the Dniestr/Nistru River. Despite Pridnestrovia’s (PMR) victory in its war of independence, it would not achieve its goal of being a recognized state. The ceasefire agreement of 1992 officially put an end to the war and solidified Prinestrovia’s separation through the creation of a security zone and the establishement of peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the resolution of the conflict and the end of the new status quo had to be synchronized with the accordance of a new political status for the PMR. As an official status was never determined, the conflict has remained frozen. During the post-war period, the balance of power favored the PMR from an economic, energy and security perspective, providing it with major leverage over Moldova. However, given that the PMR was never attributed statehood meant that it inherited a symbolic deficit because only Moldova could provide it with recognition. Moldova’s policy of recognition towards the PMR between 1994 and 1998 would be the determing factor in the transformation of the conflict, leading to the signing of three “major accords”. The historic Moscow Memorandum of 1997 highlighted this transformative process by which the two “opponants” considered eachother as “partners” within the negociation process. By 1998, Chisinau and Tiraspol embarked upon the path of confidence building and security measures with the Odessa Accord of 1998

To predict and prevent future armed conflicts like Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022, there is more value in knowing how these wars occurred rather than why they occurred. The Russian Playbook is built from three distinct “plays” employed by Moscow and organised in the theoretical framework of Historical Institutionalism through Path Dependence modelling. This research focuses on Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as cases for comparison by building on the Soviet legacy in each state which forms the antecedent historical conditions of the Playbook’s Path Dependence. Where Play 1 focuses on offensive and defensive influence seeking as a form of structural persistence, Play 2’s shaping and weaponisation acts to counter reactive sequences. Both Plays function within path dependency’s punctuated equilibrium and appear consistently throughout Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova following the collapse of the Soviet Union. When Play 1 and Play 2 are overpowered by reactive sequences that cannot be countered, Moscow deems the disequilibrium as irremediable and the path towards conflict begins. Play 3 refers to the start of lock-in effects towards conflict, beginning with “pre-crisis” conditions. Play 3’s Lock-in Effectsserve as the period in which a predictable conflict outcome is likely to occur, though lock-in refers to the path adherence in preparation for future conflict. This Play occurs in both Georgia and Ukraine at the time of this research, though its future employment within Moldova should not be excluded. These actions, in the form of the Russian Playbook and its Plays act as a guide for operationalising and implementing Russia’s grand strategy. This research goes beyond individual figureheads of Russia or specific institutions and instead focuses on patterns that exist throughout historical cases. These patterns show there is nothing particularly “new” in how Russia operates despite the vast number of newly coined phrases including “hybrid” leading people to believe otherwise. As such, Putin did not create the Russian Playbook, he inherited it. / <p>Master's of Political Science with a Specialisation in International and European Relations.</p>