Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att testa sambandet mellan en koncentrerad aktieägarandel och låg utdelning bland aktieföretag på den svenska börsen. Vad som är unikt för just denna studie är att den genomförs på den svenska börsen samt den skattesats som skiljer sig mellan Sverige och exempelvis Finland där tidigare studier av samma karaktär genomförts. Metod: Studien har genomförts med en kvantitativ metod och en deduktiv ansats. Den finansiella data som används i studien har hämtats via databasen ”Retriever”, information om aktieägande har manuellt hämtats från ”Ägarna och makten” (Sundqvist, 2015). Resultat och slutsats: Slutsatsen innefattar en saknad av direkt samband mellan koncentrerat ägande och låg utdelningsnivå vilket besvarar syftet. Vad som kan lyftas fram som en eventuell förklaring är den skattemässiga aspekten gällande utdelning och kapitalvinst. Tidigare forskning som påträffat samband i andra länder har en skattesats som skiljer sig mellan utdelning och kapitalvinst vilket innebär skattemässiga fördelat att välja det ena framför det andra. Detta var en av de aspekter som var av stort intresse innan studien startade. Studiens bidrag: Denna studies teoretiska bidrag påvisar att sambandet mellan ägarkoncentrationen och företagens utdelning inte är självklart på den svenska börsen. Istället finner vi att det är huvudsakligen företagens finansiella nyckeltal som ligger till grund för företagens utdelning. Förslag till vidare forskning: Resultatet av denna studie föder ytterligare nyfikenhet kring möjligheter att forska vidare. Exempel på intressanta ämnen är Agnblads (2001)teori om det utländska ägandets påverkan på det framtida ägandet i Sverige. Även agentteorin och dess olika påverkan på företagen går att fördjupa sig i och studera på den svenska marknaden då ägandet är koncentrerat och en stor del maktfördelning sker. / Aim: The aim of this study is to test the relationship between ownership concentration and dividends in listed Swedish firms. Method: This study has a quantitative method and a deductive approach. The financial data has been collected via the database ”Retriever”, information about the ownership of the companies was manually collected from the book ”Ägarna och makten” (Sundqvist, 2015). Result and conclusions: The result of the study is that dividends may variate due to the independent variables. However, there is not a significant relationship between ownership concentration and dividends. Contribution of the thesis: The contribution of this study provides further information regarding ownership concentration and dividends, we find that the financial ratios of the companies have a larger impact on the dividends than the ownership concentration. Suggestions for future research: The result of this study adds alot of curiosity to the future studies about this subject. Our suggestions to future research is to elaborate Agnblads (2001) theory about foreign ownership and how it might affect companies in Sweden. We also propose to research further about the Agency-theory and which effects it has on the Swedish listed firms since we have a concentrated ownership.

Corruption is a major cause and result of poverty around the globe. It arises at all levels of society, from national governments and military to small businesses and sports. Corruption affects all elements of society in some way as it undermines democracy and economic growth as well as the environment and people’s health. The main purpose of this thesis is to examine if corruption has a significant effect on economic growth in developing countries. The empirical analysis is conducted with a regression analysis, using data from recognized institutions. Other variables that can affect GDP per capita growth are also examined such as the level of democracy, fertility rate, life expectancy, education and the Initial GDP per capita to test for conditional convergence. In our main model, the empirical results show that corruption does not have a significant effect on economic growth but this is basically due to that the model exhibits multicollinearity. In our second model, where we omitted the variables Democracy, Initial GDP and Life expectancy, we found that corruption has a significant, negative effect on economic growth. This is in accordance with previous empirical results which hold that more corruption in a nation leads to less economic growth.

Managing public forestland is a challenging enterprise as the government must steward the actions of private forest companies while simultaneously considering public values, natural disturbance, markets, revenue generation and environmental services. Governments use timber sales, volume-based, and area-based tenures to delegate forest harvesting activities to individual timber companies. By delegating forest management, government must wisely navigate the principal-agent relationship to avoid unexpected outcomes. However, the agents’ response is often overlooked despite the likelihood that the agents may possess company-centric financial motivations. The British Columbia context, where the government is facing the aftermath of a catastrophic mountain pine beetle epidemic, provides a fruitful location for the study of the principal-agent dilemma. If forest companies share a future forest focus with the government, such that agents respond with actions that lead to the government’s first best outcome, the government could reduce policy analysis to an examination of the tradeoff between short-term revenue generation and sustainable differentiated product supply. But review of the silviculture funding mechanism reveals that the very regulatory mechanism used to achieve government’s results may affect the future forest estate by reducing the amount of salvage once the value of the forest is degraded below the cost to harvest and regenerate it. Relying primarily on harvest-based silviculture funding, the principal is shown to forego a 20 per cent increase in forest growth in the study area by not using the agents’ forestry expertise to improve the long term productive potential of the forest. A bi-level linear programming model is developed to merge the goals of government with the behavioural responses of the two predominant volume-based tenures used in BC. Results show that the government’s choice of harvest level, timber price and tenure instrument in recognition of agent response is the only way to achieve the government’s forest stewardship objective. Treating each element in isolation neglects the nature of the institutional system and will result not only in unintended outcomes, but very likely, policy failure. / Graduate

The dominance of federal and state contracts by large enterprises reduces the share of contracts small and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) business leaders obtain. As of the last census reading in 2016, SMEs received only 23% of contracts. The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore the strategies of 3 small business leaders, operating in south Florida, for obtaining state contracts through public procurement. The thematic findings were in the context of the principal-agent theory as the conceptual framework. The participants answered 10 questions in semistructured interviews and provided organizational procurement documents for review. The methodological triangulation of multiple data sources and data analysis led to the identification of 3 primary themes: business performance, overcoming barriers, and strategic initiatives. Enabling proper business performance protocols for revenue, company reputation, pricing, and compliance benefitted the 3 participants as a strategy for successfully winning state contracts. The participants first identified the barriers they experienced, which included access, bargaining power, funding, and labels. The barriers encountered by the participants became less overwhelming with the implementation of strategic initiatives based on knowledge, relationship building, skilled personnel, and taking action. Findings included the importance of SME business leaders and personnel educating themselves on the public procurement process and building relationships with individuals in the various agencies. Application of the findings may lead to a social change of higher small business employment rates, increased revenue, and improved innovation for business leaders.

Vi har studerat svenska börsnoterade bolag på Stockholmsbörsens largecap-lista som omfattar de största börsnoterade bolagen i Sverige. Syftet med denna studie är att söka samband mellan bolagens nedskrivningar av goodwill och väsentliga händelser. Dessa väsentliga händelser utgörs av byte av revisor och verkställande direktör. Den teoretiska referensramen utgår från tidigare teorier om företagsledningars olika sätt att subjektivt bedöma behovet av nedskrivningar. Det är inte alltid en ledning tar beslut som är för företagets bästa utan kan ha egna incitament för att maximera den egna nyttan. Metoden som vi utgått från i vår studie har varit en kvantitativ metod där vi samlat in data från bolagens årsredovisningar och kvantifierat det för att söka samband genom regressionsanalys. Vårt resultat ger inga indikationer på samband mellan nedskrivningar av goodwill och väsentliga händelser. / We have studied Swedish listed companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange largecap list, which includes the largest listed companies in Sweden. The purpose of this study is to seek connection between the companies' impairment losses on goodwill and significant events. These significant events consist of a change of accountant and CEO. The theoretical frame of reference is based on previous theories on the different ways of management to subjectively assess the need for write-downs. It is not always a management decision that is for the good of the company but may have its own incentives to maximize its own benefit. The method we used in our study has been a quantitative method where we collected data from the companies´ annual reports and quantified it to seek connection through regression analysis. Our results do not give any indication of the relationship between impairment of goodwill and significant events.

Most of the theory that concerns auditing relates to agency theory where auditors' role is to mitigate the information asymmetry between principals and agents. During the last decade, we have witnessed technological advancements across the society, advancements which also have affected the auditing profession. Technology and accounting information systems has decreased information asymmetry in various ways. From an agency theory point of view, this would arguably reduce the demand for auditing. In the same time, the audit profession is expanding into new business areas where auditors perform assurance services. The purpose of this paper is to investigate auditors' role in a technological environment. Interviews have been used to explore auditors' perception of the role. The result indicates that auditors' role still is to mitigate principal-agent conflicts, though, information asymmetries are expanding to comprehend more and to a wider stakeholder group due to technology. The end goal is still the same, that to provide trust to the stakeholders, technology enable new ways of reaching there and broadens the scope towards systems and other related services. That is the perceived role of auditors in today´s technological environment.

Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to identify the obstacles against supplier compliance, which focal companies encounter within the upstream supply chain when attempting to collect the requested product contents information. Based on this problem, the objective is to identify the most useful supply chain management practices to ensure supplier compliance.Method: The theoretical framework contains the Principal-Agent theory and Responsible Supply Chain Management. The empirical findings are derived through semi-structured interviews that were conducted with three Swedish corporations operating in China and one Swedish-Chinese consulting firm.Results: The two main-obstacles to supplier compliance were firstly found to consist of lacking supplier understanding of the product contents information requirements (PCIR). These obstacles prevented the supplier from understanding the risk at hand and what behaviour that triggered the risk. The second main-obstacles were found to be the prevalence of different opposing interests, which could all be traced back to the reluctance to assume an increase in costs, and could induce the supplier to pursue that interest rather than the interest to comply to the PCIR. With these obstacles in mind, the main objective of the focal company’s supply chain management practices should preferably be to create risk in relation to the PCIR, ensure supplier understanding and pay attention to the opposing interests. The most useful type of supply chain management practice for fulfilling these objectives were the use of incentives, preferably in combination with sanctions, to create risk. Training was considered most useful for ensuring supplier understanding, although a combination of training, personal communication and written documents is potentially interesting. Regarding the opposing interests, accommodating practices were found most useful rather than attempt to persuade the supplier to give up the interest.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / The transformation of local government in South Africa has established a complex model of multiple principals exercising municipal budget oversight on municipal managers. However, earlier research has not sufficiently focused on the phenomenon of the multiplicity of principals and its wider institutional architecture, relationship dynamics and effects in order to understand the institutional constellations of oversight principals, their behaviour and their interactions on the municipal budget process. Particularly, an empirical exploration focusing on understanding the experiences and perceptions of municipal managers and oversight principals on oversight through the multiple principal model remains elusive. The aim of this study was to explore and describe the experiences and perceptions of municipal managers, municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury on the multiple oversight principals’ model, its manifestations, dynamics and effects on municipal budget oversight. The study utilised principal-agent theory to develop a conceptual and theoretical framework, and utilised the interpretive qualitative case study of the Western Cape to guide the research process. A sample of respondents consisting five (5) municipal managers, one (1) Provincial Treasury representative and ten (10) municipal councillors from municipalities in the Western Cape were interviewed for the study. The transcribed data from the 16 interviews were analysed, using a qualitative analysis method. The study findings reaffirmed the existence of multiple principals bequeathed with authority to exercise of municipal budget oversight in the Western Cape Province. Strong evidence emerged that application of the multiple principal model manifests independent, conflicting and fragmented budget oversight relationships and behaviour between the Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors during different stages of the municipal budget process. While the study acknowledges that the model and its application generates both positive and negative effects resulting in too complex, onerous and conflict-prone oversight relationships, it also highlighted these effects as necessary intrinsic attributes that do not necessarily have to manifest adverse consequences on the municipal budget oversight. These findings contradict the common-sense advocates for a collective model that emphasises coordination to improve cohesiveness among oversight principals, especially between the Provincial Treasury and the municipal councillors. The findings confirm that the Municipal Finance Management Act has consciously established a responsive system that distributes oversight among autonomous political structures in order to comprehensively eclipse the discretion of the municipal manager with varied and complementary oversight expertise, energy and diversity.

This paper investigates the correlation between how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) vote and their respective domestic democracy level. In doing so, it tests two hypotheses – first, that domestic democracy level affects MEP voting conduct. Second, that domestic democracy level affects the way MEPs tend to be disloyal to their European Party Groups (EPGs). The first hypothesis regarding the correlation between democracy level and MEP voting conduct is analysed statistically through logistic regression, the data for which has been collected from VoteWatch, whereas the second hypothesis is tested in a qualitative discussion based upon a smaller dataset.                       Both hypotheses are supported by the data, but because the study is based on a single issue, one can only feasibly generalise the findings to similar cases voted upon by the European Parliament. This paper uses a motion in the Parliament that directly concerns democratic values – as such, any conclusions drawn only apply to other cases similarly centred on democratic values. However, the findings of this study underline the importance of further studies on the topic of the influence of democracy levels on the political process of the European Union.

This dissertation seeks to explain variation in legislative strategies to control policymaking across institutional contexts. Of these many strategies, I focus particularly on the use of statutory language meant to direct agency action and on the use of oversight hearings. I argue that while low levels of oversight activity need not imply that a legislature is helplessly abdicating policymaking responsibility to unelected agencies, this may be the case in some circumstances. With the goal of establishing when the lack of oversight may mean such normatively problematic abdication, I develop a signaling model of delegation and oversight which proposes that oversight depends on institutional features (such as legislative capacity, the existence of legislative term limits and a legislative veto), political features (such as policy conflict within the government and within the legislature and the policy preferences and activism of important judicial actors), and the legislature's initial delegation of policymaking discretion to an agency. Critically, the pursuit of either strategy depends on alternative strategies available as well as on the likely actions of other institutions with the power to affect policy outcomes. The dissertation extends our theoretical understanding of legislative-executive relations and provides one of the first large-scale empirical analyses of legislative policymaking. In the first empirical chapter of this dissertation, I assess the predictions of the theory concerning congressional oversight activity from 1947-2006. I find that both the extent to which a congressional committee's ideology diverges from an agency's and the policy-specific expertise of said committee affect the number of oversight hearing days the committee holds, but only when policy disagreements are sufficiently conflictual. This last condition suggests, contrary to previous research, that the extent to which oversight should be necessary, to either legislative policymaking or democratic legitimacy, varies across preference arrangements. In the next empirical chapter, I switch my focus from the analysis of a single legislature over time to a cross-sectional study of the extent to which U.S. state legislatures delegate authority to bureaucratic agencies. Here, I find that the amount of discretion that a legislature delegates to an agency charged with implementing Medicaid policy is nonlinearly related to the extent to which state courts are likely to affect policy outcomes, as captured by a new measure of judicial activism. These analyses confirm that legislatures consider alternative methods of control as well as the likely actions of external institutions when crafting their policymaking strategies.