In the last decade measuring a company´s performance exclusively financially has been heavily criticised. Consequently, different performance measurement systems including the Balanced Scorecard, the Performance Pyramid, and the Quantum Performance were developed, discussed and implemented in industry. Besides the financial perspective, additional perspectives (e.g. customers, processes, employess, etc) have been considered. Organisational performance is assumed to be a multidimensional phenomenon today. Hence one important aspect of the discussion of several concepts of performance measurement has been the selection of the right measures. This paper focused the problemof measuring multidimensional organisational performance. Based on the multitask agency theory we enhanced the approaches of Holmstrom/milgrom and Austin by introducing extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, cost of measurement and uncertainty of measurement into the model.

Leasing är en populär finansieringsmetod. Redovisningen av leasing har dock kritiserats för att inte redovisa en rättvisande bild. Åtgärder för att försöka förbättra leasingredovisningen var en av de punkter som stod på agendan för IASB och FASB konvergensprojekt. Den främsta kritiken riktas till företag som redovisar under US GAAP där standarden lätt låter sig kringgås. Detta eftersom de medvetet klassificerar leasingavtalen som operationella. De operationella leasingarna ger en missvisande bild eftersom de inte går igenom balansräkningen. Det blir missvisande om de produkter eller tjänster som finansieras genom leasing skapar intäkter för företaget och bör därför ses som en tillgång.Syftet med studien är att föra en fördjupad diskussion kring den kommande leasingstandarden och dess effekt. Eftersom standarden inte ännu införts bidrar studien till ökade kunskaper inom området inför kommande standard. Studien bygger på en kvalitativ ansats med såväl kvantitativ som kvalitativ data. Den omfattar flera olika tillvägagångssätt för information. Empirin behandlar beräkningar på den förväntade effekten av en ny standard samt diskussioner med respondenterna.Resultatet visar på att den nya standarden får en markant påverkan på de företag som har stor andel operationella leasingavtal som redovisar under US GAAP. Det visar även hur nyckeltal som soliditet och skuldsättningsgrad försämras vid en kapitalisering av operationella leasingavtal. Resultat visar på en mer rättvisande bild vid ny leasingsstandard. Däremot kan den rubbas om alternativa finansieringsmetoder uppkommer.Studien behandlar en fördjupad diskussion kring ett mycket omtalat ämne men det var först i januari i år som den nya standarden presenterades. Därför bidrar studien med relevant information om den slutliga produkten av konvergensprojektet för leasing och diskussion kring alternativa finansieringsmöjligheter. / Leasing is a popular financing method and has received a lot of criticism for its accounting because it is not representing a true and fair view. This problem was one of the things on the agenda of the convergence project between IASB and FASB. The prime criticism is aimed for those companies that report under US GAAP where the standard is easy to manipulate by classify the leases as operating. The operating contracts are providing a deceptive picture by avoiding the balance sheet. The reason way this is deceptive are because the leased asset generates income for the company.The purpose of the study is to conduct a deeper discussion about the future leasing standard and its impact. Since the standard has not yet been put into use, the study contributes to increase knowledge in the area for the future standard. The study is based on a qualitative approached with quantitative and qualitative data. Different approached has been considered when collecting empirical data. The empirical data process information about leasing and calculations on the expected impact of the new standard and also discussions with the respondents.The result indicates that the new standard have a significant influence on the companies that have a large proportion of operating leases. The outcome also indicates how the key figures solidity and debt to equity ratio is being impaired through a capitalizing of operating leases. The outcome gives an increased true and fair view of the leasing standard. However financial engineering can disrupt the true and fair view.The study covers a deeper discussion about a controversial subject, but it was not until January this year the standard was publicly presented. The study therefore contributes with relevant information to the final product of the convergence project for leasing and a discussion about alternative financial engineering.This thesis is written in Swedish.

臺北市勞動檢查處為配合近年來「宣導、檢查、輔導」三合一策略提升防災效能，自民國87年開始將檢查業務部分轉換為「自主管理」模式，並將臺北市的營建工地分級管理，依不同等級有不同的自主檢查頻率，並派員實施不同程度的稽查。 依相關自主管理計畫的規定，若某營造廠加入計畫獲得「優等」或「特優級」的認證標章，除非發生災害、遇專案檢查及市民檢舉等情形外，檢查員不主動前往實施勞動檢查，但仍由機關中技正層級以上人員組成機動小組，不定期以輔導方式實施督導；所以該營造廠只要依規定之檢查流程及制式表格填寫按時回報，就幾乎不受規範所拘束。 但是近年參加自主管理計畫的營造工地發生職業災害的頻率，並未如預期下降，不符機關績效目標；因此，本研究重點在探究勞動檢查運用自主管理政策工具績效不佳的原因，是否這些營造廠的工地在申請獲得「優等」或「特優級」認證後，負責職業安全衛生工作的人員或主管，其責任及權限的移轉後造成行為與態度轉趨鬆懈？ 研究結果發現在實施自主管理計畫後，在營造廠中依不同的層次有不同的結果，部分負責人確實發生了道德風險（Moral Hazard）行為，而負責職業安全衛生工作的人員，礙於利潤及工期等眾多因素，鬆懈了安全衛生工作，部份發生了道德風險行為，致未達組織預設的目標。 / Taipei Labor Inspection Office adopted a strategy that combined advocacy, inspection and counseling to enhance the effectiveness of occupational hazards prevention. Since 1998, it began to change the policy from “inspection strengthening” to “self-management”. With hierarchical management of the construction sites in Taipei according to this strategy, construction sites of different levels have different inspection frequency and different degrees of inspection. In accordance with the self-management program, if an construction site in Taipei who joined this program obtains "excellent" or "Premium Class" certification, unless occupational accident happened, or special inspection project is launched, or citizens report, or other dangerous situations occur, the inspection personnels will not do labor inspection, but will still occasionally provide unscheduled counseling by official chief. As long as the construction company fills out the report form on time according to the program of the standard inspection flow, this company is nearly unregulated. But the occupational accident rate of those sites who applied to self-management program did not fall as expected, it does not achieve the goal as set by official performance indicators; therefore, this study aims to explore the reasons why those sites who obtain "excellent" or "Premium Class" certification, have shown that their behaviors and attitudes toward occupational safety and workers’ health have become more lax after joining the program? This study found that after the implementation of self-management program, moral hazard behaviors occur in different hierarchical levels of organizations. Construction company’s directors do show moral hazard behavior, while those in charge of occupational safety and health work, some do have moral hazard behavior, out of profit motive and time concern of the construction project among many other factors. All together explains why this self-management program does not achieve the goal set by official performance indicators.

政府機關委外執行民意調查已成為民主國家治理的趨勢之一；但民意調查的高度專業性和特殊性質，導致過程中有許多「看不見的黑手」介入的機會，故如何監督、控制民調的品質以確保信效度遂成為一項重要課題。全國各級政府機關中，以台北市在委外執行民調業務上的規定最為公開、完備，不僅訂有專法，更獨步全國成立「民意調查諮詢委員會」，協助各局處在委外執行民調過程中把關調查品質、解決問題。在這種「一個委託人（委託局處）、兩個代理人（執行廠商和民調諮詢委員）」的架構之下，本研究從交易成本理論出發，探討台北市的委託局處在這套委外與審查機制下必須付出的交易成本類型、背後的影響因素、與調查品質之間的關係。 本研究深度訪談5位民調諮詢委員、5個委託局處、研考會和4家執行民調的廠商共17人次，輔以次級資料分析，發現各局處在委外執行民調過程中的作法、程序和重視程度皆不一，付出的交易成本類型眾多，其中的「事前審查成本」、「搜尋廠商成本」、「事後審查成本」、「控制成本」在邏輯關係上較能對應後續之民調品質，其多寡深受「委託局處的重視程度」、「廠商的執行能力」影響。此外，為提昇調查品質，委託局處若付出較多事前成本（包括：事前審查成本和搜尋廠商成本）後能先行把關委託局處的需求與調查規格，且規模比起事後成本（包括控制成本、事後審查成本）來說較為減少許多，對調查品質將有正面影響；若未付出事前審查成本，則需於決標後耗費更多時間、精力與資源才有辦法確保調查品質。 然而，研究結果卻顯示民調諮詢委員會不見得能達到提昇調查品質的目的，仍有執行能力不佳、圖謀不軌的廠商無法達到審查委員的要求而遭到解約。因此，本研究歸納「民調諮詢委員會」兩項主要的缺失，包括未能事前把關調查規格與執行預算之間的合理性，無法克服「逆向選擇」執行廠商的問題；加上定位不明，難以保證可以完全發揮把關之功能與職責，委託局處未必完全依照委員的意見來要求廠商修正，以致淪為無人負責的窘境。 最後，本研究提出主要的政策建議，包括研考會的角色應更加積極、強化，確立民調諮詢委員會的定位，嚴肅思考業界委員協助審查的必要性，民調諮詢委員協助審查調查案的預算編列和招標文件；委託局處需掌握整個流程和民調諮詢委員的功能，顧及調查規格和預算的合理性並不以預算為唯一考量，與民調諮詢委員、執行廠商和研考會保持密切關係。

Cette thèse porte sur le contrôle que les Etats exercent sur les ONG humanitaires. Ces dernièresconservent parfois une grande marge de manoeuvre dans la mise en oeuvre de leur mandat, alorsque, dans d'autres circonstances, elles agissent en sous-contractants de la politique étrangère deleur État d'origine. Nous cherchons à identifier les facteurs qui mènent les ONG plutôt dans unedirection que dans l’autre, ainsi que la modalité de contrôle exercée par les États – coordinationou blanchiment - La thèse explique pourquoi, au sortir de la guerre froide, les Etats ont accru leurengagement dans l’action humanitaire, de façon unilatérale d’abord et multilatérale ensuite.Sur la base de l’étude du cas de la politique humanitaire internationale entre 1989 et 2005,l’analyse révèle un processus causal constitué de cinq séquences, qui explique comment les Etatsont recours à un agent quand leurs stratégies unilatérales sont infructueuses.Nos résultats attestent du caractère stratégique du financement de l’action humanitaire pour lesEtats, conditionné par les préférences géographiques et politiques de ces derniers. Financerl’action humanitaire permet de soutenir les anciennes colonies, d’appuyer la lutte contre leterrorisme et les interventions militaires des pays donateurs. Les financements étatiquesbénéficient aux ONG les plus dépendantes de leurs Etats d’origine. Les organisations nongouvernementalesdeviennent des organisations néo-gouvernementales. Celles-ci connaissent un rejetplus fort de leur présence en zone de conflit par rapport aux ONG qui refusent de recourir auxfonds publics. Face à l’échec de leurs stratégies de contrôle unilatéral, les Etats interventionnisteseuropéens délèguent la gestion de la politique humanitaire à un agent, ECHO, dont le mandat estde rendre moins visible la tutelle étatique les ONG.Cette situation engendre des problèmesd’agences multiples : l’agent dérape en raison de sa forte perméabilité à ses sous-contractants. Enréaction, les Etats renforcent les dispositifs de contrôle sur leur agent. Au final, la politiquehumanitaire se construit sur un équilibre fragile dans lequel chaque État tend naturellement à lacontrôler tout en sachant qu'un contrôle trop visible priverait cette politique de l'efficacité qui luiest propre, et qui tient, précisément à sa neutralité. / This thesis examines how States control their humanitarian NGOs. NGOs may sometimes enjoya great room of manoeuver in the implementation of their mandate, whereas, in othercircumstances, they act as sub-contractors of their home States’ foreign policies. This researchaims to identify the factors leading them to opt for one or the other course of action, as well as themodalities of States’ control (coordination or laundering). We explain why, at the end of the ColdWar, States have increased their commitments in humanitarian action, firstly bilaterally and then,multilaterally. Drawing upon the analysis of the international humanitarian policy between 1989and 2005, we reveal a 5-phases causal process which explain why States delegate competencies toan international agent when faced with the failures of their unilateral strategies. The results showthat States fund humanitarian aid in a strategic way, aligned with their geographic and politicalpreferences. Humanitarianism enables them to support their former colonies, to contribute toanti-terrorism policies, and to back military interventions. States’ funding mostly benefit to NGOthat depend on their home States. NGO thus become neo-governmental organizations. Theseagencies experience a greater rate of rejection of their action in conflict zones that NGOs thatrefuse to rely on public funding. Faced with the failure of their unilateral control strategies,European interventionist States delegate the management of the humanitarian policy to an agent,ECHO, who mandate is to make the State control of NGOs less visible. This situation raisesmultiple-agency problems: the agent slips because of its strong permeability to its sub-contractors.The principal react by reinforcing the control of its agent. At the end of the day, the humanitarianpolicy builds on a fragile equilibrium in which each State strives to control is while knowing thata too visible control decrease the efficacy of such policy, which precisely lies on its neutrality.

The major difference between venture capital-firms and other financiers is that their business idea is not only providing capital but also knowledge in business development. The ownership structure of an venture capital-firm can be private as well as public. The Swedish government is today one of the major actors in the Swedish venture capital-industry. The purpose of this study is to shed light on how venture capital-firms involve itself in its portfolio firm and if this contributes to an increased value of the portfolio firm. We also try to shed light on differences in how a public and a private venture capital-firm gets involved in its portfolio firm and if there is any difference in how they can contribute to added value. We have chosen to interview two public and two private venture capital-firms and one of their portfolio firms. To answer the essay’s purpose we used qualitative case studies with semi-structured interviews. The theoretical framework consists of principal-agent theory, knowledge-based view of the firm and social capital and previous studies of venture capital-firms involvement and value-added in their portfolio firms. This essay is limited only to venture capital-firms and portfolio firms located in Stockholm. It is the perceptions of the Venture capital-firm and the portfolio firm we are interested in, regarding the venture capital-firms involvement and value-added. Our study shows that venture capital-firm’s level of involvement in their portfolio firms varies depending on the development stage in the portfolio firm. The portfolio firm’s network increases with the venture capital firm’s entry and it also provides knowledge in business development. The study did not find any difference in the way which the public or private venture capital-firm involve itself in its portfolio firm. Nor is there any difference in how they contribute to value-added in their portfolio firm. / Skillnaden mellan venture capital-företagen och andra finansiärer är att de har som affärsidé att förutom tillförandet av kapital även tillföra kunskaper i affärsutveckling till de företag de investerar i. Venture capital-företag investerar i onoterade företag som befinner sig i ett tidigt utvecklingsskede med tillväxtpotential. Venture capital-företagens ägarstruktur kan vara såväl privat som statlig. I dagsläget är den svenska staten en stor aktör på den svenska venture capital-marknaden. Syftet med uppsatsen är att belysa hur venture capital-företag involverar sig samt hur det kan bidra till ett ökat värde i sitt portföljföretag. Vi försöker även belysa om det finns skillnad i hur ett statligt och ett privat venture capital-företag involverar sig i sitt portföljföretag samt om det finns en skillnad i hur de kan bidra till ett ökat värde i sitt portföljföretag. Undersökningsobjekten för vår studie är två privata och två statliga VC-företag och ett av deras respektive portföljföretag. Vi har använt oss av kvalitativa fallstudier med semistrukturerade intervjuer för att kunna besvara våra frågeställningar. Den teoretiska referensramen består av principal-agent teorin, ”knowledge-based view of the firm” och socialt kapital, samt tidigare studier om venture capital-företagens involvering och värdetillförsel. Vi har avgränsat oss till venture capital-företag och dess respektive portföljföretag belägna i Stockholm. Uppsatsen har sin utgångpunkt i venture capital-företagets och portföljföretagets uppfattningar avseende involvering och värdetillförsel. Vår studie visar att venture capital-företagens involveringsgrad i sina portföljföretag varierar beroende av portföljföretagets utvecklingsfas. Portföljföretagets nätverk ökar i samband med venture capital-företagets inträde och de tillför även deras kunskap i affärsutveckling. Studien visar också att det inte finns en skillnad i hur det statliga och det privata venture capital-företaget involverar sig i sitt portföljföretag. Det finns inte heller någon skillnad i hur de bidrar till ett ökat värde i sitt portföljföretag.

Although the future socio-economic benefits of a new fibre-based ("next generation access", NGA) telecommunications infrastructure seem to be uncontroversial, most countries have to date only undertaken NGA investments on a small scale. Accordingly, a universal NGA coverage appears to be a rather unrealistic objective without government intervention. Indeed, many governments have already initiated diverse subsidy programs in order to stimulate NGA infrastructure deployment. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on NGA infrastructure-based services and the public authorities' incomplete information about the capital costs of the network provider. This paper puts forward to delegate the choice of the network expansion to the NGA provider. Simple linear profit-sharing contracts can be designed to control the NGA provider's incentives and to put in balance the public objectives of network expansion and limitation of public expenditure. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

No description available.

No description available.

A tese trata de questões referentes à economia dos transplantes renais, enfocando os mecanismos institucionais e de incentivos relacionados à captação de órgãos no Brasil, bem como a eficiência dos estados brasileiros que captam e realizam tais transplantes. A questão investigada na tese por meio dos ensaios foi analisar os efeitos e as implicações da estrutura de incentivos sobre o número de órgãos (inclusive rim) captados, ou seja, sobre o comportamento do sistema público de transplantes. Buscou-se também avaliar a eficiência desse sistema e sua tendência de comportamento ao longo do período 2006-2011. Foi conduzida inicialmente uma apresentação de alguns fatos estilizados para a possível elaboração de estratégias referente ao problema de pesquisa, entre os quais se destacaram: i) o tamanho e o tempo de espera nas filas por transplante de órgãos, no período recente, vêm apresentando uma tendência crescente; ii) o Brasil ocupa o segundo lugar no número absoluto de transplantes renais, atrás apenas dos Estados Unidos; iii) o país apresenta o maior programa público de transplantes de órgãos sólidos; iv) o processo de captação de órgãos tem-se apresentado uma atividade com elevada variabilidade entre os estados brasileiros, gerando um desequilíbrio entre a oferta e a demanda por órgãos e v) o sistema de transplante renal é classificado como uma modalidade terapêutica eficiente. No segundo ensaio da tese, analisaram-se os mecanismos de incentivos oferecidos aos hospitais que realizam a captação de rim para transplantes no Brasil. A abordagem teórica usada foi o modelo Principal-Agente, num contexto de informação assimétrica. No modelo, o SUS foi classificado como o Principal (receptor de órgãos captados) e os hospitais captadores, como Agentes. O SUS, por meio de um contrato, busca maximizar o seu objetivo de obter o maior número de órgãos para transplante e, para atingi-lo, delega ações aos hospitais. Os Agentes decidem se lhes interessam criar uma estrutura e condições para a captação de tal órgão. De acordo com os resultados do modelo Agente-Principal, verificou-se que o SUS (Principal) tem adotado diversas medidas de incentivos aos hospitais que realizam a captação de órgãos, tais como: criação de um fundo específico para financiamento dos transplantes (FAEC - Fundo de Ações Estratégicas e Compensação); pagamento uniforme para hospitais universitários e não universitários; expansão dos tipos de procedimentos hospitalares a serem pagos pelo SUS; reajuste frequente das remunerações pagas por procedimento da Tabela de Procedimentos do Sistema de Informações Hospitalares do Sistema Único de Saúde; cursos e/ou encontros com os profissionais da saúde que atuam no processo de doação-transplante e criação de novos incentivos financeiros para hospitais que realizam transplantes na rede pública. Portanto, se os profissionais recebem maiores incentivos, esses podem agir com eficiência no processo de captação do órgão e, consequentemente, contribuem para que ocorra uma redução no tempo e nas filas de espera por transplantes. Objetivando avaliar a eficiência dos estados brasileiros no sistema de transplante renal e a produtividade deles ao longo do tempo, fez-se uso do ferramental da Análise Envoltória de Dados-DEA e do Índice de Malmquist e suas decomposições (efeito Emparelhamento e Deslocamento de Fronteira). Utilizou-se uma amostra de 22 estados no período 2006-2011. O método DEA com Retornos Variáveis de Escala (BCC) orientado no sentido do produto foi aplicado nesse estudo. Cada estado foi considerado como Unidade de Tomada de Decisão (DMU). Os dados classificados como inputs (recursos) foram os seguintes: gastos (nominal) totais com transplantes renais, gastos (nominais) com serviços hospitalares e gastos (nominais) com serviços dos profissionais relacionados ao setor. Como output (produto) foi usado o número de rins transplantados. Os resultados indicaram que existe entre os estados brasileiros uma discrepância significativa em relação à captação e o número de transplantes de rins. Isso gerou uma ineficiência no sistema de transplante renal no país e pode estar ocorrendo em virtude do funcionamento não adequado da gestão; do não seguimento das regras nacionais (como por exemplo, vinculação das equipes a centros transplantadores; distribuição adequada de imunossupressores; encaminhamento de órgãos não aproveitados para estados próximos; execução da tipagem HLA de toda a lista de espera de rim) que causam prejuízos aos pacientes; das comissões intra-hospitalares não ativas e das equipes hospitalares sobrecarregadas. Portanto, alguns estados que participam do processo de captação e doação de rins para transplante estão apresentando ineficiência em termos de ordem administrativa e operacional. / The thesis is about the economy of kidney transplants, focusing on the institutional mechanisms and incentives related to organ harvesting in Brazil, as well as the efficiency of the Brazilian states that perform such transplants. The essays investigated the effects and implications of the incentives structure on the number of organs (including kidney) harvested by the transplants public system. The efficiency of this system and its performance over the 2006-2011 period was also evaluated. Firstly some stylized facts related to the subject were presented, among which stand out: i) the size of queues and waiting times for organ transplantation in recent years have grown; ii) Brazil ranks second in the absolute number of kidney transplants, behind only the United States, iii) the country has the largest public program for solid organs transplantation, iv) the process of organ harvesting has high variability among Brazilian states, creating an imbalance between supply and demand for organs and v) the kidney transplantation system is as an effective therapeutic modality. In the second essay the mechanisms of incentives offered to hospitals that perform kidney harvesting in Brazil were analyzed. The theoretical model used was the Principal-Agent in a context of asymmetric information. In the model, SUS was rated as the Principal (receptor of harvested organs) and the harvesting hospitals, as agents. SUS seeks to maximize the number of organs for transplantation in a contract through which it delegates the harvesting to hospitals. Agents decide whether they are interested in creating a framework and conditions for harvesting organs. The results of the Principal-Agent model indicate that SUS (the Principal) has adopted various incentives to hospitals that perform organ harvesting, such as creating a specific fund to finance transplants (FCSA - Fund for Compensation and Strategic Actions); same payment for university and non-university hospitals, expanding the types of hospital procedures to be paid by SUS; frequent remuneration raises of the amount paid by the procedures in Table of Procedures of the Hospital Information System of the Unified Health System; courses and / or meetings with health professionals working in the donation-transplantation process and creation of new financial incentives to hospitals that perform transplants for the public system. So, if the professional receives stronger incentives, he will act more effectively in the organ harvesting and will thereby contribute to a reduction in waiting lines for transplantation. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the Brazilian states in kidney transplant and their productivity over time, the Data Envelopment Analysis-DEA was used and the Malmquist index and its decomposition (Pairing effect and Boundary Displacement) to a sample of 22 states over five years (2006-2011). The DEA model with variable returns to scale (BCC) directed towards the product was applied in this study. Each state was considered a Decision Making Unit (DMU). Data classified as inputs (resources) were the following: total amount spent (nominal) with kidney transplants, amount spent (nominal) with hospital services and amount spent (nominal) with the professional services related to that sector. As output (product) was used the number of transplanted kidneys. The results indicated that there is a significant discrepancy among the Brazilian states in harvesting and transplanting kidneys. This fact has led to inefficiency in the country’s kidney transplant system and it may be so due to inadequate management, to ignoring natiimmunosuppressants; forwarding not used organs to nearby states, implementation of HLA exam to the entire waiting list for kidney transplant) causing harm to patients; to inactive in-hospital committees and to overloaded hospital staff. Therefore, some states in the process of kidney harvesting and transplantation are showing operational and managerial inefficiencies.onal directives (eg, vinculating teams to transplant centers; proper distribution of immunosuppressants; forwarding not used organs to nearby states, implementation of HLA exam to the entire waiting list for kidney transplant) causing harm to patients; to inactive in-hospital committees and to overloaded hospital staff. Therefore, some states in the process of kidney harvesting and transplantation are showing operational and managerial inefficiencies.