Reorganization with a focus on procedural aspects of insolvency proceedings The legal regulation of insolvency proceedings in the Czech Republic has been subjected to substantial modernization by the Czech act No. 184/2006 Coll., The Insolvency Act. The Insolvency Act comprehensively responds to recent development in the society and economic situation by implementing non-liquidation bankruptcy solutions. The purpose of this thesis is to provide complex insight in to the insolvency proceedings and its components, with a focus on its procedural aspects. The crucial part of this thesis is the analysis of the procedural proceedings, under which the reorganization is carried out. The thesis is composed of ten chapters, each of them dealing with different parts of the procedure. Chapter One generally defines insolvency proceedings as a specific type of civil procedure. Chapter is subdivided into three parts describing the concept and nature of the insolvency proceedings, as well as specific principles by which the insolvency proceeding is ruled by. Chapter Two characterises the entities and participants of the insolvency proceeding while presenting details on their characteristics, capacities and procedural rights. Chapter Three focuses specifically on the decision-making and supervisory activities of...

Conforme a Lei n.º 9.307, de 23 de setembro de 1996, as sentenças arbitrais nacionais produzem os mesmos efeitos das sentenças judiciais, independentemente de homologação. A despeito disso, elas se encontram sujeitas ao controle do Poder Judiciário. A Lei de Arbitragem disciplina os limites e meios para a impugnação judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais basicamente em dois dispositivos, os arts. 32 e 33. Optou-se por um regramento bastante sucinto, mas que é suficiente para resolver as situações práticas que podem se verificar quando uma sentença arbitral é impugnada. Compreendido que a arbitragem é processo de origem convencional (privada) e que por força daquelas e outras regras, como os arts. 17, 18, 20, § 2º, e 31 ela se insere no círculo da teoria geral do processo (aplicando-se-lhe, por conseguinte, os respectivos princípios e conceitos) e se sujeita aos ditames essenciais do devido processo legal, torna-se possível, a partir das técnicas interpretativas existentes, chegar a soluções para as diversas questões envolvendo o controle judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais das quais a Lei n.º 9.307 não tratou expressamente ou de que tratou de forma imprecisa. / According to Law n.o 9.307, which came into effect in September 23rd, 1996, domestic arbitral awards have the same effect on the parties as a ruling by a State Court, without the need for judicial confirmation. The Brazilian Arbitration Act regulates the limits and means for the judicial challenge of domestic arbitral awards in, essentialy, two articles, art. 32 and 33. The Act opted for brief rules on the issue, but they are sufficient to resolve the practical situations that may arise when an arbitral award is challenged. Understanding that arbitration is a process of conventional origin (private) and that due to those as well as other rules, such as articles 17, 18, 20, paragraph 2, and 31 it is contained in the field of general procedural theory (so that, consequently, the same principles and concepts are applicable) and is subject to the essential dictates of due legal process, it becomes possible, due to existing techniques of interpretation, to develop solutions to the many issues involving the judicial control of domestic arbitral awards that Law n.o 9.307 either did not expressly regulate or regulated imprecisely.

Conforme a Lei n.º 9.307, de 23 de setembro de 1996, as sentenças arbitrais nacionais produzem os mesmos efeitos das sentenças judiciais, independentemente de homologação. A despeito disso, elas se encontram sujeitas ao controle do Poder Judiciário. A Lei de Arbitragem disciplina os limites e meios para a impugnação judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais basicamente em dois dispositivos, os arts. 32 e 33. Optou-se por um regramento bastante sucinto, mas que é suficiente para resolver as situações práticas que podem se verificar quando uma sentença arbitral é impugnada. Compreendido que a arbitragem é processo de origem convencional (privada) e que por força daquelas e outras regras, como os arts. 17, 18, 20, § 2º, e 31 ela se insere no círculo da teoria geral do processo (aplicando-se-lhe, por conseguinte, os respectivos princípios e conceitos) e se sujeita aos ditames essenciais do devido processo legal, torna-se possível, a partir das técnicas interpretativas existentes, chegar a soluções para as diversas questões envolvendo o controle judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais das quais a Lei n.º 9.307 não tratou expressamente ou de que tratou de forma imprecisa. / According to Law n.o 9.307, which came into effect in September 23rd, 1996, domestic arbitral awards have the same effect on the parties as a ruling by a State Court, without the need for judicial confirmation. The Brazilian Arbitration Act regulates the limits and means for the judicial challenge of domestic arbitral awards in, essentialy, two articles, art. 32 and 33. The Act opted for brief rules on the issue, but they are sufficient to resolve the practical situations that may arise when an arbitral award is challenged. Understanding that arbitration is a process of conventional origin (private) and that due to those as well as other rules, such as articles 17, 18, 20, paragraph 2, and 31 it is contained in the field of general procedural theory (so that, consequently, the same principles and concepts are applicable) and is subject to the essential dictates of due legal process, it becomes possible, due to existing techniques of interpretation, to develop solutions to the many issues involving the judicial control of domestic arbitral awards that Law n.o 9.307 either did not expressly regulate or regulated imprecisely.

L'autonomie procédurale est la dénomination erronée du phénomène réel qu'est la subsidiarité juridictionnelle. La I agi que veut que I' on parie a, termes de compétences, puisque I a subsidiarité régule leur exercice entre les États membres et l'Union. En matière de subsidiarité juridictionnelle relative aux modalités procédurales de mire en œuvre du droit de l'Union, il s’agit ainsi de compétence procédurale. La conséquence majeure de ce glissement notionnel est une relecture de l'ensemble de la jurisprudence de la Cour dans ce domaine. Cette relecture donne à voir plusieurs éléments qui, mis bout à bout donnait une nouvelle logique d'ensemble à la jurisprudence de la Cour. Tout d'abord, équivalence et effectivité, qui sont traditionnellement considérées comme régulant cette compétence procédurale du juge national , ne sont pas des principes mais des critères. Il ne sont par ailleurs pas les seuls à exercer cette fonction de régulation de l'exercice de la compétence et sont concurrencés par le droit à un protection juridictionnelle effective. Cette relecture montre alors que l'effectivité est un frein à la primauté du droit d l'Union en droit interne. Par ailleurs, le juge de Luxembourg prend a, compte depuis les premières années des exigence des États membres désireux de s’affranchir ponctuellement du critère d'effectivité. Ce mouvement est en fait une intégration de leur identité nationale, érigée en justification corrigeant le contenu même de cette effectivité. En d'autres termes, les États membres peuvent de plus en plus avancer des motifs d' intérêt général pour justifier le non-respect de l'effectivité du droit de l'Union. / Procedural autonomy is a term often misused when talking about the very real phenomenon “judicial subsidiarity”. It is more accurate to talk in terms of competence considering the principle of subsidiarity regulates the role they play between Member States and the Union. As such, when discussing judicial subsidiarity in relation to the procedural aspects of implementing EU law, one should talk about procedural competence. This change in meaning ultimately leads to a revision of all relevant case law. Such a review brings to light a number of elements that, when juxtaposed, reveal an overarching rationale behind the Court's rare law. First, both equivalence and effectivity, long perceived as regulators of procedural competence national judges, are not in fact principles but criteria. Furthermore, they are not the only regulating criteria as the right to an effective judicial protection also comes into play. It then becomes apparent that effectivity is an obstacle to EU law having primacy over national law. Moreover, for a long time the ECJ has taken into account requests made by Member States to, on occasion, bypass the criteria of effectivity. As such, the ECJ accepts that national identity can serve as corrective justification of the very content of effectivity. In other words, Member States can put forward more and more arguments in the name of “public interest” to justify non-compliance with EU law effectivity .

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