<p>Behovet av att skydda sig mot plagiat har blivit allt viktigare. Med dagens snabba kommunikation och höga teknologisk standard, kan en mer eller mindre liknade eller exakt kopia vara på marknaden efter endast några få dagar.</p><p>Den som plagierar sparar både tid och pengar. Att formge en tilltalande produkt, tar tid och kostar pengar, vilket gör att den som kopiera utnyttjar det någon annan formgivit och det arbete den gjort. Dessutom sparar den som kopierar mycket tid på att inte behöva marknadsföra produkten.</p><p>De skydd som finns för produktens form och design, ges genom immaterialrätt som omfattar upphovsrätten patent, varukännetecken samt mönster - eller formgivningsskydd.</p><p>Alternativ för den som ”bara” vill göra känt att man formgivit något är Svensk Forms Nyhetsregister.</p><p>I uppsatsen redovisas några produkter som har blivit plagierade. Resultatet av dessa vissa att det är svårt för en mindre formgivare att skydda sin design.</p> / <p>The need of protection against plagiarism has become more important in the last few years.Develeopment of the internet means that a product similar the one you have made can be on the market in a few days. They who make use of plagiarism saves both time and money. That means that a company that uses plagiarism take advantage of the originator who made the product from the beginning. Another benefit that a company that are use plagiarism gets is that they dont need to pay money för marketing of the product.</p><p>There are both legal and agreed for a products design. These means gives protection for a product and help the founder to get credit for the innovation.</p><p>An alternative for a person that just wants to present that he or she is the founder is The Swedish Forms new Registration. In the paper a few observed cases of plagiarism has been examined. The result of these cases shows that it is difficult for a small person who has created a product to defend his product against plagiarism. This is due often due to lack of knowledge, expensive legal proceedings and insufficient global watch.</p>

Development of the Real Property Law Regulation in Czech Lands in 19th and 20th centuries The purpose of my master degree thesis is to analyse the development of legal regulation in the field of real property law in the Czech lands between years 1800 and 2000. There is several reasons for my research which are specified in the thesis's Preface: the fact I am very interested in everything what is connected with the legal aspects of real property questions, my original profession (having secondary school education in construction domain - and construction is a real property according to the valid Czech legal form) and influence of the denial of certain general principles of property law in the Czechoslovakia in the past to my family. The thesis is composed of ten chapters, each of them describing the legal regulation of the real property law in different historical period of time. Chapter One is introductory and defines basic characteristics of real property law in the past, beginnings of its concept as a fundamental human right and specificities of the soil including mentioning the exclusive Czech legal institute buildings being a real property. Chapter Two shows the essential institutes of legal relations to the real properties from the beginnings of Czech statehood (feudalism and absolutism times)...

This thesis examines the establishment of servitudes by positive prescription in Scots law, with particular reference to the doctrine’s conceptual development and the nature of possession required under section 3 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first provides a historical account of the law of positive prescription as applied to servitudes from the 17th century to the 20th century, culminating in its statutory expression in section 3(1) and (2) of the 1973 Act. The second considers what the 1973 Act means when it says that a servitude must be “possessed” for the prescriptive period. While jurists in Scotland have traditionally thought that a right cannot be possessed as such, since it lacks a physical corpus, they have tended to view the apparent exercise of a right as equivalent to the detention of a corporeal object and concluded that servitudes can be “possessed” (or “quasi-possessed”) by analogy. An alternative approach is to say that, while possession denotes a comprehensive factual control of an object for one’s own benefit, certain lesser degrees of factual control are also protected by the law. On this view, the (apparent) exercise of a servitude constitutes a limited “possession” of the land itself and is protected accordingly. Part two argues that this alternative approach is the more coherent and provides helpful analytical tools for understanding what is really going on when a servitude is “possessed” for the purposes of prescription. The third part of the thesis consists of a detailed analysis of the nature of the possession required to establish a servitude by positive prescription. In particular, possession “as if of right” is shown to consist of two “steps”: firstly, the prescriptive claimant must show sufficient possession to indicate that a servitude is being asserted; and, secondly, the possession must not be “by right”, i.e. referable to another right already held by the claimant. After this, the statutory requirements of openness and peaceableness are considered in detail.

Les biens ne semblent exister que pour être classés, distingués et appropriés, mais ne sont guère envisagés indépendamment des droits réels qui s’y rapportent. Or, la multiplication pléthorique des droits réels pourrait bien révéler la diversité des objets possibles du droit réel. Ces objets ne sont pas des choses du monde extérieur, mais une réalité abstraite que le droit construit au terme d’une opération de qualification: ce sont des objets juridiques, parce qu’ils sont déjà envisagés par le droit objectif à l’occasion de l’application d’une règle de droit positif qui impose l’appréciation de certains éléments de fait propres à en révéler l’existence. Le droit objectif construit donc une réalité qui lui est propre, avant même qu’il soit fait référence à un éventuel droit réel. Pour autant, la technique juridique n’est jamais inerte. Il existe des mécanismes permettant à la volonté de modifier la consistance ou l’affectation des objets juridiques et, partant, d’agir sur le régime des biens. Ces opérations sont à la fois caractéristiques et spécifiques de la technique du droit réel, employée pour façonner la réalité que perçoit le droit objectif. Les prétentions subjectives à la jouissance des objets juridiques rejaillissent, cependant, sur la conception que l’on se fait du droit réel, au point d’occulter sa dimension technique derrière les prérogatives qu’il semble conférer aux sujets de droit. / In French property law, things only seem to exist in order to be classified or owned. They are scarcely described in themselves, independently from rights in rem. The multiplication of these rights suggests, however, that they only reflect the diversity of underlying property objects. Such objects are not things from the external world, but an abstraction which the legal system constructs upon characterising certain facts and giving them a legal denomination. The application of a legal rule requires the appreciation of factual elements which, in turn, reveal the existence of an object filled with juristic qualities, before a property right even exists. Yet, legal technique is never entirely passive. The law provides certain mechanisms through which it is possible to modify the legal consistency and the purpose served by juristic objects and, therefore, to change the rules applicable to them. These results are both characteristic of and specific to in rem legal techniques. However, when legal subjects assert claims to the possession of an object, their pretensions also transform our understanding of in rem mechanisms, obscuring their technical function beneath the rights and powers which they seem to grant these individuals.

No description available.

This thesis argues that the legal ordering of the natural environment represents a culturally contingent 'order of things'. Within this process of categorisation, Nature is constructed as an 'other' to the human subject. This opposition allows nature to be conceived as either an object of control, as found in property law, or as a wilderness to be preserved apart from human society. This latter view is implicit to the principles informing early environmental laws for the protection of natural heritage in international law and within Australia. More recently, this distinctively western legal ordering has been challenged to be more culturally inclusive and to include concepts that incorporate human interaction with the natural environment. In making this argument, the thesis adopts a theoretical framework derived from Foucault's 'Order of Things'. Modem western understanding of the natural environment is directly informed by western science. Scientific discourses, with origins in the Enlightenment, have been extremely influential in determining the legal ordering of the natural environment. In this context, the thesis provides an overview of the conceptual shift from a pre-scientific, organic conception of the relationship between people and nature to a people/nature dichotomy that persists as the nature/culture meta-narrative in modern society. The rise of a more holistic conception of the natural environment, based in ecological principles, has only partially displaced the latter view. The thesis also examines the manner in which property law constitutes the 'proper' order of the natural world within western culture. The bundle of rights concept, implicit to modern conceptions of property, finds resonances in western scientific understanding of the natural world. In particular, property law replicates the subject /object distinction that is central to modern western thought. The positing of nature as an object of control through the property relationship has been a resilient ordering of the natural environment. It has directly contributed to an instrumental perception of the natural environment. Indeed, the property concept was the central way of 'constructing' the Australian natural environment at law from colonisation to well into the twentieth century. The initial legal designation of Australia as 'terra nullius' allowed received English property law to form the template for ordering the occupation of the Australian natural environment by British civilisation. In the second half of the 20th century the wilderness ideal, in concert with ecological 'balance' concepts, gained currency in international and domestic law as the foundation for the protection of natural heritage. Natural heritage protection was a high profile aspect of early environmental laws in Australia. Thus the World Heritage Convention assumed an importance for natural heritage protection within Australia due to specific historical, political and constitutional factors. The adoption of 'holistic' definitions of environment in many pieces of Australian legislation has served to partially displace the instrumental, proprietary view of nature. However, the legal recognition of natural heritage, when based around wilderness ideals, remains predicated upon the western people/nature dichotomy. More recently, reforms to early environmental laws have been instituted and case law reveals a state of flux in how natural heritage areas are to be identified and valued. The traditional western legal constructions of nature have served to occlude Aboriginal and Tones Strait Islander peoples' relationships with 'country'. Such legal frameworks continue to be problematic if a more culturally inclusive and holistic conception of heritage, such as cultural landscapes, is to be adopted. Further, while the recognition of native title has led to a re-examination of many fundamental legal principles, reexamination of our western legal constructs remains incomplete. One of the crucial areas yet to be fully worked through is how to accommodate western dualistic notions of the relationship between people and the natural environment with the legal requirements to establish native title. The need for accommodation has direct practical ramifications in that many world heritage, national estate and other 'wilderness' areas are, or may be, subject to native title claims. Therefore, the thesis considers the need to re-assess western, scientifically derived conceptions of natural heritage as the prevailing principles for environmental preservation. Finally the thesis discusses the contingency of any legal ordering of the natural world. Western representations of nature have exerted tremendous influence upon the legal regimes that have regulated and ordered nature across the Australian continent. These classifications are embedded within a particular cultural narrative. Parts of the Australian natural environment that are designated as property, as natural heritage, as native title, or as cultural heritage do not achieve this legal characterisation due to any inherent value or features of the natural environment itself. These areas are not necessarily property or heritage or native title until incorporated within, or recognised by, western legal frameworks. As such, any decision to ascribe a given legal status to the natural environment as part of the legal ordering needs to be seen as involving issues of choice that have direct distributive justice implications.

<p>Patent law has during time evolved from industrial inventions to also include intellectual inventions. Patentability has as well changed with time. For technology to be patentable it must be considered to be a technical solution to a problem, and today genetic inventions are considered to be such a technical solution. From the beginning plants and animals were not considered as inventions; however, technology progress urged modifications of existing legislation to meet development progress within technology. European as well as international harmonization have been carried out in this field to ensure uniformity.</p><p>The exclusion from patentability for plant and animal varieties can be found in several sources of law; this study focuses on the exclusions in Article 4 of Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, as well as in Article 53b of the European Patent Convention. After two specific cases from the European Patent Office the scope of the exclusion from patentability for plant and animal varieties was questioned. The two cases ONCO-mouse and Plant Genetic Systems had different outcomes, patent was granted in one case and not in the other; and that raised confusion as to the definition of plant and animal varieties, as both cases concerned genetic modification.</p><p>Although there is no clear definition of plant and animal varieties, case law provides guidance to a certain extent, the reasoning in the case law also gives guidance as to where the judiciary is heading in its interpretation. There is more legislation concerning plant varieties, and the definition of this term might be considered to be clearer. The general opinion seems to be that what is said about plant varieties should be applied mutatis mutandis to animal varieties, and vice versa, however this may be questionable in some cases. The lack of a clear definition of the terms plant and animal varieties might result in a lack of legal certainty in this field, as demonstrated by the questioning of the two contradicting cases mentioned above.</p><p>Rapid developments in the field of biotechnology imply that the patentability of plants and animals will be assessed on other grounds in the future. As biotechnology is an expanding area, the acceptance of new controversial inventions may occur on a more regular basis. Time will tell if this is the case.</p>

<p>Syfte och frågeställningar </p><p>Syftet med denna uppsats var att granska skattelagstiftningen rörande sponsring, samt att jämföra de befintliga reglerna rörande sponsring med Stockholms Handelskammares förslag ny lagtext. Målet med Handelskammarens förslag är att det ska bli enklare för företag att dra utgifter för sponsring. Vi hade följande frågeställningar: Varför skall sponsring vara avdragsgill? Vilka följder kan Handelskammarens nya förslag ge? Skall avtal inom sponsring vara skriftliga? Varför anses motprestation som enbart höjer goodwill och image som gåva?</p><p> </p><p>Metod </p><p>Rättsdogmatisk metod, som går ut på att systematisera och tolka rättsregler med hjälp av lagtext, rättspraxis och juridiska arbeten. </p><p>Resultat </p><p>Enligt lag skall utgifter för att förvärva och bibehålla intäkter dras av som kostnad, en sponsringsutgift skall alltså därför dras av som kostnad och därmed vara avdragsgill. Stockholms Handelskammares nya lagtextförslag skulle innebära att utgifter som kan antas få betydelse för näringsverksamheten skall dras av, tanken är att motprestation i form av att stärka företagets goodwill och image skall vara avdragsgill. Detta skulle kunna utnyttjas för personligt intresse, alltså skulle det kunna vara möjligt att dra av rena gåvor som sponsring. Idag finns det inget krav på skriftligt avtal inom sponsring, vi anser att det vore bra ur bevisningssynpunkt för företag om det förelåg ett krav på skriftlig dokumentation. Orsaken till att motprestation som bara höjer goodwill och image anses som gåva är att om det skulle vara avdragsgill kan detta utnyttjas för personligt intresse. </p><p>Slutsats </p><p>Idag finns det enligt vår undersökning tre vägar att gå: antingen att behålla den befintliga lagen, att anamma Stockholms Handelskammares nya lagtextförslag eller att utveckla ett nytt förslag. Vi anser att den befintliga lagen är det bättre alternativet i nuläget, orsaken till detta är att Handelkammarens förslag enligt vår mening är väl liberalt då alla utgifter som antas ha betydelse för näringsverksamheten skall dras av som kostnad. Vår rekommendation är att avtal inom sponsring skall vara skriftliga. En lösning på värderingsproblematiken efterlyses. </p>

Syfte och frågeställningar Syftet med denna uppsats var att granska skattelagstiftningen rörande sponsring, samt att jämföra de befintliga reglerna rörande sponsring med Stockholms Handelskammares förslag ny lagtext. Målet med Handelskammarens förslag är att det ska bli enklare för företag att dra utgifter för sponsring. Vi hade följande frågeställningar: Varför skall sponsring vara avdragsgill? Vilka följder kan Handelskammarens nya förslag ge? Skall avtal inom sponsring vara skriftliga? Varför anses motprestation som enbart höjer goodwill och image som gåva? Metod Rättsdogmatisk metod, som går ut på att systematisera och tolka rättsregler med hjälp av lagtext, rättspraxis och juridiska arbeten. Resultat Enligt lag skall utgifter för att förvärva och bibehålla intäkter dras av som kostnad, en sponsringsutgift skall alltså därför dras av som kostnad och därmed vara avdragsgill. Stockholms Handelskammares nya lagtextförslag skulle innebära att utgifter som kan antas få betydelse för näringsverksamheten skall dras av, tanken är att motprestation i form av att stärka företagets goodwill och image skall vara avdragsgill. Detta skulle kunna utnyttjas för personligt intresse, alltså skulle det kunna vara möjligt att dra av rena gåvor som sponsring. Idag finns det inget krav på skriftligt avtal inom sponsring, vi anser att det vore bra ur bevisningssynpunkt för företag om det förelåg ett krav på skriftlig dokumentation. Orsaken till att motprestation som bara höjer goodwill och image anses som gåva är att om det skulle vara avdragsgill kan detta utnyttjas för personligt intresse. Slutsats Idag finns det enligt vår undersökning tre vägar att gå: antingen att behålla den befintliga lagen, att anamma Stockholms Handelskammares nya lagtextförslag eller att utveckla ett nytt förslag. Vi anser att den befintliga lagen är det bättre alternativet i nuläget, orsaken till detta är att Handelkammarens förslag enligt vår mening är väl liberalt då alla utgifter som antas ha betydelse för näringsverksamheten skall dras av som kostnad. Vår rekommendation är att avtal inom sponsring skall vara skriftliga. En lösning på värderingsproblematiken efterlyses.

In recent times companies have been forced to become more and more digitalized in order to spread company information and facilitate communication with clients, con-sumers and their own employees. The knowledge to integrate software and launch the company into the digital world cannot always be found within the company itself. Therefore, companies often resort to employing consulting companies to enable this for them. Because of copyright, the software created does not solely belong to the employing company – the intellectual property rights automatically stay with the con-sulting company that made it. When the consulting company omits details concerning intellectual property rights in the employment contract, the standard rules in the Swedish Copyright Act and the international directives kick in and give the consulting company the full rights to the programmes that it has created – with a few exceptions. The employing company may only alter the software in order to ensure that it is fully compatible with the al-ready existing programmes it utilises and the operating system it uses. Even reverse engineering is permitted as long as the information gathered is only used for ensuring the compatibility. Information in databases is protected as it is creatively arranged in systematic or me-thodical way by the one that has made a substantial investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting the information. The substantial investment depends on the one that has taken the risk of investing in the particular database. As databases are rarely made by consulting companies on behalf of a client, and the rules are sufficiently clear as to whom the ownership of the database is, there are few questions concerning data-bases. Because of this, the assumption would be that the current legislation is work-ing properly. One of the more troubling issues in regards to copyright is that even though reverse engineering is illegal, proving infringement comes down to evidence and what parts that are quantitatively or qualitatively significant in the original programme. Cur-rently, there is no registry of copyrighted works in Sweden and so there is not telling who made the programme first if the work happens to spread. The creators of soft-ware have expressed concern and allegedly lobbied for a new directive giving more protection to the original creators. The culmination of the lobby work was the Soft-ware Patent Directive, which proposed that software should be seen as an invention and therefore eligible for patenting. However, there were many reasons as to why software should not be patented, most notably increased cost and the years of wait-ing for the patent grant, and the directive was rejected. Still, the concerns persisted and no greater protection has been given to the creators of software.