Submitted by JOSÉ ESTEVAM DE ALMEIDA PRADO (jeap@jeap.com.br) on 2018-09-17T12:44:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Estevam Prado - Dissertação final.pdf: 2266670 bytes, checksum: 312ab5780824b82a4f6e4f41f29aef17 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2018-09-17T17:36:31Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Estevam Prado - Dissertação final.pdf: 2266670 bytes, checksum: 312ab5780824b82a4f6e4f41f29aef17 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-09-18T13:58:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Estevam Prado - Dissertação final.pdf: 2266670 bytes, checksum: 312ab5780824b82a4f6e4f41f29aef17 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-18T13:58:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Estevam Prado - Dissertação final.pdf: 2266670 bytes, checksum: 312ab5780824b82a4f6e4f41f29aef17 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-21 / A presente dissertação tem por objetivo estudar a reparação de danos sofridos no mercado de valores mobiliários causados por divulgação de informações falsas ou enganosas. Partindo do papel da informação na formação dos preços de valores mobiliários, e dos danos que pode causar a divulgação de informação falsa ou enganosa, analisamos o tema sob a ótica da responsabilidade civil. O tema tem sido pouco explorado em nosso país até então, e apenas recentemente tem despertado maior atenção em virtude de ações privadas propostas por investidores no exterior em face de importantes companhias aberta brasileiras, com algum desdobramento em nosso país. Para expandir o nosso conhecimento, realizamos pesquisa de direito comparado examinando o tratamento dado nos Estados Unidos e na França aos casos de informação falsa ou enganosa no mercado de valores mobiliários. Verificamos as diferenças existentes e as barreiras à efetiva reparação de danos no mercado de valores mobiliários, concluindo que, embora os tribunais desses países demonstrem disposição de tutelar os interesses lesados, a reparação tem sido ficta. Identificamos como questão problemática a responsabilização da companhia emissora, pois nesse caso não há de fato reparação de danos, mas, sim, a socialização de prejuízos, embora isso possa ser contornado ou mitigado por meio de seguro de responsabilidade e/ou criação de fundo de reparação de danos no mercado de valores mobiliários. / The present dissertation aims to study the repair of damages suffered in the securities market caused by the disclosure of false or misleading information by public companies. Based on the role of information in the formation of securities prices, and the damages that may be caused by the dissemination of false or misleading information, we analyze the issue from a civil liability perspective. The issue has received little attention so far in our country, and only recently has it attracted more attention due to private actions filed by investors abroad in the face of important Brazilian public companies, with some development in our country. To further our knowledge, we conduct comparative law research by examining the treatment given in the United States and France to cases of false or misleading information in the securities market. We have verified the existing differences and barriers to the effective compensation of damages in the securities market, concluding that, although the courts of these countries have shown willingness in protecting the injured interests, reparation has been elusive. We identified the liability of the issuing company as a problematic issue, because in this case there is in fact no compensation of damages, but, rather, the socialization of losses, although this may be overcome or mitigated by means of civil liability insurance and/or creation of a compensation fund for damages in the securities market.

This thesis deals with tax implications. It is focused on the evaluation of the options of transferring to another business form in terms of tax burden. By processing the overall tax burden in various business forms will be proposed an option, which would bet he best for husbands Houfek in terms of tax. There will be also taken into account tax optimization using international revenues that husbands could arrives in connection with business development.

沙氏法是美國在經歷一連串包括安隆、世界通訊等知名企業在內的財報不實醜聞後，為重建投資大眾對公開發行公司財報及美國證券市場的信心，迅速於2002年7月30日頒佈之一項企業革新法。綜觀其中66項條款，引發最多爭議、且對所有公司影響最大的首推404條款。該條款要求管理階層與簽證會計師評估公司與財務報導有關之內部控制制度其有效性，而爭議的重點主要在其實施方式和高遵循成本。 本研究透過個案研究，以深度訪談與問卷調查的方式，瞭解個案公司為遵循沙氏法404條款而推動之專案其組織架構與施行程序，同時蒐集公司主管及員工之意見，以分析實施效益並提出建議。 研究發現，33.34%的受訪者認同公司遵循沙氏法404條款所獲得的效益大於成本，17.34%反對，49.33%持中性看法。受訪者除認為實施沙氏法專案有助於強化同仁的風險意識、引導公司重新檢視與財務報導有關之內部控制制度，並將作業程序標準化、提升內控品質與財報可信度、遵循集團政策外，同時認為沙氏法專案有改善的空間，尤其在整合公司現有的風險控管機制、簡化測試流程及對測試文件的要求等方面。 誠如個案公司財務長所重視的“塑造企業文化”，沙氏法404條款強調的是“由上到下、以風險為基礎”，因此，樹立正確的在上位者之語調與表態極為重要，尤其是董事會、執行長和財務長，必須全力支持，建構具成本效益且符合沙氏法404條款的測試架構，以評估與財務報導有關之內部控制，進而確保財務報導之可靠性。 / After a whole series of financial scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom frauds, the US government swiftly declared the Corporate Reform Law on July 30, 2002, i.e. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), aiming to restore investors’ confidence in financial statements of the public companies and the US security market, as well. Among 66 sections in total in SOX, the most contentious aspect, which has also made significant impacts on companies, is Section 404 (“SOX 404”) requiring management and the external auditors to assess the effectiveness of Internal Control over Financial Reporting (“ICFR”). The key point of contention is its stringent implementation and high compliance cost. In-depth interview and questionnaire survey methods were adopted in this case study to explore how the researched company (“the Company”) implemented its project in response to SOX 404 and then to have a detailed analysis based upon the answers and comments obtained from the interviewees and the questionnaire respondents. Suggestions are made at the end of the study. The study finds that 33.34% of the respondents agreed with the view that compliance with SOX 404 generates greater benefit than cost to the Company, while 17.34% were against it, and 49.33% remained neutral. Despite the fact that abiding by SOX may enhance the employees’ risk awareness, guide the company to reexamine its ICFR, add more credibility of financial reports, and conform to Group policy etc., both the interviewees and the respondents consider that there is room for improvement as far as SOX 404 project is concerned. For example, a full integration of the existing risk management mechanisms and also a great simplification of testing procedures and documentation requirements. Just as the CFO of the Company highlights the importance of molding enterprise culture, SOX 404 is also top-down, risk-based oriented. As a result, it is essential to set the right tone at the top. The Board of Directors, CEO, and CFO must give their full support for building a testing framework, which is cost-effective and keeps to SOX 404. By doing so, ICFR can be accurately assessed, and the reliability of financial reports can be virtually assured.

Si l’on considère que le rôle des actionnaires varie dans un continuum qui s’étend de la passivité à l’une des extrémités jusqu’au contrôle total de la société dans laquelle ils ont investi, on peut affirmer que si, à une certaine époque, les investisseurs institutionnels ont privilégié une certaine forme d’apathie rationnelle, cette réalité a évolué. Loins d’avoir atteint l’autre extrémité du spectre, on doit néanmoins constater que désormais, les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants doivent faire face à un nombre limité d’actionnaires institutionnels qui se connaissent et détiennent une part importante des titres d’une société. Malgré la présence d’obstacles légaux et organisationnels qui entravent toujours aujourd’hui l’exercice des droits des actionnaires, il semble que les interventions des investisseurs institutionnels aient transcendé la règle de la majorité en ayant recours à des moyens inusités pour diminuer les risques d’opportunisme au sein des sociétés ouvertes. En effet, si l’activisme des investisseurs institutionnels est un phénomène complexe qui prend des formes multiples souvent opaques et qui est difficile à cerner avec précision, il est néanmoins possible d’affirmer que ce mécanisme de gouvernance joue un rôle des plus importants en contribuant à limiter les coûts d’agence découlant de l’extraction de bénéfices privés par les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants. En effet, au Canada, où la structure de propriété d’une majorité de sociétés est concentrée, l’activisme actionnarial permet de faire contrepoids au vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire des dirigeants ainsi qu’à l’influence qu’exercent les actionnaires dominants afin d’assurer une certaine forme de protection aux droits des actionnaires minoritaires. / If the role of shareholders is regarded as varying along a spectrum ranging from passivity to control of the company in which they have invested, it is safe to say that whereas institutional investors have exhibited a form of rational apathy in the past, this situation has changed significantly in recent years. Although institutional investors are still far from reaching the other end of the spectrum, it is clear that senior management and controlling shareholders are now faced with a limited number of institutional shareholders who know each other and who hold a significant share of the company's stock. In spite of the legal and organizational barriers that still impede the ability of shareholders to exercise their rights, it appears that the actions of institutional investors have transcended majority rule by resorting to unusual ways of reducing the risk of opportunism within publicly held Canadian companies. While the activism of institutional investors is a complex phenomenon embodying various forms which are often opaque and difficult to fully grasp, it can nevertheless be said that this mechanism of governance plays a critical role in slimming down agency costs arising from the realization of private benefits by managers and controlling shareholders. Indeed, in Canada, where most companies have a concentrated ownership structure, shareholder activism can serve as a counterbalance to the broad discretionary powers of company leaders and the influence of controlling shareholders, thus constituting a certain measure of protection for the rights of minority shareholders.

This master's thesis deals with the valuation of BEZNOSKA, s.r.o. Situated in Kladno, the Czech Republic, this company engages in the development and production of instruments and implants for bone surgery. The company was established on the basis of the "surgery" division of then POLDI Kladno at the beginning of the nineties, during the "big privatisation" period. The aim of this thesis is to estimate the market value and investment value of the company as of 31 December 2009 as defined in the International Valuation Standards. The valuation is carried out using two basic methods. The focus of the work is based on the DCF method the result of which is verified by a method based on the market analysis, in particular the similar public company method. The book value method is only complementary. The thesis is divided into six chapters. Sequenced logically, it contains the basic information on the company valued, financial analysis, strategic analysis, analysis and forecast of the value drivers, financial plan and the valuation itself based on the method mentioned above. These topical units are further divided into several subchapters as necessary. Various analyses and statistical methods needed to successfully meet the set objective are applied throughout the text.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act made audit committees directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and supervision of companies' auditors. Limited research in the auditor selection process and PCAOB inspections suggest that managers, not audit committees, may still be selecting the auditors, and that inspection reports are not useful. This study addresses both of these areas. This paper considers two theories of governance, Agency Theory and Institution Theory, to analyze the audit committee members' auditor selection process. The study examines whether Audit Committee Members use two specific types of audit quality indicators, other than managers' recommendation, in evaluating auditors. In a setting where the manager recommends the auditor, the auditors' inspection results (favorable/unfavorable) and a prior manager/auditor affiliation (absent/present) are manipulated in a between-subject research design, using financially literate professionals as a proxy for audit committee members. The study finds that audit quality perception and auditor selection are jointly determined. Inspection results are positively associated with audit quality perception and auditor selection. The nature of a manager-auditor affiliation is directly associated with audit quality perception and inversely related to auditor selection. Further, controlling for perception, audit committee members are more likely to recommend auditors with unfavorable inspection results, if a prior affiliation with management is present than if an affiliation is absent. Overall, the results indicate that audit committee members are diligent in evaluating auditors, and PCAOB inspection results are useful. The results of this study contribute to the audit committee effectiveness and PCAOB literature. / by Veena Looknanan-Brown. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-Florida Atlantic University, 2011. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Si l’on considère que le rôle des actionnaires varie dans un continuum qui s’étend de la passivité à l’une des extrémités jusqu’au contrôle total de la société dans laquelle ils ont investi, on peut affirmer que si, à une certaine époque, les investisseurs institutionnels ont privilégié une certaine forme d’apathie rationnelle, cette réalité a évolué. Loins d’avoir atteint l’autre extrémité du spectre, on doit néanmoins constater que désormais, les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants doivent faire face à un nombre limité d’actionnaires institutionnels qui se connaissent et détiennent une part importante des titres d’une société. Malgré la présence d’obstacles légaux et organisationnels qui entravent toujours aujourd’hui l’exercice des droits des actionnaires, il semble que les interventions des investisseurs institutionnels aient transcendé la règle de la majorité en ayant recours à des moyens inusités pour diminuer les risques d’opportunisme au sein des sociétés ouvertes. En effet, si l’activisme des investisseurs institutionnels est un phénomène complexe qui prend des formes multiples souvent opaques et qui est difficile à cerner avec précision, il est néanmoins possible d’affirmer que ce mécanisme de gouvernance joue un rôle des plus importants en contribuant à limiter les coûts d’agence découlant de l’extraction de bénéfices privés par les dirigeants et les actionnaires dominants. En effet, au Canada, où la structure de propriété d’une majorité de sociétés est concentrée, l’activisme actionnarial permet de faire contrepoids au vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire des dirigeants ainsi qu’à l’influence qu’exercent les actionnaires dominants afin d’assurer une certaine forme de protection aux droits des actionnaires minoritaires. / If the role of shareholders is regarded as varying along a spectrum ranging from passivity to control of the company in which they have invested, it is safe to say that whereas institutional investors have exhibited a form of rational apathy in the past, this situation has changed significantly in recent years. Although institutional investors are still far from reaching the other end of the spectrum, it is clear that senior management and controlling shareholders are now faced with a limited number of institutional shareholders who know each other and who hold a significant share of the company's stock. In spite of the legal and organizational barriers that still impede the ability of shareholders to exercise their rights, it appears that the actions of institutional investors have transcended majority rule by resorting to unusual ways of reducing the risk of opportunism within publicly held Canadian companies. While the activism of institutional investors is a complex phenomenon embodying various forms which are often opaque and difficult to fully grasp, it can nevertheless be said that this mechanism of governance plays a critical role in slimming down agency costs arising from the realization of private benefits by managers and controlling shareholders. Indeed, in Canada, where most companies have a concentrated ownership structure, shareholder activism can serve as a counterbalance to the broad discretionary powers of company leaders and the influence of controlling shareholders, thus constituting a certain measure of protection for the rights of minority shareholders.

Les enjeux de la quasi-régie (traduction française du « contrat « in house » ») sont multiples car elle constitue avant tout une dérogation aux règles de passation des contrats publics. Elle est de ce fait entièrement conditionnée par cette caractéristique et repose sur une combinaison particulière entre plusieurs modalités liées au fonctionnement des prestataires intégrés et aux relations qu’ils entretiennent avec leurs détenteurs. Seules les situations qui ne sont pas susceptibles de porter atteinte au bon fonctionnement du marché peuvent donc être qualifiées de mécanismes interorganiques. La quasi-régie est ainsi clairement distincte d’autres notions, telles les associations transparentes ou les montages artificiels, et constitue une véritable construction juridique légitime que les acteurs du secteur peuvent manier. Sa malléabilité est toutefois révélée par l’étude des modes d’intervention multiples avec lesquels elle est compatible en France : la société publique locale n’est par exemple qu’un moyen parmi d’autres de la mettre en oeuvre. Cette flexibilité est confirmée par le fait que les disciplines financière et fiscale françaises ne se saisissent pas de ce mécanisme, de telle sorte que la quasi-régie ne constitue pas un mode de gestion intermédiaire entre régie et externalisation. La qualité de contrat spécial, plus précisément celle de « contrat interorganique », semble toutefois pouvoir lui être attribuée car la quasi-régie repose sur une combinaison de circonstances contractuelles et institutionnelles spécifiques qui impliquent avant tout des modalités particulières en termes de passation, sans pour autant exclure certaines singularités en matière d’exécution. / “In-house providing procurements” concern contracts awarded by contracting authorities without application of the procedures laid down in european secondary law. They thus have to be first considered as a derogation, which reveals their stakes but also the way they’ve been shaped. To make sure that it would’nt be used to abuse european law, european institutions have paid special attention to in-house operation’s conditions. In-house contracting parties have to prove the existence of particular conditions relating to the functioning of the contractor and its relations with its holders. Through those characteristics lies the particularity of in-house providing, which can be distinguished from other notions, such as “transparent associations” or “artificial schemes”. This is also a way to affirm in-house procurements’ legitimacy and to make it a real legal construction. This naturally leads to its qualification. Studying its manifestations in french public law makes clear that this construction is not complete. In-house contractor may take many legal forms, which brings to light in-house providing’s flexibility. It also prevents financial and fiscal french law to seize this derogation. In house-contracts can’t therefore be described as a an intermediary governance mode, between outsourcing and internal governance (in-house operations stricto sensu). Nevertheless, in-house providing procurements embody a type of special contracts, “les contrats interorganiques”, which implies particular rules relating to their passation and admits a certain particularity concerning their execution.