Abstract Maintenance makes machine life long more and gets no loss about a chain reaction on part broken. Repair a part that has high complex and is important. It need engineer experience to decide its maintenance process plan. For turbine blade maintenance style that has various type and a small quantity. Different broken feature have different maintenance process in the maintenance process planning stage. This thesis creates a system for this property maintenance on the process planning system on the Maintenance of turbine blades. Analyzing blade broken feature and classifying the feature to bring up a case-based reasoning and fuzzy set operation that usually see in expert systems. It uses case-based databases to save engineer experiences and analysis to decide critical maintenance process factors. The critical factors can help find out similarity case and modulate a newer case. It needs to create a proto-type system for these purposes. The first, classifying turbine blades broken feature and coding the repair process for different maintenances. The second, using fuzzy set language to determine case¡¦s similarity and finding out algorithm. Integrating product data management system and the system. The research uses a company as case study to test and verify the proto-type system.

Abstract The market environment of Mobile Phone Industry has had rapid change in the past decade. It is almost same important to gain the loyalty of existing customers as to gain the new customers in the current competitive environment. For many companies in this industry, Customer Relationship Management has been become a significant issue in their strategies. This research is based on the concept of Customer Relationship Management. The purposes of this research are to probe the performance of Customer Retention Programs and the churn reason in mobile phone industry. The research datum were collected from TAT Corp.(TransAsia Telecommunications) including Customer Retention Programs as ¡§Second Honeymoon Program¡¨, ¡§New Second Honeymoon Program¡¨ and ¡§Talking Reward Program¡¨ and a survey from the customers who had been deactivated in February and March of the year 2002. The analysis of the retention programs show significantly relevant on AGE, GENDER, CUSTOMER LEVELS, TENURE, and RATE PLAN factors. The inspection results of survey datum in the churn reasons are explained individually. The suggestions are made after discussing the policies and strategies of TAT Corp.

<p>This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the legal position regarding abuse of a dominant position and particularly tying practices. The practice is central within European competition law and has been highly discussed in literature recently. In Article 102 TFEU it is explicitly stated that supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such contracts, shall be considered as a way of abusing a position of strength. Although the method is often reasonable and very common within many business areas, it might be pursued as a tactic of excluding competition. The General Court’s decision in <em>Microsoft </em>led to some confusion as regards to the European approach towards tying practices. Prior to that judgment, the EU Courts appeared quite negative to the practice and seemed determined that the practice was in fact anticompetitive. For an example, in <em>Hilti </em>the Court found it sufficient that the company had deprived its costumers of a choice. The effects on competition were not analyzed in great detail and in most cases the EU Courts fined the undertaking involved in such business methods. However, in <em>Microsoft </em>the General Court took a new approach and focused on the actual effects that followed from the practice. Many argues that European competition law has moved from a <em>per se </em>approach to a <em>rule of reason</em> approach. In my opinion however, it seems relatively unclear whether or not this new approach shall apply to all versions of tying or if it was applied due to the certain circumstances involved in <em>Microsoft</em>. The tying practice involved a form of technical tying, i.e. an integration of two distinctive products. Cases prior to <em>Microsoft </em>mostly concerned a form of contractual tying and were treated very differently by the EU Courts. My opinion on the matter is therefore that it is not possible to declare a clear legal position regarding the practice of tying. There is a need for new judgments and official guidelines since the current situation deprives companies of legal security as concerns the practice of tying within European competition law.</p>

A common conceptual framework depicts morality as an alien force commanding us from on high; in contrast, this dissertation presents a picture of morality that is deeply social. It is not an abstract morality that commands us, but we who place demands on each other. On this picture, we are equal participants in morality, rather than mere subjects of morality. This participation has fundamentally important implications for the shape and structure of morality; or so this dissertation argues. By way of introducing the work as a whole, I will here note some of the key facets of the social nature of morality that the dissertation develops. Our participation is primarily as enforcers, rather than followers, of morality. We hold people accountable to moral requirements through emotional responses like resentment, as well as actions and relations that follow from that attitude. As I argue, these emotions carry an important representational content, displaying the other person as having shown ill will. This ill will can be best understood as a disregard for relevant moral considerations that are available to the resented agent. Despite the negative tone of resentment, it is an aspect of being in community with each other. Someone who can be resented is a co-member of a community with us upon whom we can make demands and who can make demands upon us. We may not share community with some people regarding some issues, such as across religious divides, while still seeing them as people with whom we share at least some form of community, as within the system of basic liberal rights. There are people, as I discuss, who fail to be eligible for responsibility to even basic demands. With such people we have no community; they are to us like forces of nature, and the most dangerous of them are for us monsters. Though many endorse conceptions of community focused on shared experiences or values, I argue that such a notion of community is not appropriate for modern, diverse societies. In modern, particularly liberal, societies, we cannot expect to share religion, occupation, views of the good life, or the like, so these cannot constitute community among the members of society. A shared moral framework, however, provides a promising conception of community for diverse societies like our own. Our shared morality may thus be among the most important forms of community we can have on the large scale of modern society. That same diversity, however, raises problems for a shared morality. As I argue, our interpersonal moral demands will have to be justified to each other, given our different perspectives, and such justification may be difficult. I address both the nature of this interpersonal justification, as well as the difficulties of achieving it, within this dissertation. This dissertation shows that morality is social in yet another way. Focusing on justice, as a central part of the morality, I argue that the content of the principles to which we hold each other accountable itself emerges from our social institutions as those develop over time through our interactions. The diverse members of society must be able to share an understanding of their mutual expectations, but such members tend to disagree about how to interpret and apply moral values and principles. Social institutions, such as legal systems with courts to interpret law, can provide a common interpretation of expectations. If the rules that emerge from these institutions are justified to the members, then those rules may constitute justice within that society. This dissertation, then, presents a picture of morality that is social through and through. Morality is constructed within our social institutions, enforced interpersonally, restricted to what is mutually justified to society’s members, and ultimately constitutes one of our primary forms of community.

Sammanfattning Inom den direkta beskattningens område har medlemstaterna i den Europeiska Unionen till stor del behållit sin behörighet men ska likväl beakta EU-rätten vid utövandet av denna behörighet. EU-rätten har dock fått ett allt större inflytande på den direkta beskattningens område genom bestämmelserna om den fria rörligheten och etableringsfriheten som till viss del begränsar medlemsstaternas behörighet. Medlemsstaterna måste rättfärdiga en nationell bestämmelse som är i konflikt med etableringsfriheten för att få tillämpa den och ofta åberopas den principiellt accepterade rättfärdigandegrunden förhindra skatteflykt. Det är dock inte ovanligt att nationella bestämmelser anses oförenliga med etableringsfriheten om de syftar till att förhindra förlust av skatteintäkter. Att förhindra förlust av skatteintäkter är inte en accepterad rättfärdigandegrund då den anses vara grundad på rent ekonomiska intressen och således inte utgör ett tvingande hänsyn till allmänintresset. En medlemsstat vars nationella bestämmelse ämnar förhindra skatteflykt åsyftar dock högst sannolikt att indirekt förhindra att de skatteintäkter hänförbara till medlemsstaten går förlorade vilket tyder på att även denna rättfärdigandegrund kan anses grundad i ett ekonomiskt intresse från medlemstaterna. Frågan uppkommer därför om det finns en tydlig gränsdragning mellan dessa två rättfärdigandegrunder. Innebörden av förhindra förlust av skatteintäkter måste anses inrymmas i medlemsstaternas ändamål med att söka förhindra skatteflykt. Dessa två rättfärdigandegrunder har således samma syfte och därför kan uppdelningen av dessa inte anses helt självklar. Gränsdragningen mellan dessa rättfärdigandegrunder anses således inte tillräckligt tydlig för att kunna hävda att förutsebarhet de facto föreligger för medlemsstaterna vid tillämpningen av respektive rättfärdigandegrund. / Abstract The Member States in the European Union have kept their authority within the area of direct taxation but must still observe Community law when exercising this authority. However, Community law has received a major influence on the area of direct taxation through the free movement provisions and the freedom of establishment, which limits the authority of the Member States. If a national measure restricts or hinders the freedom of establishment, the Member States must justify the measure in order to be able to apply it and the prevention of tax avoidance is an often referred ground of justification that is accepted in principle. It is however not unusual that a national measure is considered in breach with the freedom of establishment if it refers to the prevention of loss of tax revenue. The loss of tax revenue is not an accepted ground of justification as it is considered to be based on merely economic interests and thus not regarded as a matter of overriding general interest. A Member State whose national measure aims at preventing tax avoidance, most likely also aims to prevent that tax revenues derived from the Member State is not deprived from it. This indicates that prevention of tax avoidance also is based on an economic interest which arise the question whether or not there is a distinct differentiation between these grounds of justification. The meaning of the loss of tax revenue is considered to be included in the objective of the Member States when they seek to prevent tax avoidance. Accordingly, these two grounds of justification have the same purpose and the separation between them can therefore not be considered as obvious. The differentiation between these grounds of justification is hence not obvious enough to be able to claim that predictability is at hand for the Member States when applying concerned ground of justification.

This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the legal position regarding abuse of a dominant position and particularly tying practices. The practice is central within European competition law and has been highly discussed in literature recently. In Article 102 TFEU it is explicitly stated that supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such contracts, shall be considered as a way of abusing a position of strength. Although the method is often reasonable and very common within many business areas, it might be pursued as a tactic of excluding competition. The General Court’s decision in Microsoft led to some confusion as regards to the European approach towards tying practices. Prior to that judgment, the EU Courts appeared quite negative to the practice and seemed determined that the practice was in fact anticompetitive. For an example, in Hilti the Court found it sufficient that the company had deprived its costumers of a choice. The effects on competition were not analyzed in great detail and in most cases the EU Courts fined the undertaking involved in such business methods. However, in Microsoft the General Court took a new approach and focused on the actual effects that followed from the practice. Many argues that European competition law has moved from a per se approach to a rule of reason approach. In my opinion however, it seems relatively unclear whether or not this new approach shall apply to all versions of tying or if it was applied due to the certain circumstances involved in Microsoft. The tying practice involved a form of technical tying, i.e. an integration of two distinctive products. Cases prior to Microsoft mostly concerned a form of contractual tying and were treated very differently by the EU Courts. My opinion on the matter is therefore that it is not possible to declare a clear legal position regarding the practice of tying. There is a need for new judgments and official guidelines since the current situation deprives companies of legal security as concerns the practice of tying within European competition law.

In this study, the relationship between medical thought and philosophy is investigated through the works of the famous Islamic thinker, Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Zakariya al-Razi (ca. 250-323/864-935). In one of the texts we shall be examining Razi thought that he could resolve the problem of the world's creation through allegory. Razi's interlocuter was concerned to defend the idea of epistemological "revelation." Although Razi agrees that the Intellect was sent by the Creator, he insists that this was done primarily for the benefit of the "self," which had become entangled in "material confusion." He is particularly concerned to counter the authoritarian implications of his opponent's epistemological position, which appears to emphasize doctrinal truth at the expense of all other considerations. These considerations are taken up by Razi in another work, the Kitab al-tibb al-ruhani. There, he draws on the science of medical treatment for application in ethics, but with some interesting implications for the problem of knowledge. The real object must be to bring man to his proper destination, and in this Razi's views coincide with the early mystical tradition in Islam, from al-Hujwiri to al-Ghazzali, where the problem essentially consists of existential realization rather than a merely abstract or intellectual process.

This paper takes as its starting point the fact of reasonable pluralism and defends political liberalism as the best means of accommodating diversity and a plurality of different conceptions of the good. I then ask what is needed for a social order characterized by diversity and a multiplicity of different ways of life to come into existence and perpetuate itself over time. First, I defend political liberalism and argue that the creation of a society that is accommodating of diversity requires that the state be mindful of the spillover effects between public institutions and the private lives of citizens. Second, I argue that the individuals living in such a society must adopt certain virtues, both publicly as well as privately. I achieve this by presenting an account of the virtues of citizens in a political liberal society. Third, I draw out the implications of having a society characterized by reasonable pluralism and many different conceptions of the good, by arguing that such a society should avoid adopting too expansive a role, since an overly ambitious conception of social justice risks stifling the diversity a political liberal society is trying to protect. I conclude with some general remarks about the current state of liberal theorizing and the need for liberal theorists to provide an account of liberalism that includes more than one’s conception of distributive justice and legitimate state coercion. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2008-09-22 21:48:39.206

This thesis is an examination of the role of reason in the thought of the left-leaning writer, publisher, editor and journalist Leonard Woolf. Examining Woolf’s response to political radicalization and impending international conflict between 1930 and 1940, this discussion contends that Woolf sought to emphasise human thought, reason and individual psychology as a response to interwar anxieties about cultural crisis. / Thesis (Master, History) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-09 13:03:11.911

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