Relying mainly on R. B. Pippin’s and D. Moggach’s interpretative works on Kant and Hegel, the thesis tackles the problem of the reception of Kant by Hegel. It does so by looking into the impact of Kant’s first critique on the Preface, the Introduction and the first part of the section Self-consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Three Kantian conditions for there to be freedom are identified and shown to be reinterpreted by Hegel in a continuist perspective. These three conditions are spontaneity, reflectivity and negativity which propels and retains the free Kantian subject in the Hegelian becoming of reality.

In this thesis, I defend John Rawls’s assertion that political liberalism does not use the concept of truth. I respond to objections from Joshua Cohen and David Estlund. I argue that Cohen fails to show that public reason needs a minimalist conception of truth, since individuals with a range of conceptions of moral truth can meet the requirements of public reason. I dispute Estlund’s argument that the liberal principle of legitimacy is merely insular. Estlund assumes that the claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy is reasonable is no different than the claim that the principle is acceptable to reasonable persons. I argue that this assumption is incorrect, and that therefore the liberal principle of legitimacy is justifiable on the grounds that it is reasonable. I argue that political liberals need not worry that doing without the concept of truth will undermine the semantic coherence or objectivity of political liberalism.

This essay explores the issue of organizing mathematics education by means of syllogism. Two aspects turn out to be particularly significant. One is the syllogistic analysis while the other is the cunning of reason. Thus the exploration is directed towards gathering evidence of their existence and showing by examples their usefulness within mathematics education. The syllogistic analysis and the cunning of reason shed also new light on Chevallard's theory of didactic transposition. According to the latter, each piece of mathematical knowledge used inside school is a didactic transposition of some other knowledge produced outside school, but the theory itself does not indicate any way of transposing, and this empty space can be filled with the former. A weak prototype of syllogism considered here is Freudenthal's change of perspective. Some of the major difficulties in mathematics learning are connected with the inability of performing change of perspective. Consequently, to ease the difficulties becomes a significant issue in mathematics teaching. The syllogistic analysis and the cunning of reason developed in this essay are the contributions to the said issue.

Idamari Törnberg & Marcus Tillberg (2011). Nu gäller det! Varför slutar då ungdomar spela ishockey? – En kvantitativ enkätstudie om fortsatt eller avslutande ishockeykarriär efter uttagningarna till distriktsförbundslag i Västerbottens län. (Now is the time! Why do teenagers stop playing ice hockey? – A quantitative survey study about continued or ending ice hockey career after tryout to Team Västerbotten) Bachelor Essay in Swedish. Umeå: Umeå University, Department of education. Abstract This Bachelors thesis is a survey study on why talented teenagers in the county of Västerbotten, Sweden dropout of, or proceed the sport ice hockey. The study was made in collaboration with the ice hockey association of Västerbotten to find out how many of the boys born in 1993 and 1995 that has been on tryout for team Västerbotten that quits and continues and the reason for that. A survey was sent out to 138 of the teenagers that had been on these tryouts to examine the reasons and opinions on dropouts and what action that needs to be made to prevent this. The response rate was 57 % and a possible reason for that can be that they who didn’t respond are dropouts. It turned out that most of the respondents is still playing ice hockey, just a few had dropped out and the biggest reason is the fact that ice hockey is fun no matter if they made the team or not. Furthermore the study showed that the there isn’t just one reason to quit or continue, it’ a mix of reasons.

I do through this thesis aim to reflect upon the reasonableness to why one should write a thesis. I do this by sharing with you four different parts. The first part is that of foragers and our common human heritage. The second one is set in the middle ages and the foundation of universities. In the third part the modern research university is examined whilst the fourth part aims to provide a sensible understanding of today. I do look at the reasonableness to undergo the work for a thesis in all of these parts whilst proposing an idea concerning human confusion and our need for belonging which leads us to believe in an imperative prerogative (IP) which may be said to be the context in which we find ourselves.The IP would further dictate what knowledge is and is not, which would highly relate to the reasonableness of conducting a thesis. In an IP there are various stories, and one of them is that of education and writing a thesis. I ask of you as a reader to reflect upon and view our current higher educational system in a historical perspective. I, thus, aim not to provide you with innovative new knowledge in business but rather to reflect upon our current educational system in our society, which I would argue, is taken over by the businesses and its rules and norms.

The purpose of this study was to describe and analyse a group of young adults’ childhood experiences of the intervention "contact family". The used methods were qualitative interviews and a standardised formulary with life questions, to strengthen the interviews and to compare data. The theoretical frame was taken from Bronfenbrenner’s child development theory and Antonovsky’s salutogenic perspective, which we supplemented with Hilchen Sommerschild’s theory about the "conditions of control". The results showed that all of the interviewed clients were positive to the intervention. They got to do things with their contact families that they did not do at home – the opportunity to an environmental change, the feeling of appreciation and a better every-day life with new perspectives. Some felt that it was negative that their contact families lived on the country side, that the contact family itself had problems of their own, and that it was hard to adapt to the new roles of the family. The conclusion was that the intervention of the contact families mainly was positive and seemed to be significant for the clients.

<p>Traditional approaches to the empirical research of human action, rational choice theory dominant amongst them, have implicitly adopted philosophical pre-suppositions about human action that are untenable and in need of correction. In this project, I seek to both (a) diagnose these problems by showing that rational choice theory is insufficiently attentive to both the question of what agents are and of what kind of world they occupy, and (b) overcome these problems by offering a conception of practical reason that is more "realistic" in that it incorporates a philosophically convincing account of world and of the practical agent's relation with it. To that end, I develop a conception of praxis that is centered on the idea that practical agents act within and toward practical horizons rather than exercising a faculty of choice within stable decision spaces.</p> / Dissertation

<p>In this dissertation, I develop a political liberal ethics of citizenship that reconciles conflicting religious and civic obligations concerning political participation and deliberation--a liberal-democratic ethics of citizenship that is compatible with religious integrity. I begin by canvassing the current state of the debate between political liberals and their religious critics, engaging Rawls's Political Liberalism and the various religious objections Nicholas Wolterstorff, Christopher Eberle, Robert George, John Finnis, Paul Weithman, Jeffrey Stout, and Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier develop (Chapter One). I then critically evaluate political liberalism's requirements of citizens in light of the religious objections and the religious objections in light of political liberal norms of reciprocity, concluding that some religious citizens have legitimate complaints against citizenship requirements that forbid citizens from offering religious arguments alone in public political discussions (Chapter Two). Next, I propose an alternative set of guidelines for public political discussions in constitutional democracies, the phased account of democratic decision-making, that, I argue, addresses the religious citizens' legitimate complaints without undermining a constitutional democracy's legitimacy or commitment to public justification (Chapter Three). Then, I argue that a religious practice of political engagement I call prophetic witnessing is compatible with the phased account, can serve as a canonical model to guide religious citizens' political participation, and can help religious citizens navigate the substantive conflicts between their religious and civic obligations that remain possible even in a society that follows the phased account (Chapter Four). Finally, I conclude by imagining three different democracies, each adhering to a different set of guidelines for public political discussions, in order to argue for the benefit of adopting norms that balance citizens' obligations to govern themselves legitimately with citizens' ability to integrate their deepest moral and religious commitments and their public, political argument and advocacy.</p> / Dissertation

This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume&#039 / s philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume&rsquo / s &ldquo / science of man&rdquo / attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demonstrates that in doing so, Hume actually resorts to reason. Further, certain inconsistencies in Hume&rsquo / s argument can only be resolved by recourse to metaphysics. To make this clear I examine how the passions that Hume puts forward as the basis of human nature cause sympathy and build a sense of morality. Since the most basic feature of human nature exists within the concept of &ldquo / being-human&rdquo / , the necessity of metaphysical and ontological explanations will be shown. Hume&rsquo / s position on the goodness or wickedness of human nature is examined. As a result, the purpose of this research is to show that it is not possible to isolate ethics from metaphysical elements by constructing a science based on Newtonian methods.

My thesis aims to delve into Immanuel Kant&rsquo / s formulation of the faculty of imagination in his Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of the Power of Judgment. In relation to the First Critique, it specifically concerns the relation of the &ldquo / mysterious&rdquo / function of imagination to the object and its representation as one of the fundamental steps of the emergence or production of theoretical knowledge. As regards the Third Critique, it scrutinizes the relation of imagination to reflective, as opposed to determinative, judgment and seeks to specify its role in aesthetic appreciation and artistic creativity. The thesis first provides us with a background to Kant&rsquo / s philosophy, delineating the specific issues at hand and briefly introducing important Kantian fundaments, along with imagination, by making use of secondary literature. It then views imagination as has been theorized throughout the history of philosophy up until the age of Enlightenment and examines Kant&rsquo / s two Critiques with a focus on imagination. Thirdly, it evaluates the aspects of Kantian imagination through the works of scholars whose differing interpretations are compared and disputed. Taking mainly the discussions of the previous chapter into account, the conclusion chapter constitutes my own interpretation of the disputes and possible solutions related to the imagination within the broader frame of Kantian philosophy.