Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1935. / Vita. Bibliography: p. [157].

Original publication from author's Habilitationsschrift--Zürich, 1976. / Translation of Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins. Includes bibliographical references (p. [295]-297) and indexes.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-265).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Miami University, Dept. of English, 2004. / Title from second page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-104).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-122).

Tendo em vista o pluralismo religioso e a importância política que as tradições religiosas e as comunidades de fé assumiram nos últimos anos, essa dissertação se dedica ao estudo do conceito moderno de tolerância a partir da interpretação pós-secular de Jürgen Habermas, a qual toma como base a concepção enunciada por Rainer Forst. Tal conceito tem papel de destaque na formação deliberativa da vontade de cidadãos que desejam reconhecer-se como iguais em sociedades marcadas por uma profunda diversidade cultural. O desafio foi, diante do multiculturalismo das sociedades modernas pluralizadas e secularizadas, identificar um procedimento capaz de atender à exigência que se impõe com o fato do pluralismo - um conceito de justiça eticamente neutro - sem, contudo, que isto se desse à custa do desrespeito às minorias religiosas e culturais. A reflexão acerca da tolerância e das dificuldades de sua realização nas sociedades contemporâneas tomou, em grande parte do estudo, o ponto de vista da diversidade religiosa e do crescente papel que a religião desempenha na esfera pública. / Considering the religious pluralism and the political significance that religious traditions and communities of faith have taken recently, the subject of this dissertation is the modern concept of toleration, starting from the post-secular perspective of Jürgen Habermas, which takes as its basis the conception enunciated by Rainer Forst. Such a concept plays a major role in the deliberative will-formation of citizens who wish to recognize themselves as equals in societies characterized by a deep cultural diversity. The challenge has been, in face of the multiculturalism of secular and pluralized modern societies, to identify a procedure capable of meeting the requirement that is imposed by the fact of pluralism - an ethically neutral concept of justice - without, however, disregarding religious and cultural minorities interests. The reflection on toleration took, most of the time, the point of view of the religious diversity and of the increasing role played by religion in the public sphere.

[pt] É no contexto da proposta kantiana para a prática da moralidade que a tese está centrada. Dentro desse contexto, o foco principal é o problema da educação, pois a educação para a moralidade tem pressupostos e requer determinadas práticas, que são melhor compreendidas se levamos em conta o âmbito do sistema kantiano. De acordo com Kant, a razão humana cumpre não só uma função teórica, voltada para o conhecimento da natureza, mas também uma função prática, voltada para ideia de liberdade. Isso faz com que a questão da moralidade e da educação tenham seu cerne na ideia de liberdade. Em função dessa ideia, segundo Kant, a razão é capaz de determinar a vontade e o agir do ser humano, possibilitando um agir autônomo. É com vistas à constituição de sujeitos autônomos que a tarefa da educação moral se faz necessária, tarefa que requer um longo caminho de formação do caráter e do aprendizado pela liberdade, aprendizado cujos pressupostos residem nos princípios da razão pura, os únicos que possibilitam a moralidade. / [en] This thesis is centered on Kant s proposal for the practice of morality. In this context, the main focus is the problem of education, since education for morality has principles and requires certain practices that make better sense if we take into consideration the realm of Kant s system. According to Kant, the human reason fulfills not only a theoretical function, aimed at the knowledge of nature, but also a practical function, aimed at the idea of freedom. Therefore, the question of morality and education has its roots in the idea of freedom. Reason is capable of determining the will and the actions of human beings, making an autonomous action possible. Aiming at the constitution of autonomous subjects, the task of moral education is necessary, and it requires a long path of formation of character and learning through freedom. The foundations of this learning reside in the principles of pure reason, the only ones to make morality possible.

This research aims to offer an original reconstruction of Aristotle’s psychology of music that explains his views on the relation between instrumental music and emotions. I argue that, contrary to the relevant scholarship, for Aristotle instrumental music cannot convey emotions to the listener. What instrumental music does, I claim, is to cause an objectless mood or disposition (διάθεσις) that “prepares the way” (προοδοποιεῖν) for the emotions. Most interpreters of Politics VIII (1340a12-29) argue that for Aristotle a piece of instrumental music would be able to represent emotions and the listener would be moved to the same emotion by a sort of sympathetic contagion. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of emotions. For Aristotle a necessary condition for the emotions is that those experiencing them “judge” (κρίνειν) a situation based on their beliefs. If it is accepted that there is such a thing as an emotional contagion through music, then the cognitive theory of emotion presented by Aristotle is at risk since no such a judgment would be required. The thesis is presented in three chapters. In chapter one the cognitive elements that give rise to emotions are analysed. The nature of the term παθή is explored as well as the difference between its use as a ‘general affection’ and its use as the mental process that we now call ‘emotion.’ In this latter sense the emotions are mental states directed to an object on which a judgment is made and that are accompanied by pain or pleasure. The nature of the emotional judgment is investigated and the possibility of its existence in non-rational animals is explored. It is concluded that, even if we accept emotions in animals, intentionality and predication of an object are necessary conditions for the existence of emotions. In the second chapter, I discuss two instances where it seems Aristotle makes an exception to the judgment as necessary condition for the emotions. First, emotions aroused by the perception of signs of emotions, like the mere voice of the orator (Rhet. 1408a16-26) and the spectacle in the theatre (Poet. 1453b1-10) and second, emotions aroused by bodily changes (De an. 403a25). I argue that in Aristotle’s view in both cases the factors at work (voice, sight, bodily condition) only facilitate the arousal of emotions, but the actual arousal requires an additional narrative context that supplies grounds for the judgment that in turn gives rise to the emotion in question. In the first case the orator’s voice and the theatre’s spectacle work just as a condiment (ἥδυσμα) that helps to intensify (συναπεργάζεσθαι) the object of judgment (Pol. 1340b17; Poet. 1449b25; 1450b16; Rhet. 1386a31). Our emotional response has as its object their story, not the elements that decorate it. In the second case, the bodily changes are the material constituents of emotions; facilitate the generation of emotions: hotness around the heart, for example, makes the subject prone to anger; but the emotion of anger appears only after a particular situation is evaluated by the mind. In the third chapter, I turn to the specific case of music. From an exegesis of Pol. 1340a12-29, I argue that the emotions ostensibly transmitted by music (μουσική) to the listener are due to the lyrics of the songs (μέλη), not to the instrumental music itself. Therefore the question about the nature of the emotional effect of pure instrumental music remains open. My answer to this question is based on the analysis of the causal mechanism by means of which instrumental music affects the listener. Aristotle’s physiology reveals the physical impact of sound on the sense of hearing, and from there to the heart, the first sensorium. Bodily changes in the organ create an objectless disposition (διάθεσις) in the listener by relaxing or agitating his body, without providing any content for the mind besides the perception of the sound. Exciting or relaxing the heart by means of music would leave the listener in the disposition of readiness to react emotionally, but the emotion would appear only once an intentional object, i.e., the content of the emotion, is presented and evaluated by the mind. Finally, I show the relevance of my interpretation of these dispositions to understanding the role of emotions in the education of character in the Politics. Aristotle proposes to use only a certain type of music in his educational curriculum, not one too relaxed or too tense, but a middle between them that puts the students in a stable and noble disposition that would, in turn, lead them to be guided by reason instead of their emotions.

Intitulée : «La connaissance de soi, dans la perspective de Socrate», cette thèse a pour but d’étudier les caractéristiques de la démarche de Socrate, en ce qui concerne la connaissance de soi et son importance. La mise en œuvre de la vie humaine, telle qu’elle mérite d’être vécue, au sens socratique, est l’objectif indispensable de cet engagement philosophico-spirituel, qui consiste à rendre à l’homme, l’identité existentielle qui lui est essentiellement propre. C’est donc à la recherche de cette identité concrète, que Socrate a toujours invité ses interlocuteurs, et invite encore les lecteurs, à faire usage de leur intellect, afin de découvrir la partie la plus divine de leur âme. La question de la connaissance de soi, dans la perspective de Socrate relève plus précisément de la connaissance de l’âme, considérée comme le véritable soi, portant en elle l’empreinte divine. Par conséquent, se connaître soi-même vise la contemplation de cette particularité propre à l’homme, laquelle le conduit à son excellence. L’aspect subjectif de cette entreprise rationnelle, garantit totalement l’indépendance de l’individu, à la recherche de lui-même, lui permettant également d’acquérir les connaissances qui résident en lui, selon la théorie de la réminiscence. D’où la nécessité de s’appliquer à cette tâche essentielle de l’existence humaine, afin de lui donner un véritable sens humain. La connaissance de l’intelligible―faisant partie intégrante de sa recherche―, cet éveilleur de l’esprit a mis en œuvre, d’une manière extraordinaire, les outils essentiels de sa philosophie pratique, à savoir : la dialectique, la réfutation et la maïeutique, portées par son Amour, en vue de faire sortir ses semblables de leur caverne d’ignorance, en les invitant à se diriger vers le monde intelligible. Il ne s’agit donc pas de chercher un idéal, dans l’espoir de de s’y conformer, ce qui met en péril la liberté du sujet, mais de s’accomplir le plus concrètement, le plus parfaitement possible, comme un être humain excellemment achevé. C’est dans ce contexte précis, que la connaissance de soi, dans la perspective de Socrate, sera prise comme le modèle par excellence de cet accomplissement. / Entitled “Self-khowledge, from the perspective of Socrates” this thesis intends to examine fundamental characteristics of the Socrates’ authentic approach to self-knowledge, and the utmost importance of it. Implementation of human life, as it deserves to be lived, in the Socratic sense of the word, is the essential purpose of this philosophical and spiritual commitment, which aims at giving back to the human being the ontological identity, of his own by essence. Therefore, Socrates always invited his interlocutors, and still now invites his readers, to search for this concrete identification, and to use their intellect in order to discover the most divine part of their soul. The self-knowledge problem in the Socrates’ perspective is questioned here, for it precisely comes from the soul knowledge, considered as the genuine one-self, bearing in it the heavenly imprint. Therefore, “to know one-self“ aims at contemplating the divine part of our one-self, which leads the man to his excellence, as such he is destined to become. The subjective aspect of this rational enterprise gives a guarantee of total independence to the individual seeking his one-self. It also allows him to acquire the knowledge that lies in him according to the “reminiscence theory, “hence the necessity for him is to take great care of this essential task of a human life, in order to give it a real human significance. To know what is intelligible, being an integral part of his research, “He who awakened the mind“developed in a wonderful manner essential tools of his practical philosophy which are: dialectics, refutation, maieutic, as supported by his Love, intending to let his fellow-men to get out of their “cave“ of ignorance, by inducing them to head for the intelligible world. It does not mean to seek an ideal with the hope to look like it, which unquestionably puts at risk the individual’s freedom, but to find out one’s own fulfilment in the most possible concrete and perfect way as an excellently accomplished human being. In this very context, self-knowledge, such as Socrates meant it, will be considered as the pre-eminent model of this accomplishment.

O presente trabalho, cujo objeto visa tematizar o unilateralismo cientificista que vigora no ensino universitário, enseja articular propostas que oportunizem a recuperação do caráter crítico-reflexivo da formação cientifica do estudante de graduação, especialmente nas áreas tecnológicas. Por isso, como prelúdio da pesquisa, articulamos inicialmente, em formato amplo, o problema da autonomização das ciências, a transformação da filosofia e das instituições que, contaminadas pelo teor positivista das teorias científicas, passaram a operar a formação humana. A formulação deste problema teve a intenção de erguer os alvos na direção dos quais vai articular-se a crítica filosófica, especialmente aquela articulada pela Escola de Frankfurt, da qual o autor, cuja teoria tomamos como fio condutor desse trabalho, faz parte, na condição de expoente máximo da segunda geração. Habermas, no âmbito da razão comunicativa, tomando como pano de fundo a tradição filosófica e sociológica, vai reconstruir a idéia de razão e racionalidade e propor a ação comunicativa como mediadora entre teoria e prática, capaz de recuperar a problematicidade nos processos de aprendizagem científica. No âmbito da ação comunicativa o mundo da vida é recuperado da tradição fenomenológica e reconstruído comunicativamente como um saber de fundo a-problemático, que opera, liquidificadamente, os mundos referenciais e suas respectivas pretensões de validade. Tal esforço tem em vista a recuperação da totalidade teórica, prática e estética da razão para contrapor ao unilateralismo cientificista, operado pelo visor estreito da razão instrumental na modernidade. Isso posto, para articular o propósito da tese, na última parte, avançamos reflexões sobre potenciais contribuições que a razão comunicativa pode trazer para jogar luz e imprimir um caráter avisado à formação especializada. Para tanto, três idéias mobilizaram o objetivo proposto: A primeira delas articula-se na busca de aportes teóricos para subsidiar nossa reflexão e pensar sobre o caráter unilateral, superficial e deficitário da razão científica, vigente na formação técnica especializada. O segundo ponto articula-se em torno da reflexão sobre as idéias de Educação e Universidade, ensejando recuperá-las intersubjetivo-discursivamente e ao mesmo tempo discutir os grandes desafios que se anunciam à formação técnica na Universidade contemporânea. Por fim, a terceira ideia engendra um duplo propósito: primeiro, propor o cultivo da razão triafásica em ambientes acadêmicos tecnologicamente formatados, o qual oportunize a formação de um cientista habilitado teoricamente a conhecer e fazer, habilitado praticamente a viver junto com os outros, bem como ser um eu autêntico, realizar-se como pessoa humana e ser feliz e, segundo, visando devolver a problematicidade à formação científica especializada, articulamos propostas de ação que, implementadas junto às Comissões de Graduação, de Pesquisa e de Extensão, poderão iluminar a formulação dos Planos Pedagógicos dos cursos e indicar caminhos para recuperar a formação teórica, ético-moral e estética do futuro cientista. / This paper, having as purpose to deal with scientificist unilateralism present in university education, tries to show suggestions to restore the critical-reflective nature of graduation courses, mainly in technological fields. To begin with, we deal with civilization crisis, sciences autonomy, and changes in philosophy and institutions which, influenced by positivist visions of scientific theories, are present in human education. The stating of this problem involves articulation with Habermas' philosophical criticism of Frankfurt School, whose theory is the heart of this paper. In the scope of communicative reason, Habermas takes philosophical tradition as a background to reconstruct the idea of reason and rationality, and proposes communicative action as a mediating category between theory and practice in order to recover problematicity in scientific learning processes. In the scope of communicative action, life world is taken from phenomenology tradition and recovered in the communicative form as a non-problematic background knowledge, which works in referent worlds and in their validating intentions. Such effort has as purpose to recover theory, practice and aesthetic of reason to oppose them to scientificist unilateralism, guided by a single vision of modern instrumental reason. Thus, to draw up the purpose of this thesis, we make reflections on potential contributions from communicative reason to highlight specialist education, as well as to make it aware of its condition. We adopted three main ideas: one of them searches for theoretical and methodological support to analyze the unilateral, superficial and defective nature of scientific reason present in specialized education. The other involves critical reflection on education and university, trying to make them re-establish their intersubjective nature, and to discuss the big challenges to technical education in contemporary University. Last, the third idea has two purposes: first, the growing of triphasic reason in technical academic contexts to provide students with habilities to know and to practice, to interact with others, to be happy and fulfilled; second, by returning problematicity to specialist scientific education to solve tensions between work-interaction, we propose actions which can be introduced to Graduation, Research and Extension Departments in order to highlight pedagogical design and show the ways to recover theoretical, ethical, moral and aesthetic education of future scientists.