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Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexandre Klock Ernzen.pdf: 1236935 bytes, checksum: 9d9094bd941f0c6a734cb61b0e9b1222 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The dissertation has as study object the Karl Popper s metaphysical programme, expressed in his thesis of the propensities as a possible solution to the modern physics schism. According to the author, the great scientists had a largely metaphysical investigation program that methodologically guided their decisions and discoveries about reality. Our dissertation investigated how Popper argues the relationship between philosophy and science, a required symbiosis to seek a possible solution to the cosmology s problem. To the author, modernity was wrong on separating philosophy from science by stating that the first could not cooperate with the second. Metaphysics, however, is the ambit that ensures scientific speculation, allows the emergence of scientific theories and hypotheses. It is up to the (physics) science the submission of theories to tests, with the intention of purifying the guesswork as possible explanations of the reality. We learn from our mistakes, and progress as our theories are refuted. In this expedient is where we can treat a cosmology, a possible explanation of the metaphysical reality with a world unity image, orderly and coherent. A metaphysical research program unites all perspectives about the world and provides objective knowledge. Science, with its investigations, seeks for the proximity to the truth while replacing its metaphysical research programs. The problem of theoretical quantum physics was the rejection against metaphysics, and, thus, consequently its research program lost the unity regarding the knowledge constituted. Popper intends, through his theory of knowledge, support his collaboration as a philosopher for science when dealing with a metaphysical program that could be perfectly complementary to the twentieth-century science. This program aims to ensure the investigative mode resumption of the great scientists from the Greeks to the present times. A united image of the world allows the objectivity of knowledge and ensures a possible key of reading to match man's freedom and the emergence of new theories, besides enabling the own reality modification by man. The author argues there is at least a genuine problem concerning all beings of reason: cosmologically understand the world and himself. Therefore every human is committed to seeking theoretical solutions to solve this problem as well as others arising from it. Popper s knowledge theory is a clear attempt to fix Kant s philosophy, treating the objective knowledge as provisional and demonstrating the fragility of science itself. You cannot erect the theoretical edifice without the metaphysics help that underlies any scientific thesis. Popper's thesis is that the science of the twentieth century, expressed in quantum theory, requires an unitary metaphysics image of the cosmos so that it is possible to overcome physics crisis. Due to the division result from the rejection to Schroedinger and Faraday s metaphysical research program and Einstein's metaphysical program, Popper introduced a metaphysical program intended to bring together all metaphysical aspects of the world in an united image, able to support the knowledge about reality and man. Emergence concept is what enables to deal with reality in a propensity way. The man s freedom related to theoretical creations and actions can only be effective if we consider the image of the universe as indeterminate. The interaction between possible worlds, the emergence of human reason and its transcendence with the language allow objective knowledge. The thesis of the propensities enables emergence of the world of knowledge as an undetermined linguistic constitution which referent is a physical reality, equally indeterminate. / A dissertação tem por objeto de estudo o programa metafísico de Karl Popper expresso em sua tese das propensões como uma possível solução ao cisma da física moderna. Segundo o autor, os grandes cientistas possuíam um programa de investigação, em grande medida metafísico, que orientava metodologicamente suas decisões e descobertas acerca da realidade. Nossa dissertação investigou como Popper argumenta a relação entre filosofia e ciência, simbiose necessária para procurar uma possível solução ao problema da Cosmologia. Para o autor, a modernidade errou ao separar a filosofia da ciência, afirmando que a primeira não poderia colaborar com a segunda. A metafísica, entretanto, é o âmbito que garante a especulação científica, permite o surgimento de hipóteses e teorias científicas. À ciência (física) cabe a submissão de teorias a testes, com a intenção de depurar as conjecturas como possíveis explicações da realidade. Aprendemos com nossos erros, e progredimos à medida que nossas teorias são refutadas. Neste expediente é que podemos tratar de uma cosmologia, uma possível explicação metafísica da realidade com uma imagem de mundo unitária, ordenada e coerente. Um programa metafísico de investigação une todas as perspectivas acerca do mundo e possibilita o conhecimento objetivo. A ciência, com suas investigações, busca proximidade da verdade enquanto substitui seus programas metafísicos de investigação. O problema dos teóricos da física quântica foi abandonar a metafísica, assim, consequentemente, seu programa de investigação perdeu a unidade relativamente aos conhecimentos que constituíram. Popper pretende, com sua teoria do conhecimento, sustentar sua colaboração como filósofo para a ciência ao tratar de um programa metafísico que pode ser perfeitamente complementar à ciência do século XX. Esse programa pretende assegurar a retomada do modo investigativo dos grandes cientistas, desde os gregos até os tempos atuais. Uma imagem unitária do mundo possibilita a objetividade do conhecimento e assegura uma possível chave de leitura para compatibilizar a liberdade do homem e a emergência de novas teorias, além de possibilitar a modificação da própria realidade pelo homem. O autor defende que há ao menos um problema genuíno que interessa a todos os seres de razão: compreender cosmologicamente o mundo e a si mesmo. Por isso, todo ser humano está comprometido em buscar soluções teóricas para a resolução deste problema, bem como outros dele decorrentes. A teoria do conhecimento de Popper é uma tentativa clara de corrigir a filosofia de Kant, ao tratar o conhecimento objetivo como provisório, bem como ao demonstrar a fragilidade da própria ciência. Não se pode erigir o edifício teórico sem o auxílio da metafísica, que subjaz a toda e qualquer tese científica. A tese de Popper é a de que a ciência do século XX, expressa na teoria dos quanta, necessita de uma imagem metafísica unitária do cosmos para que seja possível superar a crise da física. À cisão decorrente da rejeição do programa metafísico de investigação de Schroedinger e Faraday e o programa metafísico de Einstein, Popper apresentou um programa metafísico que pretendeu reunir todos os aspectos do mundo em uma imagem unitária, capaz de subsidiar o conhecimento da realidade e o homem. O conceito de emergência é o que possibilita tratar da realidade de forma propensitiva. A liberdade do homem em relação às criações teóricas e ações somente poderá ser efetiva se tivermos em conta a imagem do universo como indeterminado. A interação entre os mundos possíveis, a emergência da razão humana e sua transcendência com a linguagem permitem o conhecimento objetivo. A tese das propensões possibilita a emergência do mundo do conhecimento como constituição linguística indeterminada, cujo referente é a realidade física, igualmente indeterminada.

Numerous studies have attempted to measure scientists' influence by measuring the quantity of citations to their works. The problem with "citation counting," as it is called, is that it assumes that each listing of an author in a citation index is equal to another without bothering to explore the substantive uses of citations in the source article. The present study attempts to alleviate this problem by content analysis of citations in a limited sphere: reference to major philosophers of science by sociologists. In just over 100 sociology journals, citations to Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, Ernst Nagel, and Carl Hempel (overall, the most frequently cited philosophers of science) from 1971-1982 were randomly sampled. Each citation was classified according to the following criteria: 1) philosopher cited; 2) work cited, 3) exclusivity (whether cited with others); 4) multiplicity (number of citations by the philosopher in the same article); 5) type of article; and 6) purpose of citation. Purposes of citation included seven categories: 1) listing as relevant literature; 2) definition of a concept; 3) modification or extension of a philosopher's theory; 4) formulation of a research problem; 5) interpretation of results; 6) critical of philosopher's work; and 7) other. Analysis of these data revealed the following conclusions: 1) the major use of philosophy was the furnishing of concepts and their definitions; 2) philosophy of science played little or no role in directing research or interpreting results; 3) the use of citations differed greatly among the philosophers; 4) simple citation counting would have severely distorted the relative influences of each philosopher; and 5) the dialogue between sociology and the philosophy of science has, in the last decade, been dominated by Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions.