Thesis (M.A. (Human Rights))--Mahidol University, 2006. / LICL has E-Thesis 0018 ; please contact computer services.

Zugl.: Hildesheim, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.

Univ., Diss--Toronto. / Includes bibliographical references and index. If liberalism is a faith, what becomes of the separation of church and state? -- Pragmatism, liberalism, and the quarrel between science and religion -- Rorty's repudiation of epistemology -- Rortian irony and the "de-divinization" of liberalism -- Religion and Rawls's freestanding liberalism -- Stanley Fish and the demise of the separation of church and state -- Fish, Locke, and religious neutrality -- Reason, indifference, and the aim of religious freedom -- Appendix : a reply to Stanley Fish.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Universität Regensburg, 1997/98. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [358]-391) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Universität Regensburg, 1997/98. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [358]-391) and index.

Thesis (D. Min.)--New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 1995. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 175-183).

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 2004. / Bibliogr.: f. 120-122. Publié aussi en version électronique.

John Rawls was a political philosopher concerned with social justice, specifically the best way that society could be structured so that individual rights and duties were fairly distributed amongst everyone and division of advantages from social cooperation were optimally determined. He believed that this conception of justice rested in principles that would be agreed upon by free, self-interested and rational persons in a starting position of equality and fairness. The principles of the theory of justice are ones that are meant to enable this group of people to cooperate with each other while recognizing that individuals in the group both share the same interests and have conflicting interests. These principles can be understood as underlying our most strongly held ethical beliefs – the ones that exhibit our ability to make the right moral decisions. This paper explains Rawls’ theory of justice, Justice as Fairness, considers an alternative known as “mixed conception” and offers Rawls’ response to the alternative before delving deeper into the debate to understand whether Rawls’ theory of a “mixed conception” should be chosen for a society. Rawls was a notoriously difficult writer so this thesis spends a significant amount of time trying to explicate his views and arguments. With that being said, this thesis does miss out on some key secondary details but hopes to give a clear and compelling picture of his theory, especially the parts that relate to the debate. The debate centers on the choice between the difference principle, which calls for society to maximize the prospects of the least advantaged, and the social minimum principle, which has society set a social minimum that would allow citizens to lead decent lives and take measures necessary to ensure everyone can reach that minimum. In the end, I reach the conclusion that the social minimum principle, in combination with some of Rawls’ other principles, should be used as one of the main principles of justice in society.

In this thesis I establish a hitherto unseen parallel between John Rawls’ theory of justice and utilitarian accounts with respect to population ethics; I argue that the absurd conclusions which plague utilitarianism also plague Rawls’ theory. These are the repugnant and preposterous conclusions. I then argue that Kant's political philosophy offers the resources to escape these absurd conclusions because of a crucial metaphysical difference between theories governed by outcome-oriented considerations and those governed by freedom-oriented constraints.

In Law of Peoples Rawls tries to work out a theory that will ensure a fair interaction between the world’s ‘peoples’ (synonymous with “nations”). By this he means a description of international rules that both liberal and non-liberal peoples can accept, with the purpose of eradicating political injustices in the world; which Rawls believes is the big cause of the greatest evils in the world. Furthermore, in his theory, Rawls envisions a set of international institutions (WTO, World Bank and “the UN”) that will work as the basic structure for implementing this scheme of law; global rules of trade; providing loans; facilitation of capital investment, etc. However, the theory lacks a description of which political liberties the peoples would want to secure, within the international institutions, and of what principles of distribution they should be assigned. Accordingly, I will in this essay try to establish which rights the peoples—as Rawls envisions them—would want to secure, and why they would want to be viewed as equal to everybody else, by reasons of the institutions profound and pervasive effect on peoples success. Furthermore, I will contend that this equality in political liberties, and especially the ‘principle of equal participation’, will be impaired by the inequalities in resources that Rawls accepts between the peoples. Consequently, an issue of how wealthier peoples will use their power to promote their self-interest, and the lack of belief that constitutional safeguards, within the international institutions, will constrain them from using means of agitation.