Cette étude est une critique normative de l'éducation scolaire québécoise selon une conception de la justice sociale, celle de la théorie de la justice de J. Rawls. L'analyse emprunte la porte d'entrée de la légitimité morale de ses pratiques. Un important rappel historique, traduit dans une perspective politique, puis interprété dans les termes de la philosophie politique, compose son volet empirique et révèle notre objet d'analyse, une "philosophie publique" de l'éducation québécoise. L'analyse normative de cette dernière, prise pour représentation conceptuelle de l'éducation québécoise, scolaire et publique, et conduite en rapport avec la conception libérale égalitaire de Rawls, révèle une conception utilitariste dominante politiquement et inadéquate au regard du caractère moral des personnes. Une conception non seulement inadéquate mais injuste selon Rawls, vu la primauté kantienne des personnes qu'il défend.

Les idéologies politiques africaines :mythe du pouvoir ou instance du développement ?<p>Réflexion épistémologique sur le nationalisme congolais à la lumière de la théorie rawlsienne de la justice.<p><p>Panafricanisme, négritude, consciencisme, socialisme et nationalisme ont eu en gros sur le sol africain, une double mission :-délivrer les pays du joug colonial<p>sortir ces pays du sous-développement par un travail d’une <p>-\ / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The aim of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the school debate in Sweden by focusing on one of the key topics of the debate, namely the allegedly threatened equality and equity of the education system. This debate circles around two aspects: (1) The quality of the education is to be the same at all schools, independent of geographical location or provider. (2) A fair grading process of the pupil’s achievements that follows the rule of law.The source material for the study consists of the web-based magazine Skolvärlden which is run by the teacher union Lärarnas Riksförbund. The magazine was chosen as the teacher union has developed a political program to tackle the equality and equity problems in the Swedish school. The research questions for the empirical examination are the following: (1) How is the debate about equality and equity in education described and constructed during 2018 in Skolvärlden? (2) What needs are to be fulfilled and what solutions are proposed by Skolvärlden to ensure an increase of the equity and equality in the Swedish school?The questions are inspired by framing theory which is used as a theoretical framework to explain the correlation between the answers to each question. To achieve this, the study uses a content analysis combined with a narrative analysis. Based on the analysis, the study answers a third question: (3) In which manners can the debate about equity and equality in Skolvärlden be an expression of ideas about justice, the governing of the school system and the school’s role in society? To reveal ideas about justice, John Rawls’ A theory of justice is applied to the public debate about equity and equality in education and the Swedish curriculum to create a theoretical framework.The study shows that the debate is constructed and described in a way that the political program proposed by Lärarnas Riksförbund appears as a perfect solution. The shaped narrative consists of decisionmakers who remain passive while teachers decry conditions for teaching and demand better terms to provide every pupil with quality education. While arguments about the situation for teachers appear, the emphasis lays on the consequences for the pupils. It is them, the articles claim, who are affected by the dreadful working conditions and lousy leadership. The proposed solution is a reformed school system which is governed and financed by the state instead of the current decentralized model.

In der Dissertation habe ich versucht eine Theorie der globalen Gerechtigkeit darzustellen. Diese Theorie hat als ihre Basis das Denken von John Rawls. Rawls hat sich in seinem letzten Buch „Das Recht der Völker“ zu dem Thema geäußert. Ich erläutere seine Gedanken und zugleich kritisiere ich sie. Meine Kritikpunkte an Rawls: 1. Keine detaillierte Erläuterung der Aufteilung in ideale und nichtideale Theorie 2. Unvollkommenheit der Prinzipien für die ideale Theorie der globalen Gerechtigkeit Ich verweise auf die mögliche Verbesserung des Rawlschen Standpunktes über globale Gerechtigkeit durch: 1. eine Unterscheidung der normativen und deskriptiven idealen bzw. nichtidealen Theorie (damit wird die Struktur von Rawls‘s Arguments klarer) 2. Durch die Darstellung von drei Prinzipien die Rawlssche Prinzipien hätten sein könnten (damit bekommt seine Theorie inhaltlich mehr Wert) 3. Durch die Erläuterung des Prinzips der Solidarität als das, was an Rawls‘s Theorie besonders gewesen sein könnte. / In my disertation I have tried to present a theory of global justice. This theory has for its basis the thought of John Rawls. Rawls expressed his thaughts about the topic in his last book „The Law of Peoples.“ On the one hand I explain his theory while on the other I criticize it. My critique on Rawls goes accoring the following lines: 1. No elaborated disitiniction betwen the ideal and nonideal theory 2. Unfinished principles for the ideal theory of global justice I point to the possible amelioration of Rawls´ theory of global justice through: 1. Differentiation of the normative and descriptive ideal and nonideal theory (through this disticition is the stucture of Rawls´ argument clearer) 2. Introduction of three prinicples that should have been Rawls´s (through these three principles the content of his theory becomes more valuable) 3. Eplaning the principle of solidarity as the principle that could have been the specific for Rawls´ theory

In diesem Buch schlage ich eine radikal neuartige Sicht auf den Utilitarismus vor. Meine Hauptthese ist, dass der Utilitarismus selbst keine vollständige normative Theorie ist, aus der sich per se Handlungsbewertungen ableiten ließen, sondern normativ untersättigt und neutral ist. Sein normativer Gehalt ist vollständig abhängig von angenommenen Nutzenfunktionen. Jede konsistente Menge von moralischen Regeln (Moralsystem) kann, wie ich im Anhang beweise, als ein Spezialfall des Utilitarismus interpretiert werden. Um dies zu explizieren, stelle ich utilitaristische Interpretationen verschiedener Moralpositionen vor: Zwei alltagsmoralische Regeln (das Gebot, Versprechen zu halten und das Tötungsverbot), egalitäre Positionen zu Verteilungsfragen sowie die Rawls’sche Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Hierbei gebe ich stets korrespondierende Nutzenfunktionen an, deren Vorliegen Utilitaristen auf die interpretierten moralischen Positionen verpflichtet. Die Frage nach dem normativen Gehalt des Utilitarismus schlechthin ist somit falsch gestellt. Ein Großteil der Kritik des Utilitarismus als moralische Theorie läuft ins Leere, denn sie kritisiert einen solchen nur scheinbar eigenständigen normativen Gehalt des Utilitarismus, den sie selbst durch unterstellte Nutzenfunktionen erst erzeugt. Die Verteidigung des Utilitarismus verfehlt ebenso oft das Ziel, wenn sie zur Rettung des Utilitarismus an sich konkurrierende Nutzenfunktionen ins Feld führt, ohne die normative Neutralität des Utilitarismus generell zu thematisieren. Diese normative Neutralität macht den Utilitarismus gleichsam zur Normalform der Ethik, denn jeder moralische Disput lässt sich in einen Disput über korrespondierende Nutzenfunktionen überführen. Der Utilitarismus ist also nicht moralische Theorie, sondern vielmehr die Methode der Ethik. / In this book I suggest to look at utilitarianism in a radical new way. My key starting point is that utilitarianism in itself is not a complete normative theory from which judgements of actions could be drawn but instead that utilitarianism is normatively undersaturated and neutral. Its normative content is entirely dependent on assumed utility functions. Every consistent set of moral rules (moral system) can, as I prove in the appendix, be interpreted as a special case of utilitarianism. To explicate this, I give utilitarian interpretations of a number of different moral positions: two everyday moral rules (the rule to keep promises and the prohibition of killing), egalitarian positions on distribution, and the Rawlsian theory of justice. In each case I propose corresponding utility functions that commit utilitarians to the interpreted moral position. Thus, asking about the normative content of utilitarianism in itself is meaningless. Much of the critique of utilitarianism as a moral theory misses the point as it criticizes such an assumed normative content of utilitarianism in itself while imputing the existence of certain utility functions. Many defendants of utilitarianism fall for the same mistake, as they propose rival utility functions to rescue their assumed normative content of utilitarianism without addressing the general normative neutrality of utilitarianism. For this normative neutrality, utilitarianism can be viewed as the normal form of ethics, because every moral dispute can be translated into a dispute over corresponding utility functions. Therefore, Utilitarianism is not a moral theory, but rather the method of ethics.

The present work approaches the matter of the Law of Property and its social function according to John Rawls theory of justice, having the intention to understand what the role of the property is to the author, the ways of property which are considered fair by him and, if it answers to the principles of justice and property which fitted with its social purpose. For such, it deals with, firstly, in chapter 1, the conteporary conception of law of property, which is inserted within a more humanitary, cooperative pespective of society and reciprocity, longing to a socialeconomical harmony and the effectiviness of certain human necesseties to improve the pespective of the citizens lives. Carrying on in this chapter, it is studied Locke s concept of private property to demonstrate the points where his theory disagree with John Rawls theory, thus it brings more individual view of property and it adopts a restricted conception of this right. Locke defends the unlimited accumulation of wealth, being the property turned, only, to the individual growth of the owner and to benefit the business, and then not existing a distributive and cooperative justice. Macpherson criticizes Locke s theory since it is extremely individualist. Chapter 2 aims to analyse the main ideas of Rawls theory of justice, seaching for the main and fundamental concepts so that chapter 3 is well-understood. Rawls supports the distributive justice and encourages the social cooperation. For this author, the basic liberties are inegotiable and the object of his theory is the basic structure of the society as an equitative system of social cooperation among free and iqual citizens. In order to reach this, the individuals make an agreement under the veil of ignorance to formulate the principles of justice which will run the institutions of a democratic constitutional fair society. Chapter 3 fights against the matter of the law of property for this author, a big suppoter of the distributive justice and of the social cooperation, which understands the law of property as basic good, because it helps to accomplish the expectations of the citizens lives, and it must also be capatible to the other rights and liberties which belong to a social system to provide a honored life. Rawls thought was a target for criticism by Robert Nozick, whom rescued Locke s theory of appropriation, not agreeing with the notion of distributive justice and of social cooperation, counteracting in several points to the Rawls theory of justice. However, according to the philosophers Álvaro de Vita, Will Kimlicka and Van Parijs, the defense of John Rawls theory was made, because they support the thought of this author, abova all objections shown by Nozick. Thus, the right of property must have a social mean to promote certain basic needs of the individuals, and this is clear in Rawls work so that he believes in social cooperation, in the effectiviness of human dignity, of self-respect, of self-steem and of their own citizenship, through a distributive justice. / O presente trabalho aborda a questão do direito de propriedade e sua função social a partir da teoria da justiça de John Rawls, com a intenção de compreender qual o papel da propriedade para o autor, as formas de propriedade consideradas justas para ele e, se atende aos princípios da justiça a propriedade que cumpre com uma finalidade social. Para tanto, trata-se, primeiramente, no capítulo 1, a concepção contemporânea de direito de propriedade, o qual está inserido numa perspectiva mais humanitária, cooperativa, de sociabilidade e reciprocidade, buscando a harmonia econômico-social e a efetivação de certas necessidades humanas para melhorar as perspectivas de vida dos cidadãos. Dando continuidade a este capítulo, é estudado o conceito de propriedade privada de Locke, com a finalidade de demonstrar os pontos em que sua teoria contrapõe-se à teoria de John Rawls, pois traz uma visão mais individualista de propriedade e adota uma concepção restrita deste direito. Locke defende a acumulação ilimitada de riquezas, estando a propriedade voltada, unicamente, para o crescimento individual do proprietário e para beneficiar o comércio, inexistindo uma justiça distributiva e cooperativa. Macpherson critica a teoria de Locke por ser extremamente individualista. O capítulo 2 intenciona analisar as principais idéias da teoria da justiça de Rawls, buscando-se os conceitos principais e fundamentais para que o capítulo 3 seja mais bem compreendido. Rawls defende a justiça distributiva e incentiva a cooperação social. Para este autor, as liberdades básicas são inegociáveis e o objeto de sua teoria é a estrutura básica da sociedade como um sistema equitativo de cooperação social entre cidadãos livres e iguais. Para que isso seja alcançado, os indivíduos realizam um acordo, sob o véu da ignorância , para formular os princípios da justiça que regerão as instituições de uma sociedade constitucional democrática justa. O capítulo 3 enfrenta a questão do direito de propriedade para o autor, grande defensor da justiça distributiva e da cooperação social, que entende o direito de propriedade como um bem básico, pois auxilia nas realizações das expectativas de vida dos cidadãos, devendo ser compatível com os demais direitos e liberdades pertencentes a um sistema social para proporcionar uma vida digna. O pensamento de Rawls foi alvo de crítica de Robert Nozick, o qual resgatou a teoria da apropriação de Locke, não concordando com a noção de justiça distributiva e de cooperação social, contrapondo-se em inúmeros pontos à teoria da justiça ralwsiana. Mas, com base nos filósofos Álvaro de Vita, Will Kymlicka e Van Parijs foi realizada a defesa da teoria de John Rawls, pois defendem o pensamento deste autor, acima das objeções apresentadas por Nozick. Asim, o direito de propriedade deve ter uma finalidade social para promover certas necessidades básicas dos indivíduos, e isso, percebe-se na obra de Rawls, pois ele acredita na cooperação social, na efetivação da dignidade humana, do auto-respeito, da auto-estima e da própria cidadania, por meio de uma justiça distributiva.

Dissertation in political science, C-level by Niklas Andersson, Spring Semester 2009. Tutor: Arne Larsson “The Treaty of Lisbon – The Defence against Globalization?” In the modern world globalization have undermined the nation-state and left it without the right measurements to adequately deal with the social and economic unrest that follows in its way. The states, built on contract theories, have an obligation to protect its citizens from the state of nature which seems to have failed as globalization has changed the rules. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls to identify the elements of a state and create a modern and ideal contract theory. The treaty shall then be used on the Treaty of Lisbon as it can be seen as a contract between the European states to create an entity in the shape of the European Union with the power to defend Europe from the unrest created by globalization. My question for this was as follows: Is the new treaty for the European Union acceptable as a new social contract according to the social contract theories? During my research the following criteria’s for a social contract was found: 1. A legislative branch 2. An executive branch 3. A judicial branch 4. The Right to taxation 5. A centralized educational system 6. The right to property 7. Equalizing redistribution system 8. The right to leave the contract. The first four is essential in creating a state and are the primary criteria’s for its existence while the other four is determining the character of the state that is created and are therefore not essential in the creation of the state and are consequently secondary criteria’s in a states creation. The answer to the question is no, as the Treaty of Lisbon first of all don’t give the Union the right of taxation on its citizens and secondly, the Union are not given the mandate to act for an educational or an equalizing redistributive system. Without these criteria’s the EU don’t have the possibility to quickly act on its own to deal with urgent problems that rises from the negative aspects of globalization. / Statsvetenskaplig uppsats, C-nivå av Niklas Andersson, Vårterminen 2009. Handledare: Arne Larsson "Lissabonfördraget - Försvaret mot Globaliseringen?" I den moderna världen har globaliseringen underminerat nationalstaten och lämnat dem utan verktyg för att kunna ta hand om den sociala och ekonomiska oron som följer i dess väg på ett adekvat sätt. Staterna, byggda på kontraktsteorierna har en ansvar för att skydda sina medborgare från naturtillståndet, men som nu har misslyckats i och med att globaliseringen ändrat spelreglerna. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka kontraktsteorierna av Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau och John Rawls för att identifiera beståndsdelarna för en stat och utifrån det skapa en modern idealbild av kontraktsteorin. Kontraktet ska sedan jämföras med Lissabonfördraget då de i viss mån kan ses som ett kontrakt mellan Europas stater för att skapa en enhet utifrån den Europeiska Unionen med makten att skydda Europa mot oron skapad av globaliseringen. Min fråga var följande: Är det nya fördraget för den Europeiska Unioen acceptabel som ett nytt socialt ontrat enligt de gamla kontraktseorierna? Under mon undersökning kom jag fram till följande kriterier för ett socialt kontrakt: 1. En lagstiftande instans 2. En verkställande instans 3. En lagstiftande instans 4. Rätten att beskatta 5. Ett centraliserat utbildningssystem 6. Rätten till ägande 7. Utjämnadne omfördelningssystem 8. Rätten att lämna kontraktet. De första fyra är essentiella i skapandet av en stat och de primära kriterierna för dess existens medan de övriga fyra bestämmer karaktäen på staten som skapats och är ärmed inte avgörande och är därmed sekundära kriterier. Svaret till frågan är nej, eftersom Lissabonfördraget först av allt inte ger Unionen möjligheterna till beskattning och för det andra , Unionen har inte fått madatet till att agera för ett utbildningssystem eller omfördelande ujämningssytem. Utan dessa kriterier har inte EU möjligheten att snabbt agera av egen kraft för att ta hand om brådskande problem som uppståt från globaliseringens negativa sidor.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rosane Terezinha Felipe.pdf: 343926 bytes, checksum: 224c503dc3bfd9bea2ea039acc896491 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-07-04 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The objective of the present work consists in the investigation and exhibition of the conception of the original position in the theory of justice as fairness, drawn by John Rawls. For that, it is highlighted the way the author exhibits the agreement made in this initial situation of the choice, in other words, the parts symmetrically situated in the original position and covered by the veil of ignorance, that has the function to impede the passage of arbitrary information that can influence in the choice of the principles. Besides, the agreement made in the original position is characterized as hipothetical and non-historical. Rawls, in the subsequent works of A Theory of Justice, emphasizes that the misunderstanding about the hypothetical aspect of this position is due to the fact it isn´t seen as a representation artifice. By this way , in order to understand the argumentation about the original position, it treats the doctrines, in which the theory of justice as fairness, is presented as an alternative, with the intent to contextualize the theory of Rawls. From the works of the own author, it looks for presenting the fundamental ideas and the way how they are linked in this theory. Besides, they are object of study the role and the characteristics of this initial situation of the choice and the principles of justice, as the result of the agreement made between the parts in the original position, are objects of the study. This position is understood as an initial situation of the suitable equality for the choice of the principles, that must specify the fair terms of the society understood as a system of social cooperation. / O objetivo do presente trabalho consiste na investigação e exposição da concepção de posição original na teoria da justiça como eqüidade, elaborada por John Rawls. Para isso, destaca a maneira como o autor expõe o acordo realizado nesta situação inicial de escolha, ou seja, as partes simetricamente situadas na posição original e encobertas pelo véu de ignorância, que tem como função impedir a passagem de informações arbitrárias que possam influenciar na escolha dos princípios. Além disso, o acordo realizado na posição original é caracterizado como hipotético e a-histórico. Rawls, nas obras posteriores a Uma Teoria da Justiça, destaca que o mal-entendido quanto ao aspecto hipotético desta posição está no fato dela não ser vista como um artifício de representação. Desta forma, a fim de compreender a argumentação acerca da posição original, trata-se das doutrinas nas quais a teoria da justiça como eqüidade é apresentada como uma alternativa, com o intuito de contextualizar a teoria de Rawls. A partir das obras do próprio autor, procura apresentar as idéias fundamentais e a forma como estão interligadas nesta teoria. Além disso, são objetos de estudo o papel e as características dessa situação inicial de escolha e os princípios de justiça, como o resultado do acordo realizado entre as partes na posição original. Esta posição é compreendida como uma situação inicial de igualdade adequada para a escolha dos princípios, que devem especificar os termos eqüitativos da sociedade compreendida como um sistema de cooperação social.

Purpose/Aim: The purpose of this study is to understand the meaning of global responsibility and toxicwaste control. The Basel Convention is the UN's international regulations on the import, export andtransport of hazardous waste. According to the Basel Convention, the export of electronic waste todeveloping countries is fully legal if the recipient country has given approval in writing. Is there a linkbetween toxic colonialism, global responsibility, justice and human rights?Material/Method: A qualitative case study of what delegates from three African countries think abouttoxic colonialism and global responsibility.Main results: The essay gives an explanation of the concept of toxic colonialism in relation to the BaselConvention and the Ban Amendment, from three African UN delegates, furthermore an analysis of theimportance it can have on global responsibility, justice and views on human rights.The essay results show that the Ban Amendment of the Basel Convention is in line with Rawl'sdifference principle and the principle of freedom and would contribute to increased justice on electronicwaste coding if the amendment goes through and is used in symbiosis with human rights: UDHRArticle 25 and ICESCR Article 12.1-2.

This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness), yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal polities.