Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-10T11:09:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_JovinianoJoseRezendede_M.pdf: 1301687 bytes, checksum: 71602265165401b392f8c7abca689095 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: No século XX, na busca de argumentos racionais capazes de fornecer fundamentos legítimos para as principais instituições democráticas, filósofos e teóricos políticos se dedicaram à elaboração de concepções liberais de justiça. Nesse sentido, um dos esforços mais significativos foi o realizado por John Rawls (1921-2002), principalmente contido na obra Uma Teoria da Justiça (1971). A teoria de Rawls refletiu a necessidade das teorias liberais em responderem aos atuais problemas das sociedades capitalistas, principalmente às questões sobre o fundamento das obrigações políticas que se referem à legitimidade das instituições democráticas e à questão da estabilidade Nesta dissertação, não se pretende realizar uma análise puramente exegética ou comparativa das obras de Rawls, mas tratar de dois principais problemas que Rawls enfrentou em Uma Teoria da Justiça e que perpassaram todo seu projeto filosófico, ou seja, como seria possível haver consenso acerca de uma concepção de justiça para uma sociedade democrática constitucional? Os termos que constituem essa concepção conseguiriam contar com o apoio dos cidadãos? Para responder essas questões Rawls elaborou a concepção de justiça como eqüidade, um conjunto de princípios de justiça escolhido por pessoas racionais e razoáveis em uma situação inicial eqüitativa. Para Rawls, a concepção de justiça como eqüidade é estável porque ao aplicar-se às principais instituições sociais, tornariam a sociedade bem-ordenada. A atuação dos princípios de justiça nas instituições sociais geraria nos cidadãos um efetivo senso de justiça. Em Uma Teoria da Justiça, a estabilidade social é garantida pela presença desse efetivo senso de justiça, e em uma sociedade bem-ordenada os princípios de justiça garantiriam os direitos básicos para o exercício da cidadania democrática, e ainda assegurariam o auto-respeito dos indivíduos. Nesse contexto, agir conforme a justiça constitui um bem comum para as pessoas em geral. Em O Liberalismo Político (1993), Rawls revisa a sua concepção de justiça, e para dar maior realismo ao ideal de uma sociedade bem ordenada, pressupõe que essa sociedade seja marcada por uma pluralidade doutrinas morais e filosóficas abrangentes e razoáveis que são incompatíveis, mas justiça como eqüidade, por ser apresentada como uma concepção política de justiça capaz de alcançar um consenso por sobreposição entre diferentes doutrinas religiosas e filosóficas, seria capaz de solucionar a questão da estabilidade / Abstract: In the 20th century, in the search of rational arguments capable of giving legitimate fundaments to the main democratic institutions, philosophers and political theoreticians were dedicated to the elaboration of liberal conceptions of justice. In this meaning, one of the most significant efforts was made by John Rawls (1921-2002), mainly in his work A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls' theory has reflected the necessity of liberal theories in response to the actual problems of capitalist societies, regarding matters of political obligations that refer to the legitimacy of democratic institutions and also matters of stability. In this thesis, there is no intention of a pure comparative analysis of Rawls'work, but to deal with two problems that Rawls has faced in A Theory of Justice and have overlapped his entire philosophical project, that means, how would it be possible to reach a consensus concerning a conception of justice to a constitutional democratic society? Could the terms that made this conception of justice count on the support of the citizens? To answer these questions Rawls has elaborated the conception of justice as fairness, a set of principles of justice, chosen by rational and reasonable people in an equitable situation. To Rawls, the conception of justice as fairness is stable, because applying it in the main social institutions would generate in the citizens an effective sense of justice. In A Theory of Justice, social stability is guaranteed by the presence of this effective sense of justice, and in a democratic society, the principles of justice would guarantee basic rights to the use of a democratic citizenship, and would also assure an individual self-respect. In this context, acting according the justice is a common well to people in general. In Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls revises his conception of justice, and to give more realism to the ideal of a well-ordered society, he considers that this society be characterized by a plurality of wide moral and philosophical doctrines that are incompatible, but justice as fairness, because it is presented as a political conception of justice capable of reaching a overlapping consensus between different religious and philosophical doctrines, would be capable of answering the matter of stability / Mestrado / Etica / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-28T07:40:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Welter_NelsiKistemasher_M.pdf: 10134975 bytes, checksum: 596c2c38f2063717dc62b364902fe9bd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001 / Resumo: Dado o problema de escolha que se coloca na posição original, Rawls acredita que seus princípios de justiça sejam a melhor solução dentre uma lista de princípios possíveis de ser escolhidos. Procura demonstrar, portanto, que, dada a situação de insegurança em que se encontram as partes na posição original, elas buscam, como raciocínio central, a estratégia maximin de argumentação que leva à opção pelos dois princípios. O primeiro princípio defende que as liberdades básicas se apliquem a todos igualmente. Já a primeira parte do segundo princípio propõe a maximização das expectativas das pessoas menos beneficiadas, as que possuem menos expectativas de bens primários, enquanto que a segunda parte defende que a estrutura básica da sociedade deve estar disposta de tal forma a oportunizar aos que nasceram em posições sociais menos favorecidas a igualdade de oportunidades. Esses princípios compõem uma concepção de justiça que pode especificar uma base moral apropriada para instituições que fazem parte da sociedade democrática / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

La thèse est intitulée :« Justice politique et démocratie chez John Rawls. Repères pour une rationalité politique africaine contemporaine ». Notre objectif est d’utiliser les contenus essentiels de la conception politique de la justice de John Rawls pour proposer une voie qui serait la meilleure en vue de venir à bout des crises et de l’instabilité politique en Afrique noire en général et en République Démocratique du Congo en particulier. Dans l'introduction, nous avons réaménagé la problématique en allant dans le sens de plus de précision sans trop nous écarter de la question principale. Nous avons précisé l’hypothèse et l’objet de la thèse. Nous avons ainsi nettoyé l’introduction en écartant tous les aspects qui pouvaient poser problème.Pour ce qui concerne le corps du texte, nous avons commencé par une brève présentation du principal auteur de référence. Nous avons ainsi présenté brièvement J. Rawls, ses principaux ouvrages ainsi que les principaux précurseurs de sa pensée. Ensuite, nous avons analysé la conception de la justice politique de l’auteur avec une attention particulière en faveur de son volet domestique. Nous avons montré que cette conception de la justice politique a été élaborée comme une réaction aux défis de la crise de la justice politique dans les démocraties occidentales. Elle y a soulevé néanmoins certains enthousiasmes et certaines inquiétudes. Mais malgré cela, ses contenus essentiels pourraient être utilisés pour élaborer des réaménagements des processus politiques face aux déficits de la justice politique en Afrique. A cet effet, nous avons décrit la manière dont se présente la crise de la justice politique en Afrique et nous l’avons illustré par un cas concret de la crise de la justice politique en rd Congo. Nous avons analysé quelques élaborations théoriques de quelques philosophes africains en réaction à cette crise. Et nous avons montré que pour venir à bout de l’instabilité politique due à la crise de la justice politique en Afrique, il faut construire chaque Etat africain suivant le modèle d’un système équitable de coopération. Mais pour ce faire, il faut inverser le sens de la pyramide et prendre comme socle d'émergence de la justice politique le village, c’est-à-dire les institutions de la justice politique à la base :construire chaque village africain, en général, et chaque village rd congolais, en particulier, comme un système équitable de coopération ouvert à la liberté, à l’égalité de chances et à l’amélioration des conditions existentielles des citoyens les plus défavorisés. On harmonisera ainsi le système démocratique du sommet (les institutions nationales) à la base (les institutions villageoises). / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / Este trabajo se divide en tres capítulos. En el primero de ellos se realiza una presentación general, introductoria aunque no elemental, de la teoría de la justicia de Rawls en su última versión, describiendo su marco general, dilucidando sus conceptos y elementos básicos claves (incluyendo a los principios de justicia). Asimismo, se esbozan las relaciones que existen entre los diferentes elementos de la justicia como equidad con el objeto de ofrecer una visión más sistemática e integrada, evitando así presentar la teoría de la justicia de Rawls como un conjunto de conceptos y partes aisladas entre sí. En el segundo capítulo se aborda y analiza la idea de igualdad en la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls y las maneras en que dicha noción se encuentra en varias partes de su teoría, atendido que la justa igualdad de oportunidades es una manifestación de tal idea. Considerando el objeto de este trabajo, se revisará especialmente cómo la idea de igualdad se manifiesta especialmente en la concepción normativa y política de la persona y en todos los principios de justicia que Rawls propone (“igualdad de la libertad”, “justa igualdad de oportunidades” y “principio de la diferencia”), las relaciones existentes entre ellos y la forma en que operan conjuntamente, especificando así los términos equitativos de la cooperación social, y en consecuencia sentando las bases de la “igualdad democrática”. Finalmente, en el capítulo III se analiza en extenso el principio de la “justa igualdad de oportunidades”: sus distintas formulaciones, sus interpretaciones, su ámbito de aplicación y, por último, sus implicaciones prácticas a nivel institucional. Se elabora, además y como ya se anticipó, una justificación que prima facie es independiente y distinta a la del argumento desde la posición originaria. En especial, se consideran las medidas o reformas políticas, jurídicas y económicas que son compatibles con dichos planteamientos, y el impacto que podrían tener en la sociedad chilena.

Denna studie har som syfte att undersöka på vilket sätt muslimskt religionsutövande möjliggörs i en allsvensk fotbollsklubb. Forskningen som har gjorts är kvalitativ och har genomförts med hjälp av intervjuer samt en granskning av klubbens skrivna material i form av dess värdegrund. Resultatet har analyserats med hjälp av två teorier som ser olika på mångfald, dels en liberal multikulturalism och dels en radikal multikulturalism – baserade på en distrinktion mellan dessa båda av Anne Sofie Roald. Därtill har John Rawls rättviseteoretiska begrepp "ursprungspositionen" använts som analysverktyg. Det har framgått att den allsvenska klubben har en välkomnande attityd gentemot mångfald. Det har också framkommit att den står på en sekulär grund. Detta kan utgöra en problematisk plats för en muslimsk religionsutövande spelare. Analysen belyser att klubben erbjuder de muslimskt religionsutövande spelarna förutsättningar, men dessa inte är permanenta och det kan ifrågasätta den välkomnande attityden klubben vill förmedla.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / A political arrangement is an arrangement for persons. Political arrangements are assessed in terms of the extent to which they manage the affairs of persons, which includes protecting their interests and entitlements. Political arrangements which are unable to protect the interests of its citizens, or a group of citizens, are deemed unacceptable, and where appropriate, alternative arrangements which do protect the interests and entitlements of its citizens are sought. In this thesis I argue that the political arrangement of John Rawls is unable to protect the interests and entitlements of the severely cognitively disabled who are regarded as full citizens by advanced political arrangements in the world today. I argue that it is the contract nature and conception of the person in Rawls’s system which excludes the severely cognitively disabled. This exclusion goes against our widely-held intuitions about the rights and entitlements of the severely cognitively disabled. I look to the Person Life View of Marya Schechtman, a conception of the person that includes the severely cognitively disabled, to see if a conception of the person that includes the severely cognitively disabled is able to solve the gap in Rawls’s system. I argue that it is not able to do so. I then propose a new way of approaching questions of personhood and appeal to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the basis, arguing that membership of a type of organism typically considered a person is enough to be a complete member of that type and therefore a person.

In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization.

No description available.

Justice, and what is just, have been discussed by many with no true definition to go by and both political and moral theories alike have tried to find the right definition of what justice is supposed to be. This study will use three political theories to tackle the question if the american election system can be considered just or unjust. The three theories are John Rawls’s Justice as fairness, Thomas Hobbes and the social contract and lastly Robert Nozick’s libertarianism. To analyse the framing of question a normative ‘givet-att’ analyse method will be used, to form arguments from the values presented in the three different theories of justice. The conclusions drawn from the analysis are in the cases of Rawls and Hobbes theories quite similar, on how the election system should be interpreted. Nozick’s theory on the other hand gives a different conclusion compared to the other two. However, the goal of this study is not to find one true answer to whether the election system can be called just or not, but rather to show it from different perspectives of justice and how that can affect the view of the election system.

The following essay argues that Transnational Civil Disobedience may be justified when it is applied to questions relating to global climate change. Civil Disobedience as a politically motivated form of lawbreaking posits questions regarding political obligation and citizenship and such questions are amplified when applied to the transnational level.Furthermore, this essay focuses on the influential account of Civil Disobedience as it has been formulated by John Rawls. The writer argues that there are potential issues with this formulation when it is applied outside of the greater scope of Rawls’s work. Instead, the essay argues for a formulation of Civil Disobedience that includes a politicizing feature, and to view it as an extra institutional form of political discourse that is detached from notions of state belonging.Finally, it is argued that the All Affected Principle may be used as a necessary condition for justifying acts of Transnational Civil Disobedience. The nature of Global Climate change as an event that affects the human race as a whole, gives rise to the potential for non-citizens to claim a level of political agency in matters that affect them despite lacking formal representation.