Liberals claim that the exercise of state power must be justified on terms that all citizens can reasonably accept. They also support democracy. The challenge is to bring these two desideratum in line-- to ensure that democratic deliberations are somehow predicated on claims that all citizens can reasonably accept. Put differently, the challenge is to set the terms of public reason. Liberal philosophers advance grand theories of political justice towards this end. They claim that a reasonable argument in the political sphere is one that conforms to theory x. The difficulty is that there will be those who reasonably reject theory x, preferring theory y or z, or eschewing theory altogether. Pessimism at the prospect of agreement on higher-order theories of justice leads some to advocate simple majority rule. The thesis argues that convergence on higher order theory is not essential to public reason. The Supreme Court of Canada’s method of adjudication under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is used as a model. Where basic rights are engaged, or are alleged to be engaged, the Court examines the reasonableness of law and policy using a series of open-ended tests. These tests discipline their deliberations by focusing attention on generally accepted facts and values (notably, the values expressed by the Charter). The thesis contends that the Court’s open-ended, contextual approach can serve as a model for broader public reasoning. The thesis then explores the role of religious arguments within this model. In a polity committed above all to Charter values, what is the place of religion in the justification of law? It is argued that religion is understood to be private and inscrutable under the Charter. This is what justifies the Court’s generous reading of the right to religious freedom. It also justifies our forbidding state coercion in the name of religion. With the preceding ideas in mind, the thesis examines Canadian law and public discourse on the issues of therapeutic cloning (ch.4) and same sex marriage (ch.5).

In this thesis, I defend John Rawls’s assertion that political liberalism does not use the concept of truth. I respond to objections from Joshua Cohen and David Estlund. I argue that Cohen fails to show that public reason needs a minimalist conception of truth, since individuals with a range of conceptions of moral truth can meet the requirements of public reason. I dispute Estlund’s argument that the liberal principle of legitimacy is merely insular. Estlund assumes that the claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy is reasonable is no different than the claim that the principle is acceptable to reasonable persons. I argue that this assumption is incorrect, and that therefore the liberal principle of legitimacy is justifiable on the grounds that it is reasonable. I argue that political liberals need not worry that doing without the concept of truth will undermine the semantic coherence or objectivity of political liberalism.

This paper will argue in three sections that Thus Spoke Zarathustra necessarily implies an aristocratic political system. In the section "Zarathustra’s Value Theory," I lay out Zarathustra's theory of value creation. In the second section, "Possible Interpretations of Value Creation," I describe three different perspectives that can be used to understand Zarathustra’s value theory. In the third section, "Zarathustra and Politics" I provide a critique of modern liberalism and an alternative coherent with Nietzsche's philosophy, aristocracy.

Depuis la parution de A Theory of Justice en 1971, la théorie de la justice comme équité de l'auteur américain John Rawls occupe une place importante dans le domaine de la justice économique et sociale. Les deux principes de justice qu'elle énonce, celui de la plus grande liberté égale pour tous ainsi que le principe de différence associé à une juste égalité des chances, ont été et continuent d'être largement discutés, analysés et critiqués aujourd'hui. Ces principes, applicables dans le cadre d'une démocratie constitutionnelle contemporaine caractérisé par le fait du pluralisme raisonnable, sont présentés par Rawls comme étant ceux que choisirait rationnellement une personne placée derrière un voile d'ignorance l'empêchant de savoir quelle position elle occupe dans la société. Cette situation initiale hypothétique dans laquelle s'effectue le choix des principes de justice par un individu représentatif constitue ce que Rawls décrit comment étant la position originelle. Dans des circonstances similaires à celles de cette position originelle, John Harsanyi estime quant à lui que le choix d'un individu rationnel n'aboutirait pas aux deux principes proposés par Rawls mais plutôt au principe de la maximisation de l'utilité. Pour en arriver à cette conclusion, Harsanyi utilise la théorie bayésienne de la décision rationnelle. Or, alors que la théorie bayésienne implique un recours abondant à des raisonnements probabilistes, Rawls rejette ce type de raisonnement probabiliste au sein de la position originelle. Il appert ainsi que Rawls et Harsanyi utilisent différemment la théorie du choix rationnel en situation d'incertitude, ce qui les amène à défendre des théories de la justice différentes: d'un côté, Rawls élabore une théorie déontologique; de l'autre, Harsanyi développe une version particulièrement sophistiquée de la théorie conséquentialiste qu'est l'utilitarisme. À mes yeux, l'utilisation faite par Harsanyi est en meilleure symbiose avec une application conventionnelle de la théorie de la décision rationnelle. Par ailleurs, bien que Rawls présente ses deux principes comme le résultat du choix rationnel d'un seul individu représentatif, l'idée principale derrière sa théorie de la justice est celle d'un accord volontaire portant sur les termes d'une coopération sociale mutuellement avantageuse entre personnes libres, égales et rationnelles. Je soutiens que cette idée contractualiste est mal servie par l'argumentation à partir de la position originelle et que les véritables arguments de Rawls en faveur de ses deux principes de justice et contre le principe utilitariste sont plus efficaces lorsqu'ils sont présentés indépendamment de la construction de la position originelle. En outre, alors que Rawls présentait initialement sa théorie comme un concurrent direct de l'utilitarisme, la relation entre les deux théories mérite d'être nuancée et précisée à la lumière des écrits subséquents de l'auteur de Théorie de la Justice. Ainsi, lorsque l'on examine leurs applications dans un contexte réaliste, l'utilitarisme et la théorie de la justice comme équité apparaissent en bout de ligne davantage comme des alliés que comme des adversaires sur l'échiquier politique des démocraties libérales contemporaines. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Rawls, Harsanyi, Principes de justice, Utilitarisme, Théorie du choix rationnel.

Dans ce mémoire, nous chercherons à développer le concept de responsabilité sociale. Nous tenterons, par le fait même, de faire la lumière sur les raisons qui font que les citoyens des sociétés modernes ne semblent plus avoir beaucoup d'intérêt pour la responsabilité sociale. Pour développer plus facilement notre pensée, nous nous appuierons tout d'abord sur une conception précise de la responsabilité; celle de Hans Jonas. Cet auteur utilise son « principe responsabilité », en particulier pour défendre l'idée que le monde court à sa fin si nous nous obstinons à vivre sans égard pour notre environnement. Pour cette raison, il faut absolument prendre nos responsabilités et agir. Nous verrons aussi que la responsabilité chez Jonas est engendrée par un sentiment et qu'elle est donc, selon l'auteur, universelle, puisque nous pouvons tous éprouver ce sentiment de responsabilité. Nous adhérerons à sa conception de la responsabilité sur certains aspects: en premier lieu dans la mesure où cette dernière est, dira-t-il, unilatérale et non-réciproque, même si nous pouvons tous être sujet ou objet de la responsabilité; en deuxième lieu, nous conviendrons aussi que la responsabilité puisse être engendrée par un sentiment et qu'elle puisse être à la base de notre action, mais avant tout, dans la mesure où nous sommes confrontés à une situation familiale ou amicale. Mais nous rejetterons, par ailleurs, l'idée que le sentiment soit le meilleur conducteur de l'action responsable surtout au niveau social. Car en effet, la responsabilité sociale conduite par le sentiment, supposerait l'impossibilité de l'exiger par des lois, légales comme morales. Par contre, nous verrons en quoi la notion de responsabilité de Jonas nous semble fortement individuelle et peu portée, malgré son aspect universaliste, sur des déterminants sociaux ou collectifs: ce avec quoi nous sommes en désaccord. Ensuite, nous examinerons la théorie de Bruckner, selon laquelle les sociétés occidentales actuelles favorisent, par l'individualisme, une infantilisation et/ou une victimisation du citoyen, qui fait obstacle à son sens de la responsabilité sociale. Nous verrons ensuite en quoi le système de pensée de Jonas valorise ce genre de sociétés individualistes. Et nous verrons ce que propose Bruckner pour revaloriser, de nouveau, l'autonomie, l'indépendance et le dialogue politique. Et finalement, nous défendrons un système politique démocratique permettant enfin l'autonomie des citoyens: celui de John Rawls. Nous le soutiendrons dans son élaboration d'une institution permettant l'adhésion des citoyens, le plein pouvoir au peuple et d'où peut enfin émerger la responsabilité sociale. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Responsabilité sociale, Hans Jonas, Pascal Bruckner, John Rawls, Démocratie.

I explore the problem of using primary goods as the index for determining the least-advantaged members in a society in Rawls’s theory of justice. I look at the problems presented to Rawls by Amartya Sen and his capabilities approach. I discuss the solutions to Sen’s problems given by Norman Daniels, who argues that primary goods are able to take capabilities into account. Finally, I supplement Daniels, arguing that the parameters Rawls uses to define his theory limit Sen’s objection and that primary goods are the appropriate metric of justice in Rawls’s theory.

Abstract Taiwan's social security has implemented at the institutional for a while. The development of social security shows the face of diversity in each era. There is diverse social security law can be described with impressive results, but we also have to reflect on another issue: What is Taiwan's social security law the common purpose? Every laws and regulations both have a different development process, in the whole social security should have their roles, if the social security policies and regulations have a lack in the principle of system, the government which in the administrative system may be faces obstacles. Particularly, after the democratization of political system in Taiwan, the development of social security measures cannot prevent the intrusion of politics, vote often become the means of achieving the people's welfare and security, and just in the implementation of policies on social security payments of uncertainty measures, it is unable to satisfy what people's need essentially. At this point, the state is difficult to achieve the protection of people's right and equalize opportunity and remove social conflicts, the state power is hard to protect the right of freedoms and vulnerable function, it caused the implementation of social justice by the state as the legitimate role become increasingly disordered. View of diverse of the development of Taiwan's social security law, the legal system reflects the purpose of social security to promote harmony development of society which has become an important starting point. Thus, this study is about the status of social security law, the legal aspects of evidence which in our Constitution, "Social Security" in the normative sense, that is what we want to create? The concept of this country endowed with a local social security of the explanation? Or should we look for the legal science for another closer theory of state and society relations outside positive law, in order to facilitate the establishment of law system. And another study is from the philosophy of law, analysis Lorenz von Stein's book of social theory, which is German scholar of public law, and the book of John Rawls theory of justice, which is American political scientist. And then look for the social constitution real meaning behind the words to construct a more complete system of social security law. Attempt to think through the social sciences, the social security law find a common language, and to answer how to construct a Taiwanese legal system of social security, people's social life will have a more harmonious development of justice in order.

The purpose of this essay is, in a political philosophy perspective, to offer an illumination of John Stuart Mill¡¦s thoughts on modernity. In this essay, firstly, in the first chapter, I will try to elaborate the reason why I write this essay and take a perspective of history and political philosophy as my analytic viewpoint. Moreover, I also briefly introduce Mill¡¦s writings and the frameworks of this essay. In the second chapter, I describe the events, movements, and thoughts that gradually shape the modernity. From the standpoints of Weber, Hume and Romanticism, I also refer to one of the most important characteristics of modernity in political philosophy: value pluralism. In Mill¡¦s thoughts, how to response to the problem derived from value pluralism is my most important discourse. In the following chapter, I offer an exposition to detail Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity, focusing on his utilitarianism and liberalism. I mainly discuss how Mill¡¦s principles of utility and liberty response to the problem derived from value pluralism. I also discuss two contemporary thinkers¡¦ thoughts to find Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity, namely John Rawls and John Gray. In the fourth chapter, I assess and review the criticisms on Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity. In the conclusion chapter, I briefly go through the major viewpoints of this essay.

Virtue is the way to conduct oneself and is the develop guidance and the behavioral principle that lead the people of the past, present, and future to fulfill morals. Decency, well-being, and happiness are the ultimate goals that people seek and are the standards for people to discuss and define behaviors. Therefore, the reason that the becoming of moral people through fulfilling decency is that decency is itself the truth and the highest value among all existences. Decency itself is the concept for all concepts described by Plato, and is spiritual in the rational world. Mankind should avoid being blinded by physical or material values when pursuing values, and should position such pursuing within the spiritual life and metal happiness. Aristotle, however, believes that while a natural person transforms to a moral person, individual¡¦s utmost decency should be dominated by group¡¦s utmost decency. After modern liberalism has prevailed, Hobbes sees human ethics are based on jungle justice, and the evil among interpersonal relationship requires organizing a strong and powerful society to protect oneself and development. Organizing of such society shall break the traditional ethics to establish modern ethics. Despite Locke sees ethics and decency are social customs and compliance of laws, but social customs and laws are not the base, which should be interests and natural rights because interests and natural rights are the foundation, on which the developments of social customs and laws are based. These fundamental base for moral principles is established under free will, and because of mankind¡¦s freedom, ethical behaviors, social responsibilities, and public welfare are developed. Kant, however, believes that virtue comes from primarily good will and sets its position on utmost decency and all values are under utmost decency. Moral principles are, on the other side, unparalleled order, which is absolute, pervasive, and unconditional. Constant says that despite there is difference between freedom of the people of the past and the freedom of the people of present time, but the freedom of the people of the past may not be denied entirely or yearned for because the era now is an open society. Freedom of the past and freedom of present time are equally important. Miller believes that there is not just quantitative difference in happiness, but also qualitative difference. That is, spiritual happiness if far beyond physical happiness. Spiritual happiness is difficult to satisfy and physical happiness is easier to satisfy. Therefore, people who seek for spiritual happiness have stronger pride and do not wish for perish. Hayek says social order is a self-initiated and volunteer order, rather than constructed organized order. Therefore, every person should obey rules for common and righteous behaviors. Such system rules are formed naturally while people interact with each other. Rawls sees justice as the priority decency for social system and is the guiding principle for a society. If ethic does not match with truth, then it must be abandoned or revised. Principles of justice must be constructed from pure procedural justice. Thus it can be seen that the moral and decency of the philosophers listed herein can be concluded that there will be no moral if there is no freedom.

本論文之首要目標在於針對Rawls後期思想體系的核心，亦即「公共理性之理念」的意涵與理論地位，以及他將「整全性的學說」排除於公共論理之外此一作法，透過提出三種詮釋觀點予以逐步釐清，並嘗試為Rawls加以辯護。第一章藉由說明Rawls以六個基本理念建構而成的基本理念體系，在其整體正義理論中將「公共理性之理念」予以初步定位。為了要進一步理解此一理念之主要特徵，以及它在當代政治哲學的中所扮演的角色與可能引發的相關爭議，在第二章中對於Habermas與審議式民主理論略作介紹，以作為理解Rawls的適當脈絡。第二章首先介紹Habermas對於「人權」與「人民主權」之緊張關係的分析，並將他用以解決此一爭議的理論設計，亦視為一種廣義的「公共理性之理念」來略加說明。至於第二章的末兩節，則以審議式民主理論內部的「實質性」與「程序性」之爭議為焦點，並指出「審議的無窮回歸」此一審議式民主理論無法解決的難題，以作為理解Rawls的「公共理性之理念」的線索。餘下的三至五章，依序提出了三種不同的詮釋觀點。第一種詮釋觀點將「公共理性之理念」理解為一種以審議式民主為理想藍圖的民主改革方案；第二種詮釋觀點則將該理念視為Rawls針對「自由憲政民主之理念」所提出的辯護方案：至於在第三種詮釋觀點中，「公共理性之理念」成為針對在TJ中仍有疏漏之證成策略的一種修正方案。