Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2017-02-14T14:42:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ubiratan Trindade_.pdf: 1470459 bytes, checksum: d2baa4890ad9b56c9fa1fc0dbb80b4c1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-14T14:42:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ubiratan Trindade_.pdf: 1470459 bytes, checksum: d2baa4890ad9b56c9fa1fc0dbb80b4c1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-08 / Milton Valente / Um dos objetivos desta investigação é apresentar ao leitor o debate entre comunitaristas (holistas) e liberais individualistas (atomistas), esclarecendo os pressupostos defendidos por ambos no que diz respeito às suas visões de pessoa e sociedade. Partindo da reflexão dos elementos centrais da teoria de Rawls, nas obras A Theory of Justice (1971) e Political Liberalism (1993), nós avaliamos a plausibilidade e o grau de sustentação de sua doutrina frente aos seus mais destacados críticos no campo do comunitarismo, entre os quais, Michael Sandel e Charles Taylor, destacando suas principais objeções à obra de Rawls, mais precisamente à concepção moral de pessoa na posição original. Mostramos que a teoria da justiça como equidade é compatível com as exigências ontológicas e epistemológicas das sociedades complexas contemporâneas, afirmando que o agente moral submetido a uma situação de escolha na posição original possui a noção de senso de justiça e empatia em relação aos demais membros da sociedade. A partir da crítica feita à Rawls pelos comunitaristas, procedemos na defesa de seus pressupostos fundamentais, ou seja, na plausibilidade da complementaridade entre uma concepção deontológica e teleológica de sociedade, na qual o justo e o bem podem ser complementares, como forma de superação dos conflitos políticos proporcionando então, a pretendida estabilidade e unidade das instituições sociais. Destacamos, ainda, a importância da noção de pessoa no modelo de representação oferecido por Rawls e conhecido como “posição original” mostrando que o modelo neocontratualista de Rawls não corresponde a uma concepção abstrata ou atomizada de pessoa. O objetivo central dessa tese foi responder se nossas escolhas do que é certo ou errado se dão a partir de uma concepção naturalizada de pessoa (conhecimento inato) ou de uma concepção política de pessoa (cultural), ou, até mesmo, da complementariedade de ambas. Se confirmada a hipótese da complementariedade entre as duas concepções, estaremos aptos a dar uma resposta às críticas endereçadas a Rawls por parte dos comunitaristas, mostrando que sua teoria não é abstrata ou atomista. A partir dessas considerações, analisamos na obra Elements of Moral Cognition, de John Mikhail, sua interpretação do equilíbrio reflexivo rawlsiano e a concepção naturalizada de pessoa, que afirma que os seres humanos possuem um conhecimento inato de uma variedade de regras, conceitos e princípios morais ou até mesmo jurídicos. Na obra Why Political Liberalism? de Paul Weithman, trabalhamos uma concepção política de pessoa, dando destaque para a reformulação da teoria de Rawls a partir da obra Political Liberalism (1993) mostrando a distinção entre o conceito moral de pessoa em A Theory of Justice (1971) e em Political Liberalism (1993). / One of the objectives of this research is to present to the reader the debate between communitarians (holists) and individualistic liberals (atomists), enlightening the assumptions defended by both regarding to their visions of person and society. From the reflection of the central elements of Rawls' theory in The Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993), we assessed the plausibility and sustainability of his doctrine towards his most prominent critics in the communitarianism area, among them, Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, highlighting their main objections to Rawls's work, more precisely to the moral conception of person in the original position. We showed that the theory of justice as equity is compatible with the ontological and epistemological demands of contemporary complex societies, asserting that the moral agent when submitted to a situation of choice in the original position owns the sense of justice notion and empathy towards the other members of the society. Based on the criticism on Rawls by the communitarians, we proceeded on the defense of his fundamental assumptions, it means, in the plausibility of the complementarity between a deontological and teleological conception of society, in which the just and the good can be complementary, as a way of overcoming political conflicts, and thus providing the desired stability and unity of social institutions. We also emphasize the importance of the notion of person in the model of representation offered by Rawls and known as "original position" showing that Rawls's neocontractualist model does not correspond to an abstract or atomized conception of person. The main objective of this dissertation was to answer whether our choices of what is right or wrong come from a naturalized conception of person (innate knowledge) or from a political conception of (cultural) person, or even from the complementarity of both. If the hypothesis of complementarity between the two conceptions is confirmed, we will be able to answer those criticisms addressed to Rawls by the communitarians, showing that his theory is not abstract or atomistic. From these considerations, we analyzed the work Elements of Moral Cognition written by John Mikhail, his own interpretation of the rawlsian reflexive equilibrium and the naturalized conception of person, which states that human beings have an innate knowledge of a variety of rules, concepts, and moral principles or even legal ones. In the book Why Political Liberalism? by Paul Weithman, we worked on a political conception of person, highlighting the reformulation of Rawls's theory based on the work political Liberalism (1993), showing the distinction between the moral concept of person in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993).

John Rawls developed principles of justice to guide the fair allocation of resources in a society. However, his principles did not take into consideration a society’s differing health needs. Norman Daniels attempted to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to apply to the allocation of health resources. In Just Health, Daniels argued that, under certain circumstances, an age-based allocation of health resources can be prudent. He proposed the Prudential Lifespan Account (PLA) to defend age-rationing against claims that it would lead to favoring one age-group over another. In this paper, I analyze Daniels’s PLA and argue that societal aging poses a significant threat to its effectiveness. I then examine and critique alternate theories to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to account for health, specifically those proposed by Dennis McKerlie and Hugh Lazenby.

The conversation to which my dissertation belongs is that which preoccupied John Rawls in Political Liberalism, namely: (1) how it is possible that a religiously and morally pluralistic culture like ours lives cooperatively from one generation to the next, and (2) The extent to which religious or moral convictions are appropriate bases for political action. My three-essay dissertation is about aspects of this investigation that affect minority or non-mainstream religious and cultural groups, since legal institutions, and theoretical models of them (such as Rawls’s and Ronald Dworkin’s) are in many ways ill-suited to accommodate their ways of life. In the first essay, I consider Rawlsian obstacles to developing a religiously impartial conception of “substantial burdens” on religious free exercise within First Amendment jurisprudence. I apply this question to federal cases in which Native American tribes sought to prevent government uses of land that would be, they claimed, catastrophic to their cultural survival and all citizens’ safety. I propose a jurisprudential model that places a heavier burden on judges to listen and perhaps translate such views, counting non-mainstream forms of reasoning as legally cognizable and sufficient to create a prima facie constitutional case, where current models would not. In the second essay, because few conceptions of justice require that law be cognizable and justifiable to everyone, I review liberal conceptions of what makes a cultural group or person “irrational” or “unreasonable.” With a focus on public education, and cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins in mind, I argue that approaches to “unreasonableness” from the likes of Rawls, Charles Larmore, Jonathan Quong, and Stephen Macedo are well-intentioned but unduly restrictive, insofar as they tend to, by definitional fiat, exclude citizens who embody widely recognized civic virtues, or who at least pose no threat to a stable democracy. In doing so, I argue that they instantiate the sort of social circumstance that Herbert Marcuse calls one-dimensionality. In the third essay, I consider whether a meaningful and practical model for “group rights,” which would include the right of peoples to preserve their cultures, can be developed within American jurisprudence. This argument is largely inspired by a paper from political scientist Vernon van Dyke, and considers overcoming challenges to this notion wrought by contemporary forms of liberalism and vehement public disagreement over recent, pertinent Supreme Court decisions involving associational rights, like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Citizens United v. FEC.

John Rawls's theory of justice, which he calls "justice as fairness," has proven to be most influential with regard to the course of contemporary political theory. In both of Rawls's books, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, his aim was to present a theoretically-compelling defense of deontological liberalism, and to present a set of principles by which to fairly order a just society. While Rawls's project has attracted a fair number of proponents over the years, it has also been a popular target for liberal and nonliberal critics alike. A recurrent theme among these criticisms has been an objection with Rawls's conception of the self as presented in A Theory of Justice. This thesis will focus on feminists' criticisms of Rawls's conception of persons. In general, feminists contend that Rawlsian liberalism suffers a structural gender bias resulting from Rawls's conception of the self. Rawls's notion of the self, feminists argue, rests on male or masculine attributes. I will demonstrate in the course of this thesis that feminists' charges fail on two accounts. First, feminists do not present an accurate reading of Rawls's conception of persons in either A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. Second, in reviewing feminist approaches to gendering the self (which is integral to their critique), it will be shown that feminists are unable to gender the self in a theoretically defensible manner. Thus, feminists cannot make the claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine concept. It follows from these twin defects that feminist contentions fail to prove that Rawls's theory is gender biased.

Communities near nuclear power plants are at potential risk from natural and man-made failures at the nuclear power plants located within those communities. This study explored the concerns and rationalizations of residents of a community who live within a 10-mile evacuation zone of the nuclear power plant located there. Using the general theory of deliberative democracy, the purpose of this qualitative study was to understand and explore why individuals continue to live close to nuclear power plants. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 15 individuals who live within a 10- mile radius of a nuclear power plant in the western US. These interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed using a modified Van Kaam procedure. Findings indicated that members of the community had concerns that natural or man-made disasters could lead to catastrophic failure of the nuclear power plant but rationalized living in proximity. Another key finding was that the community itself was supported by the revenue generated from the plant which led many of the participants to live in the community and this contributed to their rationalizing for why they should live close to the plant. The social change implications of this study included recommendations to mayors, city councils, and regulatory bodies to provide more information about nuclear power plants to communities to help them cope with fear and feelings of helplessness. Residents living near nuclear power plants would benefit from the recommendations made in this study because it would help them understand the risks of living near nuclear power plants.

This thesis examines the relation between two contrasting approaches to justice: the constructive and reconstructive projects of Rawls and Habermas on the one hand, and the deconstructive projects of Levinas and Derrida on the other. First, I identify the central difference between the two projects, reconstructing each account of justice as it develops in relation to Kant??s practical philosophy. I then argue that the two projects are complementary. [New Paragraph] Whilst Rawls and Habermas emphasise the possibility of objectively realising Kant??s idea of an impartial standpoint among autonomous persons, Levinas and Derrida defend the impossibility of determining the content of justice. Rawls and Habermas subscribe to the ??art of the possible??, rendering Kant??s impartial standpoint by means of the ??original position?? (Rawls) or the ??procedures of discourse ethics?? (Habermas). By contrast, Levinas argues for justice??s failure, discovering, in Kant??s moral law, a principle of responsibility for the particular other which conflicts with impartiality. Distinguishing himself from both the reconstructive tradition and Levinas, Derrida affirms, in part through his readings of Kant, the ??undecidability?? of the critical function of justice. Committed to the possibility of justice, Derrida also acknowledges its impossibility: no local determination can reconcile responsibility before the other with impartiality among all. [New Paragraph] Having identified the central difference between the two traditions, I then defend their complementarity. ??Reasonable faith?? in the possibility of justice must be supplemented by the acknowledgment of its impossibility. Conversely, attesting to justice??s failure is unsatisfactory without commitment to the possibility of constructing just social forms. Distancing myself from the liberal critique whereby deconstruction withdraws from the political (Fraser, McCarthy, Benhabib, Gutmann), I instead add my voice to a dissenting group (Young, Cornell, Mouffe, Honig, Honneth, Patton, Thomassen) which affirms that deconstruction can productively engage with the constructive tradition. Deconstruction is at home in Rawls?? view that ??the ideal of a just constitution is always something to be worked toward??.

This thesis is concerned with the concept of social justice. It is a concept increasingly used in educational literature, yet infrequently well theorized. However, if one of the key aims of education is the development of active and informed citizens who will work to further democratic processes and thereby a more just society, then teacher educators and policy makers need to develop in pre-service teachers a well considered sense of justice and a desire to teach for social justice. The problematic here is the highly contested nature of the meaning of social justice. Given the lack of a universally agreed upon understanding of what social justice means, a useful avenue of research is how do teachers, who are meant to carry out the above aims of education, understand social justice and what are possible implications of these understandings? Research of this nature is rare however, it is argued here that such research is important as the manner in which teachers understand social justice will have implications for the way in which they teach, the content they choose to present to their students, and their view of what a just society may look like. Accordingly, the aim of this thesis is to explore the understanding a sample of final year secondary pre-service teachers studying Studies of Society and Environment (SOSE) in a School of Education in a university in the State of Queensland, Australia, have, of the concept of social justice. The range of understandings of social justice held by this sample of pre-service teachers are then evaluated against a well known but infrequently well articulated (within the educational context) theory of social justice, that is, Justice as Fairness by John Rawls. Pre-service secondary teachers of SOSE, that is, social science teachers, were chosen for this research on the basis that it is they, who, by the nature of their subject disciplines, for example, history, geography, sociology, economics and political philosophy, are most likely to have greater opportunities to engage with issues of social justice, citizenship, and democracy within their teaching. Based on this assumption, teachers of SOSE should possess a greater knowledge of social justice compared to other teachers. While the focus of this research is on pre-service teachers of SOSE, it is incumbent on teachers of all discipline areas to work towards developing active and informed citizens who will work to expand and support democratic processes, as set out in the aims of education. As such, this research is relevant not only to social science teachers, but rather to all teachers. In order to carry out the above aim I modify and breakdown the complexity of Rawlsian theory to a number of more easily understood aspects or focal points of social justice and argue that the resulting conceptual framework is in line with both the aims of education previously stated and the widely accepted belief of Australia as an egalitarian society. Such a task, which has not previously been done within an educational context, seems timely as under the dominant neo-liberal ideology and the increased prominence given to difference theorists of social justice, issues of economic equality appear to have fallen off the agenda in recent governmental and educational social justice research and discourse. A phenomenographic research approach was used to ascertain the range of understandings a theoretical sample of 15 final year pre-service secondary teachers of SOSE had of social justice. Data were obtained from one-off semi-structured interviews. Phenomenographic research typically groups the pre-service teacher‟s responses into different categories or understandings of social justice. In this study, pre-service teachers displayed three qualitatively different ways of experiencing or understanding social justice. In brief, they characterized or understood social justice as: (1) providing equal opportunity; (2) as providing equal participation; or (3) as active citizenship. These categories may then be hierarchically arranged against the previously constructed Rawlsian framework. For example, in Category 3 (active citizenship), pre-service teachers understanding of social justice had more in common with the Rawlsian framework (indicating a deeper understanding of social justice) than either Category 1 or 2. Accordingly, Category 3 was ranked the highest under the above criteria followed by Category 2 and then Category 1. When compared with the Rawlsian framework, pre-service teacher‟s understandings of social justice were found to be lacking by varying degrees between the three categories in three key areas: social justice as a focus on structural inequality; social justice as a focus on a more egalitarian society; and social justice as a focus on active citizenship and the promotion of democratic processes. The implications of these omissions are discussed in terms of teaching for social justice, and promoting a more just and democratic society. In particular, the egalitarian nature of a Rawlsian framework directs future educational research, policy engagement, and teacher education on social justice to issues of poverty and inequality and their impact on the educational outcomes of low-income students in Australia and on the direction in which Australian society is heading. Accordingly, a case is made for the use of a Rawlsian framework of social justice in teacher education courses. However, such a framework is not to be regarded as the end point to debates of social justice, but as a useful starting point to a more substantive engagement with issues of social justice as they may apply to pre-service teacher education, and educational research and policy.

We can best understand the moral obligations of citizens and officials concerning public reason as set out by John Rawls when two differing standards latent in his body of work are made explicit. The weaker standard, which I call Public Representation (or PR), is exegetically supported primarily by the proviso found in his “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. PR allows that citizens may deliberate over serious political matters, both internally and with others, according to whatever perspective and using whatever reasons they please, so long as they believe the positions they advocate are adequately just and adequately justifiable with public reasons. I present PR as establishing a moral minimum citizens and officials bear an obligation to satisfy on pain of failing to garner an adequate degree of justice, respect, legitimacy, and stability. The more demanding standard, which I call Public Judgment (or PJ), is exegetically supported by quotes found throughout Rawls’s work, but especially in Political Liberalism, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. PJ requires that citizens deliberate over serious political matters, both internally and with others, according to a public perspective with public reasons, that they only advocate positions and offer justifications they consider most reasonable, and that they share their thought processes in public. PR is nonobligatory, but achieves significant gains according to each of the four key political values mentioned above, which gives dedicated citizens good reason to embrace it. Chapter one lays out and explores the big picture concepts framing the project; chapter two sets out Rawls’s view on public reason according to the primary texts; chapter three presents four contemporary liberal theorists’ views on public reason – Nicholas Wolterstorff, Robert Audi, David Reidy, and Micah Schwartzman; chapter four uses the lessons of chapter three to help fully unpack and compare Public Representation and Public Judgment; and chapter five considers three potential objections to my view and offers corresponding replies.

This thesis is a quantitative study of distributive justice between generations or age groups. It is theoretically informed by a synchronic generation approach and John Rawls’s theory of justice-as-fairness. The empirical part compares the economic positions of, and public spending on, children, adults and the elderly in 16 European countries. The theoretical part is used as a platform for the empirical analysis. In addition to Rawls, a discussion of distributive justice includes the classical theories of Plato and Aristotle and more recent utilitarian, egalitarian and desert-based theories. The synchronic generation approach is presented and compared to diachronic approaches to studies of generational relations. The synchronic approach is theorized by scholars working in the tradition of the social studies of childhood. The chapter on methods identifies children, adults and the old by way of age brackets, it presents indicators of public spending and income, and it points out empirical applications of equality, equal opportunity and the difference principle. The techniques of analyses are presented; descriptive analysis and OLS regression. The explanatory variables vary, but in all cases include economic performance, age structure and a modified version of Esping-Andersen`s classification of welfare states (Social Democratic, Conservative, Liberal and Southern European). Six research questions are answered in the empirical part, using official statistics from Eurostat, OECD and Statistics Norway. Over the past few decades there is an extensive growth on spending on the elderly, but spending on family and children does not decline. Multivariate analyses indicate that the size of old age and family and child benefits vary across welfare regimes. The Social Democratic and Conservative welfare states are more egalitarian and have lower poverty rates compared to the Liberal and Southern European welfare states. These regime variances are also seen in multivariate analyses of child poverty and old age poverty. Risk factors for child poverty are parental unemployment, children living with single parents, young parents, ethnic parents, and low educated parents. A multivariate analysis points to a link between the size of family and child benefits and fertility rates. / Children`s welfare: money, time and space

Liberals claim that the exercise of state power must be justified on terms that all citizens can reasonably accept. They also support democracy. The challenge is to bring these two desideratum in line-- to ensure that democratic deliberations are somehow predicated on claims that all citizens can reasonably accept. Put differently, the challenge is to set the terms of public reason. Liberal philosophers advance grand theories of political justice towards this end. They claim that a reasonable argument in the political sphere is one that conforms to theory x. The difficulty is that there will be those who reasonably reject theory x, preferring theory y or z, or eschewing theory altogether. Pessimism at the prospect of agreement on higher-order theories of justice leads some to advocate simple majority rule. The thesis argues that convergence on higher order theory is not essential to public reason. The Supreme Court of Canada’s method of adjudication under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is used as a model. Where basic rights are engaged, or are alleged to be engaged, the Court examines the reasonableness of law and policy using a series of open-ended tests. These tests discipline their deliberations by focusing attention on generally accepted facts and values (notably, the values expressed by the Charter). The thesis contends that the Court’s open-ended, contextual approach can serve as a model for broader public reasoning. The thesis then explores the role of religious arguments within this model. In a polity committed above all to Charter values, what is the place of religion in the justification of law? It is argued that religion is understood to be private and inscrutable under the Charter. This is what justifies the Court’s generous reading of the right to religious freedom. It also justifies our forbidding state coercion in the name of religion. With the preceding ideas in mind, the thesis examines Canadian law and public discourse on the issues of therapeutic cloning (ch.4) and same sex marriage (ch.5).