The construction of International Humanitarian Law and the norms regarding protection of prisoners of war have evolved as a reaction to the horrors of war. After September 11 and the following war on terrorism the notion of POWs has been widely debated. The USA holds prisoners at the navy base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba without granting them status as POWs; this thesis is placing the treatment of these detainees within a historical context. The norm concerning rights of POWs is today both internationalized and institutionalized, but that has not always been the case. This thesis illuminates how the norms have evolved during World War I, World War II and Vietnam War; finally the war against terrorism and the treatment of the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay is analyzed. The intention of the thesis is to use a historical overview of the evolution of IHL, and the rights of POWs in particular, to formulate a wider assumption about the implication of IHL in the war against terrorism and the future. The thesis adopts a theory which combines constructivism and John Rawls´ theory of justice and uses constructivist ideas about the nature of the international system applied to Rawls´ notion of justice. The constructivist theory and ontology are the basis of the theoretical framework of this thesis and Rawls´ definition of justice as the base of social institutions are viewed from a constructivist perspective. IHL and the norms regarding protection of POWs are thus considered as social facts, constructed and upheld through social interaction between states.

Cette thèse concerne la pensée de trois auteurs qui s’interrogent quant à la manière dont les philosophes politiques devraient procéder pour en arriver à comprendre et à juger les phénomènes politiques de manière adéquate : Raymond Geuss, Chantal Mouffe et Pierre Manent. Plus spécifiquement, elle se propose d’étudier les critiques que ces derniers dirigent à l’endroit de l’approche dominante en philosophie politique contemporaine et qui est à leur avis le mieux exemplifiée par l’œuvre de John Rawls. Aux yeux de ces derniers, cette approche, qui consiste essentiellement à s’engager dans une réflexion abstraite sur la nature de la justice définie comme l’ensemble des droits politiques dont les citoyens devraient légitimement pouvoir jouir, souffre d’un important manque de réalisme, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reflète très peu la délibération dans laquelle les citoyens et les hommes politiques doivent concrètement s’engager pour faire face aux problèmes politiques réels. Dans un premier temps, l’auteur expose les objections que Geuss, Mouffe et Manent formulent contre la philosophie rawlsienne et il présente les fondements de la pensée de ces trois auteurs. Il s’efforce ensuite de vérifier si leur critique du normativisme abstrait en philosophie politique nous permet toujours de penser un certain fondement aux jugements politiques.

The liberal tradition has borne great fruits since the dawn of the modern era by emphasizing the value of equality and personal liberty, and by developing a theory of rights. Despite its incredible success, many authors have been pointing to fissures in the liberal structure, including practical and theoretical problems with state neutrality, with the state’s stance vis-à-vis different cultures, and with liberalism’s purported radical individualism. It is my belief that the gains of liberalism can be reconciled within a new theory that better answers to such critiques. Citizenship Beyond Liberal Neutrality begins with an analysis of contemporary debate between liberalism and its critics. This leads to a discussion of the state’s relationship toward cultural identities, and to a discussion of the meaning of citizenship within a liberal-democratic state. What we need, I argue, is a civic identity that is both capable of judging cultural practices, and capacious enough for a citizenry characterized by reasonable pluralism. This common identity, moreover, provides a locus for attachment that is often found wanting in contemporary liberal theory. I draw on relevant insights from virtue theories, constitutional patriotism, and an ‘analogical’ understanding of public reason to inform a new, liberal-like conception of citizenship. In order to exemplify this conception, and to bolster the case for it, I consider how such a philosophy could play out with respect to two public policy areas that are central to citizenship, namely education and immigration. Distilled to its simplest, I argue for a theory of citizenship that admits a conception of the good, that can promote virtue while respecting autonomy, and that can provide a basis for civic unity.

This paper examines common and past applications of affirmative action, including arguments for and against the application; presents John Rawls’ theory of justice, and proposes a framework using Rawls’ theory for future applications of affirmative action. The proposal relieves heavily on the principle of fair equality of opportunity, both as an indicator for when using affirmative action is appropriate as well as a tool to help identify the people that affirmative action programs should target. Using this framework, the public education system is identified as a sector of society that fails to provide fair equality of opportunity for all citizens, and an example of how the Rawlsian conception of affirmative action should be used in practice to help address the inequalities and help restore equality of opportunity within the public education system is given. Objections to affirmative action, both in general and more specifically tailored to the model proposed in this paper, are raised and responded to. This paper comes to the conclusion that affirmative action programs, when targeted towards individuals who are denied fair equality of opportunity and have low rates of social mobility, will help create a more just society.

In this thesis my aim is to bring attention to the problem of sexual exclusion as experienced by members of the disability community and argue that this is an issue of justice. I do this by first discussing the value of sex. I maintain that sex is an integral part of a flourishing human life. Once this is established, I examine theories of justice and demonstrate how the systematic sexual exclusion of persons with disabilities can be understood as an injustice that must be addressed. Finally, I give an overview of some of the proposed solutions to the problem of sexual exclusion and conclude that the transformation of social attitudes is necessary for sexual justice. / Graduate / 0422 / trw.deboer@gmail.com

abstract: Large-scale land acquisition (LaSLA), also called "land grabbing" refers to the buying or leasing of large tracts of land, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by foreign investors to produce food and biofuel to send back home. Since 2007, LaSLA has become an important development issue due to the opportunities and threats for SSA countries. LaSLA has the potential to create local jobs, transfer technology, build infrastructure, and modernize SSA's agriculture. Nonetheless, it can also aggravate food insecurity, perpetuate corruption, degrade ecosystems, cause conflicts, and displace local communities. What drives LaSLA, what are its impacts on local people, and under what circumstances can we consider it as just and ethical? To examine what drives LaSLA, I used country level data from 2005 to 2013 on economic conditions, natural resources, business practices, and governance to estimate LaSLA models. I find that LaSLA increases with increasing government effectiveness, land prices, and the ease of doing business, and decreases with stronger regulatory regimes. To assess LaSLA's impacts on local people, I conducted a comparative case study in Tanzania. I compare changes in peoples' livelihood between treatment villages (those experiencing LaSLA) and control villages (those without LaSLA projects). The results show that under current practices, the risks of LaSLA outweigh the benefits to local livelihoods, yet there are potential benefits if LaSLA is implemented correctly. To philosophically examine whether LaSLA can be considered just and ethical, I apply John Rawls' theory of justice. The analysis indicates that from both procedural and distributive justice perspective, LaSLA currently fails to satisfy Rawlsian principles of justice. From these analyses, I conclude that if implemented correctly, LaSLA can produce a win-win outcome for both investors and host countries. I suggest that strong governance, rigorous environmental and social impact assessment, and inclusion of local people at all levels of LaSLA decision making are critical for sustainable and equitable outcomes. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Biology 2017

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / Este ensayo busca criticar y cuestionar el estatus moral de los animales no humanos y, por otro lado, su estatus jurídico. Defenderé cinco postulados. (1) Los animales no humanos son fines en sí mismos en sentido kantiano. (2) El reconocimiento de sujetos de derecho debe ser imparcial y no debe estar influenciado por el prejuicio de especie. (3) Debemos reconocer como sujetos de derecho a los seres vivos dotados de sensibilidad. (4) Existe una igualdad moral entre los animales humanos y los animales no humanos (5) Los animales no humanos deben ser reconocidos como personas en sentido jurídico.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000416581-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 626223 bytes, checksum: 7fea76adca3066a3de5bc7de0f03b330 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / As democracias ocidentais contemporâneas caracterizam-se pelo consenso a respeito da defesa dos direitos individuais fundamentais. O princípio da igualdade, tanto em sua formulação jurídica quanto em sua expressão social, tem por objetivo fazer com que fatores como poder econômico, influência política, origem familiar e preferências pessoais não possam promover desigualdades que não possuem justificativa moral. O princípio da liberdade tem por objetivo garantir espaço para a autonomia e a livre expressão individual. O conflito entre esses dois princípios, como se sabe, define o contexto tanto das conquistas e dos impasses dos regimes democráticos quanto o contexto do debate filosófico a respeito da fundamentação da democracia. Minha tese é a de que a instauração do individualismo nas democracias ocidentais é o resultado de um longo processo de desenvolvimento histórico que estabeleceu a igualdade – e não a liberdade – como o princípio organizador fundamental da ordem social democrática. Essa reavaliação permite superar os impasses gerados por teorias que colocam a autonomia e a racionalidade como fundamento das sociedades democráticas, inflacionando, assim, o conceito de liberdade, restringindo a política a processos de deliberação que deveriam se aproximar de condições idealizadas que não encontram correspondência na prática social e, quase sempre, pressupondo definições para o que seria a natureza humana, a escolha racional ou uma verdadeira autenticidade ou esclarecimento que permitiria escapar de todos os tipos de determinações heterônomas. Para indicar em que sentido proponho essa reavaliação, inicio retomando a obra de Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). Proveniente de uma família aristocrata em plena época pós-revolucionária na França, Tocqueville analisa a formação dos Estados Unidos da América mostrando que, na instauração da democracia americana, o ideal de igualdade ocupa um lugar anterior ao ideal de liberdade não só historicamente, mas também na justificação e na prática do sistema democrático. Subverte-se, assim, tanto a leitura da modernidade enquanto tentativa de efetivar conjuntamente os ideais de igualdade e liberdade, quanto a leitura de que o traço essencial da modernidade seria a instauração de uma racionalidade que acabou tornando-se instrumental ou técnica. Na primeira metade do século XIX, com uma interpretação que evita o unilateralismo, Tocqueville constata que a característica principal das democracias é o fato de que os homens, colocados em situação de igualdade, isolados e entregues a si mesmos, são indivíduos frágeis que, desprovidos de tradições, só possuem a razão para tentar justificar as leis que devem se auto-impor. Essa leitura tocquevilleana negativa da democracia moderna permite compreender fenômenos contemporâneos aparentemente tão incompatíveis quanto, por exemplo, o isolamento social e o amplo consenso em relação aos direitos humanos ou as instituições jurídicas como instância última de mediação dos conflitos sociais e a falência praticamente completa da lei e de quaisquer instrumentos de poder para lidar com questões humanas e, mais recentemente, tecnológicas.O individualismo democrático é, fundamentalmente, a consequência da efetivação cada vez maior do ideal moderno de igualdade. A filosofia política precisa levar a sério o fato de que, ao mesmo tempo em que corrói o ideal de uma racionalidade autofundante, essa condição democrática abre espaço, como nunca antes na história humana, para a responsabilidade individual. Essa responsabilidade é que nos permite, enquanto seres limitados e contingentes, chegar mais perto do ideal moderno de autonomia e autodeterminação.

abstract: Principles of climate mitigation in environmental ethics often draw on either considerations of fairness and forward-looking concerns, or on justice and backward-looking concerns. That is, according to some theorists, considerations of the current distribution of climate benefits and burdens are foremost, while others take repairing historic wrongs as paramount. Some theorists integrate considerations of fairness and justice to formulate hybrid climate principles. Such an integrative approach is promising particularly in the context of environmental harm to indigenous subsistence peoples, who are among those suffering the most from climate change. I argue that existing integrative climate principles tend not to sufficiently emphasize considerations of backward-looking justice. This is a problem for indigenous peoples seeking reparations for environmental harm and violations of their human rights. Specifically, indigenous people in the Arctic suffer a cultural harm from climate change as they lose their land, and their way of life, to erosion, cementing their status as climate refugees. I argue that the current climate situation facing Native Arctic people is unfair according to Rawls' second principle of justice. In addition, the situation is unjust as indigenous people suffer from emissions by others and few attempts are made for reparations. Thus, Rawlsian fairness combined with reparative justice provide a befitting theoretical framework. I conclude that an acceptable climate principle will adequately integrate considerations of both fairness and justice, both forward-looking and backward-looking considerations. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Philosophy 2014

Orientador: João Carlos Kfouri Quartim de Moraes / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-08T10:34:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_HudsonMarceloda_M.pdf: 1305428 bytes, checksum: 85d842430a1cbd2e45c585a5cb54c898 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Resumo: A questão dos direitos fundamentais ocupa um lugar de destaque na obra de John Rawls. O filósofo estadunidense empreendeu grande esforço para explicar as liberdades fundamentais e sua prioridade por entender que as doutrinas tradicionais, especialmente o utilitarismo, não são capazes de assegurar os direitos fundamentais aos cidadãos vistos como pessoas livres e iguais. Segundo o autor, os direitos fundamentais devem ser garantidos a todos os cidadãos indistintamente, pois são vistos como bens necessários para o desenvolvimento das duas capacidades morais da pessoa, quais sejam: a de ter uma concepção de bem e um senso de justiça. Apesar de Rawls conferir prioridade aos direitos fundamentais, ele aceita que tais direitos podem sofrer restrições. Tais restrições serão aceitas quando surgirem conflitos entre as diversas liberdades, com o objetivo de proteger o sistema global de liberdades. Serão também aceitas quando forem necessárias para promover as mudanças sociais necessárias para que todos os cidadãos possam efetivamente gozar das liberdades. Após revisar sua teoria, Rawls passou a defender explicitamente a necessidade de garantir aos indivíduos as condições materiais básicas necessárias para o efetivo exercício dos direitos fundamentais. Este estudo pretende analisar a questão da prioridade das liberdades fundamentais e também a sua relação com a questão da soberania popular. / Abstract: The question of the basic rights occupies a place of prominence in the workmanship of John Rawls. The american philosopher undertook great effort to explain the basic freedoms and its priority for understanding that the traditional doctrines, especially the Utilitarianism, aren?t capable to assure the basic rights to the seen citizens as free and equal persons. According to author, the basic rights must indistinctly be guaranteed to all the citizens, therefore they are seen as necessary goods for the development of the two moral capacities of the person, which are: a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. Although Rawls to confer priority to the basic rights, he accepted it that such rights can suffer restrictions. Such restrictions will be accepted when to appear conflicts between the diverse freedoms, with the objective to protect the global system of freedoms. They will be also accepted when they will be necessary to promote social changes necessaries so that all the citizens can effectively enjoy of the freedoms. After to revise his theory, Rawls started to defend explicit the necessity to guarantee to the individuals the necessary basic material conditions for the effective basic right of action. This study intends to also analyze the question of the priority of the basic freedoms and its relation with the question of the popular sovereignty. / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia