The purpose of this essay is to examine how God-talk can be used to say something reality depicting and potentially true, and at the same time contribute to a feminist aim where women and men are equally qualified in their talk about God. A pure shift from male to female metaphors and properties applied to God is rejected. Religious language that is used from a radical semantic realistic or radical semantic anti-realistic point of view is also rejected since those positions are not in line with the feminist aims. Metaphors are of value when examining how to speak about God. It is examined if, and in that case how, metaphors can express truths and say something reality depicting. It is argued that a theory of metaphors based on semantic modest anti-realism contributes with something more distinct than a theory of metaphors based on realism does. This distinction highlights the different uses in language between an analogical way and a modest anti-realistic use of metaphors. The three classical “ways” in religious language – univocal, analogical, and equivocal language – are possible to use from a feminist perspective of religious language. It is argued, however, that religious language that is supposed to be in line both with a feminist agenda and be able to contribute to our understanding of God, ourselves, and express truths must be based on a semantic modest realism or semantic modest anti-realism. Analogical language is the one and only religious “way” that is compatible with both semantic modest realism and semantic modest anti-realism. For that reason, it is argued, the analogical language has an advantage over univocal and equivocal language. Finally, four criteria are set up that a good feministic metaphor must achieve, and some remarks about the research of feminism and religious language still to examine is made. / Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur vi kan tala om Gud på ett sätt som kan vara verklighetsbeskrivande samtidigt som det gynnar feminismen och kvinnors och mäns lika rätt att tala om Gud. Ett rent skifte från manliga till kvinnliga metaforer om Gud avvisas. Religiöst språk som används ur en radikalt semantiskt realistiskt eller ett radikalt semantiskt anti-realistiskt utgångspunkt avvisas då dessa inte går i linje med en feministisk agenda. Metaforer är viktiga i undersökningen av hur vi kan tala om Gud. Det undersöks om, och i så fall hur, metaforer kan uttrycka något sant och verklighetsbeskrivande. Det argumenteras för att en metaforteori som utgår från semantisk modest anti-realism kan bidra med något mer distinkt och kreativt än en metaforteori som utgår från semantisk kritisk realism. Denna distinktion tyddliggör skillnaden mellan ett analogt religiöst språk och en semantisk modest anti-realistisk användning av metaforer. Både univokt, analogt och ekvivokt språkbruk kan användas ur ett feministiskt perspektiv. Analysen visar emellertid att ett religiöst språkbruk som ska gynna feminismen och samtidigt kunna uttrycka någonting sant och verklighetsbeskrivande måste utgå från semantisk kritisk realism eller semantisk modest anti-realism. Det analoga språkbruket är det enda religiöst språkbruk som är kompatibelt med både semantisk kritisk realism och semantisk modest anti-realism, varpå det analoga språkbruket har en fördel över univokt och ekvivokt språk. Tillsist ställs fyra kriterier upp som en bra religiös feministisk metafor måste möta. Uppsatsen avslutas sedan med några kommentarer om hur vidare forskning av religiöst språk med feministiskt språkperspektiv kan se ut.

I denna studie undersöktes hur realismen i vittnens numeriska konfidensbedömningar av sina minnesutsagor påverkades av om de först fick uttrycka graden av säkerhet med ord i en verbal konfidensbedömning och sedan i siffror i en numerisk konfidensbedömning, jämfört med om vittnen enbart fick göra en numerisk konfidensbedömningar. Deltagarna fick se en filmsekvens och därefter besvara frågor om filmen i en enkät. Dryga hälften av deltagarna fick göra numeriska konfidensbedömningar medan andra hälften fick besvara en likadan enkät fast med både verbala- och numeriska konfidensbedömningar. Vi fann inga signifikanta skillnader för de olika undersökta beroendemåtten korrekthet, konfidens, överkonfidens och kalibrering. Dock tydde resultaten på att den verbala- och numeriska konfidensbedömningen var associerad med en något sämre korrekthet av minnesprestation, med en något högre grad av överkonfidens samt en sämre kalibrering än för den betingelse som enbart är numerisk.

Thesis advisor: Ronald Tacelli / Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Reid are philosophers who, while writing from very different historical and intellectual contexts, both share a common conviction as epistemological realists. This paper will argue that, despite any initial appearances of conflict, their arguments and conclusions are both compatible and complementary, and that through such an agreement we can come to a richer understanding of the realist tradition. At the heart of this unity lie the shared principles that: * Knowledge involves a direct apprehension of things themselves. * Ideas are not themselves objects or intermediaries, but the active means by which the intellect understands. * The relationship between the mind and its object is not one of a material likeness, but of a formal likeness. * The existence of external objects of knowledge is not demonstrable, but is a self-evident first principle. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Paul Christensen / Revolutions have been a neglected subject in Structural Realism. Nevertheless, they have profound impacts in the International System, ranging from immediate state-unit behavior deviation to long-term altering of the balance of power. Revolutions can be explained within the Structural Realist paradigm as a structural contradiction between state and society that depresses state capabilities, allowing it to succumb to intra-territorial competition. Accordingly, revolution can be considered a mechanism for reconstituting state-unit power. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science.

When trying to make a game character come alive and add some sense of realism to a game, it can be done in multiple ways. Animating a 3D model is the commonly used one and it is usually done by hand. The artist moves the model's limbs bit by bit to make small animation clips that are then played in the game. This has a few drawbacks, it's time consuming and depending on what the character is doing in the game it won't always look accurate. Ragdolls can be used together with animations to help bring more realism to the model. Together with animation and colliders on the model limbs, it can simulate when the models limbs interact with objects on the screen. It can also simulate physical responses that happen. But some problems still remain that can't be solved by ragdolls and animation alone. One example is the foot position when a character walking up or down sloped terrain. The foot can clip through the terrain and destroy the sence realism, however ragdolls together with inverse kinematics can solve such problems.

After about 40 years of dictatorship of the Assad family the people of Syria were fed up and at the time of the Arab Spring 2011 a revolution in Syria started, which later on turned into a civil war which has been going on for seven years. This has led to the civilian population suffering from both the regime and the oppositional side. The UN has repeatedly submitted resolutions but none have gone through when Russia and China have used their veto rights. They point out that other countries should not get involved with Syria's internal affairs without the consent of Syria. The question that arises is why Russia prevents the UN from actin in Syria despite the humanitarian disaster that occurs in the country. By analyzing Syria based on the realism theory I will be able to map out the underlying reasons for why the UN are being prevented from acting. The method I will use is intentional analysis to reveal the hidden intentions and motives Russia has in Syria. The results of this study are that the action by the Russian side clearly shows that Russia has strategic motives in Syria to preserve its interests and to strengthen its structural position in the international politics. Russia's economic and geopolitical interests in Syria mean that they act according to their interests, thus preventing the UN from acting, as a possible regime change would represent an economical and geopolitical backlash for Russia. This means that realism explains the case best because it stresses that states act according to their own interests and that international organizations are meaningless.

Thesis advisor: Lisa S. Cahill / Naïve optimism pervades theological literature regarding human responses to ecological crises. What is needed is both hope and realism--despair will not resolve anything, but neither will an ecotheologian's vision of a "redeemed," harmonious restoration of the divinely intended natural order. A comparison of two theologians whose views seem at first to be in irresolvable conflict with one another may help to show what a "realistic hope" could look like. How do James M. Gustafson and Sallie McFague conceive of God as relating to human beings, and what do their conceptions imply for how humans should relate to nonhuman creation? These questions will necessarily examine their respective models of God, and how they utilize those models or images in their ecological ethics. I will argue that a synthesis of their views provides hope (despite the claims of those who dismiss McFague as naïve and Gustafson as overly pessimistic) through a third perspective akin to Douglas Ottati's notion of "hopeful realism." For Gustafson, the primary model of God is a sovereign, rather distant power--yet, Gustafson claims that humans are still responsible for attempting to discern what God enables and requires us to be and do. The weakness of his model is that it could lead to a sense of isolation from God as we strive to respond to the cries of creation seemingly on our own. Its strength is a realism that allows us to persevere in the face of ecological crises. Divine grace is present and enables human activity, even if this activity does not effect the changes we think it should. In contrast, for McFague, the primary model of God is an immanent deity whose compassion extends to all of creation--for her, the earth can be seen as God's body, and humans can be seen as co-caretakers or even partners with God as we seek to protect the earth. We should relate to non-human creation as we relate to God and to other humans--as subjects, and as "good" in and of themselves. We get the sense that God is with us in the trenches of ecojustice. The weakness of her model is its possible naïveté regarding historical possibilities and their theological significance. Its strength is its appeal to the inspiring nearness and salvific activity of God in this world, here and now. Divine grace is concrete and almost visible in its clear intention. Their models conflict, and yet these theologians share an ecological concern that is informed by their theological influences and their personal experiences of nature and human relationships. To demonstrate the complementary aspect of their views (and the relevance of this project in addressing ecotheological naïveté), I will also explore the practical application of their views to land ethics in primarily urban settings. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Sugere-se neste trabalho que o irrealismo constitui uma característica marcante da corrente dominante na ciência econômica que explica o desempenho decepcionante das atividades de previsão e explanação realizadas com base nesse paradigma. Após desenvolver o pouco claro conceito de irrealismo na ciência econômica, mostrando quando ele ocorre e quais são suas causas, busca-se relacionar sua presença com aquele desempenho decepcionante. Defende-se que ele pode ser explicado pela negligência da maior parte da corrente dominante em relação ao realismo de suas proposições, negligência traduzida na utilização amplamente difundida nas práticas dessa corrente de modelos irrealistas, que são aqueles que não buscam ou, se o fazem, não são bem-sucedidos em capturar uma parcela relevante da realidade. Sugere-se que o emprego de modelos irrealistas é geralmente - mas não sempre - o resultado da insistência do mainstream na ciência econômica em aderir à abordagem dedutivista em um mundo caracterizado pela não-ubiqüidade de regularidades estritas que ela invariavelmente pressupõe, e se manifesta tipicamente na aplicação generalizada em situações concretas de modelos econômicos fortemente abstratos cujos pressupostos implicam a operação de mecanismos que são inválidos nessas situações específicas. A explicação para esta tendência ao irrealismo do mainstream, por sua vez, se encontra no fato de que a grande maioria dos modelos elaborados a partir dessa perspectiva pressupõe a onipresença de estruturas de mercado competitivas a despeito de que em muitas - e mesmo na maioria das - situações reais elas estão claramente ausentes, o que decorre do viés ideológico que os economistas associados à corrente dominante possuem e que se caracteriza pela crença inequivoca nas insuperáveis virtudes do mecanismo de mercado e da propriedade privada como princípios orientadores centrais da organização da produção e mesmo da vida em sociedade. Essa crença se encontra na origem do liberalismo econômico tradicional e do neoliberalismo, e sua defesa obrigatoriamente requer que os mercados sejam, pelo menos em sua grande maioria, competitivos. Para satisfazer essa hipótese a ideologia neoliberal impõe à realidade a onipresença de estruturas de mercado competitivas, possíveis em abstrato mas geralmente ausentes em situações reais, o que faz com que os modelos construídos a partir da abordagem que a ela adere assim como a própria abordagem sejam freqüentemente irrealistas. / This work suggests that irrealism is a remarkable feature of mainstream in economics and explains the poor performance of both activities of prediction and explanation that heavily draw from this paradigm. After elaborating the unclear concept of irrealism in economics, showing when it occurs and what are its causes, I try to relate its presence to that poor performance. It\"s sustained that this performance can be explained by the negligence of most of mainstream practioners concerning the realism of their propositions, negligence that translates into the widely spread use of unrealistic models, those that do not try or, if they do, they don\"t succeed in capturing a relevant portion of the reality, in their practices. It\"s suggested that the use of such an unrealistic models is mostly - but not always - due to the insistence of mainstream economics in sticking to the deductivistic approach in a world where the strict regularities that it inevitably assumes are extremely scarce, and tipically shows itself in abstract models widely applied to concrete situations where their assumptions imply the operation of mechanisms that happen to be invalid in those specific situations. The account of that tendency to irrealism in mainstream economics should be looked for in the fact that the large majority of models they create assumes the ubiquity of competitive market structures despite in many real situations - probably in most of them - they are clearly absent, what is a result of the ideological bias that mainstream economists have, defined by the strong belief in the insurmountable virtues of the market mechanism and private property as general principles for the organization of production and even for life in society. This belief is found in the origin of traditional economical liberalism and of neoliberalism, and its defense inevitably requires markets to be, at least in their large majority, competitive. In order to satisfy that assumption neoliberal ideology imposes into reality the ubiquity of competitive market structures, possible as an abstraction but generally absent in real situations, what frequently making those models that heavily draw from this paradigm as well as the whole approach totally unrealistic.

by Amanda Jane Ryder. / Bibliography: leaves 158-162 / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / The purpose of this thesis is to compare and contrast the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James in two respects: (1) their ideas of reality and (2) their doctrines of the continuity of consciousness and its metaphysical implications. Chapter II traces their different theories of reality to basic differences in their metaphysical orientations. Peirce, as a metaphysical realist, maintains that general terms refer to ideas and laws which are realities apart from the particulars which manifest them and the minds which apprehend them. The real correspondents of general terms are within two realms of being: the realm of first-ness, which is possibility and feeling; and the realm of thirdness, which is law, meaning, and thought, all of which are synonymous. Both differ from the world of existence, or secondness, in which possibility is actualized, and in which ideas, including laws, are physically and mentally operative. [TRUNCATED]