The purpose of this paper is to uncover a new level of thinking regarding the discourse and debate around the standard of reasonable doubt and how it is used in our court rooms. The current argument surrounding the reasonable doubt standard has become circular and reached an impasse. By introducing the lens of social control and using the writings of notable French philosopher Michel Foucault, this paper looks at the origins and development of the reasonable doubt standard and links it with the increasing methods of social control present in punishment as well as evaluating the cultural narrative around its origin and assessing why this standard was permitted to continue to be a cornerstone of the Anglo-American judicial system.

This thesis is about the politics and the possibilities of aetiology. Firstly, the possibilities. Does an infectious disease have one, single pathogenic cause or many, interacting causes? In the medical microbiological sciences, there is no definitive answer, one way or another, to this question: there, the conditions of aetiological possibility exist in a curious tension. Ever since the birth of the 'germ theory of disease' and the concomitant birth of the singular aetiological object, these conditions have allowed for the co-existence of a very different, and far less well understood kind of object: the multifactorial object. That SARS was caused by one, singular viral agent, a coronavirus (CoV), is now entrenched as microbiological fact. And yet, the curious thing about SARS is that the history of the 2003 outbreak is littered with moments at which the possibility of the multifactorial object presented itself to, and was actively considered by, medical microbiologists. So how did we get here - to SARS-CoV, an infectious disease that could be understood and storied in this, the most singular of ways? And what happened along the way to deny the multifactorial aetiological object any kind of existence at all? In an attempt to grapple with these questions, the thesis seeks to recover the possibility of the multifactorial object through a deep, ethnomethodological reading of the moments at which it flared up precise/y as a possibility for medical microbiologists investigating the outbreak. What emerges from that recovery operation is a sense that the multifactorial object was never actually ruled out or disproved in any way, but rather, was vanished. Put another way, the suggestion is that various medical microbiological practices and interventions, whilst establishing singularity, were serving, at the same time, to create an illusion of multifactorality's non-existence; an illusion behind which the issue of multifactorality, its possibility, could be discarded without ever having to be resolved, one way or the other. In the closing sections of this thesis a move is made towards suggesting that SARS-Co V, the singular disease, was the product of a choice-, a choice that was made to explore one aetiological possibility at the expense of another. And that is where the politics comes in. For if politics, the realm of the political, can be taken to arise in situations where various possibilities exist but not all possibilities can be chosen, then it follows that what this thesis provides is an opportunity to foreground the politics bound up with the practical doing of aetiology. As a result, and based on the experience of attempting to recover the vanished multifactorial object from the 2003 SARS outbreak, the thesis concludes with an attempt to inhabit the present in such a way as to make it possible to think, in a little more detail, about where aetiology, as understood by medical microbiologists, might be heading in the future: might recent shifts in practical, everyday, seemingly innocuous microbiological technique, have begun to make it easier to coax the multifactorial object out into a space of visibility? Might those shifts actually herald the crossing of an epistemological threshold in the medical sciences? And might the conditions of aetiological possibility be changing, and changing in ways that would drastically alter what it meant to speak of a 'disease', an 'infection' and a 'pathogen'?

A partire dall’analisi di diverse sentenze particolarmente significative per l’accertamento del dolo, la tesi prende in considerazione i diversi orientamenti filosofici sul metodo scientifico nella spiegazione e comprensione dell’azione intenzionale. Prendendo posizione per l’autonomia del metodo scientifico nelle scienze umane, la tesi cerca di delineare una metodologia per l’accertamento del dolo che sia, al tempo stesso, rispettosa del principio di determinatezza nel diritto penale e della necessaria individualizzazione nell’accertamento dell’elemento soggettivo. L’analisi è condotta studiando le principali posizioni della dottrina italiana e tedesca sul tema, nonché attraverso un’indagine comparatistica sugli states of mind costitutivi della mens rea nel diritto inglese. Su queste basi e prendendo spunto dai casi giurisprudenziali trattati, la tesi propone un metodo di accertamento che utilizzi come base di comprensione la situazione vissuta dal soggetto concreto e, attraverso di essa, interpreti la condotta secondo i significati sociali pertinenti. Il lavoro si concentra, inoltre, sul tema dell’oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio, cercando di precisarne il significato nell’ambito del dolo, e sulla configurazione dogmatica del dolo, illustrando i riflessi dell’accertamento sulla sistematica del reato. In conclusione, la tesi cerca di esplorare la possibilità di riformare il codice penale inserendo una regola che renda maggiormente stringente e controllabile l’accertamento del dolo. / Starting from the analysis of several sentences that are particularly significant in terms of the assessment of intention, the thesis considers the different philosophical attitudes on the scientific method for the explanation and comprehension of wilful action. With due regard to the difference in the scientific method in human sciences compared to natural sciences, the thesis tries to outline a method for the assessment of intention that is in compliance both with the principle of empirical verifiability in criminal law and with the required individualisation in the assessment of the subjective element. The research was carried out analysing the main positions of Italian and German law on the issue, and through a comparative investigation over the states of mind that represent the mens rea in English law. On these grounds, and drawing inspiration from the legal cases analysed, the thesis suggests an assessment method that uses the situation experienced by the concrete subject as grounds for comprehension, and through this situation, interprets the conduct in accordance with pertaining social meanings. The work also focuses on the issue of beyond any reasonable doubt, trying to specify the meaning within the scope of intention; and on the dogmatic structure of intention, explaining the effects of assessment on the theory of crime. In conclusion, the thesis attempts to explore the possibility of reforming the criminal code by introducing a rule making the assessment of intention more strict and easy to control.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

A Reasonable Doubt is the act by which the Customs communicates the importer that doubts that this has declared the customs value in compliance with the valuation rules properly, requiring information and documentation necessary to verify that they have properly followed the rules valuation. In this article as we explore the conceptual and procedural aspects of management prerogative, we will try to find the limits to their exercise from the time, space and material point of view consistently (in concordance) with the rights and obligations of taxpayers. / Una Duda Razonable es el acto a través del cual la Aduana comunica al importador que duda que éste haya declarado el valor en aduanas cumpliendo las reglas de valoración adecuadamente, requiriendo la información y documentación que sea necesaria para verificar que se han cumplido adecuadamente con las reglas de valoración. En este artículo mientras analizamos los aspectos conceptuales y procedimentales de esta prerrogativa de la administración, trataremos de encontrar los límites a su ejercicio desde el punto de vista temporal, espacial y material en concordancia con los derechos y obligaciones de los contribuyentes.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.