Evitar que o tempo atue como agente de corrosão de diretos durante o longo período de pendência do processo deve ser uma verdadeira obsessão do processualista moderno, consciencioso da finalidade e da existência da ciência processual que constitui o seu objeto de estudo. A visão teleológica do processo como instrumento de realização do direito material deve estar presente na interpretação de todas as regras processuais, sempre tendo em mente o sábio conselho de Chesterton, para quem o homem pode enxergar mais longe se subir aos ombros dos que vieram antes. Romper com velhos dogmas para proporcionar resposta aos novos problemas é fazer com que o direito processual seja dinâmico, conferindo-lhe a capacidade de superar crises de efetividade. A alteração dos fatos durante a longa travessia que é o processo constitui o objeto deste estudo, sobretudo no que se refere aos impactos sobre importantes figuras e institutos processuais como a causa de pedir, a estabilização da demanda, a rigidez do sistema preclusivo, a inércia da jurisdição e a interpretação destes, plasmada nos princípios constitucionais do contraditório e da duração razoável do processo, que integram o conceito amplo do devido processo legal. Para alcançar tais propósitos, esta dissertação está estruturada em cinco partes. O acesso à ordem jurídica justa é o tema inicial e o primeiro capítulo é destinado ao seu estudo. Acesso à justiça não se confunde com estar em juízo. O seu real significado está relacionado com a realização da promessa constitucional de entrega da tutela jurisdicional a quem efetivamente tem direito a ela, sempre lembrando que ela deve ser justa, igualitária e tempestiva. O capitulo dois, núcleo da abordagem teórica do objeto deste estudo, centra-se na identificação da demanda e de seus elementos objetivos, em que se busca demonstrar a existência de uma pluralidade de possibilidades para a investigação do mesmo problema. A concepção alemã do objeto do processo (ou objeto litigioso) enfoca o problema de modo absolutamente distinto daquele concebido pelo direito italiano (teoria dos três eadem). O tempero dado pelas teorias da substanciação e individualização para identificação do núcleo resistente da causa de pedir demonstram a necessidade da análise dos elementos que compõem a demanda, em atenção ao direito material que se busca fazer valer em juízo. Os direitos autodeterminados e heterodeterminados reclamam a utilização de métodos distintos para identificação da causa petendi, demonstrando que esta figura jurídica goza de certa elasticidade. O capítulo três desenvolve a conceituação do fato superveniente e do fato de conhecimento superveniente, bem como o impacto distinto destes na esfera jurídica do autor e do réu, analisando o último momento do procedimento em que é praticamente possível introduzir o fato novo e, sobretudo, o real alcance do art. 462 do Código de Processo Civil. A interpretação deste dispositivo processual revela um poderoso alcance de notável utilidade para aperfeiçoamento do processo como método estatal de solução de controvérsias. O quarto capítulo problematiza os limites da modificação da causa de pedir no curso do processo, com a superação do dogma da estabilização da demanda. A não-incidência ou não-aplicação de regras processuais meramente formais para dar efetividade aos princípios constitucionais informadores do devido processo legal é a pedra de toque para a conclusão a que se chega ao fim do trabalho. O capítulo cinco, conclusivo do percurso analítico empreendido, apresenta o estágio de compreensão do objeto alcançado neste estudo. Garantido o contraditório e a ampla defesa, deve ser prestigiado o princípio constitucional da duração razoável do processo, cuja correta interpretação é dele extrair uma garantia de resolução integral da crise de direito material com o menor grau de perturbação social possível, ou seja, com o menor dispêndio de energia e tempo, o que implica reconhecer a possibilidade de modificação da causa petendi. / Avoiding time to act as a corrosion agent of rights during the long period of a pending case must be a true obsession for the modern expert in civil procedure, conscious of the purpose and existence of procedural science that constitutes its object of study. The teleological vision of the judicial process as an instrument of realization of substantive law shall be present in the interpretation of all procedural rules, always keeping Chestertons wise advice in mind, to whom a man can see further if he climbs on the shoulders of those who came before. Breaking with old dogmas to provide solutions to new problems is to make procedural law dynamic, giving it the capability to overcome crises of effectiveness. The change of events during the long journey of the case is the object of this study, particularly with regard to the impacts on important procedural figures and institutions such as cause of action, stabilization of claim, rigidity of the preclusive system, inertia of jurisdiction and its interpretation, present in the constitutional principles of adversary system and reasonable time of proceedings, which form the broad concept of due process of law. To achieve such aims, this dissertation is structured in five parts. The access to the fair legal system is the opening theme and the first chapter focuses on its study. Access to justice should not be confused with being at court. Its real meaning is related to the implementation of the constitutional promise of delivery of legal protection to those who are actually entitled to it, always remembering that it must be fair, equitable and timely. The second chapter, the core of the theoretical object of this study, focuses on the identification of the litigation and its objective elements and seeks to demonstrate the existence of a plurality of possibilities for the investigation of the same problem. The German conception of the subject matter (or litigious matter) analyzes the 194 problem in a completely different manner from that designed by the Italian Law (theory of the three eadem). The effect given by the theories of substantiation and individualization for the identification of the resistant core of the cause of action demonstrate the necessity of analyzing the elements of claim, in response to the substantive law that seeks to be enforced in court. The self-determined and heterodetermined rights claim the use of different methods to identify the causa petendi demostrating that this legal concept hás certain elasticity. The third chapter develops the concept of supervening fact and supervening knowledge of the fact as well as their different impact on the legal sphere of the plaintiff and the defendant; the last moment of the proceedings that permits the introduction of the new fact is analyzed and, especially, the actual scope of article 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The interpretation of this procedural provision reveals a remarkable range of powerful utility for improving the legal process as a state method of settlement. The fourth chapter discusses the limits to change the cause of action during the course of action overcoming the dogma of the stabilization of claim. The nonlevy or non-application of purely formal procedural rules to give effect to the constitutional principles which inform the due process of law is the cornerstone of the conclusion reached at the end of the work. The fifth chapter concludes the undertaken analytical path and presents the understanding stage of the object of this study. Being the adversary system and full defense guaranteed, the constitutional principle of reasonable time of proceedings must be considered. Its correct interpretation is to acquire a guarantee of full resolution of the crisis of substantive law with the lowest degree of social disruption as possible, i.e., the lowest expenditure of energy and time, which means recognizing the possibility of changing the causa petendi.

O direito à razoável duração do processo, inserido expressamente no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro a partir do advento da Emenda Constitucional 45/2004, já poderia ser inferido desde a incorporação da Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos, bem como ser considerado um corolário da garantia do devido processo legal. Todo indivíduo tem o direito a um processo sem dilações indevidas, em especial aquele que se encontre submetido a uma prisão preventiva, medida cautelar pessoal de extrema gravosidade. Nesse contexto, exsurge o direito que o indivíduo preso preventivamente tem de que o seu processo seja julgado em um prazo razoável ou de que ele seja desencarcerado, caso preso além da necessidade fática contida no caso concreto. Entretanto, a interpretação da garantia não pode restar somente à livre vontade dos aplicadores do direito, sendo necessária uma regulamentação legal efetiva da duração da prisão preventiva, por meio de prazos concretos nos quais o sujeito deverá ser posto em liberdade, ante a desídia estatal. Incorporando experiências estrangeiras, deve o legislador pátrio adotar marcos temporais legais, em que a prisão preventiva deverá cessar, caso excessivamente prolongada. Muito embora no ano de 2011 tenha sido reformada a tutela das medidas cautelares pessoais no Código de Processo Penal, o legislador ordinário não aprovou a imposição de limites de duração da prisão preventiva, permanecendo ao livre arbítrio das autoridades judiciárias a interpretação da garantia em referência. Assim, o Projeto de Lei do Novo Código de Processo Penal, atualmente em trâmite no Congresso Nacional, ao prever limites máximos de duração da prisão preventiva, dá uma efetiva regulamentação à garantia da duração razoável do imputado preso, devendo ser, espera-se, mantido no eventual texto final aprovado. / The right to reasonable duration of process, inserted expressly into Brazilian law from the advent of the 45th Constitutional Amendment, of 2004, could already be inferred since the incorporation of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as be considered a corollary of the due process of law clause. Each individual has the right to a process without undue delay, specially those submitted to preventive detention, personal precautionary measure of extreme severity. In this context, arises the right of the individual who is preventively arrested that his case is ruled within a reasonable time, or that he is set free, when remanded beyond factual necessity. However, the interpretation of such right cannot be left only to the free will of law enforcers, needing an effective legal regulation regarding the duration of preventive detentions, through concrete marks in which the individual must be set free, before the state negligence. Incorporating foreign experiences, Brazilian legislator must adopt temporal legal marks, in which preventive detention must cease, in case it is excessively delayed. Despite modification in 2011 of the legal regulation of personal precautionary measures contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, the ordinary legislator did not approve the imposition of limits of duration regarding preventive detention, remaining to the free will of judicial authorities the interpretation of the referred right. Thus, the Project of the New Criminal Procedure Code, currently in progress through the National Parliament, containing maximum limits of duration regarding preventive detention effectively regulates such guarantee thus must be, as expected, held in the final approved legal text.

O direito à razoável duração do processo, inserido expressamente no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro a partir do advento da Emenda Constitucional 45/2004, já poderia ser inferido desde a incorporação da Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos, bem como ser considerado um corolário da garantia do devido processo legal. Todo indivíduo tem o direito a um processo sem dilações indevidas, em especial aquele que se encontre submetido a uma prisão preventiva, medida cautelar pessoal de extrema gravosidade. Nesse contexto, exsurge o direito que o indivíduo preso preventivamente tem de que o seu processo seja julgado em um prazo razoável ou de que ele seja desencarcerado, caso preso além da necessidade fática contida no caso concreto. Entretanto, a interpretação da garantia não pode restar somente à livre vontade dos aplicadores do direito, sendo necessária uma regulamentação legal efetiva da duração da prisão preventiva, por meio de prazos concretos nos quais o sujeito deverá ser posto em liberdade, ante a desídia estatal. Incorporando experiências estrangeiras, deve o legislador pátrio adotar marcos temporais legais, em que a prisão preventiva deverá cessar, caso excessivamente prolongada. Muito embora no ano de 2011 tenha sido reformada a tutela das medidas cautelares pessoais no Código de Processo Penal, o legislador ordinário não aprovou a imposição de limites de duração da prisão preventiva, permanecendo ao livre arbítrio das autoridades judiciárias a interpretação da garantia em referência. Assim, o Projeto de Lei do Novo Código de Processo Penal, atualmente em trâmite no Congresso Nacional, ao prever limites máximos de duração da prisão preventiva, dá uma efetiva regulamentação à garantia da duração razoável do imputado preso, devendo ser, espera-se, mantido no eventual texto final aprovado. / The right to reasonable duration of process, inserted expressly into Brazilian law from the advent of the 45th Constitutional Amendment, of 2004, could already be inferred since the incorporation of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as be considered a corollary of the due process of law clause. Each individual has the right to a process without undue delay, specially those submitted to preventive detention, personal precautionary measure of extreme severity. In this context, arises the right of the individual who is preventively arrested that his case is ruled within a reasonable time, or that he is set free, when remanded beyond factual necessity. However, the interpretation of such right cannot be left only to the free will of law enforcers, needing an effective legal regulation regarding the duration of preventive detentions, through concrete marks in which the individual must be set free, before the state negligence. Incorporating foreign experiences, Brazilian legislator must adopt temporal legal marks, in which preventive detention must cease, in case it is excessively delayed. Despite modification in 2011 of the legal regulation of personal precautionary measures contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, the ordinary legislator did not approve the imposition of limits of duration regarding preventive detention, remaining to the free will of judicial authorities the interpretation of the referred right. Thus, the Project of the New Criminal Procedure Code, currently in progress through the National Parliament, containing maximum limits of duration regarding preventive detention effectively regulates such guarantee thus must be, as expected, held in the final approved legal text.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:27:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CarlosFN_DISSERT.pdf: 1117429 bytes, checksum: fd5c9f1fb5bd475f5333136bbafa92c1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-29 / This dissertation aims to address the limits and possibilities of realizing the fundamental right to reasonable time of the Brazilian legal system process. From this perspective, we analyze a reasonable time concept for the process, consistent with the civil homeland process; the relationship between efficiency, effectiveness, legal security and reasonable time of adjudication; a formal recognition of the fundamental right to reasonable time of the procedure in the Constitution of 1988; and the immediate applicability of this fundamental right. As indicated, the crisis of the Judiciary and procedural delay are problems directly related to the limits and possibilities of realization of the fundamental right under study. Moreover, we also present some mechanisms that can be used to overcome these problems. The subject was developed based on constitutional interpretation of fundamental rights, an approach that will always have this concern to be based on a methodology which includes the normative and empirical-dogmatic fields, realizing the fundamental right to reasonable time of the process. We adopted as methodological approach the study of this issue in judicial aspect, more specifically in the field of civil procedure. Finally, we weave through a critical and analytical view, our conclusions, which demonstrate the possibilities of overcoming the limits imposed to immediate implementation of the fundamental right to reasonable time of the process in our legal system / A presente disserta??o tem por objetivo abordar os limites e possibilidades de concretiza??o do direito fundamental ao tempo razo?vel do processo no ordenamento jur?dico brasileiro. Nessa perspectiva, analisamos uma concep??o de tempo razo?vel do processo adequada ao processo civil p?trio; a rela??o entre efic?cia, efetividade, seguran?a jur?dica e o tempo razo?vel da presta??o jurisdicional; a positiva??o formal do direito fundamental ao tempo razo?vel do processo na Constitui??o Federal de 1988; e a aplicabilidade imediata desse direito fundamental. S?o indicadas a crise do Judici?rio e a demora processual como problemas relacionados diretamente aos limites e possibilidades de concretiza??o do direito fundamental em estudo. Apresentamos, ainda, alguns mecanismos que podem ser utilizados na supera??o desses problemas. O tema foi desenvolvido com base no vi?s constitucional de interpreta??o de direitos fundamentais, abordagem que ter? sempre presente a preocupa??o de pautar-se numa metodologia que contemple os campos normativo, emp?rico-dogm?tico e de concretiza??o do direito fundamental ao tempo razo?vel do processo. Adotamos como corte metodol?gico o estudo dessa problem?tica no ?mbito judicial, mais especificamente, no campo do processo civil. Por fim, tecemos, numa vis?o anal?tica e cr?tica, nossas conclus?es, as quais demonstram as possibilidades de supera??o aos limites impostos ? concretiza??o imediata do direito fundamental ao tempo razo?vel do processo em nosso ordenamento jur?dico

Evitar que o tempo atue como agente de corrosão de diretos durante o longo período de pendência do processo deve ser uma verdadeira obsessão do processualista moderno, consciencioso da finalidade e da existência da ciência processual que constitui o seu objeto de estudo. A visão teleológica do processo como instrumento de realização do direito material deve estar presente na interpretação de todas as regras processuais, sempre tendo em mente o sábio conselho de Chesterton, para quem o homem pode enxergar mais longe se subir aos ombros dos que vieram antes. Romper com velhos dogmas para proporcionar resposta aos novos problemas é fazer com que o direito processual seja dinâmico, conferindo-lhe a capacidade de superar crises de efetividade. A alteração dos fatos durante a longa travessia que é o processo constitui o objeto deste estudo, sobretudo no que se refere aos impactos sobre importantes figuras e institutos processuais como a causa de pedir, a estabilização da demanda, a rigidez do sistema preclusivo, a inércia da jurisdição e a interpretação destes, plasmada nos princípios constitucionais do contraditório e da duração razoável do processo, que integram o conceito amplo do devido processo legal. Para alcançar tais propósitos, esta dissertação está estruturada em cinco partes. O acesso à ordem jurídica justa é o tema inicial e o primeiro capítulo é destinado ao seu estudo. Acesso à justiça não se confunde com estar em juízo. O seu real significado está relacionado com a realização da promessa constitucional de entrega da tutela jurisdicional a quem efetivamente tem direito a ela, sempre lembrando que ela deve ser justa, igualitária e tempestiva. O capitulo dois, núcleo da abordagem teórica do objeto deste estudo, centra-se na identificação da demanda e de seus elementos objetivos, em que se busca demonstrar a existência de uma pluralidade de possibilidades para a investigação do mesmo problema. A concepção alemã do objeto do processo (ou objeto litigioso) enfoca o problema de modo absolutamente distinto daquele concebido pelo direito italiano (teoria dos três eadem). O tempero dado pelas teorias da substanciação e individualização para identificação do núcleo resistente da causa de pedir demonstram a necessidade da análise dos elementos que compõem a demanda, em atenção ao direito material que se busca fazer valer em juízo. Os direitos autodeterminados e heterodeterminados reclamam a utilização de métodos distintos para identificação da causa petendi, demonstrando que esta figura jurídica goza de certa elasticidade. O capítulo três desenvolve a conceituação do fato superveniente e do fato de conhecimento superveniente, bem como o impacto distinto destes na esfera jurídica do autor e do réu, analisando o último momento do procedimento em que é praticamente possível introduzir o fato novo e, sobretudo, o real alcance do art. 462 do Código de Processo Civil. A interpretação deste dispositivo processual revela um poderoso alcance de notável utilidade para aperfeiçoamento do processo como método estatal de solução de controvérsias. O quarto capítulo problematiza os limites da modificação da causa de pedir no curso do processo, com a superação do dogma da estabilização da demanda. A não-incidência ou não-aplicação de regras processuais meramente formais para dar efetividade aos princípios constitucionais informadores do devido processo legal é a pedra de toque para a conclusão a que se chega ao fim do trabalho. O capítulo cinco, conclusivo do percurso analítico empreendido, apresenta o estágio de compreensão do objeto alcançado neste estudo. Garantido o contraditório e a ampla defesa, deve ser prestigiado o princípio constitucional da duração razoável do processo, cuja correta interpretação é dele extrair uma garantia de resolução integral da crise de direito material com o menor grau de perturbação social possível, ou seja, com o menor dispêndio de energia e tempo, o que implica reconhecer a possibilidade de modificação da causa petendi. / Avoiding time to act as a corrosion agent of rights during the long period of a pending case must be a true obsession for the modern expert in civil procedure, conscious of the purpose and existence of procedural science that constitutes its object of study. The teleological vision of the judicial process as an instrument of realization of substantive law shall be present in the interpretation of all procedural rules, always keeping Chestertons wise advice in mind, to whom a man can see further if he climbs on the shoulders of those who came before. Breaking with old dogmas to provide solutions to new problems is to make procedural law dynamic, giving it the capability to overcome crises of effectiveness. The change of events during the long journey of the case is the object of this study, particularly with regard to the impacts on important procedural figures and institutions such as cause of action, stabilization of claim, rigidity of the preclusive system, inertia of jurisdiction and its interpretation, present in the constitutional principles of adversary system and reasonable time of proceedings, which form the broad concept of due process of law. To achieve such aims, this dissertation is structured in five parts. The access to the fair legal system is the opening theme and the first chapter focuses on its study. Access to justice should not be confused with being at court. Its real meaning is related to the implementation of the constitutional promise of delivery of legal protection to those who are actually entitled to it, always remembering that it must be fair, equitable and timely. The second chapter, the core of the theoretical object of this study, focuses on the identification of the litigation and its objective elements and seeks to demonstrate the existence of a plurality of possibilities for the investigation of the same problem. The German conception of the subject matter (or litigious matter) analyzes the 194 problem in a completely different manner from that designed by the Italian Law (theory of the three eadem). The effect given by the theories of substantiation and individualization for the identification of the resistant core of the cause of action demonstrate the necessity of analyzing the elements of claim, in response to the substantive law that seeks to be enforced in court. The self-determined and heterodetermined rights claim the use of different methods to identify the causa petendi demostrating that this legal concept hás certain elasticity. The third chapter develops the concept of supervening fact and supervening knowledge of the fact as well as their different impact on the legal sphere of the plaintiff and the defendant; the last moment of the proceedings that permits the introduction of the new fact is analyzed and, especially, the actual scope of article 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The interpretation of this procedural provision reveals a remarkable range of powerful utility for improving the legal process as a state method of settlement. The fourth chapter discusses the limits to change the cause of action during the course of action overcoming the dogma of the stabilization of claim. The nonlevy or non-application of purely formal procedural rules to give effect to the constitutional principles which inform the due process of law is the cornerstone of the conclusion reached at the end of the work. The fifth chapter concludes the undertaken analytical path and presents the understanding stage of the object of this study. Being the adversary system and full defense guaranteed, the constitutional principle of reasonable time of proceedings must be considered. Its correct interpretation is to acquire a guarantee of full resolution of the crisis of substantive law with the lowest degree of social disruption as possible, i.e., the lowest expenditure of energy and time, which means recognizing the possibility of changing the causa petendi.

Public administration plays a major role in some countries that benefits citizens and government. Therefore, the government needs to uphold a standard of effectiveness in public administration. Research has been done in effectiveness in public administration in individual countries with limited research on certain aspects. However, not much research has been done on effectiveness of public administration which is linked to case management in Scandinavian countries. In the Swedish Administration Act, an efficiency principle has been incorporated which provides an opportunity for the delay in the case of delayed processing. At present there is no such opportunity in Norway. Aim to clarify what protection there is for individuals against delay in case management in Swedish and Norwegian law and whether this is consistent with the international commitments to which the countries are bound, primarily the principle of efficiency. The purpose is therefore to clarify what applies in each country, and to compare protection in both countries and whether this is compatible with international law, primarily the European Convention and EU law. Two methods have been used: the legal dogmatic and the comparative method. The result indicates that there is clearly that both countries tried to reduce resources in administrative case management by simplifying the rule. But this is not closed to meeting the requirement for efficiency in case management. Imposing penalties for case handling are not enough if there is no effective remedy that can uphold international law. Consequently, the delay speech without effective remedies will not lead to any major changes in practice in Swedish law. Norway is in the process of reviewing its provisions. This study is expected to draw attention to international law that is linked to public administration.

The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms drawn up in Rome on 4 November 1950, entered into force in September 1953, consolidated the minimal standarts of human rights protection which are equally binding for all democratic Europe countries. Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair trial – one of the favourable condition to realize human rights. It is the fundamental right and the guarantee of other human rights protection. The aim of the master thesis is to scrutinize the conception of the right to a fair trial under the Article 6 of the European Convention, its content and the practice of The European Court of Human Rights on this question. It is considering especially urgent questions of the Article‘s 6 application. On that ground the position of the Court is formed and the analysed regulations becomes the part of theory. The master thesis should create the basis for the further analysis of the Article 6 and promote the publication of the problem on human rights and safeguard them in Lithuania. In the Article 6 there is determined the right that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reaonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. In the Convention sense the right to a fair trial is interpreted widely because of its significance in the democratic society. Otherwise the narrow interpretation of Article 6 would not answer the purpose. The right to a fair trial should be analysed as the whole... [to full text]

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage. / The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights.