In 1945/46, after the surrender of Germany in the Second World War, approximately twelve million German civilians living in Central and Eastern Europe were expelled (or fled before they received the inevitable expulsion order) mostly to Germany in what R.M. Douglas termed the "largest forced population transfer [...] in human history." Even though these events occurred over sixty years ago, the recollections of these expellees suggest the ongoing immediacy of their experiences. For this phenomenological-historical ethnography, I collected more than eighty life stories and oral histories specifically from ethnic Germans expelled from Bohemia, Moravia, and Czech Silesia (Sudeten Germans). Through the lenses of musical practice and musical repertoire, I investigate how these Sudeten Germans used and still continue to use music as a tool for both remembrance and adaptation in their new environments. I seek to understand music's significances for social and political integration in the Sudeten-Germans' "new sounding homeland" in West Germany. Taken one at a time, these recollections disclose the various ways in which music and musical practices retrieve memories of their Bohemian homelands and are able to mitigate both the loss of those homelands and the distressing overall effects of expulsion. Woven together, these recollections reveal how music offers emotional solace and facilitates the building of a new sense of belonging in the face of geographic displacement and material dispossession. I then compare these recollections to memories of Sudeten Germans expelled to the former East Germany as well as to the memories of Germans who were forced to stay in Czechoslovakia. This comparison highlights how the reframing and even silencing of musical practices in these environments affected processes of social identity reconstruction until the 1989 Velvet Revolution. I suggest that the analysis of the Sudeten Germans' individual musical experiences reveals new perspectives of how they used and still use musical practices to negotiate intercultural power relations and rebuild a sense of Heimat (notion of belonging to a place of origin). Broadly speaking, the results of this study facilitate an understanding of the phenomenon of forced migration and how music is able to reflect, reframe, and renegotiate it.

(in English): My goal is to demonstrate that witnesses of certain historical events can describe their experiences in a variety of ways without distorting actual facts. The subject of my research is a reflection of the Czech Jewry Genocide through the eyes of a generation born during the so-called first Czechoslovak Republic. On the day of their liberation, Czech Jews who had survived Shoah were mainly unified in the fundamental aspects of the perception of their past in Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camps, regardless of whether their native tongue was Czech or German. What's more, any ideological differences that could have possibly existed between them in pre-war years, ceased being important under the influence of a common fate. It is fair to say then, that from the viewpoint of Czech Shoah Survivors in 1945, they constituted a relatively unified group but not for much longer. After the end of WWII, these people returned to the newly established Czechoslovak Republic and the point of view within the groups gradually began to vary. For some, the new regime had fulfilled their expectations. The majority of Czech Jews however, chose to emigrate after the Communist Coup d'etat and in time began to share their war experiences. The Jews in the Czech Republic began telling their stories as well....

Why does it appall us if the CEO of a German prime bank lays off his employees despite sufficient revenue? Why do we feel contempt for Klaus Zumwinkel, a well-known tax evader? Why is Bill Gates admired for donating billions of dollars to a foundation? The answer to these questions appears to be remarkably simple: Because one seems wrong whereas the other right. More precisely, it is either morally right or morally wrong. This dissertation deals with emotions that arise when we assess peoples’ actions. Such emotions can be described as moral emotions. On the one hand, I am particularly interested in how these emotions are created. On the other hand, the consequences of identifying these emotions and therefore the function of moral emotions take on a significant role for me as well. I proceed on the assumption that these emotions have a mediating role for subsequent actions. Therefore, the key issues are why we experience the emotions we have and moreover, what is to be expected when we feel these emotions. Here, moral emotions are of major importance when transitioning from thinking to acting. Weiner (2006) and Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer and Weiner (2004) previously described emotional reactions as mediating factors between cognitive processes (attributions) and subsequent behavior. Similar to this sequential model, moral emotions supposedly serve as a quick and efficient basis for decision-making regarding subsequent behavior as the heuristics advocated by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999). Here, moral emotions function as ‘heuristic cues’ that can channel our behavior. Even modern theories in computer and information science depict the human being as an “emotional machine” making use of emotionally driven programs in order to mediate between dynamic input factors from nature and adaptive output processes in terms of behavioral reactions. (Minsky, 2007) The methods of my research rely on a true role model: Charles Darwin. In his work “The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals” from 1872, Darwin also considered the question of what role emotions play and how they are created. Darwin (1872) proposed six potential methods to examine emotions in more detail (for an overview see Meyer, Schützwohl, & Reisenzein, 2008). Although Darwin mainly focused on the phylogenetic history and particularly dealt with the expression of mimicking as well as the congenital and inherited trigger conditions of emotional reactions, his findings and methods nevertheless were the role model for generations of emotion researchers and are still of great relevance (Izard, 1971, 1991, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Rudolph, Schulz, & Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tomkins, 1963, 1962; Weiner, 2006). So far, Rudolph, Schulz and Tscharaktschiew (2013) have presented an empirically supported taxonomy of moral emotions and thereby have identified universally valid leading conditions of moral emotions. They are guided by attributional concepts as previously described by Heider (1958) in the context of his naïve analysis of action using forced-choice methods for selecting emotions with their subjects. Rudolph et al. (2013) divided moral emotions into emotions that assess one’s own actions (so-called actor emotions) or other people’s actions (so-called observer emotions). It becomes apparent that our moral identification of emotions depends on whether a) this action was considered as good or bad in terms of a moral standard, b) the goal of an action was or was not attained and c) the acting person made or did not make an effort in doing so. These dimensions are known as ought (a), goal-attainment (b) and effort (c). I am particularly interested in whether the dimensions discovered by Rudolph et al. (2013) will appear in autobiographical and free reports. Furthermore, I will examine more in depth the scenarios predicted by the theory and individual emotions in different test settings. All studies are conducted on an empirical basis using quantitative and qualitative methods that were previously applied by Darwin (1872) in modified form. First, I will examine whether the categories ought, goal-attainment and effort established by Rudolph et al. (2013) could be traced in recalled reports of emotional episodes using qualitative methods. Afterwards, extremely similar emotions will be distinguished in enhanced detail using a category system. Emotions such as anger, disgust and despite will be scrutinized in an experimental setting for the first time. It will be determined whether a sequential model of cognition emotion behavior already develops by the early stages using the complex emotions schadenfreude and sympathy with preschool children. For prisoners and people suffering from a personality disorder, the emotions of guilt and shame will be distinguished. In addition, the link to future behavior as well as neurological particularities of such groups of people will be taken into consideration. In my work, I will intensively scrutinize the category system assumed by Rudolph et al. (2013). Simultaneously, emotions that have been extremely similar or strongly connected thus far will be analyzed and described to a finer extent. Eventually, results will allow for a better understanding regarding the prediction of subsequent behavior.:Acknowledgments I Danksagung III Preliminary Remarks V Summary VI Zusammenfassung VIII List of Contents X List of Figures XII List of Tables XIV 1. Introduction 1 1.1. What is an Emotion? 1 1.2. The Case of Moral Emotions – Naïve Scientists and Everyday Judges 3 1.3. A Classification of Moral Emotions 4 1.4. Social Functions of Moral Emotions 7 1.5. Expanding a Coherent Theory of Moral Emotions – A Darwinian Perspective 9 1.6. Aims and Scopes / Overview of Several Chapters Within this Monograph 12 2. The Everyday Moral Judge – Autobiographical Recollections of Moral Emotions 17 2.1. Abstract 17 2.2. Introduction 18 2.3. Method 25 2.4. Results 29 2.5. Discussion 51 3. Emotional Disapproval – Cognitive and Social Determinants of Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 57 3.1. Abstract 57 3.2. Introduction 58 3.3. Method 64 3.4. Results 68 3.5. Discussion 77 4. Causes and Consequences of Schadenfreude and Sympathy: A Developmental Analysis. 81 4.1. Abstract 81 4.2. Introduction 82 4.3. Study 1: Goal-Attainment and Approach 87 4.4. Study 2: Type of Relation and Granted Benefit 98 4.5. Study 3: Valence of Behavior, Responsibility and Granted Benefit 105 4.6. Overall Discussion 116 5. Shame or Guilt – How Moral Emotions Affect the Probability of Relapse 119 5.1. Abstract 119 5.2. Outline 120 5.3. Testing the Relation of Emotional Reactions and Recidivism Rates in a Forensic Sample 127 5.4. Shame and Guilt as Predictors for Recidivism 131 5.5. Practical Implications and Outlook 135 6. Psychopathy and Spatial Abilities – Reduced Navigation-Performance as a Result of Structural Brain Changes? 139 6.1. Abstract 139 6.2. Introduction 140 6.3. Method 145 6.4. Results 151 6.5. Discussion 156 7. Overall Discussion 159 7.1. Implications for a Theory of Moral Emotions 159 7.2. A Few Concluding Remarks and Outlooks 163 8. References 165 9. Curriculum Vitae 186 10. Scientific Publications 190 10.1. Paper, Books, Book Chapter 190 10.2. Presentations, Talks 192 / Wieso empört es uns, wenn der Vorstandsvorsitzende einer deutschen Großbank trotz sprudelnder Kassen Mitarbeiter entlässt? Wieso empfinden wir Verachtung für Klaus Zumwinkel, einen prominenten Steuersünder? Warum bewundern wir Bill Gates für seine Milliardenschenkung an eine Stiftung? Die Antwort auf diese Fragen scheint denkbar einfach: Weil das eine falsch, das andere dagegen richtig erscheint. Genauer gesagt: Es ist moralisch richtig oder moralisch falsch. In meiner Arbeit geht es um eben jene Emotionen, die entstehen, wenn Handlungen von Personen bewertet werden. Solche Emotionen kann man als moralische Emotionen bezeichnen. Dabei interessieren mich einerseits die Entstehung, andererseits die Konsequenzen eines solchen Emotionsempfindens und damit die Funktion der moralischen Emotionen. Ich gehe dabei davon aus, dass diese Emotionen einen vermittelnden Charakter für nachfolgende Handlungen haben. Die entscheidenden Fragen sind also: Warum haben wir die Emotionen, die wir haben? Und: Was ist zu erwarten, wenn wir diese Emotionen verspüren? Dabei nehmen die moralischen Emotionen eine Schlüsselrolle auf dem Weg vom Denken zum Handeln ein. Bereits Weiner (2006) oder Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer und Weiner (2004) haben emotionale Reaktionen als vermittelnde Größen zwischen kognitiven Prozessen (Attributionen) und nachfolgendem Verhalten beschrieben. Ähnlich diesem Sequenzmodell sollten moralische Emotionen wie die von Gigerenzer und Todd (1999) propagierten Heuristiken als schnelle und sparsame Entscheidungsgrundlage für das nachfolgende Verhalten dienen. Bei einer solchen Betrachtung fungieren die moralischen Emotionen als ‚heuristic cues’, die unser Verhalten bahnen können. Sogar moderne Theorien im Fachbereich Informatik zeichnen das Bild vom Menschen als „emotionale Maschine“, die gefühlsgesteuerte Programme benutzt, um zwischen dynamischen Input-Größen aus der Natur und adaptiven Output-Prozessen im Sinne von Verhaltensreaktionen zu vermitteln (Minsky, 2007) Meine Untersuchungen folgen in der Auswahl der Methoden einem großen Vorbild: Charles Darwin. In seinem Werk „Der Ausdruck der Gemütsbewegungen bei dem Menschen und den Tieren“ (im englischen Original: The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals) geht Darwin (1872) ebenfalls den grundlegenden Fragen nach, welche Funktion Emotionen haben und wie sie entstehen. Dabei legt Darwin sechs mögliche Methoden vor, um sich mit Emotionen genauer zu beschäftigen (für einen Überblick siehe Meyer et al., 2008).Zwar liegt Darwins Fokus dabei eher auf der Stammesgeschichte und er beschäftigt sich vor allem mit dem mimischen Ausdruck sowie den angeborenen und vererbten Auslösebedingungen emotionaler Reaktionen. Dennoch waren und sind seine Erkenntnisse und die von ihm verwendeten Methoden das Vorbild für Generationen von Emotionsforschern (Izard, 1971, 1991, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Ortony et al., 1988; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tomkins, 1963, 1962; Weiner, 2006) Bisher haben Rudolph, Schulz und Tscharaktschiew (2013) eine empirisch gestützte Taxonomie moralischer Emotionen vorgelegt und damit allgemeingültige vorauslaufende Bedingungen moralischer Emotionen identifiziert. Sie orientieren sich dabei an attributionalen Konzepten, wie sie bereits Heider (1958) mit seiner naiven Handlungsanalyse beschreibt und benutzen dabei vor allem hypothetische Szenarien und vorgegebene Emotionswörter zur Untersuchung der Emotionen ihrer Probanden. Moralische Emotionen unterscheiden Rudolph et al. (2013), in solche Emotionen welche eigene Handlungen (so genannte Actor Emotionen) oder die Handlungen anderer (so genannte Observer Emotionen) bewerten. Es zeigt sich, dass unser moralisches Emotionsempfinden davon abhängt, ob diese Handlung a) bezogen auf einen moralischen Standard als gut oder schlecht gilt, b) das Ziel der Handlung erreicht wurde oder nicht und c) sich der Handelnde dabei angestrengt hat oder nicht. Diese Dimensionen bezeichnen wir als ought (a), goal-attainment (b) und effort (c). Mich interessiert in dieser Arbeit vor allem, ob sich die von Rudolph et al. (2013) gefundenen Dimensionen auch in autobiografischen Schilderungen und in freien Berichten wiederfinden. Darüber hinaus nehme ich die Voraussagen der Theorie und einzelne Emotionen in verschiedenen Untersuchungssettings genauer unter die Lupe. Alle Untersuchungen sind empirischer Natur und orientieren sich an den quantitativen und qualitativen Methoden, die in abgewandelter Form bereits Darwin (1872) benutzte. Als erstes prüfe ich anhand qualitativer Methoden, ob sich die von Rudolph et al. (2013) gefundenen Kategorien von ought, goal-attainment und effort auch in erinnerten Schilderungen emotionaler Episoden nachzeichnen lassen. Stark ähnliche Emotionen werden anschließend mithilfe eines Kategoriensystems noch besser unterschieden. Die Emotionen Ärger, Empörung und Verachtung werden in einem experimentellen Setting erstmals genauer unterschieden. Die Frage, ob sich ein Sequenzmodell von Kognition  Emotion  Verhalten bereits in frühen Entwicklungsstadien ausbildet, wird anhand der komplexen Emotionen Schadenfreude und Mitleid mit Vorschulkindern untersucht. Bei Strafgefangenen und Personen mit Persönlichkeitsstörungen werden die Emotionen Scham und Schuld näher unterschieden. Außerdem werden hier Zusammenhänge mit zukünftigem Verhalten sowie neurologischen Besonderheiten solcher Personengruppen betrachtet. Meine Arbeiten unterziehen einerseits das postulierte Kategoriensystem von Rudolph et al. (2013) einem harten Test. Gleichzeitig werden bisher stark ähnliche oder zusammenhängende Emotionen feiner analysiert und beschrieben. Schließlich ermöglichen die Ergebnisse ein besseres Verständnis für die Vorhersage von nachfolgendem Verhalten.:Acknowledgments I Danksagung III Preliminary Remarks V Summary VI Zusammenfassung VIII List of Contents X List of Figures XII List of Tables XIV 1. Introduction 1 1.1. What is an Emotion? 1 1.2. The Case of Moral Emotions – Naïve Scientists and Everyday Judges 3 1.3. A Classification of Moral Emotions 4 1.4. Social Functions of Moral Emotions 7 1.5. Expanding a Coherent Theory of Moral Emotions – A Darwinian Perspective 9 1.6. Aims and Scopes / Overview of Several Chapters Within this Monograph 12 2. The Everyday Moral Judge – Autobiographical Recollections of Moral Emotions 17 2.1. Abstract 17 2.2. Introduction 18 2.3. Method 25 2.4. Results 29 2.5. Discussion 51 3. Emotional Disapproval – Cognitive and Social Determinants of Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 57 3.1. Abstract 57 3.2. Introduction 58 3.3. Method 64 3.4. Results 68 3.5. Discussion 77 4. Causes and Consequences of Schadenfreude and Sympathy: A Developmental Analysis. 81 4.1. Abstract 81 4.2. Introduction 82 4.3. Study 1: Goal-Attainment and Approach 87 4.4. Study 2: Type of Relation and Granted Benefit 98 4.5. Study 3: Valence of Behavior, Responsibility and Granted Benefit 105 4.6. Overall Discussion 116 5. Shame or Guilt – How Moral Emotions Affect the Probability of Relapse 119 5.1. Abstract 119 5.2. Outline 120 5.3. Testing the Relation of Emotional Reactions and Recidivism Rates in a Forensic Sample 127 5.4. Shame and Guilt as Predictors for Recidivism 131 5.5. Practical Implications and Outlook 135 6. Psychopathy and Spatial Abilities – Reduced Navigation-Performance as a Result of Structural Brain Changes? 139 6.1. Abstract 139 6.2. Introduction 140 6.3. Method 145 6.4. Results 151 6.5. Discussion 156 7. Overall Discussion 159 7.1. Implications for a Theory of Moral Emotions 159 7.2. A Few Concluding Remarks and Outlooks 163 8. References 165 9. Curriculum Vitae 186 10. Scientific Publications 190 10.1. Paper, Books, Book Chapter 190 10.2. Presentations, Talks 192

This study sought to explore and describe the recollections of young adults who were exposed to domestic violence within the family structure during childhood, so as to develop an understanding of the systems and structures needed to develop effective services to child victims of domestic violence. It is envisaged that services to these children could aid as an important preventative strategy, in that newly acquired behaviour and thinking patterns could assist them to defer from engaging in violent relationships, thereby, breaking the cycle of violence. The research study was conducted by means of a qualitative research approach and made use of the phenomenological, contextual, explorative and descriptive research designs. The purposive sampling technique was used and semi-structured interviews were employed to obtain the data. Tesch’s (cited in Creswell, 2009:186) proposed eight steps for data analysis were employed. Data verification focused on credibility/authenticity, transformability, dependability and conformability. It is envisaged that the findings and conclusions of this study could inform the planning of services to children exposed to domestic violence. / Social Work / M.A. (S.S.)

The study provides a theoretical account for the representation of apartheid in South African fiction. Narrative strategies employed in the post-apartheid novels The innocence of roast chicken (Richards, 1996), The smell of apples (Behr, 1996), All we have left unsaid (Case, 2006) and Thirteen cents (Duiker, 2011) reveal that depictions of the past contribute to narrative structure and the production of meaning. Genettean temporal relations, namely narrative order, duration and frequency are a systematic method to analyse the selected novels, since it enables a contrast between the narrative past as the histoire, and the narrative present as the récit. Retrospective events are constructed as memories, thereby are complemented by Bergson’s psychological and philosophical theory in the analysis and interpretation of the dualistic interaction between the apartheid and post-apartheid temporal centres adopted within the novels. The representation of apartheid may be seen as sub-themes and time as configurations of temporal zones. / Afrikaans & Theory of Literature / M.A. (Theory of Literature)

The study provides a theoretical account for the representation of apartheid in South African fiction. Narrative strategies employed in the post-apartheid novels The innocence of roast chicken (Richards, 1996), The smell of apples (Behr, 1996), All we have left unsaid (Case, 2006) and Thirteen cents (Duiker, 2011) reveal that depictions of the past contribute to narrative structure and the production of meaning. Genettean temporal relations, namely narrative order, duration and frequency are a systematic method to analyse the selected novels, since it enables a contrast between the narrative past as the histoire, and the narrative present as the récit. Retrospective events are constructed as memories, thereby are complemented by Bergson’s psychological and philosophical theory in the analysis and interpretation of the dualistic interaction between the apartheid and post-apartheid temporal centres adopted within the novels. The representation of apartheid may be seen as sub-themes and time as configurations of temporal zones. / Afrikaans and Theory of Literature / M. A. (Theory of Literature)