The European market is constantly changing and business across national borders is be-coming a daily feature. Companies no longer settle for trading within their own national borders and perhaps cannot even afford to restrict themselves to such a small area if they wish to expand. The new view of EC Company Law given by the European Court of Justice makes it possible for companies to move to another Member State and still be recognised as a legitimate company. This view is based on the incorporation theory, i.e. the theory that a company shall be governed by the law of the state in which it is incorporated. However, with this change come new threats to the market. Scholars fear that the European market will take the same approach as that of the US, where the state of Delaware has been able to attract more than half of the larger enterprises on the market in the regulatory competition between the states. In addition to that, the European market has been intro-duced to new supranational companies, i.e. companies that are above national law and answer to EC law, and these companies could have a large impact on the changes of the market. The SE Company and the proposed European Private Company may come to prevent a European Delaware. In this paper it is argued that a regulatory competition is going to occur within the Union in the near future – if it has not already – based on changes made by some Member States in order to attract more companies to incorporate under their jurisdiction. It will not fully resemble the situation in the US since the two market fields differ from one another. It is also argued that a European Delaware may come to exist, but that the mere existence of a regulatory competition does not have to result in such a state. A Delaware effect may be prevented by the European Private Company, if this form comes to exist. It is the thesis of this paper that the market in addition to the EPC, in order to actually be able to prevent the somewhat unwished competition, must meet three vital requirements. First of all, the EPC must differ from the statute of the SE Company, meaning it must be separated from national law since it otherwise would be an element of competition in itself. Second, the market – and then mostly through new Company Law Directives – must keep the freedom restricted. If the Directives allowed companies unrestricted freedom of establishment that would mean a possibility to move cross-border without the need for a EPC, which in turn would not be able to prevent a European Delaware. Third, there cannot be a working reincorporation within the Union, meaning Member States cannot be allowed to benefit from tax revenues that derive from such a move, since that would be yet another element to the regulatory competition. / Den europeiska marknaden undergår konstant förändringar och handeln över de nationella gränserna har blivit ett dagligt inslag. Företag nöjer sig ej längre med att endast bedriva verksamhet inom det egna landets gränser och om de önskar att expandera är det måhända inte möjligt att begränsa sig till ett sådant litet område. Europadomstolens nya syn på europeisk bolagsrätt gör det nu möjligt för företag att flytta från en medlemsstat till en annan och fortfarande räknas som ett legalt företag. Denna syn är baserad på den s.k. inkorporeringsteorin, d.v.s. teorin att ett företag skall regleras av lagen i den stat i vilken företaget har inkorporerats. Men med denna förändring kommer nya hot på marknaden. Akademiker befarar att den europeiska marknaden kommer ta an samma ton som den amerikanska där staten Delaware har lyckats locka till sig merparten av de stora företagen på marknaden i den statliga konkurrensen. I tillägg till det nyss sagda har det introducerats nya överstatliga företag på den europeiska marknaden, d.v.s. företag som står över nationella bestämmelser och istället endast regleras av EG lagstiftning, och dessa företag kan komma att ha en stor inverkan på de förändringar som händer på marknaden. Europabolaget och det proponerade Privata Europabolaget kan därigenom komma att hindra ett Europeiskt Delaware. Det är i denna uppsats hävdat att en regelverkskonkurrens mellan medlemsstaterna kom-mer att ske på marknaden – om det inte redan har – baserat på de förändringar som vissa medlemsstater redan gjort i respektive lagstiftning för att på så sätt locka till sig fler företag. Situationen kommer inte att till fullo likna den amerikanska eftersom de två marknaderna skiljer sig från varandra. Det är också argumenterat att ett europeiskt Delaware kan uppenbara sig, men att detta inte kommer ske enbart för att det finns en regelverkskonkurrens inom EU. En Delaware-effekt kan komma att hindras av det Privata Europabolaget, om denna form i framtiden accepteras. Teorin enligt denna uppsats är att i det fall ett europeiskt Delaware skall hindras måste den europeiska marknaden uppfylla tre viktiga krav. Först och främst måste det Privata Europabolagets statut skilja sig från Europabolagets, d.v.s. det måste vara separerat från nationella bestämmelser eftersom det i annat fall skulle vara ytterligare en beståndsdel av regelverkskonkurrensen. För det andra måste marknaden – främst genom de nya bolagsdirektiven – hålla friheten på marknaden under kontroll. Om direktiven tillåter företagen att utan hinder utnyttja etableringsfriheten skulle det innebära en möjlighet att röra sig över de nationella gränserna utan ett överstatligt bolag och det i sin tur skulle innebära att det Privata Europabolaget inte skulle kunna hindra ett europeiskt Delaware. För det tredje finns det inget utrymme för en fungerande återinkorporering inom Unionen, d.v.s. att medlemsstaterna inte kan tillåtas dra fördel av de skatteinkomster som kan uppkomma genom en sådan flytt eftersom det skulle gynna regleverkskonkurrensen.

<p>The European market is constantly changing and business across national borders is be-coming a daily feature. Companies no longer settle for trading within their own national borders and perhaps cannot even afford to restrict themselves to such a small area if they wish to expand. The new view of EC Company Law given by the European Court of Justice makes it possible for companies to move to another Member State and still be recognised as a legitimate company. This view is based on the incorporation theory, i.e. the theory that a company shall be governed by the law of the state in which it is incorporated. However, with this change come new threats to the market. Scholars fear that the European market will take the same approach as that of the US, where the state of Delaware has been able to attract more than half of the larger enterprises on the market in the regulatory competition between the states. In addition to that, the European market has been intro-duced to new supranational companies, i.e. companies that are above national law and answer to EC law, and these companies could have a large impact on the changes of the market. The SE Company and the proposed European Private Company may come to prevent a European Delaware.</p><p>In this paper it is argued that a regulatory competition is going to occur within the Union in the near future – if it has not already – based on changes made by some Member States in order to attract more companies to incorporate under their jurisdiction. It will not fully resemble the situation in the US since the two market fields differ from one another. It is also argued that a European Delaware may come to exist, but that the mere existence of a regulatory competition does not have to result in such a state. A Delaware effect may be prevented by the European Private Company, if this form comes to exist. It is the thesis of this paper that the market in addition to the EPC, in order to actually be able to prevent the somewhat unwished competition, must meet three vital requirements. First of all, the EPC must differ from the statute of the SE Company, meaning it must be separated from national law since it otherwise would be an element of competition in itself. Second, the market – and then mostly through new Company Law Directives – must keep the freedom restricted. If the Directives allowed companies unrestricted freedom of establishment that would mean a possibility to move cross-border without the need for a EPC, which in turn would not be able to prevent a European Delaware. Third, there cannot be a working reincorporation within the Union, meaning Member States cannot be allowed to benefit from tax revenues that derive from such a move, since that would be yet another element to the regulatory competition.</p> / <p>Den europeiska marknaden undergår konstant förändringar och handeln över de nationella gränserna har blivit ett dagligt inslag. Företag nöjer sig ej längre med att endast bedriva verksamhet inom det egna landets gränser och om de önskar att expandera är det måhända inte möjligt att begränsa sig till ett sådant litet område. Europadomstolens nya syn på europeisk bolagsrätt gör det nu möjligt för företag att flytta från en medlemsstat till en annan och fortfarande räknas som ett legalt företag. Denna syn är baserad på den s.k. inkorporeringsteorin, d.v.s. teorin att ett företag skall regleras av lagen i den stat i vilken företaget har inkorporerats. Men med denna förändring kommer nya hot på marknaden. Akademiker befarar att den europeiska marknaden kommer ta an samma ton som den amerikanska där staten Delaware har lyckats locka till sig merparten av de stora företagen på marknaden i den statliga konkurrensen. I tillägg till det nyss sagda har det introducerats nya överstatliga företag på den europeiska marknaden, d.v.s. företag som står över nationella bestämmelser och istället endast regleras av EG lagstiftning, och dessa företag kan komma att ha en stor inverkan på de förändringar som händer på marknaden. Europabolaget och det proponerade Privata Europabolaget kan därigenom komma att hindra ett Europeiskt Delaware.</p><p>Det är i denna uppsats hävdat att en regelverkskonkurrens mellan medlemsstaterna kom-mer att ske på marknaden – om det inte redan har – baserat på de förändringar som vissa medlemsstater redan gjort i respektive lagstiftning för att på så sätt locka till sig fler företag. Situationen kommer inte att till fullo likna den amerikanska eftersom de två marknaderna skiljer sig från varandra. Det är också argumenterat att ett europeiskt Delaware kan uppenbara sig, men att detta inte kommer ske enbart för att det finns en regelverkskonkurrens inom EU. En Delaware-effekt kan komma att hindras av det Privata Europabolaget, om denna form i framtiden accepteras. Teorin enligt denna uppsats är att i det fall ett europeiskt Delaware skall hindras måste den europeiska marknaden uppfylla tre viktiga krav. Först och främst måste det Privata Europabolagets statut skilja sig från Europabolagets, d.v.s. det måste vara separerat från nationella bestämmelser eftersom det i annat fall skulle vara ytterligare en beståndsdel av regelverkskonkurrensen. För det andra måste marknaden – främst genom de nya bolagsdirektiven – hålla friheten på marknaden under kontroll. Om direktiven tillåter företagen att utan hinder utnyttja etableringsfriheten skulle det innebära en möjlighet att röra sig över de nationella gränserna utan ett överstatligt bolag och det i sin tur skulle innebära att det Privata Europabolaget inte skulle kunna hindra ett europeiskt Delaware. För det tredje finns det inget utrymme för en fungerande återinkorporering inom Unionen, d.v.s. att medlemsstaterna inte kan tillåtas dra fördel av de skatteinkomster som kan uppkomma genom en sådan flytt eftersom det skulle gynna regleverkskonkurrensen.</p>

The present thesis is concerned with private international law for corporate and insolvency disputes in the context of freedom of establishment. First, it presents the traditional rules of conflict applicable to corporate disputes that have been implemented in some major jurisdictions. Second, it analyses the relevant leading judgments of the European Court of Justice and it demonstrates the way in which, contrary to popular belief, the real seat theory has not been held contrary to freedom of establishment. The thesis then deals with the concept of letter-box companies and examines the limitations that are being placed to the use of freedom of establishment. This is followed by a juxtaposition of the factors that have lead and could lead to regulatory competition for corporate law in the USA and the EU respectively. A modest approach is taken towards the possibility of the latter occurring in the EU. Third, the thesis examines the treatment of insolency disputes in this context. A substantial part of it is dedicated to the definition of the basis for international jurisdiction for the opening of insolvency proceedings, namely the centre of main interests. It argues in favour of an objective test for the identification of the centre of main interests (COMI) and the allocations of certain burdens on both the debtor and the creditors. It then focuses on the treatment of forum shopping in the context on international insolvencies. Based on considerations of consent and economic efficiency, it suggests a definition, according to which certain transfers of the COMI should not amount to forum shopping. Finally, the thesis examines the possibility of a regulatory competition for insolvencies in the EU and seeks to demonstrate that the conditions for such a competition are more analogous between US corporate law and EU insolvency, rather than company, law.

Depuis 2008, le thème de l’arbitrage réglementaire a attiré beaucoup d’attention. Le contournement des réglementations prudentielles (notamment des accords de Bâle) par l’utilisation de techniques de « Shadow Banking » (telles que la titrisation ou les instruments dérivés) a été dénoncé comme étant une des causes principales de la crise bancaire. D’après la littérature spécialisée, l’arbitrage réglementaire serait le résultat de failles qui émergeraient au sein des réglementations, lesquelles seraient exploitées par des arbitragistes pour minimiser leurs coûts. Cependant, l’arbitrage réglementaire n’a pas réellement fait l’objet d’une analyse théorique et économique satisfaisante permettant de comprendre pleinement ses causes et ses conséquences. La première partie de cette dissertation s’attache plus spécifiquement aux causes de l’arbitrage réglementaire. Bien que l’attention soit bien souvent portée sur l’arbitragiste qui tente de manipuler les structures juridiques de ses transactions pour capturer des opportunités de profits, nous soulignerons le rôle du régulateur qui de manière intentionnelle ou non, crée les conditions nécessaires à l’arbitrage réglementaire. Le mode de production des règles et le rôle de l’environnement institutionnel sont bien souvent omis. Ce point nous mène à discuter en détail de la différence de nature entre réglementations et règles contractuelles et son incidence sur l’arbitrage réglementaire. La seconde partie porte sur les conséquences de l’arbitrage réglementaire. Celles-ci n’ont été que partiellement discutées dans la littérature existante. Efficacité des réglementations, qualité des règles, effet redistributif, création ou destruction de richesses, concurrence réglementaire accrue ou tentative d’harmonisation des juridictions, tels seront les thèmes qui sont impactés par ce phénomène et qui seront abordés dans cette dissertation. / Since 2008, regulatory arbitrage has attracted a lot of attention. Circumventions of banking prudential rules (such as Basel rules) using shadow banking (such as securitization or derivatives instruments) have been pointed out as one of the main causes of the banking crisis. According to the financial literature, regulatory arbitrage would be the results of “loopholes” that emerge within regulations and which are used by arbitragers to minimise their regulatory cost. However, regulatory arbitrage has not truly been analysed from a theoretical and economic perspective which is key to understand fully its causes and consequences. The first part of this dissertation will focus more specifically on the causes of regulatory arbitrage. While light is usually shed on the action of arbitragers who attempt to manipulate the legal structure of their transactions to capture profit opportunities, we emphasize the role of the regulator who purposely or not, generates the necessary conditions for regulatory arbitrage to take place. The role of rules production type and institutions are usually omitted. This point leads us to discuss in detail the difference in nature between regulation and contractual rules and their incidence on regulatory arbitrage. The second part will focus on the consequences of regulatory arbitrage. These have not only been discussed partially in the existing literature. Efficiency of regulation, quality of rules, redistributive effect, creation or destruction of resources, increased regulatory competition or harmonization strategies among jurisdictions will be discussed in this dissertation as potential outcome of this phenomenon.

L’Union européenne conduit une ambitieuse politique de développement des énergies renouvelables, visant à porter à 20 % la part de ces dernières dans la consommation énergétique européenne à l’horizon 2020. A cet effet, le législateur européen sollicite des Etats membres qu’ils mettent en œuvre des soutiens nationaux à la production d’électricité renouvelable, susceptibles de relever du champ de l’interdiction des entraves et des aides d’Etat. Parallèlement, la politique de réalisation du marché intérieur de l’énergie impose aux Etats membres de libéraliser le secteur économique dans lequel s’inscrit l’électricité renouvelable. Par l’observation des règles du marché intérieur, la thèse évalue l’articulation entre ces objectifs visiblement contradictoires. Si la finalité environnementale qui sous-tend le développement de l’électricité renouvelable justifie une inflexion des règles du marché intérieur, elle favorise les cloisonnements nationaux et fait naître une concurrence normative entre les Etats membres. Chacun d’eux use de l’attractivité de son droit pour inciter les opérateurs économiques à exploiter des sources d’énergie nationales, indépendamment de leur répartition naturelle à l’échelle européenne. L’observation empirique de ce phénomène met en évidence les risques qu’il fait peser sur la cohérence globale de l’action de l’Union dans le domaine des énergies renouvelables. En prenant appui sur certaines évolutions du droit positif et de la pratique des acteurs privés sur le marché, la thèse évalue les hypothèses de renouvellement des mécanismes du marché afin qu’il devienne un instrument à part entière de promotion de l’électricité renouvelable dans l’Union européenne. / The European Union is pursuing an ambitious policy to develop renewable energy aimed at increasing its share to 20% in the European energy consumption by 2020. To that extent, the European legislator requests from all Member States that they implement national support for the production of renewable electricity, which may fall within the scope of the ban on restrictions and State aids. In parallel, the policy of achieving the internal energy market requires the Member States to liberate the economic sector in which renewable electricity is used. By observing the rules of the internal market, the thesis evaluates the articulation between these objectives that seem contradictory. While the environmental goal underlying the development of renewable electricity justifies an inflexion of the rules of the internal market, it promotes national separation and gives rise to normative competition between the Member States. Each of them uses the attractiveness of its own laws to persuade the economic operators to exploit national energy sources, independently of their natural distribution on a European scale. The empirical observation of this phenomenon highlights the risks it poses to the overall coherence of the European Union’s action in the field of renewable energies. By using some developments of the positive law and the practice of private actors in the market, the thesis evaluates the hypotheses to renew the market mechanisms so that the market becomes a full instrument for promoting renewable electricity in the European Union.

The regulation of hedge funds has been at the centre of a global policy debate for much of the past decade. Several factors feature in this debate including the magnitude of current global investments in hedge funds and the potential of hedge funds to both generate wealth and destabilise financial markets. The first part of the thesis describes the nature of hedge funds and locates the work in relation to four elements in existing theory including regulatory competition theory, the concept of differential mobility as identified by Musgrave, Kane’s concept of the regulatory dialectic between regulators and regulatees, and the concept of unique sets of trust and confidence factors that individual jurisdictions convey to the market. It also identifies a series of questions that de-limit the scope of the present work. These include whether there is evidence that regulatory competition occurs in the context of the provision of domicile for hedge funds, what are the factors which account for the current global distribution of hedge fund domicile, what latitude for regulatory competition is available to jurisdictions competing to provide the domicile for hedge funds, how is such latitude shaped by factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the competing jurisdictions, and why do the more powerful onshore jurisdictions competing to provide the domicile for hedge funds not shut down their smaller and weaker competitors? The second part of the thesis examines the regulatory environment for hedge funds in three so-called offshore jurisdictions, specifically the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands, as well as two onshore jurisdictions, specifically the United Kingdom and the United States. The final section presents a series of conclusions and their implications for both regulatory competition theory and policy.

The purported costs of provincial autonomy in Canadian securities regulation have been well documented. Proposals for centralizing the securities regulatory regime, whether under a national regulator or through restricting the scope of provincial divergence from national standards, have consistently cited the costliness of the current regime. However, policymakers' cognitive biases lead them from time to time to overemphasize the need for decisive and swift action, which in turn causes them to abandon sound decision-making processes. Provincial autonomy ensures that policymaking with national reach is process-oriented and is more likely to be guided by facts and rational projections. Supporters of centralization discount or ignore these features of decentralization and are too sanguine about the ability of centralized regulators to adhere to process. Any further proposals for reform should properly account for these effects.

The purported costs of provincial autonomy in Canadian securities regulation have been well documented. Proposals for centralizing the securities regulatory regime, whether under a national regulator or through restricting the scope of provincial divergence from national standards, have consistently cited the costliness of the current regime. However, policymakers' cognitive biases lead them from time to time to overemphasize the need for decisive and swift action, which in turn causes them to abandon sound decision-making processes. Provincial autonomy ensures that policymaking with national reach is process-oriented and is more likely to be guided by facts and rational projections. Supporters of centralization discount or ignore these features of decentralization and are too sanguine about the ability of centralized regulators to adhere to process. Any further proposals for reform should properly account for these effects.

The aim of this work is to analyse the companies under the private international and European law, their cross-border mobility and the problems associated therewith. Crucial emphasis is placed on the synthesis of foreign and Czech authors and confrontation of theory and practice in the light of the current global development of company law in private international law. The key point is the determination of personal status of the company and the conflict between the incorporation theory and the real seat theory. At the outset the author explains the reasons which led him to write this thesis, including the methods used to do so. The whole thesis is divided into four main thematic areas. In the first chapter, some of the basic concepts are defined in order to clarify the thematic framework within which the thesis will be dealt with. The second chapter addresses the definition of the term "Company", its personal status, various approaches to determine the effects of different conflict theories and the regulatory competition arising thereof. The third part deals with a detailed analysis of the Czech law, in particular with the relationship between the Czech Republic and foreign companies, the concept of residence, criteria for determining personal status and different approaches to the cross-border...

Widespread cross-border securities trading have led to the internationalization of securities markets. No one seriously disputes that such securities dealings require regulation, but there is no academic consensus on the best normative approach to such regulation. The academic debate initially focused on whether regulatory competition or cooperation constitutes the better model. However, the debate seems to have evolved to adopt a hybrid model combining the virtues of these two approaches. ‘Harmonization’ constitutes the dominant hybrid model. Nevertheless, the implementation of the harmonization model has barely received any attention in the literature. The aim of this thesis is hence two-fold: first, justify why harmonization should be the preferred model for the regulation of international securities markets; and second, develop, applying an international trade regulation perspective, a regulatory framework to implement the harmonization model using the World Trade Organization and General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO/GATS) framework.