In this thesis I aim to query the Ecological Modernisation vision of green growth by focusing on the emblematic case of desalination technology as the solution to the threat of water scarcity. I focus the study on a drought crisis, which resulted in the adoption of desalination in the Eden District Municipality (EDM) of South Africa. Focusing on the towns of Sedgefield and Knysna, in the Knysna Local Municipality (KLM) of the EDM, I ask the questions of ‘what, how, by whom, why and to what end was desalination adopted?’. This interrogation is characterised by two movements, firstly tracing the process and mechanism through which this consensus was manufactured; and secondly countering this by examining the underlying metabolic relations constituting crisis and solution. The research was carried out over a period of 11 months, from October 2011 to August 2012, during which I undertook 91 semi-structured interviews, extensive document analysis and participant observation. The theoretical strands drawn upon are a blending of post political theory, to inform an analysis of the techno-managerial orientation of consensus manufacture; and a Marxian relational ontology, to examine what is produced and foreclosed by the logic. This project is undertaken in five parts. Firstly, I show that the dominant representation of 'drought crisis' insisted upon the indisputability of drought as a threat posed by an externalised nature. Next, in examining the metabolism of drought I counter this narrative by showing the drought crisis to be a socio-natural assemblage, rather than an externalised threatening nature. This is a vital finding, showing that the support for the adoption of desalination technology as a necessary response to 'nature's crisis', pivoted on the maintenance of an ideological fiction, obscuring the relational 'becoming' of drought. In the third chapter, moving on to an examination of the solution, it emerges that an essential aspect of the solidification of consensus was the employment of exceptional disaster and environmental legislation which had the effect of neutralising drought as 'nature's crisis' and desalinationas the indisputable solution. Enabling the urgent release of disaster funding to ensure water security for economic growth. This chapter also argues that the maintenance of the dominant crisis narrative produced an opportunity for the desalination industry, by treating 'nature' as a direct accumulation strategy. In the remaining two empirical chapters I evaluate the 'promise' of the desalination techno-fix. Through focusing on the conditionality placed on disaster funding and how this impacted on project assembly, resulting in problems and costs emerging out of the desalination solution from the outset. Fundamentally, it is argued that, rather than being external to, these problems are intrinsically connected to the mechanisms and logic through which consensus emerged in the first place. To clarify, through the preceding chapters it was shown that the basis for the 'disaster funding' release was an insistence on 'nature's crisis', as an ideological fiction. These remaining chapters show that this had the effect of placing limitations on what was spent on, when, and how much. Thereby informing project assembly, with these constraints resulting in problems emerging out of the solution. In sum, the thesis concludes that the adopted E.M. logic was a false promise that served to intensify the penetration of nature by capital, resulting in a deeper movement into crisis by moving the problems around as opposed to resolving them.

In this thesis I characterize, through an analysis of some of the key themes and central insights of both Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, what Bernstein (2011) has called a “sea change” in contemporary philosophy. I illustrate how their main insights are profoundly educational and how they offer us an effective means of reconceptualising what education means within the context of our world today. I will particularly stress two important elements of this ‘sea change’ that figure prominently in both Peirce and Gadamer’s work. First, the central importance of situated agency, and second, the affirmation of a relational process ontology. When taken together, these insights entail a conception of education that radically affirms the transformative potential of human agency based on the fecundity of educational experience. This ‘sea change’ will be presented in juxtaposition to the problematic modern/Cartesian framework that is current in educational thought today.

In this thesis I characterize, through an analysis of some of the key themes and central insights of both Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, what Bernstein (2011) has called a “sea change” in contemporary philosophy. I illustrate how their main insights are profoundly educational and how they offer us an effective means of reconceptualising what education means within the context of our world today. I will particularly stress two important elements of this ‘sea change’ that figure prominently in both Peirce and Gadamer’s work. First, the central importance of situated agency, and second, the affirmation of a relational process ontology. When taken together, these insights entail a conception of education that radically affirms the transformative potential of human agency based on the fecundity of educational experience. This ‘sea change’ will be presented in juxtaposition to the problematic modern/Cartesian framework that is current in educational thought today.

This thesis is an attempt to articulate a ‘Relational’ ontology, and in turn relate this type of cultural worldview to Foucault’s philosophy and methodology. The major thesis being offered here is that Foucault can be read as a ‘Relational’ ontologist. The hope is that when he is understood from this standpoint, the unique methodology he operates with, one which allows us to view our social worlds as cultural, historical, and political products, will be seen as a coherent, authoritative, and legitimate challenge to the normalized way we envision our existence.

With its myriad of relationships, my study considers the Laich-Kwil-Tach enlivened world in which multiple beings bring meaning and understanding to life. Through exploration of Laich-Kwil-Tach ontology I engage with the theoretical concepts of animism, historical ecology and political ecology, in what I call relational ecology. Here, I examine the divide between the relational world and what Western ontology considers a natural resource; fish. Through an analysis of ethnographic texts I work to elucidate the 19th-century human-fish relationship and through collaboration with Laich-Kwil-Tach Elders, based on Vancouver Island on the Northwest Coast of North America, I seek to understand how the 19th-century enlivened world informs 21st-century Laich-Kwil-Tach ontology. In this ethnographic and ethnohistorical account of the relationship between Laich-Kwil-Tach people and fish I grapple with the question of how, within a framework of ontological difference, we can better understand foundations of Indigenous rights and find ways to respect and give agency to multiple forms of knowledge in practice. In the spirit of reconciliation, decolonization and a renewed understanding of ontological multiplicity we are challenged to create analytical frameworks that include both human and nonhuman interests and relationships. Doing so requires engagement with any number of ontological propositions and it requires a confrontation with hegemonic ontological assumptions inherent in the Western scientific, bureaucratic and legal paradigms. By accepting western-based science as one among many ways of producing knowledge, space is made for other forms of knowledge. In the process we are better able to respect Indigenous land and marine tenure systems, as well as the Indigenous right to maintain a long-standing and on-going relationship with other beings and all that this entails. / Graduate

This dissertation argues that there is a set of assumptions--or a picture, in Wittgenstein's language--that influences our thinking about who we are as human beings and our relationships to the rest of the world. These assumptions have their origins in Cartesianism and function as unrecognized, unacknowledged foundations on which all of the rest of our thinking and acting takes place. My argument is that these assumptions are deeply problematic and that we need to both examine the impact of those assumptions and beginning building alternative perspectives. I draw primarily from scholars who build upon a Wittgensteinian perspective that draws upon the Philosophical investigations, On certainty, and other volumes of Wittgenstein's work that have been published since the Philosophical Investigations. These scholars include Taylor (2007), Williams (2002), Mulhall (2007), Canfield (2004, 2007), Moyal-Sharrock (2004), Travis (2006, 2007), Schatzki (1996, 2001), and Stroll (2002, 2004). Of particular interest to me is the inner-outer distinction--or in Taylor's terms, dualist sorting--of Cartesian dualism, whereby all mental processes are contained within individual human minds that are separate and distinct from the rest of the reality. Taylor, Williams, Schatzki, and other Wittgensteinian scholars argue that this assumption continues to be relatively unacknowledged and unchallenged despite a long history of philosophical challenges to the Cartesian perspective. These scholars argue that the inner-outer distinction is deeply mistaken and yet continues to have an impact on contemporary life that is both pervasive and negative. A key part of my approach builds on Taylor's (2007) argument about the connection between ontology and epistemology within the Cartesian picture. Taylor argues that we get to a new picture only by carefully investigating the influences of the Cartesian picture and then building a new perspective out of alternatives to each piece of the Cartesian picture. Canfield (2004) argues similarly, referring to this as a bottom-up approach. In this work, I look at both theoretical and applied issues within the social sciences. I investigate how a few concrete practices play out within specific contexts when considered from an alternative perspective that takes unmediated knowledge and embodied practices (Taylor, 2007), a social conception of mind (Williams, 2002), and a relational ontology (Slife, 2004) as foundational. And finally, I present specific examples drawn from the applied practices of the social sciences with a focus on the delivery of psychological services (including psychology, psychotherapy, and counseling) and the teaching of communication (including writing, speaking, and interpersonal communication). The purpose of these examples is to bring out some of the contradictions and problems that occur because of the unacknowledged assumptions of the Cartesian picture and to show the kinds of solutions that an alternative perspective can provide. My goal is to provide concrete suggestions for thinking and acting within the context of particular practices using psychotherapy and teaching as the primary sources for examples. / text

The term care has been part of the CYC title since the University of Victoria School of Child and Youth Care (CYC) opened in the 1970’s, making care a central aspect of CYC’s public and professional identity. The purpose of this research is to explore how care is conceptualized in Foundations of Child and Youth Care Practice; a Canadian textbook widely used in CYC postsecondary education programs. This text introduces future CYC practitioners to important aspects of CYC praxis, such as care. In this research I use the Trace method developed by Selma Sevenhuijsen (2004) to analyze the text. In this analysis, feminist ethics of care acts both as a lens for analyzing care and as a framework for renewing ways of thinking about and doing care in CYC. Key findings show that conceptualizations of care in the text are deeply influenced by neoliberal ‘justice’ frameworks leading to care being framed as always ‘good’ and understood as apolitical, simple and instrumental. This reveals a lack of theorizing about care in the text and suggests that understandings of care are taken for granted and devalued. These conceptualizations of care cannot account for the complexities of the care relationship and do not adequately reflect the lived experience of young people and families. This research advocates for engagement with feminist ethics of care as a starting point for re-imagining care in CYC and offers suggestions for what this might look like. / Graduate

In this thesis, I ask how our understanding of human relations carries implications for the way we understand the affordances of communication technology on human relations. To this end, I examine and compare two opposed perspectives of human relations and social life. The first perspective, networked individualism, is a version of network theory that begins with a foundation of agentic individuals who actively construct and manage their social worlds. Levinasian relationalism, the second perspective, offers a contrasting view that sees human relations as constitutive of human subjectivity. In comparing these two perspectives, I argue that networked individualism is an inadequate framework inasmuch as its ontological assertions prevent it from seeing some of the significant affordances of technology on human relations, and I suggest that Levinasian relationalism is a viable alternative.

The cave Stora Förvar, excavated in the end of the 19th century, yielded a vast archaeological assemblage, providing great insight into the stone-age occupation of Stora Karlsö, an island a few kilometers off the west coast of Gotland. The bones of around ten humans dating to the Mesolithic have previously been identified among the four tons of faunal remains recovered from the cave. The human bone material featured cut-marks and split tubular bones. This, along with the apparent mixing of human- and animal bones in the cave, was interpreted as signs of anthropophagy. Later researchers have tentatively proposed that the individuals represented in the bone material might have been shamans, deviants, human sacrifices or low-status individuals. In the author’s opinion, this assertion is based on the dichotomies nature/culture and profane/sacred which produce a separation between the human bones and the animal bones. It is shown that defleshing and disarticulation were widespread practices during the Mesolithic, which could explain the marks found on the bones from Stora Förvar. Similarly, the mixing of human- and animal remains is a common feature of many Mesolithic sites across Europe. Employing a theoretical framework inspired by posthumanism and the ‘ontological turn’, the author argues that the assemblage should be understood through an alternative ontological premise where human and animal, hunter and prey, were not regarded as fundamentally different.

Vad vi framför är ett alternativ till idealismen och vi bemöter det ideella med relationell ontologi. Vi jämför Peter van Inwagen (2011), Bryan E. Bannon (2011), Achille Varzi (2016), Gil C. Santos (2015) och Robin Durie (2002) för att skapa en förståelse för vad relationell ontologi innebär. Vidare väljer vi att använda Andrew Benjamins (2015) definition för vidare struktur av vår teoretiska metod. Denna konkretisering menar på att vår tillblivelse är skapad utifrån relationer, ett utbyte mellan singulariteter, de punkterna som definierar en artefakt eller ett fenomen. Vidare analyserar vi analog skissteknik och applicerar den analysen och dess beståndsdelar på digitala tekniker som bildredigering och 3D modellering i vad vi kallar den Rhizo – Singulär analys som process metoden. Vad vi får ut är ett alternativt sätt att skapa vilket vi väljer att definiera som relationell avbildning, med detta utmanar vi idealismen och de ideella mönsterbilderna (Ohlsson, 2013). Med andra ord att vi förhåller oss till en öppenhet och de förvrängningar inom sinnes – världen utifrån Aristoteles och estetiken enligt Danius, Sjöholm, & Wallenstein (2012). Vi diskuterar de val som vi gör i designprocessen och fortsätter att argumentera för öppna förhållningssätt och förståelse som vi hämtar och jämför från Benjamin (2015) och Deleuze & Guattaris (1987) rhizomen. Undersökningen och den metoden vi skapar kan bli förstådd samt tillämpad i flertalet variationer. Slutgiltligen att den teoretiska metoden växer och förändras utav personer i en plural händelse vilket är Rhizo - Singulär analys som processmetoden. / We present an alternative to idealism and we meet the ideal with the concept of relational ontology. We compare Peter van Inwagen (2011), Bryan E. Bannon (2011), Achille Varzi (2016), Gil C. Santos (2015) and Robin Durie (2002) to create an understanding for what relational ontology is or could be. We choose Andrew Benjamin's (2015) definition to structure our theoretical method. This concretization means relations are fundamental for our becoming as people and objects. Relations are an exchange between singularities, the points which define an artefact or a phenomenon. Continually we analyze sketching techniques and apply that analysis and its components on digital techniques as photo editing and 3D modeling in what we call the Rhizo – Singular analysis as a process method. What we get from doing this is an alternative way of creating which we choose to define as a relational imaging, with this we challenge the idealism and the ideal pattern images (Ohlsson, 2013). In other words we approach to a openness and the material worlds distortions from Aristoteles and the aesthetics of Danius, Sjöholm, & Wallenstein (2012). We discuss the choices that we have made in the design process. We continue to argue for the open approach, the understanding which we gain and compare from Benjamin (2015) as well as Deleuze & Guattari’s (1987) rhizome. In other words the research, it's methods themselves can be understood and be applied in several variations. Finally the theoretical method grows and changes by people in a plural event that is Rhizo - Singular analysis as a process method.