Alors que le Québec met en œuvre une loi sur la laïcité de l’État, la loi 21, les expériences des enseignantes portant des symboles religieux, en particulier les expériences pouvant affecter leur identité professionnelle (IP), n’ont pas été étudiées. En utilisant un cadre d’analyse interactionniste-conflictualiste, ce mémoire explore cette question à travers les récits de vie de 9 enseignantes musulmanes, dont 8 enseignantes bénéficiant du droit acquis (EBDA) — pouvant ainsi continuer à porter leurs signes religieux dans l’exercice de leur profession en dépit de la loi 21. L’objectif de cette étude est de comprendre et décrire la relation entre le port de signes religieux et l’IP de ces enseignantes dans le cadre de la loi 21. En décrivant les considérations générales qui structurent les interactions et les relations de pouvoir vécues par ces enseignantes, cette recherche fournit des informations sur leurs représentations des concepts clés liés à l’éducation de même que sur leurs perceptions et leur compréhension de la loi 21. Cette étude permet également de faire entendre leur voix dans les débats publics portant sur le port du voile. Il ressort de cette étude que les interactions et les rapports de pouvoir vécus et rapportés par les EBDA ne conduisent pas nécessairement à des incidents impliquant des élèves et leurs parents. D’autre part, bien que les relations avec les collègues et les directeurs d’école soient le plus souvent décrites comme excellentes, quelques incidents avec ces groupes particuliers ont été signalés. Ces tensions, parfois créées par la loi 21, sont vécues de manière indirecte et subtile et prennent des formes diverses. Elles ont trait à des gestes, attitudes, comportements, mots ou commentaires offensants qui sont vécus « comme une normalité », mais qui traduisent néanmoins, dans certains cas, de l’islamophobie et du racisme ordinaire dans le milieu scolaire québécois. Bien que la loi 21 créée des tensions dans le milieu scolaire, elle suscite également de la sympathie du personnel à l’égard de certaines femmes interrogées dans notre étude. En tout état de cause, bien que la situation créée par la loi 21 soit vécue de façon décourageante pour les EBDA, aucune d’entre elles n’envisage de quitter la profession. Au contraire, l’un des résultats forts de notre étude semble révéler que la loi 21 renforce l’IP des EBDA, notamment celles qui veulent redoubler d’efforts pour « prouver » leur compétence ou améliorer leurs habiletés sociales dans le milieu scolaire. Elles deviennent ainsi très proactives dans les interactions pour être acceptées et reconnues afin de briser les préjugés à leur égard. En ce qui concerne les mécanismes de structuration de l’IP des EBDA, nous avons identifié deux types d’IP : institutionnelle et communautaire. La première comprend des enseignantes qui placent l’organisation scolaire et leur profession au premier plan et dont la façon de penser et d’agir est orientée vers l’école, le gouvernement et l’État. Leur intégration dans l’école se fait par les interactions plutôt que par les règles. La seconde concerne les enseignantes plus préoccupées par l’avenir des autres femmes qui portent le hijab, qu’elles soient enseignantes en formation ou élèves dans les écoles primaires ou secondaires. Ces enseignantes ont connu davantage d’incidents liés à du racisme ordinaire à l’école, parfois à cause de la loi 21, et se sentent plus anxieuses au travail. Leur intégration se fait par le biais de règles plutôt que par les interactions en milieu scolaire. / While Quebec is implementing a national law on secularization, namely law 21, the experiences of teachers wearing religious symbols, particularly those symbols possibly affecting teachers’ professional identity (PI), haven’t been investigated yet. Using an interactionist-conflictualist framework, this dissertation explores this issue through of nine Muslim female teachers, eight of whom have benefited from acquired grandfathered rights (AGR), and therefore are able to continue wearing their religious symbols in the exercise of their profession, despite law 21. This study was conducted to understand and describe the relationship between wearing religious symbols and the PI of these teachers under law 21. By describing the general considerations that structure the AGRs’ interactions and power relations, this research provides information about their representations of key concepts related to education, their perceptions, and their understandings of law 21. The research also provides an opportunity to foreground their voices about the hijab as an identity instrument in public debates. The study shows that the interactions and relations experienced and reported by teachers having AGRs do not necessarily lead to incidents involving students and their parents. On the other hand, while relations of teachers benefiting from AGRs with their colleagues and school principals are most often described as excellent, it should be noted that incidents with this group of school actors are occasionally reported. These tensions, sometimes created by law 21, are experienced indirectly and subtly and take various forms, including gestures, attitudes, and behaviours, as well as offensive words or comments that are not necessarily bitter, but have become “normal”. These incidents suggest, in some cases, the manifestation of Islamophobia and ordinary racism in the Quebec school environment. Although law 21 creates tensions in the school environment, it also generates sympathy in some respects. Nonetheless, although the situation created by law 21 is discouraging for teachers with AGRs, none of them have considered leaving the profession. On the contrary, one of the key findings of our study reveals that law 21 reinforces the PI of teachers with AGRs, especially as they strive to make more efforts to “prove” their competence or improve their social skills in the school environment (ex: by becoming very proactive in interactions to be accepted and to countermand prejudices). In terms of structuring mechanisms of teachers with ABRs’ PI, we identified two types of PI: institutional and community. The former includes female teachers, who place the school organization and their profession at the forefront, and whose way of thinking and acting is oriented towards the school, the government, and the state. Their integration into the school is through interactions rather than rules. The second is for female teachers who are more concerned about the future of other women who wear the hijab, whether they are student-teachers or students in primary or secondary schools. These teachers have experienced more incidents at school, sometimes because of law 21, and feel more anxious at work. Their integration happens through rules rather than through interactions.

Depuis la loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public adoptée le 11 octobre 2010 jusqu’à aujourd’hui, la tension entre la liberté religieuse et les valeurs de la République est prégnante. Les valeurs de la République, qui renvoient stricto sensu à la devise « Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité », sont conjuguées avec d’autres notions. Dans le processus d’élaboration de la loi de 2010, elles sont articulées à la dignité et l’égalité des sexes. Depuis, elles sont conjuguées avec, voire identifiées à la laïcité, érigée en valeur, et les citoyens sont appelés à adhérer à cet ensemble axiologique. Cette évolution des cadres de référence dans la prise en compte du religieux par l’État, et la tension qu’elle emporte entre la liberté religieuse et les valeurs de la République, doivent être interrogées. / On October 11th, 2010, a Frenchlaw prohibits the deliberate concealment of hiding the face in public spaces. Since then, the tensions between freedom of religion and the values of the Republic remain strong. Theses republican values which strictly refer to the motto « Liberty, Equality, Fraternity » coexist with many concepts. During the process of law-making, the bill articulated the French Republic values with dignity and gender equality. Ever since these newly added concepts are now accepted as components of the secularism. Citizens are called to adhere to this value system. The framework evolution required by the consideration of the religious fact of the State and the strong tensions between the freedom of religion and the values of Republic must be analyzed.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

Le droit à la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion expressément reconnu à l’enfant par l’article 14 de la Convention internationale de New York adoptée en 1989 soulève de nombreuses questions. En raison de l’état de dépendance de l’enfant et de sa vulnérabilité, l’exercice de cette liberté apparaît particulièrement fragilisée. Les droits de l’enfant sont en effet menacés de toute part, tant par l’autorité publique, que par sa famille, ou par des tiers, voire par l’enfant lui-même. Les parents tout en étant les premiers protecteurs et les premiers « guides spirituels » de l’enfant pourront parallèlement représenter les premiers obstacles à l’exercice de sa liberté religieuse pleine et entière suscitant un conflit entre droits parentaux et droits de l’enfant. L’État s’érige d’ailleurs en protecteur lorsque ses parents lui font courir un risque au nom même de leurs convictions religieuses. Le juge pourra aussi connaître de conflits familiaux provoqués par un désaccord religieux. Garant de l’ordre public, l’État sera parfois amené à limiter la liberté religieuse de l’enfant et de ses parents en mettant en avant la primauté d’un intérêt social tel la sauvegarde du principe de laïcité. Il apparaît donc nécessaire de considérer la question de la liberté religieuse de l’enfant à la fois dans la sphère familiale et plus largement dans la société en nous interrogeant notamment quant à l’effectivité réelle du droit de liberté religieuse de l’enfant. Comme pour tout sujet touchant aux droits de l’enfant, la recherche de l’équilibre entre liberté et protection s’inscrit sur un chemin difficile dont témoigne l’étude du droit de l’enfant à la liberté religieuse. / The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion expressly granted to the child under article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in 1989 raises many questions. Regarding his particular dependence and vulnerability, the exercise of this liberty by the child appears particularly weaken. Children’s rights are indeed threatened from all quarters, so much by public authority as by their family or by third parties, if not by the child himself. Parents, while being his first protectors and first “spiritual guides”, can also represent the first obstacle to the full exercise of the child’s freedom of religion, therefore raising a conflict between parental and children’s rights. It is to be noticed that the State establishes itselfs as the protector of the child whenever parents endanger him even in the name of religious beliefs. The judge might also intervene within family conflicts resulting from religious disagreements. Ensuring public order as well, the State will in some cases subject child’s and parents’ freedom of religion to limitations deemed necessary in regard to the primacy of a particular social interest such as the protection of secularism. It seems therefore essential to consider the question of the child’s religious freedom within the family sphere as well as, to a larger extent, within society, while questioning the effectivity of the right of the child to religious freedom. As for any subject relating to children’s rights, the search for balance between freedom and protection is engaged on a difficult path as evidenced by this study on the right of the child to religious freedom.