The dissertation research will comprise three essays on the topic of the resource curse hypothesis and its mechanisms. The phenomenon of low economic growth in resource-rich regions is recognized as the “resource curse”. These essays will contribute to an understanding of the regional resource-growth relation within a nation. Essay one tests the resource curse hypothesis at the U.S. state level. With a system of equations model, I decompose the overall resource effect to account for the two leading explanations — crowding-out and institution effects, thus investigate whether the institutions mediate the crowding-out effects. I did not find evidence of an overall negative effect on growth by resource wealth. Both the crowding-out and institution appear present, but they offset: the resource boom crowds out industrial investments, but good institutions mitigate the overall effect. Resources do reduce growth in states with low-quality institutions, including Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. Essay two compares the effects of resource revenues on the economic growth and growth-related factors across Chinese provinces and American states, using panel data from 1990 to 2015. With the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy, I show that regions with higher resource revenues grow faster than other regions in both China and the U.S. The positive resource effect is larger and more statistically significant in the U.S. Further testing impacts of three resource-related policies in China, e.g. the market price reform, the fiscal reform, and the Western Development Strategy, I show that the market price reform together with the privatization process on coal resources contribute the positive resource effect in China. Though strong and positive resource – growth relations appear in both countries, evidence also suggests consistent negative resource effects on certain growth-related factors in both countries, such as educational attainments and R&D activities. Essay three explores the schooling response to the oil and gas boom, taking advantage of timing and spatial variation in oil and gas well drilling activities. Development of cost-reducing technologies at the time of higher crude oil and natural gas prices in the early 2000s has accelerated shale oil and gas extraction in the United States. I show that intensive drilling activities have decreased grade 11 and 12 enrollment over the 14 year study window − approximately 36 fewer students per county on average and overall, 41,760 fewer students across the 15 states enrolled considered in the analysis. On average, with one additional oil or gas well drilled per thousand initial laborers, grade 11 and 12 enrollment would decrease 0.24 percent at the county level, all else equal. I investigate heterogeneous effects and show that the implied effect of the boom is larger in states with a younger compulsory schooling age requirement (16 years of age instead of 17 or 18), lower state-level effective tax rate on oil and gas productions, traditional mining, non-metro, and persistent poverty counties.

La richesse naturelle est-elle un gage de prospérité ou se révèle-t-elle être une malédiction? Comment le pétrole a-t-il façonné l'évolution économique des pays producteurs ? Dans le prolongement de ces interrogations, l'objectif de cette thèse est de progresser dans la compréhension des mécanismes qui font que le pétrole est, pour les pays exportateurs, aussi souvent une malédiction qu'une bénédiction. Les travaux empiriques qui constituent notre thèse permettent ainsi de répondre à trois questions distinctes : (i) quelle est la contribution du pétrole en tant que ressource énergétique (ou source d'énergie) au processus de croissance économique ? (ii) quels sont les effets directs et indirects de la dépendance aux revenus pétroliers sur la croissance économique et (iii) la malédiction pétrolière n'est-elle pas une question qui renvoie à la stabilité macroéconomique?Notre analyse met ainsi en évidence les résultats suivants : (i) une richesse pétrolière abondante et la surconsommation de pétrole observée dans une large majorité de pays exportateurs de pétrole contribuent positivement au processus de croissance économique. Ce résultat n'est toutefois valable que sur le court terme. En effet, sur le long terme, la consommation de pétrole s'avère être une conséquence de la croissance économique ; (ii) le pétrole en tant que source de revenus impacte la croissance économique directement et indirectement via ses effets sur le montant et la qualité des dépenses publiques ainsi que sur l'ouverture commerciale. Au regard de ces mécanismes de transmission, nos résultats montrent qu'au-delà d'un certain seuil de dépendance aux revenus pétroliers, la croissance économique est entravée par les effets directs et indirects de la rente pétrolière. Toutefois, ces effets peuvent être contenus, tout d'abord, en réduisant la dépendance aux revenus pétroliers, en améliorant, ensuite, la gouvernance et, enfin, en allant vers davantage de stabilité politique ; (iii) les revenus pétroliers, de part leur extrême instabilité peuvent nuire à la croissance économique en induisant des distorsions macroéconomiques. Cette instabilité se traduit plus précisément par une appréciation du taux de change réel, une hausse des dépenses publiques et de l'inflation. Les pays les plus tributaires de la rente pétrolière sont les plus exposés à cette instabilité macroéconomique. De même, les pays où l'efficacité et la crédibilité du gouvernement sont moindres sont ceux où la croissance économique pâtit le plus de cette instabilité macroéconomique.Le pétrole est ainsi un atout pour les économies des pays exportateurs de pétrole dont il faut maitriser les effets indésirables sur l'économie. Une première solution consisterait alors à réduire le niveau de dépendance de l'économie aux revenus pétroliers pour diminuer le risque d'exposition à la volatilité des prix du pétrole et en réduire le risque de contagion à l'économie. Une autre solution nécessiterait d'améliorer la capacité des gouvernements à mettre en place des politiques économiques efficientes. / Is natural wealth a guarantee of prosperity or is it a curse? How has petroleum shaped growth economic process in oil producing countries? To the extent that these questions have to be raise, the purpose of this thesis is to move towards a better understanding of the mechanisms that make oil becoming a curse as often as a blessing, in oil exporting countries. The empirical studies conducted in this thesis help answer three main questions: (i) What is the contribution of oil as energy (or an energy source) in the process of economic growth? (ii) What are the direct and indirect effects of dependence to oil revenues on economic growth? (iii) Is the oil curse a question of macroeconomic stability?Our contributions thus highlight the following results. (i) Abundant oil wealth and overconsumption observed in the vast majority of oil exporting countries contribute positively to the economic growth process. This result is, however, valid only in the short term. Indeed, in the long term, oil consumption appears to be a consequence of economic growth. (ii) Oil as a source of revenue impacts economic growth directly and indirectly through its effect on the amount and quality of public spending as well as on trade openness. Given these mechanisms, our results show that beyond a certain threshold of dependence on oil revenues, economic growth is constrained by the direct and indirect effects of oil revenues. However, these effects can be contained, first, by reducing dependence on oil revenues; then, by improving government effectiveness; and finally by increasing political stability. (iii) Oil revenues, due to their extreme instability may harm economic growth by inducing macroeconomic distortions. This instability results more precisely by an appreciation of the real exchange rate, a rise in public spending and inflation. The most dependent are countries, the most they are exposed to macroeconomic instability. Similarly, countries with an efficient and credible government are the one which suffer economic growth suffers the less from macroeconomic instability.Oil is, thus, a vantage for oil exporting countries but the adverse effects of such a natural resource on the economy must be mastered. One solution would, then, be to reduce the level of dependence of the economy on oil revenues to reduce the exposure to volatile oil prices and to reduce the risk of contagion to the economy. Another solution would be to improve the ability of governments to implement efficient economic policies.

The resource curse hypothesis suggests that resource-rich countries show lower economic growth rates compared to resource-poor countries. We add to this literature by providing empirical evidence on a new transmission channel of the resource curse, namely, the negative effect of rents on the quality of education. The cross-country analysis for more than 70 countries shows a significantly positive effect of oil rents on the quantity of education measured by government spending on primary and secondary education. Hence, the underspending hypothesis championed by Gylfason (2001) no longer holds with newer data. However, we find a robust and negative effect of oil rents dependency on the current objective and subjective indicators of quality of education, controlling for a set of other drivers of education quality and regional dummies. Despite spending significant shares of GDP on education, oil-rich countries still suffer from an insufficient quality of primary and secondary education, which may hamper their growth potentials. The significant negative effect of oil rents dependency on education quality can be explained by both the demand (e.g., skill acquisition) and supply (e.g., teacher quality) side channels.

Botswana has recently garnered analytic attention as an anomaly of the “resource curse” phenomenon. Worldwide, countries whose economies are highly skewed towards a dependence on the export of non-renewable natural resources such as oil, diamonds and uranium, have been among the most troubled, authoritarian, poverty-stricken and conflict-prone; a phenomenon widely regarded as the “resource curse". The resource curse explains the varying fortunes of countries based on their resource wealth, with resource-rich countries faring much worse than their resource-poor counterparts. However, Botswana, with diamond exports accounting for 50percent of government revenues and 80percent of total exports, has achieved one of the fastest economic growth rates in the developing world in the last 50 years. Furthermore, the Freedom House ranks it as the safest, most stable, least corrupt and most democratic country on sub-Saharan Africa. In attempting to answer why Botswana apparently escaped the “resource curse”, this research assumes that both formal and informal institutions within the state acted as intermediary variables in determining its fortune. This research thus addresses the deeper question of where Botswana obtained its unique institutional quality that facilitated its apparent escape of the resource curse. It traces Botswana’s history through four lenses: legitimacy and historical continuity, political culture, ethnicity and identity management, and external relations; as having explanatory value in understanding the Botswana exception. The research finds most evidence of Botswana’s institutional quality emanating from the country’s political culture which it found more compatible with the institutions of development and democracy that facilitate both positive economic and political outcomes. It also found evidence of legitimacy and historical continuity facilitating the robustness of both formal and informal institutions in Botswana, and identity management through assimilation as having buffered against the effects of ethnically motivated resource plunder. It however, found the least support for the assertion that external relations contributed to institutional quality.

The aim of the work Failed States in International Relations is the examination of this phenomenon regarding the terminological discrepancy, causes of the state fragility, security and social aspects and the various attitudes from the side of the international communities. A special part is dealing with so called "successfully failed states" where despite the obvious non-functioning the state is able to survive due to the revenues from the natural resources. The ?ndings are represented on the case study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a country with huge potential but miserable performance by now.

Countries with rich natural resource endowments suffer from lower economic growth and various other ills. This work tests whether the resource curse also extends to the quality of regulation and the level of corruption. A theoretical framework is developed that informs the specification of interactive random effects models. A cross-national panel data set is used to estimate these models. Due to multicollinearity, only an effect of metals and ores exports on corruption can be discerned. Marginal effects computations show that whether nature corrupts or not crucially depends on a country's institutions. A broad tax base and high levels of education appear to serve as inoculations for countries against the side-effects of mineral wealth.

The resource curse hypothesis suggests that resource-rich countries show lower economic growth rates compared to resource-poor countries. We add to this literature by providing empirical evidence on a new transmission channel of the resource curse, namely, the negative effect of rents on the quality of education. The cross-country analysis for more than 70 countries shows a significantly positive effect of oil rents on the quantity of education measured by government spending on primary and secondary education. Hence, the underspending hypothesis championed by Gylfason (2001) no longer holds with newer data. However, we find a robust and negative effect of oil rents dependency on the current objective and subjective indicators of quality of education, controlling for a set of other drivers of education quality and regional dummies. Despite spending significant shares of GDP on education, oil-rich countries still suffer from an insufficient quality of primary and secondary education, which may hamper their growth potentials. The significant negative effect of oil rents dependency on education quality can be explained by both the demand (e.g., skill acquisition) and supply (e.g., teacher quality) side channels.

The main objective of this Master thesis was to test the claim that economic dependence on oil exports impedes enduring democratic stability in the case of Venezuela in the period of 1970-2010. This assumption was based on a broad resource curse theory which addresses negative economic, political and social consequences of precious resource export dependency. The hypothesis was that exogenous variables could intesify these malign consequences. In this study we focused on the role(s) performed by multinational oil corporations (MICs) in Venezuelan petroleum industry, on the impact of the nationalization of the oil sector and on the impact of the foundation of a state-owned corporation PDVSA, which became responsible for subsequent development of oil extraction. Fist, I proved that the nationalization led to profound restructuring of institutional and power relations that had negative impact on economic prosperity and stability of the democratic regime in a long-term perspective. Soon after its establishment the national oil corporation became an independent actor able to follow its own agenda and to promote its own economic and political interests and therefore polarized the already divided society. Second, I documented empirical evidence that corroborated most of the previous theoretical...

This dissertation is devoted to the analysis of various aspects of inefficiency in the political economy. It consists of four self-containing theoretical essays. The first two chapters deal with the interplay between inefficiency and commitment. Chapter 1 studies the problem of commitment in autocratic regimes and its implications for growth. Chapter 2 argues that the absence of commitment undermines the validity of the Coase theorem. The next two chapters address alternative sources of inefficiency, abstracting from commitment-related problems. Chapter 3 discusses inefficiencies arising in organizations whose members possess veto power and suggests a way of mitigating the problem. Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of demand linkages on the efficiency of lobbying for trade policy. Chapter 1. “Autocracy, Devolution and Growth” Some autocracies have sustained high economic growth for many decades; others have stagnated at low levels of production. Paradoxically, the stagnating autocracies appear to possess more natural resources and be more resistant to political change than the growing autocracies. The paper argues that the scope for capital accumulation and growth in an autocracy is largely determined by the autocrat's incentive to cling to power. The main result of the paper is that there will be private capital accumulation only if the autocrat’s benefits from political control are not too high. The reason is that, as capital accumulates and growth slows down, the autocrat faces an increasing temptation to expropriate the capitalists. Since expropriation eliminates growth, the autocrat may voluntarily refrain from expropriating if future growth is sufficiently large; otherwise, the temptation to expropriate can only be resisted through a credible commitment, that is, by devolving some political power. For autocrats with large benefits of control, for example valuable natural resource rents, devolution of power may always be unattractive. As a result, capitalists realize that they will eventually be expropriated, and capital accumulation therefore never starts. On the other hand, autocrats with small resource rents will eventually devolve power, since this commitment is necessary to sustain growth. Therefore, capitalists are willing to start accumulating despite the autocratic regime. In other words, autocracies are vulnerable to the resource curse.   Chapter 2. “The Coase Theorem Is False” (with Tore Ellingsen) The paper provides simple and robust counterexamples to the Coase Theorem. More precisely, we show that equilibrium investments in club goods can be suboptimally small despite the presence of well-defined and perfectly protected property rights and the absence of transaction costs and informational asymmetries. The reason is that, in equilibrium, a club of owners will typically not exercise their right to exclude outsiders, preferring instead to exercise their right to sell access. As long as the club of owners does not have all the bargaining power in such ex post access negotiations, strategic non-membership provides a valuable free-riding opportunity. Chapter 3. “Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity” (with Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart and Guido Friebel) In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogeneous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. In the presence of externalities and an incomplete charter, the threat of forming an “inner organization” can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is never executed, and under which inner organizations are equilibrium outcomes, and provide a rationale for the diversity of decision rules. Chapter 4. “Protection for Sale to Oligopolists” This paper modifies Grossman and Helpman’s "Protection for Sale" model by allowing demand linkages and oligopolistic competition. It shows that increased substitutability between products weakens interest groups’ incentives to lobby. For the case of two industries it obtains a particularly simple result: the protection of the organized industry’s product falls, whereas the protection of the unorganized industry’s product increases with product substitutability. The model suggests that empirical studies of the "Protection for Sale" may overstate the lobby groups’ desire for protection. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

As the public becomes more concerned with the natural environment, one of the major topics discussed is the oil. Since there is no true source of knowledge how long the oil can continue to be extracted, it is interesting to know how long the world can benefit from such as scarce resource. Instead of idly watching as oil production decreases with time, which pre-measures could be taken in order to minimize a negative impact on an economy? The UAE is a thriving oil rich countries which for the past 30 years have experienced a vast oil wealth. Even though the oil gave wealth to the UAE, they should avoid any future oil dependency since it could negatively affect its now flourishing economy. Therefore, for the UAE to continue growing in the future it is in the best interest for the government to focus on a diversifying strategy that promotes the non-oil economy. By referring to concepts and theories of previous research in this field such as the Solow growth model, Resource curse and Dutch disease the authors find that the UAE had managed to diversify or not. Three sectors in different periods between 1970 and 2007 were measured: The oil sector, the non-oil sector and the government sector. Diversification changes means a decreasing dependency of the oil sector to the non-oil sector while the latter instead depends more on the government sector. Using British Petroleum (2008) and United Nations (2008) as sources, data was collected in order to draw a time-series regression analysis and test empirically for these diversification trends. The results for all periods confirmed that the UAE have indeed diversified and it could thus be observed that it started its successful strategy already in the 1970s. With the right government policy investments and the stability in the union, the UAE prevented from becoming dependent on oil and thereby not crowding out its important non-oil economy. / Med en ökad allmän medvetenhet angående naturmiljön så är oljan bland det mest omtalande temat. Eftersom inget vet exakt hur länge oljan kan utvinnas, är det intressant att veta hur länge världen kan förlita sig på en sådan begränsad resurs. Finns det förebyggande medel för att minska en negativ verkan på ekonomin istället för att passivt bevittna en sjunkande oljeproduktion? Förenta Arabemiraten (FAE) är en framgångsrik union som under de senaste 30 åren har åtnjutit en omfattande oljerikedom. Trots att oljan lade grunden för tillväxten i FAE, så börs unionen undvika sitt oljeberoende eftersom den negativt kan påverka den nuvarande blomstrande ekonomin. Således, för att bibehålla tillväxten i FAE för framtiden, borde det vara i statens största intresse att fokusera på en differentierings-strategi som främjar icke-oljans ekonomi. För att veta om FAE faktiskt har differentierat sig eller inte, används koncept och teorier för tidigare forskning kring områdets som t.ex. Solows tillväxtmodel, Resursförbannelsen och holländska sjukan. Tre sektorer mättes i olika perioder mellan 1970-2007: oljesektorn, icke-sektorn och statssektorn. Icke-olje sektorn förväntas minska oljeberoendet samt öka beroendet av statssektorn vilket resulterar i en differentieringstrend i ekonomin. Genom källor från British Petroleum (2008) och Förenta Nationerna (2008)  har data insamlats för att empiriskt testa en tidsserie regression och se förändringar mellan sektorerna. Under alla perioder i FAE blev en differentieringstrend bekräftad och man kunde därför se att denna framgångsrika strategi redan åtogs i 1970-talet. Med effektiva investeringar i den offentliga sektorn samt en hållbar stabilitet i unionen, undvek FAE ett oljeberoende och därmed främjade icke-olje ekonomin.