<b>Background and problem:</b> It is important for a policy aiming at overcoming discrimination to be justifiable as just or as creating justice. When a policy is implemented lacking such qualities it is argued to be unjust, which creates a problem. During the last decades there has been massive immigration to the Western countries from countries marked by war and disaster. This has created problems of integration into the “new” society, and the use of preferential policies has become increasingly topical. Whether or not the use of preferential policies is a just method is the basis of this thesis. <b>Aim</b>: The aim of this thesis is to study the concept of preferential policies in an impartial perspective of fairness. By impartial it is meant to present facts speaking both for and against preferential policies as being just. The main question of this thesis is whether or not preferential treatment is a just method to create equality within the society. <b>Method</b>: A research method of textual analysis has been used combined with an analysis of structure of arguments. <b>Theoretical framework</b>: First, definitions of discrimination and preferential policies as such are focused upon in the third chapter. Second, the concept of social justice and its connection to preferential policies is treated. The question if preferential policies should be directed towards individuals or groups is a central question in the debate and it will demand its space in this thesis. Here the importance of merit will be discussed. The section about individuals and groups will be followed by a section discussing the importance of ethnic diversity which will be followed by a comparison of the development of preferential policies in the USA and Sweden. Last, there will be a section where an attempt to generalize between arguments is made. <b>Conclusions and Discussion</b>: In this part a conclusion and a discussion will be presented. Here conclusions will be drawn from the gathered material. Finally there will be a discussion on the subject and of how the research procedure has proceeded.

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This study focuses on the rhetoric of racial politics and the ideology of exclusion it produces. This study analyzes the political rhetoric constructed by David Duke, white supremacist, disavowed neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan member, and former Louisiana State Representative. The topics of affirmative action, reverse discrimination, immigration, and welfare were chosen for analysis. Using ideological criticism, this study reveals the role Duke pays in America's increasingly exclusionary political environment. Specifically, this study uses the concepts employed by Louisa Martin Rojo in exploring the rhetorical process of demonization which is used to turn someone or something into an enemy. The process needed to demonize an enemy involves two rhetorical strategies: division and rejection. Division establishes the opposing categories in the conflict, manifesting itself as an arguments between "us verses them" or "good verses evil." Rejection further demonizes the enemy by rhetorically marginalizing, segregating, or creating a negative image about them. Through his rhetoric, Duke strives to provoke feelings of resentment by utilizing demonization to reject and divide whites from minorities. In his rhetoric, Duke excludes people of color from society by portraying affirmative action as minority special privilege, reverse discrimination as white exclusion, welfare as a bastion of illegitimacy, and immigration as the downfall of American culture. Attempting to exclude minorities from society, Duke moves beyond Rojo's concept of demonization and uses scapegoating to blame minorities for America's social ills. By using people of color as a scapegoat, Duke effectively excludes them from participating in the debate over social concerns.

The constitutionality of affirmative action in terms of section 8 of Act 200 of 1993 is investigated. The study contends that in constitutional interpretation it is permissible to have recourse to ethical precepts as long as these are anchored within the four corners of the Constitution. It is contended that the •equality clause• does not prescribe equality of outcome in favour of substantive equality of opportunity. It is asserted that group-based affirmative action may justifiably be attacked as being unconstitutional; either on the basis that it infringes the nonbeneficiary's equality rights in terms of sections 8(1) and 8(2) or that it falls beyond the constitutional protection afforded to affirmative action in terms of section 8(3). Furthermore, group-based modalities of affirmative action may also not constitute a permissible limitation on the fundamental right to equality, if compared to an individual-based socio-economic affirmative action model. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

The constitutionality of affirmative action in terms of section 8 of Act 200 of 1993 is investigated. The study contends that in constitutional interpretation it is permissible to have recourse to ethical precepts as long as these are anchored within the four corners of the Constitution. It is contended that the •equality clause• does not prescribe equality of outcome in favour of substantive equality of opportunity. It is asserted that group-based affirmative action may justifiably be attacked as being unconstitutional; either on the basis that it infringes the nonbeneficiary's equality rights in terms of sections 8(1) and 8(2) or that it falls beyond the constitutional protection afforded to affirmative action in terms of section 8(3). Furthermore, group-based modalities of affirmative action may also not constitute a permissible limitation on the fundamental right to equality, if compared to an individual-based socio-economic affirmative action model. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

There have been three main sets of trends in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the field of the internal market after 2004. The first set of trends concerned the criteria of legal analysis, i.e. the scope of EU rules on free movement, the concept of the restriction of free movement and the justification of such restrictions. The second set of trends in the case law is related to the fact that the Court completes its legal analysis by considerations linked to its value orientation of the Court, i.e. its liberalism, social tendencies, protection of fundamental rights, pragmatism and proactivity. The third trend in the case law of the internal market consisted in changing the focus of case law in the sense that the Court has begun to deal with more and more cases from sectoral fields, i.e. fields covered by secondary law.