This dissertation aims to examine and analyse the current South African position with regard to voluntary euthanasia. An examination is made from constitutional law, common law, case law and statutory law perspectives, including the legislation proposed by the South African Law Commission (project 86). The writings of prominent authors are considered. Once the South African position is examined, a comparative study is undertaken concerning relevant aspects in the Dutch law. The most important findings are that the South African Constitution may allow, and perhaps even demand, the legalization of voluntary euthanasia in South Africa, provided that sufficient safeguards can be established to effectively and sufficiently minimize the risk of abuse. Should this be impossible, the proscription of euthanasia may be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Finally, some recommendations are made for changes to the South African Law Commission’s Final Draft Bill. / Dissertation (LLM (Medical Law))--University of Pretoria, 2008. / Public Law / unrestricted

No previous study has attempted to clarify and articulate administrator attitudes regarding DNR orders in the school setting. Administrative school staff are responsible for development and implementation of school policy therefore understanding administrators' attitudes would assist discussion and decision making related to DNR orders in the school setting.

Thesis (LLM (Private Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / End of life decisions regarding defective babies raise several controversial questions. The root of the problem in withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment from defective babies lies in the conflict between human emotions, technological advancements and legal considerations. As a result of advances in medical science and neonatal technology, the lives of defective babies can often be saved or indefinitely prolonged. The question has become not whether we can treat these babies, but rather whether we should. Whether or not a defective baby’s life must be prolonged raises serious moral and ethical issues. A life compromised by severe physical and mental handicaps is weighed against an early and painless death. The best interest of the baby is the primary consideration from a legal point of view. Various factors must be taken into account to give content to this concept. Another central question is to determine who the decision maker(s) should be and what weight should be given to their opinions. Due to the fact that defective babies can not participate in this decision making process or communicate their wishes and preferences, surrogate decision makers must decide on their behalf. In sharp contrast to England, America and Canada, there is hardly any literature and no reported case law in South Africa to demonstrate the complexity of end of life decisions regarding defective babies. Selective non-treatment of defective babies have received little attention in the South African law. The Bill of Rights, inspired by regional and international Conventions determine the framework from a juristic perspective wherein decisions must be made and justified. This framework requires that the focus must be on the most vulnerable and dependant, namely the defective baby.

This thesis defends an individual's moral right to be aided in dying by a physician (that is, voluntary active euthanasia, or VAE), but departs significantly from the view in its favor generally accepted in the bioethics literature. The prevailing view appeals to both respect for an individual's autonomy and promotion of an individual's well-being as necessary conditions for a right to VAE, so as to justify the right only for those suffering grave illnesses and/or disabilities. The author argues that such a view is logically untenable; one or another aspect must be given up. Since invoking the premise that certain individuals would be better off dead necessarily relies on controversial assumptions about both the value of life and the nature and value of death, about which reasonable people disagree, it is the justification from an individual's best interest which must be excluded in a liberal society. The author endorses a self-determination justification for the right to VAE, but rejects understanding this in terms of respecting personal autonomy, instead making the case for a right to VAE grounded in self-ownership. The author's main conclusion is that the right to VAE is a general right applying to all competent adults, not only those suffering grave illnesses or disabilities, or those whose choice for VAE is an exercise of autonomy. Moreover, by analyzing the basis of physician authority over prescription medicine and how this can be justified to a society of self-owners, she maintains that individuals have not only the right to choose VAE without state interference, but also the right to be provided VAE by doctors. Nevertheless, both rights are compatible with reasonable limitations to protect both the interests of VAE seekers and the rights of others.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / African Americans' tendency to choose life-prolonging treatments (LPT) over comfort focused care (CFC) at end-of-life is well documented but poorly understood. There is minimal knowledge about African American (AA) perceptions of decisions to continue or discontinue LPT. The purpose of this study was to examine AA family members' perceptions of factors that influenced end-of-life care decision-making for a relative who recently died from serious illness. A conceptual framework informed by the literature and the Ottawa Decision Support Framework was developed to guide this study. A retrospective, mixed methods design combined quantitative and qualitative descriptive approaches. Forty-nine bereaved AA family members of AA decedents with serious illness who died between 2 to 6 months prior to enrollment participated in a one-time telephone interview. Outcomes examined include end-of-life treatment decision, decision regret, and decisional conflict. Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, independent-sample t-tests, Mann-Whitney U tests, chi-square tests, Spearman and Pearson correlations, and linear and logistic regressions. Qualitative data were analyzed using content analysis and qualitative descriptive methods. Family members' decisional conflict scores were negatively correlated with their quality of general communication (rs = -.503, p = .000) and end-of-life communication scores (rs = -.414, p = .003). There was a significant difference in decisional regret scores between family members of decedents who received CFC versus those who received LPT (p = .030). Family members' quality of general communication (p = .030) and end-of-life communication (p = .014) were significant predictors of family members' decisional conflict scores. Qualitative themes related to AA family members' experiences in end-of-life decision-making included understanding (e.g., feeling prepared or unprepared for death), relationships with healthcare providers (e.g., being shown care, distrust) and the quality of communication (e.g., being informed, openness, and inadequate information). Additional qualitative themes were related to perceptions of the decision to continue LPT (e.g., a lack of understanding, believe will benefit) or discontinue LPT (e.g., patient preferences, desire to prevent suffering). In conclusion, this study generated new knowledge of the factors that influenced AA bereaved family members' end-of-life decision-making for decedents with serious illnesses. Directions for future research were identified.