The purpose of this paper is to critically examine Richard Rorty’s arguments in favour of a limited role for religion in the public sphere, both with regard to their practical value and their consistency with Rorty’s other philosophical commitments. A brief description of Rorty’s various philosophical commitments is followed by a detailed analysis of the negative practical consequences that can be foreseen resulting from Rorty’s approach to the topic of religion and any attempt to enforce his proposed treatment of religion. After looking at the practical problems with Rorty’s position, a closer look was taken at Rorty’s consistency across his philosophical writings. With a particular focus on Rorty’s pragmatism and his epistemic relativism the author concludes that Rorty’s arguments for reducing the influence of religion in the public sphere remain of questionable practicality and, furthermore, are at odds with his epistemological commitments. Rorty’s commitment to liberal democracy entails a commitment to protecting citizens’ rights to voice their opinions in hopes of influencing public policy. Despite his controversial writings with regards to the role of religion in society, authors such as Jeffrey Stout and Nicholas Wolterstorff provide alternative approaches to the appropriate treatment of religion in society that remain consistent with an anti-foundational commitment to liberal democracy and can expect to produce more favourable practical outcomes. / Graduate

Also published as author's dissertation--Westfälisches Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [191]-198).

Univ., Diss--Toronto. / Includes bibliographical references and index. If liberalism is a faith, what becomes of the separation of church and state? -- Pragmatism, liberalism, and the quarrel between science and religion -- Rorty's repudiation of epistemology -- Rortian irony and the "de-divinization" of liberalism -- Religion and Rawls's freestanding liberalism -- Stanley Fish and the demise of the separation of church and state -- Fish, Locke, and religious neutrality -- Reason, indifference, and the aim of religious freedom -- Appendix : a reply to Stanley Fish.

O presente trabalho examina os principais traços que caracterizam a idéia rortiana de compreender a educação como redescrição do mundo. O neopragmatismo de Rorty tem sido considerado uma das posições filosóficas que têm procurado enfrentar os impasses gerados pela filosofia moderna enquanto “metafísica da subjetividade”. Tal enfrentamento tem se realizado por meio de uma crítica contundente às principais características da filosofia em sua versão fundacional-representacionista, estruturada no modelo epistemológico da relação sujeito-objeto que tem por centralidade a busca da explicação/fundamentação do conhecimento. Partindo de uma crítica rortiana à idéia de verdade e objetividade que tem constituído o cenário “cientificista” da Modernidade, passando por uma crítica ao modelo de filosofia epistemologicamente centrado e sua conseqüente “profissionalização”, o estudo apresenta uma análise atualizada do pensador norte-americano que encontrou na “metáfora”, na “conversação” e na “edificação” um modo de pensar a filosofia “sem espelhos” e sua decorrente “desprofissionalização”. Usando a “redescrição” como conceito-chave, o trabalho procura analisar, numa perspectiva rortiana, as sugestivas “redescrições em educação” a partir das possíveis (des)conexões entre filosofia e educação, público e privado, individuação e socialização, democracia e solidariedade, ética e educação, estética e mundo. As conclusões indicam que é possível ver a “redescrição” como fomentadora de “utopias educacionais” e geradora de “estratégias redescritivas” onde a filosofia, enquanto amor a sabedoria, é concebida como “conversação” e promotora de “mundos novos”. / This work examines the main aspects that characterize Rorty’s idea of understanding education as a redescription of the world. Rorty's neopragmatism has been considered one of the philosophical perceptions which attempted to face the impasses generated by the modern philosophy while “metaphysics of subjectivity”. Such confront has been carried out by means of a strong criticism to the main characteristics of philosophy in its fundational- representationist version, structured according to the epistemologic model of the subject-object relationship, which has, as its central point, the search for knowledge explanation / foundation. Starting from a Rorty’s criticism to the idea of truth and objectivity that has constituted the “scientificist” scenario of Modernity, passing through a criticism to the philosophy model that is epistemologicaly centered and its consequent “professionalization”, the study introduces an up-to-date analysis of the North American thinker who has found, through the “metaphor”, the “conversation” and the “edification”, a way of thinking about philosophy “without mirrors” and its following “deprofessionalization”. Using the “redescription” as a key concept, this work tries to analyze, according to Rorty’s perspective, the suggestive “redescriptions in education” from the possible (de)connections between philosophy and education, public and private, individualization and socialization, democracy and solidarity, ethics and education, aesthetics and the world. The conclusions indicate that it is possible to comprehend the “redescription” as a producer of educational utopias and “redescriptive strategies”, where philosophy, as love for wisdom, is conceived as “conversation” and promoter of “new worlds”.

This thesis is primarily a descriptive exploration of the related moral philosophies of Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Rorty. While Rorty is clear that his normative thinking descends from Sellars's positions, there are numerous differences between their two positions. For instance, though Rorty is a self-identified Sellarsian, he rejects the explicitly formal character of his predecessor's work. Further, Sellars's normative upshot may be seen as philanthropic whereas Rorty's is best understood as solidaristic. Chapter 1 works through Sellars's metaethical position, which gives an intentional account to experientially-imperative normative judgments. This description pays particular attention to the necessity of community and the action-motivating character of practical reasoning. Chapter 2 turns to Rorty's deployment of Sellars's insights, beginning with a brief account of the commonalities between their metaphysical and epistemological positions. The most significant extensions Rorty makes to Sellars's position are in limiting justificatory schemas to only one's own community and shifting the focus of this community from "we reasoners" to "we sufferers." The third and final chapter briefly compliments one of the benefits of Rorty's claims over Sellars's before turning to critique, arguing that unfortunately neither of their positions have much in the way of content to offer. Beyond this, it seems difficult to understand trans-traditional conversation or deliberation on their accounts, especially Rorty's. Nonetheless, by tracing the impact of Wilfrid Sellars's thought in the work of Richard Rorty, an important connection may be made and explored.

O presente trabalho examina os principais traços que caracterizam a idéia rortiana de compreender a educação como redescrição do mundo. O neopragmatismo de Rorty tem sido considerado uma das posições filosóficas que têm procurado enfrentar os impasses gerados pela filosofia moderna enquanto “metafísica da subjetividade”. Tal enfrentamento tem se realizado por meio de uma crítica contundente às principais características da filosofia em sua versão fundacional-representacionista, estruturada no modelo epistemológico da relação sujeito-objeto que tem por centralidade a busca da explicação/fundamentação do conhecimento. Partindo de uma crítica rortiana à idéia de verdade e objetividade que tem constituído o cenário “cientificista” da Modernidade, passando por uma crítica ao modelo de filosofia epistemologicamente centrado e sua conseqüente “profissionalização”, o estudo apresenta uma análise atualizada do pensador norte-americano que encontrou na “metáfora”, na “conversação” e na “edificação” um modo de pensar a filosofia “sem espelhos” e sua decorrente “desprofissionalização”. Usando a “redescrição” como conceito-chave, o trabalho procura analisar, numa perspectiva rortiana, as sugestivas “redescrições em educação” a partir das possíveis (des)conexões entre filosofia e educação, público e privado, individuação e socialização, democracia e solidariedade, ética e educação, estética e mundo. As conclusões indicam que é possível ver a “redescrição” como fomentadora de “utopias educacionais” e geradora de “estratégias redescritivas” onde a filosofia, enquanto amor a sabedoria, é concebida como “conversação” e promotora de “mundos novos”. / This work examines the main aspects that characterize Rorty’s idea of understanding education as a redescription of the world. Rorty's neopragmatism has been considered one of the philosophical perceptions which attempted to face the impasses generated by the modern philosophy while “metaphysics of subjectivity”. Such confront has been carried out by means of a strong criticism to the main characteristics of philosophy in its fundational- representationist version, structured according to the epistemologic model of the subject-object relationship, which has, as its central point, the search for knowledge explanation / foundation. Starting from a Rorty’s criticism to the idea of truth and objectivity that has constituted the “scientificist” scenario of Modernity, passing through a criticism to the philosophy model that is epistemologicaly centered and its consequent “professionalization”, the study introduces an up-to-date analysis of the North American thinker who has found, through the “metaphor”, the “conversation” and the “edification”, a way of thinking about philosophy “without mirrors” and its following “deprofessionalization”. Using the “redescription” as a key concept, this work tries to analyze, according to Rorty’s perspective, the suggestive “redescriptions in education” from the possible (de)connections between philosophy and education, public and private, individualization and socialization, democracy and solidarity, ethics and education, aesthetics and the world. The conclusions indicate that it is possible to comprehend the “redescription” as a producer of educational utopias and “redescriptive strategies”, where philosophy, as love for wisdom, is conceived as “conversation” and promoter of “new worlds”.

This thesis will examine the direct and indirect impact the Irish National theatre had upon American theatre in general and the African American theatre in particular. It discusses the relationship between the Irish theatrical movement during the Irish Literary Renaissance and the drama that was produced during the Harlem Renaissance. To do this Rorty’s concepts of the ‘strong poet’ and ‘ironist’ will be utilized. The bleeding and cross contamination of culture, it is contended, was due to the American tour that the Irish Players undertook in 1911/12. The tour, although staged in white theatre houses and attended by a mainly white audience, had a sizeable impact on the American theatrical landscape. This thesis will chart the course of this change, from the tour through to the beginnings of the Harlem Renaissance. From the Abbey Theatre to the Little Theatre movement and from there to the African American theatre a continuous thread of de-reification, of cultural awakenings is established. In essence, the source of the African American theatre, both the Artistic stylings and hopes of Alain Locke and the propaganda aspirations of W.E.B. DuBois will be referred back to the Irish tour.

O presente trabalho examina os principais traços que caracterizam a idéia rortiana de compreender a educação como redescrição do mundo. O neopragmatismo de Rorty tem sido considerado uma das posições filosóficas que têm procurado enfrentar os impasses gerados pela filosofia moderna enquanto “metafísica da subjetividade”. Tal enfrentamento tem se realizado por meio de uma crítica contundente às principais características da filosofia em sua versão fundacional-representacionista, estruturada no modelo epistemológico da relação sujeito-objeto que tem por centralidade a busca da explicação/fundamentação do conhecimento. Partindo de uma crítica rortiana à idéia de verdade e objetividade que tem constituído o cenário “cientificista” da Modernidade, passando por uma crítica ao modelo de filosofia epistemologicamente centrado e sua conseqüente “profissionalização”, o estudo apresenta uma análise atualizada do pensador norte-americano que encontrou na “metáfora”, na “conversação” e na “edificação” um modo de pensar a filosofia “sem espelhos” e sua decorrente “desprofissionalização”. Usando a “redescrição” como conceito-chave, o trabalho procura analisar, numa perspectiva rortiana, as sugestivas “redescrições em educação” a partir das possíveis (des)conexões entre filosofia e educação, público e privado, individuação e socialização, democracia e solidariedade, ética e educação, estética e mundo. As conclusões indicam que é possível ver a “redescrição” como fomentadora de “utopias educacionais” e geradora de “estratégias redescritivas” onde a filosofia, enquanto amor a sabedoria, é concebida como “conversação” e promotora de “mundos novos”. / This work examines the main aspects that characterize Rorty’s idea of understanding education as a redescription of the world. Rorty's neopragmatism has been considered one of the philosophical perceptions which attempted to face the impasses generated by the modern philosophy while “metaphysics of subjectivity”. Such confront has been carried out by means of a strong criticism to the main characteristics of philosophy in its fundational- representationist version, structured according to the epistemologic model of the subject-object relationship, which has, as its central point, the search for knowledge explanation / foundation. Starting from a Rorty’s criticism to the idea of truth and objectivity that has constituted the “scientificist” scenario of Modernity, passing through a criticism to the philosophy model that is epistemologicaly centered and its consequent “professionalization”, the study introduces an up-to-date analysis of the North American thinker who has found, through the “metaphor”, the “conversation” and the “edification”, a way of thinking about philosophy “without mirrors” and its following “deprofessionalization”. Using the “redescription” as a key concept, this work tries to analyze, according to Rorty’s perspective, the suggestive “redescriptions in education” from the possible (de)connections between philosophy and education, public and private, individualization and socialization, democracy and solidarity, ethics and education, aesthetics and the world. The conclusions indicate that it is possible to comprehend the “redescription” as a producer of educational utopias and “redescriptive strategies”, where philosophy, as love for wisdom, is conceived as “conversation” and promoter of “new worlds”.

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<p>The central thesis of <em>Bergsonian Metaphysical Undercurrents in Rorty’s Liberal Gradualism</em> is that those who take the greatest risks for social reformations are always motivated by the feeling of being part of something indefinitely greater than themselves and their own moral communities (however capacious these may be): progress just is this vague sense of indefinite movement, or becoming. In works such as <em>Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution,</em> and <em>The Two Sources of Morality and Religion</em>, Henri Bergson identified this sense of movement with time, the evolution of life, and the emotion of love respectively. Though he would probably laud Bergson’s insistence that philosophy should be partisan, Richard Rorty would be less hasty in making Bergson’s identifications, for Rorty thinks social progress is best served by gradual increases in our local sense of “us” effected by imaginary identification with others through literary exposures, not a mystical sense of oneness with all creation. Improvising on a Bergsonian note, I hold that one must already be an aspiring mystic, or moral hero, for one to get an expanded sense of “us” from reading literature. But such a lifestyle is incredibly difficult to maintain, requiring superhuman courage and moral reflection. It is only in the inspiring, active presence of a genuine moral hero that a readership will be able to make such efforts, and reliably take to literature the way Rorty would like in order to form his goal of a maximally capacious liberal utopia. Mystics act out of the metaphysical or religious conviction, whether real or imagined, that they are instruments of a great force of love. Rorty’s own utopian project would then be dependent on (and, perhaps, even an unknowing product of) these spiritual, metaphysical undercurrents of social progress.</p>