<p>I propose a Deweyan understanding of the relationship between epistemology and politics. The standards of legitimate political debate are an irreducibly political concern and cannot be invoked to justify the politics they facilitate. Yet, such standards cannot be left outside of the scope of legitimate political discourse, because they are both politically contestable and politically significant. A Deweyan account of inquiry, extended to moral and political questions, provides fruitful ground for integrating epistemological concerns within a political framework without reducing either kind of consideration to the other.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

La presente tesis aborda el papel del humor y de la ironía en la filosofía, no solo como armas retóricas que los más importantes autores de nuestra tradición han empleado, sino también como elemento esencial de una tradición llamada “ironista” defendida por el filósofo norteamericano Richard Rorty en su obra Contingencia, ironía y solidaridad. A partir de la consideración de la propia contingencia a nivel epistemológico y moral que la filosofía, según Rorty, debe asumir en tiempos postmetafísicos, planteamos nosotros dos cuestiones principales en nuestra tesis. Por un lado, sostenemos que existe un humor filosófico, representado por la ironía, que no solo permite evaluar críticamente la historia de la metafísica para señalar en ella sus incongruencias (carácter esencial de lo cómico), sino también, permite liberarnos del dogmatismo que nos impide observar la contingencia de nuestros propios “saberes” (o lo que Rorty llama “léxicos últimos”). En este sentido el humor irónico nos enseña a replantear el papel de la filosofía. Por otro lado, Rorty le otorga a la novela y a otras artes y aproximaciones a la realidad, un papel fundamental como insumo cultural que permite la reflexión y la educación moral. Nosotros sostenemos que también la comedia, en tanto expresión artística que usa el humor, nos permite dar cuenta de las incongruencias de la realidad para abordarlas de manera crítica y que a su vez permite tener nuevas perspectivas de la problemática abordada humorísticamente para actuar en consecuencia. El humor de la comedia puede ser, entonces, un insumo para comprender la realidad y para actuar en ella críticamente, es decir, el humor cumple un papel cognoscitivo y se asume como herramienta política que imagina un individuo y una sociedad nuevos

In the contemporary U.S., the state, through the Legislative Assembly, the State Board of Education, and the Department of Education, sets policies for K-12 education. These include goals and standards that affect the kinds of influences local officials, parents, and students can have on various education programs, required and elective coursework, graduation requirements, and curriculum content. The state ought to be able to justify their education policies to citizens. I argue here for a pragmatist informed "minimalist approach" to justifying education policies. This approach has state officials (and subsequently local officials) use local, situated reasons for justifying their education standards, goals, and curriculum. I argue that if state officials utilize a minimalist approach to justify education policies, it will be easier for citizens to contest (or support) the state's policies because the language employed will better represent citizen's local, situated common experiences, and be contestable on those grounds. One consequence of this minimalist approach is that state officials could exclude justifications that are made by appealing to isolated, abstract conceptions. Isolated, abstract conceptions are, as pragmatists such as Rorty have argued, transcendental in nature and doomed to failure; fortunately, as the pragmatist defense of a minimalist approach shows, they are also unnecessary. Some implications of adopting a pragmatist-informed approach is that the state should give up terms and phrases that attempt to (i) construct a unifying theory for justification or for truth; (ii) construct and somehow universally justify a single best particular method for interpreting texts and analyzing scientific processes; and/or (iii) construct comprehensive and complete standards. Rather, state officials ought to identify local, situated reasons for particular policies. From these local appeals, state officials could construct a minimal set of education policies that leave room for local officials and teachers to have particular freedoms in constructing programs, projects, and curricula. I approach this argument through a critique of select education policies in Oregon, Texas, Arizona, and Tennessee. I argue that these policies, like many education policies and standards, lack adequate justifications. Those justifications that are provided are too vague and susceptible to interpretations that are not relevant to the particular purposes of the policies. For instance, certain policies have illegitimately led to the denial of funding for "Ethnic Studies" programs in Arizona, or allowed for irrelevant teacher and student criticisms of theories within the sciences to be explored and entertained as legitimate in Tennessee classrooms. My recommendations, if followed, would give state officials grounds for excluding the concerns of citizens that are not relevant to particular policies and provide a legitimate, justifiable basis for constructing state education policies. / Graduation date: 2013

Moral realism is the view that there are such things as moral facts. Moral realists have attempted to combat the skeptical problem of relativism, which is that the truth of an ethical value judgment is often, or always, subjective, that is, relative to the parties it involves. This essay presents, discusses, and criticizes Hilary Putnam’s attempt at maintaining moral realism while at the same time maintaining a degree of epistemological relativism. Putnam’s positive account originates in moral epistemology, at the heart of which lies truth, as idealized rational acceptability or truth under ideal conditions. The bridge between moral epistemology and normative ethics stems from Putnam’s disintegration of facts and values. His theory is finalized in the construction of a normative moral theory, in which the central notion is incessant self-criticism in order to maintain rationality. After presenting Putnam’s core thesis, the criticism raised by Richard Rorty, is deliberated upon. Rorty is critical of Putnam’s attempt at holding on to objectivity, because he does not understand how objective knowledge can be both relative to a conceptual scheme, and at the same time objective. The conclusion is that Putnam is unable to maintain his notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability and is forced into epistemological relativism. Putnam’s normative ethics has characteristics in common with virtue ethics, and is of much interest regardless of whether it can be grounded epistemologically or not.

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Thesis (PhD) -- University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the question of reason and rationality, as its central focus. From the perspective of the modern metaphysical tradition, this focus has developed around the theme of subjectivity in general, and the assumption of an ahistorical transcendental subject in particular. The idea of reason was thus foundational for the articulation and validation of the notions of truth and freedom. From the perspective of modernity, reason has thus been the condition of the possibility of enlightenment, freedom and moral progress. The debate between Habermas and the representatives of postmodern thinking represents the latest chapter regarding the question of reason, its limits, and its possibilities. What makes this debate particularly challenging is that Habermas, while he defends the idea of reason against its critique by the postmodernists, is actually in agreement with them in their dismissal of the tradition of metaphysical thinking. In view of his defense of the idea of reason, however, Habermas has invariably been accused of defending an outmoded and discredited form of philosophical thinking, while his opponents have generally been hailed as progressive thinkers who have succeeded in effecting a radical break with the conceptual legacy of the metaphysical tradition. In my dissertation I argue that the exact opposite position is the case, namely, that it is Habermas, and not his postmodern opponents, who has effected a radical break with metaphysical thinking. It is his ability to transform the idea of reason, from a transcendental into a postmetaphysical concept, in terms of which the question of reason and rationality, and the related ideas of truth and knowledge, are recast in fallibilistic terms, that, in my view, represents the overcoming of metaphysics. The postmodern turn, on the other hand, in view of its reluctance to consider the question of reason from an alternative model of rationality, finds itself still trapped within a form of transcendental thinking in which it seeks to enquire into the (im)possibility of reason, in the absence of a transcendental subject. In the final analysis, I argue that it is postmetaphysical rather than postmodern thinking, that offers us a practical alternative to the problematic conception of reason, bequeathed by the tradition of metaphysical thinking. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die fenomeen van die rede en die betekenis van rasionaliteit vorm tradisioneel 'n sentrale fokus van die filosofie. Vanuit die perspektief van die moderne metafisiese tradisie het hierdie fokus ontwikkel rondom die tema van subjektiwiteit in die algemeen, en die aanname van 'n a-historiese transendentele subjek in die besonder. Die rede was dus fundamenteel vir die artikulasie en legitimering van die konsepte van waarheid en vryheid. Vanuit die perspektief van moderniteit was die rede dus die voorwaarde vir die moontlikheid van verligting, vryheid, en morele vooruitgang. Die debat tussen Habermas en die verteenwoordigers van postmoderne denke verteenwoordig die mees onlangse hoofstuk van die verhaal van die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit - die beperkings daarvan, asook die moontlikhede daarvan. Hierdie debat bied besondere uitdagings omdat Habermas, terwyl hy die idee van rede verdedig teen die kritiek van die postmoderniste, eintlik met hulle saamstem vir sover hulle die tradisie van metafisiese denke verwerp. In die lig van sy verdediging van die idee van rede, is Habermas egter voortdurend daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n uitgediende en gediskrediteerde vorm van filosofiese denke bly voorstaan, terwyl sy opponente in die algemeen voorgehou is as progressiewe denkers wat suksesvol 'n radikale breuk gemaak het met die konseptuele erfenis van die metafisiese tradisie. In my dissertasie beweer ek dat die teenoorgestelde inderwaarheid die geval is, naamlik dat dit Habermas, en nie sy postmoderne opponente nie, is wat hierdie radikale breuk met metafisiese denke suksesvol uitgevoer het. Dit is sy verrnoe om die idee van die rede te transformeer vanaf 'n transendentale na 'n post- metafisiese konsep, in terme waarvan die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit, en die verwante idees van waarheid en kennis, omskep is in fallibilistiese beg rippe, wat, soos ek aantoon, 'n (die!) suksesvolle transendering van die metafisika bewerkstellig. Die postmoderne wending, aan die ander kant, in die lig van die traagheid daarvan om 'n alternatiewe en verruimde konsepsie van rasionaliteit te ontwikkel, bly vasgevang in 'n vorm van transendentele denke waarin dit probeer om ondersoek in te stel na die (on)moontlikheid van die rede ten aansien van die afwesigheid van 'n transendentele subjek. Uiteindelik beweer ek dat dit die post-metafisiese eerder as die postmoderne denke is wat aan ons 'n praktiese alternatief bied vir die problematiese konsep van die rede, soos ons dit qeerf het by die tradisie van metafisiese denke.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ROBERTO PASCHOALI.pdf: 654301 bytes, checksum: 3ee8d65e13884352a28be15bd00ca1f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-05 / The herewith study has an analitical-philosofical outline and puts the dichotomy between solidarity and objectivity under moderation, more specifically, the focus of tension between the pragmatic conception of social companionship of Richard Rorty and the representacionist one of Jürgen Habermas. The first one edifies the commitment with solidarity above any manner of rationality, sticking with being loyal to the idea that there is nothing independent of the world of the man, of his conventions and practices. The second one, according to Habermas, point of view, submits any manner of human companionship to intersubjective rational principles, which go far beyond the cognitive-instrumental aspects of the human accomplishments that are essential for the social cohesion and the settlement of a fair and equalitarian society. The study concludes that: (a) it is possible, even not giving up on rationality, to be a solidarity member in a wider and socially fair society; (b) every human society is full with latent potential wealth which is plausible of physical, symbolic and spiritual assumption; (c) the societies in which the members have a standard of living that is below the line of poverty, potential wealth only becomes plausible of assumption as long as solidarity puts aside its supporting role in relation to the objective reason / O presente estudo tem um caráter analítico-filosófico e coloca sob reflexão a dicotomia entre solidariedade e objetividade, mais especificamente o foco de tensão entre a concepção pragmática de convivência social de Richard Rorty e a representacionista de Jürgen Habermas. A primeira alça o compromisso com a solidariedade acima de qualquer forma de racionalidade, mantendo-se fiel à idéia de que não há nada que independa do mundo dos homens, de suas convenções e práticas. A segunda, de acordo com o ponto de vista de Habermas, submete qualquer forma de convívio humano a princípios racionais intersubjetivos que vão muito além dos aspectos cognitivo-instrumentais das realizações humanas essenciais para a coesão social e o estabelecimento de uma sociedade justa e igualitária. O estudo conclui que: (a) é possível, mesmo não abrindo mão da racionalidade, ser um membro solidário numa sociedade mais ampla e socialmente justa; (b) toda sociedade humana é plena de riqueza potencial latente passível de apropriação física, simbólica e espiritual; (c) nas sociedades em que pessoas vivem abaixo da linha de pobreza, a riqueza potencial só se torna passível de apropriação desde que a solidariedade deixe de lado seu papel coadjuvante em relação à razão objetivante

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

The narrative identity: Alexander Nehamas, Richard Rorty This work analyzes the problem of narrative identity developed in the works of Nehamas and Rorty. These two American philosophers work in the same – postnietzschean – paradigm. Both of them claim that the identity is not simply given to a person; rather, it is something one has to achieve if he/she wants to have one. A means both philosophers offer to such an achievement is to narrate a story about one’s person, one’s style of life and thus to create ones identity. Nehamas and Rorty assert that while creating identity one has to obey to some rules. However, the rules the philosophers announce are somewhat different. As to Nehamas, he claims that the project of the self-creation ought to be coherent and distinctive. These two criteria are to be achieved, otherwise the self-creation will fail. In addition, this project has to be accomplished in writing. Nehamas demonstrates how these criteria distinctiveness and coherence – are achieved in the writings of certain philosophers. These philosophers are Socrates, Plato, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Foucault and ultimately Nehamas himself. Nehamas suggests that all these philosophers belong to the tradition of the art of living and that all of them are primarily concerned with the projects of self-creation and self-perfection. As to Rorty, he asserts that the creator of oneself has to fulfil one major requirement. Like Nehamas, Rorty claims that the aim of self-creator, whom he... [to full text]

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.