In January 2022, violent protests and clashes broke out in Kazakhstan and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation decided to intervene. Although Russia tends to be a strong defender of Westphalian sovereignty and a frequent critic of interventions carried out by the West, this was not the first time Russia intervened in another country. During previous interventions has Russia legitimised its actions with arguments influenced by the conceptual framings ‘Responsibility to Protect’, ‘Eurasianism’, and ‘Russkiy Mir’, three concepts whichhave a central role within Russian foreign policy. The purpose with this thesis is to examine which of these three conceptual framings has been the most prominent in Russia’s discourse and legitimation of the intervention in Kazakhstan, January 2022. With an interpretivist approach, and a constructivist lens, is therefore a discourse analysis conducted to first investigate which arguments Russia has used to legitimise the intervention. Thereafter follows a discussion on which of the conceptual framings was the most prominent within the argumentation. The results show that ‘Eurasianism’ was the most prominent conceptual framing in Russia’s legitimation of the intervention, while ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and ‘Russkiy Mir’ was only prominent to a limited extent.

Introduction: In 2022 the conflict between Russia and Ukraine led Facebook to encourage a rise of hate speech and use of violence against Russian people. This led the Russian government to take measures and ban the use of western social media such as Facebook and Instagram in Russia and proclaim the Meta organization as an extremist organization. The ban caused various reactions which consequently led to a divergence in responses and opinions. Furthermore, the situation raises the question if the ban of western social media platforms is affecting Russian ICTs users' perception and political opinion. Aim: The aim of the study is to examine how the ban of western social media giants in Russia (Facebook, Instagram) affect Russian ICTs users’ attitude in the context of “critical citizen” or regime supporter. Also, the reasons why some Russians avoid western ICTs ban by using VPN and how some Russians experience ICTs censorship. A theoretical framework has been developed for the purpose to identify the different factors which might possibly lead to the emergence of “critical citizen” or pro-government citizen. Methodology: Semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect empirical data and fulfill the purpose of the thesis. Conclusion and contribution: The empirical data shows that the ban of Western ICTs (Facebook, Instagram) in Russia did not negatively affect ICTs users’ attitude toward Russian government nor encouraged an emergence of “critical citizen” rather in most cases raise an understanding and support of the ban even among those who still using Facebook and Instagram.  Findings show that VPN usage in most cases correlated with habits of preferences rather than a seeking of western political information. Furthermore, the user's perception on Facebook and Instagram censorship is more neutral/negative in context of general restriction and neutral/positive in context of Western influence resistance.

對於一個國家而言，柔性權力的重要性和剛性權力同等重要。近年來，各國紛紛加強本國的柔性權力，以吸引外國公眾前來學習和認同本國的文化。美國學者奈伊，說明文化、政治價值觀和外交政策是國家所擁有的柔性權力的資源。因此，本文以柔性權力作為出發點，連接公眾外交與文化外交，進而探討俄羅斯從蘇聯時期到後蘇時期的對外文化政策之作為。 俄羅斯的對外文化政策從美蘇冷戰時期就已經開始，然而受限於意識型態的框架之下，兩國的文化交流深受到國家領導人外交政策風格的影響。普丁上任之後，俄羅斯開始積極向外拓展對外文化政策，其欲加強俄羅斯文化在世界上的影響力並且提高外國公眾對於俄羅斯文化價值的認同。俄羅斯於海外建立「俄羅斯世界基金會」和「俄羅斯合作」等文化推廣機構，以教授俄語和俄羅斯文化為主。希望讓外國公眾以不同的面向，瞭解俄羅斯。 本文的研究發現有下列幾點：第一、儘管俄羅斯近年來積極推廣俄羅斯文化在海外的發展，但是，俄羅斯的發展重心仍是以境外俄羅斯人為主。第二、俄羅斯國家內部的人權和官僚體系的議題和對外政策的實行方針，亦會影響俄羅斯柔性權力的發展。第三、俄羅斯的對外文化政策，與他國相比，仍然是以官方主導為主。因此，除了配合國家對外文化政策以外，俄羅斯應該要多增加非政府組織參與的比例和提昇國內相關文化產業的發展。 / For one country, soft power is as important as hard power. In these years, countries are enhancing its soft power to attract foreign public to learn to these countries’ culture and identify to their countries. American scholar, Joseph Nye , once indicated that culture, politic value and foreign policy are the resources of national soft power. Therefore, this paper discusses soft power, then connecting with public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy, and further probe into foreign cultural policy from Soviet Union era to Russian period . Russia’s foreign cultural policy started from the Cold War period, however , due to the ideology , the U.S-Soviet cultural exchange was deeply affected by the leaders of two countries. After the president Putin gained the power, Russia actively expanded its foreign cultural policy overseas, it wanted to strengthen the influence of Russian culture in the world and enhance the identity of Russian cultural values toward foreign public. The Russian government has established “Russkiy mir foundation ” and “Russotrudnichestvo” overseas to teach Russian language and Russian culture . By expanding the influence of Russian culture, foreign public is able to understand Russia from different aspects. The following are the research findings in my paper: First, the Russian government has actively developed Russian culture overseas in these years, but , the Russian government still focuses on compatriot . Second , the human rights and bureaucracy issue in Russia still deeply affect the development of soft power of Russia. Third, compared to other countries, Russian government plays an important role on foreign cultural policy. Therefore , besides its official policy, Russia should encourage on participation of NGOs and increase the development of the cultural industry.