The Russian invasion of Ukraine changed the security environment of Europe overnight. This study addresses how this affected the rhetoric regarding European identity and the threats to it, in the Finnish parliament insecurity related discussions. It does this by employing the three part framework of social identity used by Brewer and Herman in their bookabout European identity. The framework contains three aspects: the composition, the content and the in-group out-group perceptions of identity. It attempts to unearth these aspects of European identity, byemploying concepts such as nested identity and the division between ethnicand cultural identity. The study presents the results of qualitative contentanalysis with quantitative elements of Finnish parliamentary sessions fromthe Spring of 2022. The study concludes that European Identity is used inthe Finnish parliament to both increase Finnish sense of security whilebuilding solidarity with Ukraine. The nature of European identity isprimarily civil and the threats towards it are also conceived as civil threats,however with the caveats that all national/political identities are a mix ofethnic and civil elements. The study also concludes that both EU andEuropean identity matter, but that European identity is more universal.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 – most of the United Nations have, in one way or another, participated in the most significant war of many decades. The war is characterized by Russia’s atrocious war crimes, illegal annexations, terror, propaganda, and complete disrespect for international law. On the other hand, the war has also been characterized by Ukrainian resilience, a united Europe, and a new dimension of intelligence gathering through social media.Due to the internet, social media, the accessibility of mobile devices, and Ukraine’s military and civilianeffort in documenting Russian equipment – its whereabouts, status, and quantity, Open-Source Intelligence possibilities have reached new levels for both professionals and amateurs. Despite these improved possibilities, gathering such a vast amount of data is still a Herculean effort.Hence, this study contributes a starting point for anyone wanting to compile equipment losses by providing a process specialized in automatic data extraction and summarization from an existing database. The database in question is the image collection from the military analysis group Oryxspioenkop. To further complement the information provided by Oryxspioenkop, the method automatically extracts and annotates dates from the images to provide a chronological order of the equipment loss as well as a graphical overview.The process shows promising results and manages to compile a large set of data, both the information provided by Oryx and the extracted dates from its imagery. Further, the automated process proves to be many times faster than its manual counterpart, showing a linear relationship between the number of images analysed and manhours saved. However, due to the limited development time – the process still has room for improvement and should be considered semi-automatic, rather than automatic. Nevertheless, thanks to the open-source design, the process can be continuously updated and modified to work with other databases, images, or the extraction of other strings of text from imagery.With the rise of competent artificial image generation models, the study also raises the question if this kind of imagery will be a reliable source in the future when studying equipment losses, or if artificial intelligence will be used as a tool of propaganda and psychological operations in wars to come. / Sedan Rysslands oprovocerade invasion av Ukraina den 24e februari 2022 – har stora delar av de Förenta nationerna engagerat sig i århundradets mest signifikanta krig. Kriget har karaktäriserats av ryska krigsbrott, olagliga annekteringar, terror, propaganda samt en total avsaknad av respekt för folkrätt. I kontrast, har kriget även karaktäriserats av Ukrainas ovillkorliga motståndskraft, ett enat Europa och en ny dimension av underrättelseinhämtning från sociala medier.Genom internet, sociala medier, tillgängligheten av mobiltelefoner och Ukrainas militära och civila ansträngning att dokumentera rysk materiel – vart den befinner sig, vilken status den har samt vilken kvantitet den finns i, har öppen underrättelseinhämtning blomstrat på både professionell och amatörnivå. Dock, på grund av den kvantitet som denna data genereras i, kräver en helhetssammanställning en oerhörd insats.Därav avser detta arbete ge en grund för sammanställning av materielförluster genom att tillhandahålla en automatiserad process för att extrahera data från en befintlig databas. Detta har exemplifierats genom att nyttja bildkollektioner från Oryxspioenkop, en grupp bestående av militäranalytiker som fokuserar på sammanställning av grafiskt material. Utöver detta så kompletterar processen befintliga data genom att inkludera datumet då materielen dokumenterats. Därigenom ges även en kronologisk ordning för förlusterna.Processen visar lovande resultat och lyckas att effektivt och träffsäkert sammanställa stora mängder data. Vidare lyckas processen att överträffa sin manuella motsvarighet och visar på ett linjärt samband mellan antalet analyserade bilder och besparade mantimmar. Dock, på grund av den korta utvecklingstiden har processen fortfarande en del utvecklingsmöjlighet och förblir semiautomatisk, snarare än automatisk. Å andra sidan, eftersom processen bygger på öppen källkod, finns fortsatt möjlighet att uppdatera och modifiera processen för att passa annat källmaterial.Slutligen, i och med den kontinuerliga utvecklingen av artificiell intelligens och artificiellt genererade bilder,lyfter studien frågan om denna typ av data kommer vara en trovärdig källa i framtida analyser av materielförluster, eller om det kommer att förvandlas till verktyg för propaganda och påverkansoperationeri ett framtida krig.

The aim of this research is to analyse the development of an EU grand strategy, using the two dominant EU powers Germany and France and their respective approach to an EU grand strategy. The importance of the EU grand strategy cannot be underestimated as it concerns the national security of all citizens in the EU. Research in this area which contributes with more findings addressing new information must be seen as urgent and relevant. While other studies have researched the development of the EU grand strategy, the recent international structural events in the form of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War have not yet been studied. The concepts that will be used are strategic culture and strategic autonomy, with the purpose to provide insights on Germany’s and France’s approach to an EU grand strategy. Strategic culture and strategic autonomy will use theoretical assumptions based on constructivism and structural realism respectively. The findings are that Germany is still a major proponent of a transatlantic EU grand strategy, while France remains supportive of a Europeanist EU grand strategy. Recent events with the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War have led to that Germany have decided to abandon its energy dependency towards Russia and significantly increase its military spend to the by NATO stipulated two percent of GDP. These events will affect the development of the EU grand strategy, but the current signs are that Germany and France will not change their approach on the EU grand strategy because of this.

The exogenous shock that Russia's invasion of Ukraine entailed brought great challenges and demands for change in companies worldwide. Governing under these conditions is not easy, nor is knowing what is actually right to do. There is research on turbulent environments and exogenous shocks, divestments, and legitimacy, but research on the interaction between these is limited. In this study, we examine how companies have responded to exogenous shocks, more specifically how Swedish MNCs have acted and communicated as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The study consists of 69 Swedish MNCs that were active in Russia pre-invasion and their communications and actions as a result of this event, with data drawn from press releases, company reports, state registers and the media. The results show that many of the examined companies have acted in a similar way and divested the Russian market, albeit with varying quickness and forcefulness, thus adopting an approach consistent with what may be considered to be a legitimate strategy, with a few exceptions where the companies' actions has not been as consistent. What this means is that despite the fact that these decisions are made by the respective company management, the measures are generally in line with each other, which may be a result of pressure from both internal and external stakeholders and society at large.

This project investigates Russian nationalist organisations during the invasion of Ukraine, to study their collective identity and practises. It features an ethnography of 26 organisations, their websites and social media. Their content is coded via a semiotic framework, categorising their symbols, images, content posted and other identity tropes. It is then analysed by applying political, sociological and communication theories. The study’s background is the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, with its dynamics of war and cultural struggle. The results are that Russian collective identities simplified their communication already by the end of March 2022, abandoning many of the tropes they initially supported, as well as their symbols, limiting themselves to attribute the label of Nazism to Ukraine and its government, avoiding the promotion of frontline volunteer activities and considering Russia’s struggle as global. Finally, most continued to evaluate the invasion of Ukraine as proceeding positively, and at the time half the organisations referred to it as special military operation.